Chief Manager, Indian Bank v. Anil Kumar Sukhvasia
2010-05-03
H.K.RATHOD
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. K.V. Gadhia on behalf of Petitioner and learned advocate Mr. D.B. Mehta on behalf of Respondent. Learned advocate Mr. D.B. Mehta wants to place on record the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bank of Baroda Vs. Ghemarbhai Harjibhai Rabari, (2005) 10 SCC 792 2. In this matter on April 1,2008, Rule has been issued by this Court and ad-interim relief was granted, subject to compliance of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Order of this Court was challenged by the Petitioner before Division Bench (Coram: Bhagwati Prasad and D.H. Waghela, JJ.) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 533/2008, where statement of learned advocate Mr. Mehta has been recorded by Division Bench of this Court that he will not insist upon compliance of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and accordingly, Letters Patent Appeal was disposed of by this Court. 3. Today, again the same question has to be verified by this Court. It is necessary to note that this Court has passed an order on April 1, 2008, which is quoted as under: 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. K.V. Gadhia for the Petitioner and Mr. Dakshesh Mehta, learned advocate for the Respondent workman. 2. Considering the submissions made by both the learned advocates, question involved in this petition would require detailed examination, therefore, rule. Ad interim relief in terms of para 8(B) because learned advocate Mr. Gadhia for the Petitioner submits that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court at Ahmedabad has directed the Petitioner first party to absorb the second party workman from the date of order as its regular employee and, therefore, in view of that, reinstatement has not to be followed by the Petitioner bank. Terms of reference are reproduced as under: Whether Sh. Anil Kumar Sukhvasia is a workman u/s 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act? If so, whether his employment in Indian Bank from January 1, 1990 and his termination from the service of the Bank w.e.f. May 27, 1998 is legal and justified and to what relief the concerned person is entitled to and from which date? 3. Thus, as per the terms of reference, termination order was under challenge and the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court ("CGIT cum Labour Court" for short) ultimately granted the relief of absorption of the workman in the bank.
3. Thus, as per the terms of reference, termination order was under challenge and the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court ("CGIT cum Labour Court" for short) ultimately granted the relief of absorption of the workman in the bank. Therefore, if the Petitioner bank is not prepared to reinstate the workman on the same post on which he was working on May 27, 1998, then, the bank is required to pay last drawn wages to the Respondent workman because it is not mere absorption granted by the CGIT cum Labour Court but from such direction, reinstatement of the workman has to be inferred. Petitioner bank wants stay against absorption which therefore amounts to staying award of reinstatement too and, therefore, according to my opinion, Petitioner bank shall have to pay the last drawn wages to the Respondent employee if the Respondent employee has remained unemployed during the interim period from the date of award onward. Therefore, as and when the affidavit of unemployment as required u/s 17-B of the I.D. Act, 1947 is filed by the Respondent workman before this Court and copy of such affidavit is supplied by the workman to the learned advocate Mr. K.V. Gadhia on behalf of the Petitioner bank then, Petitioner bank shall have to pay the full wages last drawn by the workman from April 10, 2007 till March 31, 2008 within one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. However, it is made clear that after receiving copy of such affidavit from the workman, if the Petitioner bank is having any material and/or concrete evidence to justify and satisfy this Court that the Respondent workman has been employed in any establishment and is receiving adequate remuneration by working in such establishment, then, it will be open for the Petitioner to file appropriate application for modification of this order but so long this order exists, Petitioner shall have to regularly pay the full wages last drawn by the workman every month without interruption which was paid by the Assistant General Manager on the vouchers of the bank. 4. Notice as to interim relief returnable on May 1,2008. 4.
