JUDGMENT 1. By this Second Appeal, the appellants have challenged the legality & propriety of the judgment and decree dated 15.3.1993 passed by the District Judge, Raigarh, in Civil Appeal No.31A/91, reversing the judgment and decree of dismissal of civil suit by allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit dated 14.3.1991 passed by the Third Class-II, Raigarh, in Civil Suit No.69A/87. 2. The present Second Appeal is admitted for consideration on the following substantial questions of law:(i) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground that the notification published in M.P. Rajpatra dated 7.9.1989 and referred , to in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment exempted accommodations belonging to the Public Trusts from the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was applicable to the accommodation belonging to the respondent No. 1-trust? (ii) Whether, the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the aforesaid notification was retrospective in effect and also governed the pending suits and that in such a case even notice under Sec. 106 of T.P. Act was not necessary to be served on the tenant-appellant? (iii) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in decreeing the suit under Section 12 (1) (i) of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 without there being any pleading, issue and evidence? 3. As per pleadings of the parties, on 20.2.1984 suit for eviction was filed by Jama Masjid and Chhoti Masjid Trust, Raigarh through Mohd.Rahrnan against Mukundilal, father of the present appellants under Section 23-A of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act, 1961 ') in which it has been pleaded that defendant Mukundilal has constructed his house and the appellant-trust is in need of accommodation for his Imam before the Court of Third Civil Judge Class-II, Raigarh. By filing written statement, defendant Mukundlal, father of the present appellants has denied the adverse allegation made in the plaint and pleaded that he has constructed his own house, but has denied the bonafide need of the landlord. He has further pleaded that in the light of exemption under Section 3 of the Act, 1961, suit filed under the provisions of the Act, 1961 is not maintainable. He has further pleaded that in the light of exemption under Section 3 of the Act, 1961, suit filed under the provisions of the Act, 1961 is not maintainable. After providing opportunity of hearing to the parties, learned trial Court has dismissed the suit by holding that exemption granted vide Notification No. ,d 24(4)-83 - xxx II-I dated 7.9.89 was not retrospective, therefore, present appellant-trust is not exempted from filing civil suit under the Act, 1961. Judgment and decree impugned was challenged before the lower appellate Court and by allowing the appeal learned lower appellate Court has held that plaintiff appellant trust therein was entitled to file civil suit for eviction without any ground and also entitled for eviction under Section 12 (1) (i) of the Act, 1961. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment and decree impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court and records of the Courts below. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that exemption granted under Section 3 (2) of the Act, 1961 was applicable to appellant No.1-public trust, therefore, suit was not maintainable under the provisions of the Act, 1961. The plaintiff has not served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for termination of tenancy/lease; therefore, in the absence of any such notice, suit for possession without termination of lease was not maintainable. 6. Learned counsel placed reliance in the matter of Abdul Rehman Vs. Mst.Khatun1 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that the Court cannot proceed on the ground which was not in the plaint. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the judgment and decree impugned and argued that the alleged notification was not applicable to the respondent-trust who has filed the suit in the year 1984 before issuance of such notification, therefore, suit was maintainable under the Act, 1961. Learned counsel further argued that the respondent trust pleaded that Mukundlal has constructed his house which he has admitted in his written statement, therefore, defendant Mukundlal was under obligation to prove the fact that even after construction of house on his behalf, same is insufficient for residence of him and his family members. In the present case, the appellants have not proved the aforesaid fact, therefore, the respondent-trust is entitled for decree under Section 12 (1)(i) of the Act, 1961 even without framing the issue. 8. In the present case, the appellants have not proved the aforesaid fact, therefore, the respondent-trust is entitled for decree under Section 12 (1)(i) of the Act, 1961 even without framing the issue. 8. Learned counsel placed reliance in the matter of Betibai and others Vs. Nathooram and others in which the Supreme Court has held that property belonging to religious and Charitable Trust is exempted vide notification dated 79-1989 and tenancy can be determined straightway by issuing notice under S.106 of T.P.Act. Learned counsel further placed reliance in the matter of Ganpat Ram Sharma and others Vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi3 in which the Supreme Court has held that onus lies on landlord to prove and once so proved, it is for tenant to prove that accommodation is not suitable. 9. In the present case, suit was filed on 20.2.1984. The said notification under Section 3 (2) of the Act, 1961 was issued vide Notification No. ,d 24 (4)83 - xxx II-I dated 7.9.89 Notification having the force was not retrospective in nature and only it has come into force on the date of its issuance, therefore, in the present case, suit was not exempted from the provisions of the Act, 1961. It was triable under the Act, 1961. 10. In the matter of Abdul Rehman (supra), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that the parties are required to plead the fact which they want to plead and in the absence of pleading they cannot proceed. 11. In the present case, the present respondents have pleaded in para 3 of the plaint that Mukundilal has constructed his own house ( ;g fd bl chp izfroknh }kjk viuk Lo;a dk edku Hkh cuk fy;k x;k gS ). While denying the averment of the plaint, original appellant-defendant Mukundilal has specifically admitted in para 3 of the written statement that he is having his own house ( ;g Lohdkj gS fd oknxzLr edku ls yxk gqvk oknh dk Lo;a dk edku gS ). The present respondent-trust has not pleaded about the suitability of accommodation in its plaint. The original defendant Mukundilal has not made counter allegation that accommodation was not suitable for him. No issue has been framed by the trial Court. 