JUDGMENT By the Court.—The respondent is the widow of the deceased Ravindra Kumar who was employed as a part time Tube-well Operator (Anshkalik Nalkoop Sahayak). She claims compassionate appointment upon the death of her husband under the U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants, Dying-in-harness Rules, 1974. 2. Our attention is invited to the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Smt. Phoola Devi, Special Appeal No. 117 of 2000 decided on 14.7.2000. Learned Coordinate Bench of this Court after considering the very issue namely ‘part time employment’ was pleased to observe as under: “A part-time tube-well operator could not be put at par with a regular Government servant. Consequently, the Government clarified that such category of persons will be entitled to the benefit of 1974 Rules in view of the Government Order dated October 26, 1998 and in view of the substantial difference in the nature of the employment of a part-time tube-well operator and a regular Government servant the provisions of 1974 Rules can have no application in such a case in State of Manipur v. Thingurjam Brojen Meetei, AIR 1996 SC 2124 , it was held that family members of a confirmed work-charged employee cannot get the benefit of dying-in-harness scheme framed by Government of Manipur. The writ petitioner, therefore could not claim compassionate appointment on the ground that she was widow of a part-time tube-well operator who died in harness.” 3. Learned counsel for respondent however draws the attention of the Court to the rules which has been framed and which are known as the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-In-Harness Rules, 1974 to the Definitions Clause more so 2(a) which reads as under: “2. Definition.—In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires- 2(a) : “Government servant” means a Government servant employed in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh, who— (i) was permanent in such employment; or (ii) though temporary had been regularly appointed in such employment; or (iii) though not regularly appointed, had put in three years continuous service in regular vacancy in such employment. Explanation.—”Regularly appointed” means appointed in accordance with the procedure laid down for recruitment to the post or service, as the case may be.” 4. It is sought to be contended by the learned counsel that an expression used there does not use the word ‘Post’. Explanation.—”Regularly appointed” means appointed in accordance with the procedure laid down for recruitment to the post or service, as the case may be.” 4. It is sought to be contended by the learned counsel that an expression used there does not use the word ‘Post’. As such this submission was not considered by the Division Bench while deciding the issue in Phoola Devi’s case (supra). 5. Our attention is also invited to the judgment of a learned Single Judge in the case of Sichai Mazdoor Sangh v. State of U.P. and others, 1996 (1) UPLBEC 9 , to contend that the learned Judge of this Court has considered the nature of the work of a Tube-Well Assistant and has held that the nature of work equal to the work done by as regular employees. 6. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge was not considering the nature of compassionate appointment and the definition clause on the issue of the principle equal pay for equal work bearing in mind the Article 13(d), Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. That judgment really would not be of any assistance. We are conscious of the fact that the Supreme Court has since discussed the aspect of public employment in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi and others, JT 2006 (4) SC 420, observed that Courts while considering the concept of equal pay for equal work have noted difference from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad-hoc basis, temporary basis or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules. 7. Though this Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of the principle, the said decisions rest on the concept of equality enshrined in the Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the Court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. In so far as equal pay is concerned that has been recognized by the Apex Court. 8. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the Court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. In so far as equal pay is concerned that has been recognized by the Apex Court. 8. The Supreme Court has now held that concept of compassionate appointment, only confers a right to apply for the post in accordance with the rules in force. The rules which are reproduced clearly set out the nature of the employment of the deceased for the purpose of considering the case of compassionate appointment. The service rendered by the employee has to be if he was permanent in such employment or temporary but had been regularly appointed in such employment and though not regularly appointed but had been put in three years continuous service in regular service in such appointment. 9. Reference to three years in the rule appears to be, that those who have been appointed against a regular vacancy or a temporary vacancy or with due procedure, and in one clause even if though he was not regularly appointed but put in three years in regular vacancy, only those class of Government employees are entitled for compassionate appointment. Thus with the conscious decision in respect of the employees who were not regularly appointed but put three years continuous service in regular vacancy, only such persons/dependents are entitled to be considered against compassionate appointment. That would exclude all other categories. 10. Considering the nature of destitution of the family members upon the death of a person who was holding a part time post or otherwise, does entail financial hardship to the family, but in our opinion it will not be possible for this Court to extend the definition as sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent. We therefore find no reason to defer with the view taken by the Division Bench in Phoola Devi’s case (supra). Accordingly the impugned order is set aside. 11. Appeal is allowed. —————