4. Notice as to interim relief returnable on May 1,2008. 4. The Division Bench of this Court where aforesaid order was challenged, has passed following order on September 12, 2008: Without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, learned Counsel fairly conceded that the main Special Civil Application No. 29294/2007 pending before learned single Judge was required to be expeditiously heard and disposed with the cooperation, which was assured by learned Counsel. In view of that consensus, learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Respondent would not insist upon implementation of the interim order, which is challenged in this appeal. Therefore, by consent, the Appeal is allowed on the aforesaid understanding without entering into merits with the direction that the interim order dated April 1, 2008 shall not be implemented and the parties shall cooperative in the earliest possible hearing and disposal of the main Special Civil Application pending before learned single Judge. Parties shall be at liberty to file appropriate note for earlier listing of the petition for final hearing. Civil Application No. 5943/2008 In view of disposal of the appeal today, the application does not survive and accordingly it is disposed of. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Mehta again request to this Court that if final hearing is not possible, then, reconsider even while exercised power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to grant relief u/s 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 because, without reinstatement of workman, question of absorption does not arise. He submitted that rightly or wrongly award has been passed in favour of workman, where following direction has been issued on April 30, 2007 which is quoted as under: I. Reference is partly allowed. II First party is directed to absorb the second party Shri Anikumar Sukhvasia from the date of order as its regular employee. III. Prayer of back-wages and other relief sought are not considered and second party is not entitled for the same. IV. No Costs. 6. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court has considered documents produced by workman at Exhibit-7 which was not seriously disputed by the first party witness. The Central Tribunal has considered that second party worked for (Seven) years, having good record and no blame.
IV. No Costs. 6. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court has considered documents produced by workman at Exhibit-7 which was not seriously disputed by the first party witness. The Central Tribunal has considered that second party worked for (Seven) years, having good record and no blame. So, it was admitted by the Petitioner before the Tribunal, which reveals that there was vacancy in the first party office and first party was in need of employee. Industrial dispute which has been referred for adjudication by order dated November 5, 1999, after complaint made by workman u/s 2(A) and exercise power under clause(d) of Sub-section (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The industrial dispute which was referred to Central Government Industrial Tribunal is as under: Whether Sh. Anilkumar Sukhvasia is a workman u/s 2(S) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? If so whether his employment in Indian Bank from January 1, 1990 and his termination with effect from May 27, 1998 is legal and justified and to what relief the concern person is entitled to and from which date. 7. These disputes were required to be adjudicated by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. To technical stands have been taken by the Petitioner-Bank in industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication. Question of legality and validity of termination order was also referred for adjudication. So, on the date on which dispute was raised, workman was not in service with the Bank. Central Government Industrial Tribunal came to conclusion that Anilkumar Sukhvasia is not the employee of Bank, but, second issue whether he can be absorbed, the answer was given in yes. Distinction was made that he was not a employee of the Bank because he was engaged by Assistant General Manager and he worked for 7(Seven) years as a driver for Assistant General Manager. So, these technical defects have been considered. He was appointed by Assistant General Manager; therefore, he was not employee of Bank. The discussion made by Central Tribunal in Para 10 is relevant, which is quoted as under: 10. The documents produced by the second party at Exhibit-7, are not seriously disputed by the first party's witness. In the cross witness of the first party admits that, letter at Exhibit-7(5), was written by Regional Office. He is not denying that, it was signed by Sh. V. Shrinivasan.
The documents produced by the second party at Exhibit-7, are not seriously disputed by the first party's witness. In the cross witness of the first party admits that, letter at Exhibit-7(5), was written by Regional Office. He is not denying that, it was signed by Sh. V. Shrinivasan. He admits that, letter produced at Exhibit-7(6), is written by Regional Office. He admits that, letter produced at Exhibit-7(8), referred to absorb the second party in the employment. He admits that, letter produced at Exhibit-7(10), was written by Regional Manager to the Zonal office recommending second party to absorb in the employment of the first party. He admits that, bank decides salary of the driver staffs. He has not denied that, vehicle on which second party was of the bank. He has not denied letter produced at Exhibit-7(16). He also not denying letter produced at Exhibit-7(18). He admits that, letter at Exhibit-7(19) send by Regional office to the Central office. All this correspondence brought on record by the second party reveals that, Regional Office peruse the case of absorption of second party and Central office go on refusing it on the ground that, there is no sanction. Even the work of second party is appreciated by the first party by letter dated September 30, 2005. Even he was recommended by letters dated December 9, 1994, February 1, 1995. February 10, 1995, April 22, 1995 and June 15,1995. All these reveals that, second party was competent to work. Even he worked with A.G.M. No grievance are there about the work of second party of the first party. In this scenario one as to considered whether such an honest person is not getting regularizing only because he was not appointed by the first party and it cannot be an error of the second party. Number of cases are produced by the first party's advocate more precisely case of law of Civil Appeals 3595/2006(SC) case between, Secretary State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors. and which reveals that, said case was on different footing as in that case, appointment of ad hoc employee was in dispute. But in this case, actual second party workman worked with officer of the first party and case law produce by the first party's advocate published in Bank of Baroda Vs.