12. The present respondent-trust has not pleaded about the suitability of accommodation in its plaint. The original defendant Mukundilal has not made counter allegation that accommodation was not suitable for him. No issue has been framed by the trial Court. 12. While dealing with the question of necessity of specific pleading and specific issue for proving the fact and contesting the claim, the Supreme Court in the matter of Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam and another (supra) has held that if the parties had understood their case and for purpose of proving and contesting implied grant, had adduced evidence, absence of any specific issue is not required. Paras 30 and 31 of the said judgment read as under: "30. The learned counsel for the appellant raised an argument that since no case was made out by the respondent -plaintiffs in their plaint about the easementary right over the B Schedule pathway by implied grant, no decree can be passed by the courts below basing their conclusion on implied grant. We have already noted the findings arrived at by the trial court, on consideration of pleadings and evidence on record on the right of easement over B Schedule pathway by implied grant. 31. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence of both the parties recorded the finding that there was no evidence on record to show that either Yogini Amma or the defendants themselves until 1982 had objected to the plaintiff's use of B schedule pathway to access A schedule property. The trial court on consideration of the plaintiff's evidence and when the defendant had failed to produce any evidence, had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was given right of easement by Yogini Amma as an easement of grant. Considering this aspect of the matter, although there is no specific issue on the question of implied grant, but as the parties have understood their case and for the purpose of proving and contesting implied grant had adduced evidence, the trial court and the High Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had acquired a right of easement in respect of B schedule pathway by way of implied grant. Such being the position, we are not in a position to upset the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below, in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India." 13. Such being the position, we are not in a position to upset the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below, in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India." 13. Both the parties have led evidence. Mohd.Rahman (PW -1) has deposed in his evidence that defendant/original respondent has constructed double storey house and is keeping hotel material in the suit accommodation. Nothing has been asked to this witness relating to construction of the house by original defendant and the tact that the original defendant is residing in his own house and was only keeping hotel material in the present house. Mohd. Rafeeq (PW-2) has also deposed the same thing. The original defendant/respondent has examined himself as witness and has admitted that he is having one house, he is residing with his four sons and they were 25 to 28 members. He has also deposed that his own house is not sufficient for their residence and he is residing in the tenanted house. He has denied the suggestion in para 6 of his cross-examination that he is not residing in the suit premises and he is only keeping hotel material in the suit accommodation. His witness Mamanchand Agrawal (D W - 2) has deposed in his evidence that the appellant is residing in the suit accommodation with his wife and his four sons are residing with their family in the house constructed by the defendant/respondent Mukundilal. Haveli Singh (DW-3) has also deposed the same thing. 14. In the present case, both the parties have made specific pleading relating to construction of the house by the appellant. As held fey the Supreme Court in the matter of Ganpat Ram Sharma and others3 (supra), the respondent was under obligation to discharge its onus relating to availability of the house to tenant and when the respondent has discharged its onus, then onus was on the original appellant to prove that accommodation was not suitable in terms of Section 12 (1) (i) of the Act, 1961. Both the parties were having knowledge of their case and they have pleaded and adduced evidence, therefore, only on the ground of non framing of issue relating to Section 12 (1) (i) of the Act, 1961, case of the plaintiff cannot be thrown and evidence and pleading of the parties cannot be discarded. 15. Both the parties were having knowledge of their case and they have pleaded and adduced evidence, therefore, only on the ground of non framing of issue relating to Section 12 (1) (i) of the Act, 1961, case of the plaintiff cannot be thrown and evidence and pleading of the parties cannot be discarded. 15. The evidence of the original appellant/defendant and his witnesses reveals that he was having his own house which was used of his four sons along with his family. The original defendant/appellant Mukundilal was residing in tenanted house along with his wife and during pendency of this appeal, he died and his legal representatives are brought on record. 16. Admittedly, as per pleadings and evidence of the respondents, they are residing in their own house. Deceased Mukundilal was residing in tenanted accommodation along with his wife. If the evidence of the appellants is considered in the light of present scenario, then it would be clear that house of the appellants are sufficient and suitable for their residence and the appellants are not in need of suit accommodation, therefore, the respondents are entitled for eviction under Section 12 (1 )(i) of the Act, 1961. 17. Consequently, substantial questions of law No.1 and 2 formulated for the decision of this appeal are decided as negative, but additional substantial question of law formulated for the decision of the appeal is decided as positive and also held that parties have understood their case and for proving the fact they have adduced evidence. On the basis of decision on the aforesaid substantial questions of law, the appeal is liable to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own cost. 18. Advocate fee as per schedule. 19. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal Dismissed.