Shri Narayan Shukla,J.- 1. Heard Mr. B.R.Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Nazim Ali Siddiqui, learned counsel for opposite party No.4. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved with the order dated 5th of May, 2001, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda whereby the revision has been allowed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties. The compromise is also under challenge before this court. 3. Against the order dated 24th of October, 1997, passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Bahraich the petitioner as well as opposite party No.4 both filed revisions before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda. The petitioner filed revision on the ground that once the court below has arrived at conclusion that the petitioner is son of Sant Ram, then there is no occasion for a fresh trial to determine his status. Further the compromise as shown entered into between the parties is absolutely against the interest of the petitioner as the same has been entered into between his mother Smt. Savitri Devi and opposite party No.4. The terms of compromise itself show that it is absolutely against the interest of the petitioner (minor) by his guardian (Savitri Devi). So far as the opposite party No.4 is concerned, he is claiming his right over the land in dispute being the son of Ram Lakhan, who has been brother of Sant Ram. He claimed that Smt. Savitri Devi was wife of Radhey Shyam son of Ram Milan and the petitioner born from the wedlock of Shri Radhey Shyam and Savitri Devi, therefore, he is not son of Sant Ram and therefore, opposite party No.4 is nearest legal heir of Sant Ram to inherit his property after his death. 4. Upon perusal of the order impugned I find that the revisional court has held that the compromise was entered into before the Prescribed Officer, who has certified the same, therefore, it cannot be doubted nor can it be said as a fraudulent document. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is provided that the agreement or compromise should be lawful and an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is reads as under:- "3. Compromise of suit.-Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, (in writing and signed by the parties) or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance wherewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit): Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.) Explanation.-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 5. He further submits that under Order 32 Rule 7 it is provided that no next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. The Order 32 Rule 7 reads as under:- "7.Agreement or Compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit.- (1)No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. (1-A) An application for leave under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as the case may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor: Provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court form examining whether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor. (2)Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor." 6. He further submits that the compromise which is brought on record or order on the basis of the compromise does not reveal that it was entered into with the leave of the court. Accordingly it is voidable. He further invited the attention of this court towards the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Section 8 of which speaks regarding powers of natural guardian and reads as under:- "8.Powers of natural guardian.- (1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court,- (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor; or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority. (3)Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or by any person claiming under him. (4)No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in the case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. (4)No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in the case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. (5)The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining permission of the court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the court under section 29 of the Act, and in particular- (a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A thereof; (b) the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act; and (c) an appeal shall lie from an order of the court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that court. (6) In this section "court" means the city civil court or a district court or a court empowered under section 4A of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such court, means the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate." 7. He further submits that as is evident from the aforesaid provision the previous permission of the court is necessary. Since the compromise in question is completely disadvantageous to the petitioner, no court could grant permission to the natural guardian for such a compromise. He further submits that sub-section (3) of Section 8 speaks that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in such a manner is voidable. 8. In support of his submissions he cited the following decisions:- (1)Viswanathi versus Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mirzapur and others reported in 1983 R.D. Page 267. (2)Chandrapal versus Umrai, reported in 1981 (2) R.D. Page 298. 9. In the aforesaid cases this court held that where the compromise affects the interest of a minor or disabled person, such as a lady, blind man etc. (2)Chandrapal versus Umrai, reported in 1981 (2) R.D. Page 298. 9. In the aforesaid cases this court held that where the compromise affects the interest of a minor or disabled person, such as a lady, blind man etc. a heavy burden lies upon the courts to accept the compromise cautiously and perform its duty quite in consonance with the provisions of law. 10. He also cited the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, which reads as under:- "25. Agreement without consideration, void, unless it is in writing and registered or is a promise to compensate for something done or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law.- An agreement made without consideration is void, unless- (1) it is expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being in force for the registration of (documents), and is made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other; or unless (2) it is a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do; or unless. (3) It is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits. In any of these cases, such an agreement is a contract. Explanation 1.- Nothing in this section shall affect the validity, as between the donor and donee, of any gift actually made. Explanation 2. An agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining the question whether the consent of the promisor was freely given." 11. Explanation 2. An agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining the question whether the consent of the promisor was freely given." 11. On the other hand the learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that obtaining of permission of the District Judge is not necessary and in support of his contentions he cited two decisions, namely, (1) Maya Shanker and another versus Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported in 1984 RD page 1 & (2) Sobaran Singh and others versus Deputy Director of Consolidation, Agra and others reported in 1993 (11) LCD page 157. Upon perusal of which I find that in the case of Maya Shanker (Supra) this court has held that the provision of Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act was not to be applied to the agricultural property and no permission of the District Judge was required. Thus the sale-deed in question cannot be held to be void on the ground that no permission was taken while transferring the land in question to the opposite party No.3. 12. However, I find that the provisions of Section 32 Rule 7 the Code of Civil Procedure have not been dealt with, which requires leave of the court, before entering into any agreement or compromise on behalf of the minor. It is not in dispute that the procedure of provisions of Civil Procedure Code applies in the proceedings under U.P.C.H.Act. 13. Smt.Savitri Devi guardian of the petitioner, who has entered into compromise through the affidavit filed before the revisional court has also stated that the compromise is fraudulent one as the said compromise was not disclosed to her and it was asked by her counsel to impress the thumb thereon, but it was never disclosed to her. The opposite parties have brought on record an affidavit of her counsel, who has tried to certify the same. 14. Upon perusal of the terms of compromise, I find that the same are absolutely disadvantageous to the petitioner as from the compromise the petitioner has gained nothing. There is no permission of the court, thus it cannot be said that it was a lawful agreement entered into between the parties. 15. 14. Upon perusal of the terms of compromise, I find that the same are absolutely disadvantageous to the petitioner as from the compromise the petitioner has gained nothing. There is no permission of the court, thus it cannot be said that it was a lawful agreement entered into between the parties. 15. After going through the aforesaid provisions of the Act in the light of the facts of the present case, I arrive at conclusion that compromise entered into between the parties is not a lawful compromise, therefore, the same is hereby quashed. So far as the determination of legal heirship of deceased Sant Ram is concerned, since on this point no clear finding has been given by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and for the said purpose he has remanded the case for a fresh trial, in which I do not find error, therefore, I hereby quash the order dated 5th of May, 2001, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda by upholding the order dated 24th of October, 2000, passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Bahraich. 16. In the result the writ petition is allowed.