v. Umadevi and Ors. and which reveals that, said case was on different footing as in that case, appointment of ad hoc employee was in dispute. But in this case, actual second party workman worked with officer of the first party and case law produce by the first party's advocate published in Bank of Baroda Vs. Ghemarbhai Harjibhai Rabari, (2005) 10 SCC 792 was on the point of demand made by the employee on completion of 240 days with employer. However, in the instant case second party is not employee of the first party and no question arises to pay by the first party. Even there is no question arises to count 240 days since he never work with the first party. 8. These details have been discussed by this Court only for the purpose of considering granting relief in favour of workman. The object of Section 17-B of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is that if employer wants to challenge the order of reinstatement to higher forum and to obtain relief against reinstatement, then, workman is entitled for the benefit of Section 17-B, if he is unemployed. Looking to the substance in which reliance was placed by Central Tribunal and also considering dispute raised by Respondent-workman and relief which has been granted by Tribunal for absorption in the Bank is amounts to reinstatement otherwise without reinstatement of Respondent, he cannot absorbed by Petitioner-Bank in service but, Bank has raised, merely raising technical contention before this Court. According to my opinion such technicalities cannot hijack divine rhythm of substantial justice. Therefore, considering the object of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in the case of AIR 1998 511 (SC) Relevant Paras are quoted as under at pp. 4, 5,6 and 8 of LLJ: 7. It would be convenient at this stage to set out the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Act which reads as under: Section 17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceeding is higher Courts.
4, 5,6 and 8 of LLJ: 7. It would be convenient at this stage to set out the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Act which reads as under: Section 17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceeding is higher Courts. - Where in any case a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceeding in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this Section for such period or part, as the case may be. The objects and reasons for enacting the said provisions were as follows: When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court of High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation of the award cause hardship to the workman concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide the payment of the wages last drawn by the workman concerned, under certain conditions, from the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court High Courts. 8. It would thus appear that the object underlying the enacting of the provisions contained in Section 17-B is to give relief to the workman in whose favour an award of reinstatement has been passed by the Labour Court and the said award is under challenge in the High Court of this Court. The said relief has been given with a view to relieve the hardship that would be caused to a workman on account of delay in implementation of the award as a result of the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or this Court.
The said relief has been given with a view to relieve the hardship that would be caused to a workman on account of delay in implementation of the award as a result of the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or this Court. The question for consideration is: what is the extent to which such relief has been granted to a workman under this provision. The objects and reason do not indicate an answer to this question and its answer has to be found in the provisions of the enactment. Since the expression "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B has been construed by the various High Court in the decisions referred to above we would briefly refer to the same. 17. In Elpro International Ltd. v. K.B. Joshi, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was dealing with the challenge to the validity of the provisions in Section 17-B on the ground that the same are vague and arbitrary inasmuch as no provisions is made as to what would happen to the amount paid if ultimately the employer succeeds and the award is quashed and set aside and are therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also urged that the said provisions encroach upon the powers of the High Court and this Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. The High Court has rejected both the contention. It was held that the absence of a provisions as to what would happen to the amount paid u/s 17-B if ultimately the employer succeeds in the litigation does not make the Section either vague or arbitrary because what is to be paid u/s 17-B is in the nature of subsistence allowance that is payable u/s 10-A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which is neither refundable nor recoverable irrespective of the result of the enquiry.
As regards challenge on the ground of encroachment upon the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, the High Court was of the view that Section 17-B only guarantees to the workman the payment of wages by the employer during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court and that too subject to the conditions laid down by the said Section and the proviso, irrespective of the result of the proceedings and it also imposes an obligation upon the workman concerned to file an affidavit before the Court stating that he has not been employed in any establishment during the pendency of the proceedings and it also absolves the employer of his obligation to pay such wages if he is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the workman had been otherwise and had been receiving adequate remuneration. The High Court has observed that Section 17-B nowhere lays down that in extreme cases it is demonstrated that award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court or the Supreme Court is deterred from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. On that view the High Court held that Section 17-B does not in any way encroach upon or override the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court Article 136 of the Constitution. 24. As regards the powers of the High Court and the Supreme Court under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution it may be stated that Section 17-B, by conferring a right on the workman to be paid the amount of full wages last drawn of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal in the High Court or the Supreme Court which amount is not refundable or recoverable in the event of the award being set aside, does not in any way preclude the High Court or the Supreme Court to pass a order directing payment of a higher amount to the workman if such higher amount is considered necessary in the interest of justice.
Such a direction would be de hors the provisions contained in Section 17-B and while giving the direction the Court may also give directions regarding refund or recovery of the excess amount in the event of the award being set aside. But we are unable to agree with the view of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd. v. KB. Joshi (supra) that in exercise of the power under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted u/s 17-B. The conferment of such a right u/s 17-B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Article 226 and 136 of the Constitution. 9. In light of this background and this Court is not having sufficient time to decide petition and legal question which are raised by the Petitioner, inside of vacation, but, this Court is also considering it necessary that in such a manner, public body cannot be permitted to deny mandatory relief which is otherwise available to concerned workman, merely a relief of absorption is granted in favour of Respondent-workman. This Court can grant same relief while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, again considering objections raised by learned advocate Mr. Gadhiya and in light of fact that petition to decide finally inside of this vacation, it is not possible, therefore, it is directed to Petitioner-Bank to pay last drawn wages to Respondent-workman with effect from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2010, subject to filing of affidavit by Respondent-workman as required u/s 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within a period of 15 days from the date of receiving a copy of this order. Copy of such affidavit of unemployment is to be supplied to the learned advocate Mr. K.V. Gadhia. 10. In respect to the case of Regional Authority, Dena Bank and Another Vs. Ghanshyam, AIR 2001 SC 2270 where Hon'ble Apex Court has considered earlier decision of Regional Authority, Dena Bank and Another Vs. Ghanshyam, AIR 2001 SC 2270 6.
Copy of such affidavit of unemployment is to be supplied to the learned advocate Mr. K.V. Gadhia. 10. In respect to the case of Regional Authority, Dena Bank and Another Vs. Ghanshyam, AIR 2001 SC 2270 where Hon'ble Apex Court has considered earlier decision of Regional Authority, Dena Bank and Another Vs. Ghanshyam, AIR 2001 SC 2270 6. Section 17-B which is inserted in the Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, reads as follows: 17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher Courts.- Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court: Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this Section for such period or part, as the case may be. 7. Section 17-B provides that where the employer prefers any proceeding against an award directing reinstatement of any workman, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court. The proviso says that if the High Court or the Supreme Court is satisfied that the workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under that Section for such period or part, as the case may be. 8.
The proviso says that if the High Court or the Supreme Court is satisfied that the workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under that Section for such period or part, as the case may be. 8. The Statement of objects and reasons for inserting the said provision indicates that when Labour Courts pass awards of reinstatement, they are often contested by employers in the Supreme Court and High Courts. To mitigate the hardship that would be caused due to delay in implementation of the award, it was proposed to provide for payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned from the date of the award till the dispute between the parties is finally decided in the High Courts or the Supreme Court. It follows that in the event of an employer not reinstating the workman and not seeking any interim relief in respect of the award directing reinstatement or the workman or in a case where the Court is not inclined to stay such award in toto the workman has two options either to initiate proceeding to enforce the award or be content with receiving the full wages last drawn by him without prejudice to the result of the proceedings preferred by the employer against the award till he is reinstated or proceedings are terminated in his favour, whichever is earlier. In Dena Bank v. Kiritkumar T. Patel (supra), this Court elucidated the expression full wages last drawn as follows: The Parliament thought it proper to limit it to the extent of the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated and therefore used the words full wages last drawn. 9. It may be noticed that Section 17-B of the Act does not preclude the High Courts or this Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution respectively from passing appropriate interlocutory orders, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the; case, in the interests of justice. (Dena Bank v. Kiritkumar T. Patel (supra)).
9. It may be noticed that Section 17-B of the Act does not preclude the High Courts or this Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution respectively from passing appropriate interlocutory orders, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the; case, in the interests of justice. (Dena Bank v. Kiritkumar T. Patel (supra)). The High Court or this Court may, while entertaining employers challenge to the award, in its discretion, in appropriate cases, stay the operation of the award in its entirety or in regard to back wages only or in regard to reinstatement without interfering with payment of back wages or on payment of wages in future irrespective of the result of the proceedings before it etc. and/or impose such conditions as to the payment of the salary as on the date of the order or a part of the back wages and its withdrawal by the workman as it may deem fit in the interests of justice. The Court may, depending on the facts of a case, direct payment of full wages last drawn u/s 17-B of the Act only by the employer to the workman. The question whether a workman is entitled to the full wages last drawn or full salary which he would be entitled to in the event of reinstatement while the award is under challenge in the High Courts or this Court depends upon the terms of the order passed by the Court, which has to be determined on interpretation of the order granting relief. 11. In labour legislation what would be approach of the High Court while considering legal rights of the employees, keeping in mind constitutional goal and philosophy to be kept in mind as recently decided by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116 Relevant observations are in Para 17, 18, 19, 36 to 43 which are quoted as under at p. 286, 287, 292, 293 of LLJ: 17.
Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116 Relevant observations are in Para 17, 18, 19, 36 to 43 which are quoted as under at p. 286, 287, 292, 293 of LLJ: 17. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" "The State of Mysore Vs. The Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 75. In Y.A. Mamarde and Nine Ors. and Ghanshyam and Others Vs. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act (Small Causes Court) Nagpur and Another, (1972) 2 SCC 108 this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: The anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be in supercession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence out a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure.
Under our present Constitution the State is now expressly directed to endeavour to secure to all workers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence out a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This Directive Principle of State Policy being conducive to the general interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour will find its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity. 19. The preamble and various Articles contained in Part IV of the Constitution promote social justice so that life of every individual becomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity. The concept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of diverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. Social justice is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived Sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation of every Section of the society. In a developing society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst to reach the ladder of justice. The philosophy of welfare State and social justice is amply reflected in large number of judgments of this Court, various High Courts, National and State Industrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, Indian Factories Act, Payment of Wages Act, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, the Employees Insurance Act, the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different States. .... 11. Therefore, it is clearly the duty of the judiciary to promote a social order in which justice, economic and political informs all the institution of the national life.
.... 11. Therefore, it is clearly the duty of the judiciary to promote a social order in which justice, economic and political informs all the institution of the national life. This was also made clear in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) by Justice Mathew at para 1728, p. 1952 and His Lordship held that the Directive Principles nevertheless are: ...fundamental in the governance of the country and all the organs of the State, including the judiciary are bound to enforce those directives. The Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixed content; most of them are mere empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content in the light of its experience. 12. In view of such clear enunciation of the legal principles, I am in clear agreement with Brother J. Singhvi that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. In doing so this Court should make an effort to protect the rights of the weaker Sections of the society in view of the clear constitutional mandate discussed above. 13. Thus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity. 14. Commenting on the importance of Article 38 in the Constitutional scheme, this Court in Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 1992 SC 999 held that equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet the most commonly acknowledged- is that there shall be not any privileged person or class and that none shall be above the law. This Court held that Article 38 contemplates an equal society (Para 10, pg. 651). In Indra Sawhney etc. etc Vs. Union of India and others, etc. etc., AIR 1993 SC 477 the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that: The content of the expression "equality before law" is illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46." (at Paras 643, pg. 633) 15.
etc., AIR 1993 SC 477 the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that: The content of the expression "equality before law" is illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46." (at Paras 643, pg. 633) 15. Therefore, the Judges of this Court are not mere phonographic recorders but are empirical social scientists and the interpreters of the social context in which they work. That is why it was said in Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and Another Vs. S. Naganatha Ayyar and Others, AIR 1979 SC 1487 while interpreting the Land Reforms Act, that beneficial construction has to be given to welfare legislation. Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Court, made it very clear that even though the judges are "constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters" they should "also be responsive to part IV of the Constitution being "one of the trinity of the nation's appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio-economic order". The Learned Judge made it very clear that when the Judges when "decode social legislation, they must be animated by a goal oriented approach" and the Learned Judge opined, and if I may say so, unerringly, that in this country "the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme." (Para 1, p. 468) 16. I am in entire agreement with the aforesaid view and I share the anxiety of my Lord Brother Justice Singhvi about a disturbing contrary trend which is discernible in recent times and which is sought to be justified in the name of globalisation and liberalisation of economy. 17. I am of the view that any attempt to dilute the constitutional imperatives in order to promote the so called trends of "Globalisation", may result in precarious consequences. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in thousands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life.
Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in thousands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Here if I may quote the immortal words of Tagore: We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariot-drive was progress, and the progress was civilization. If we ever ventured to ask "progress toward what, and progress for whom", it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path. 12. It is directed to Petitioner-Bank to pay aforesaid amount to the Respondent within a period of 15 days from the date of receiving the affidavit of unemployment from Respondent-workman. Now, the matter is adjourned for final hearing on June 21, 2010 and Registry is directed to notify this matter along with papers of Letters Patent Appeal in first board. This order passed by this Court even while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while keeping in mind object of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.