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2010 DIGILAW 2336 (PNJ)

Gurmit Singh v. State Of Punjab

2010-08-16

KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA

body2010
Judgment Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. The petitioner seeks quashing of impugned order of dismissal from service, dated 8.10.1987 (Annexure P2), passed by respondent No.4-Senior Superintendent of Police, Sangrur, order dated 26.7.1993 (Annexure P4), whereby the appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Patiala Range, Patiala, along with order dated 17.11.1993 (Annexure P5) which resulted into dismissal of the revision-cum-mercy petition, passed by the Inspector General of Police, Punjab. It has been further prayed that because of acquittal in a criminal case, the petitioner be reinstated into service. 2. The petitioner was enrolled as a Constable on 26.9.1977. Thereafter, he was promoted as a Head Constable. It is pleaded that so far as his service record is concerned, the petitioner had earned commendation certificates along with cash reward. The petitioner was named as an accused in case FIR No.100 dated 28.9.1987, registered at Police Station Tapa, under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, wherein it was stated that the petitioner was allegedly found in possession of 51 bags, each containing 48 kgs. poppy husk, along with his two co-accused. In the above said FIR, the challan against the petitioner was submitted. The petitioner was tried by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala, who vide its judgment dated 4.2.1992, acquitted the petitioner by granting benefit of doubt. 3. After registration of the case, during the pendency of the trial, the petitioner was dismissed from service by the order of Senior Superintendent of Police, Sangrur, invoking the provisions of Clause (2) (b) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In the impugned order, it was stated that the petitioner was having links with opium smugglers and was also helping them in the smuggling activities. The order further stated that these activities of the petitioner were highly prejudicial and detrimental to the police force. 4. The petitioner was the member of a disciplined force. He was involved in a case pertaining to smuggling of narcotic drugs. 5. Mr. Arihant Jain, Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, has relied upon Ashok Kumar vs. State of Punjab and Others, 1990(2) Recent Service Judgments 209 to state that before the provisions of Article 311 (2) are to be invoked under Rule 16.38 of Punjab Police Rules, the District Magistrate is to decide as to whether departmental enquiry should be held or a criminal prosecution should be launched. The second contention raised is that before that the Senior Superintendent of Police, Sangrur, had to formulate an opinion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the case. It is urged that before taking recourse to Article 311 of the Constitution of India, for dispensing with the enquiry, it is necessary that there should be material before the competent authority to come to this conclusion. Lastly, it is submitted that once the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, the termination order is liable to be set aside. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon SherGirvs. State of Punjab, (Civil Writ Petition No. 13602 of 1991, decided on 23.12.2008) and Karamjit Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (Civil Writ Petition No. 2495 of 2001, decided on 28.5.1993). 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 7. From the perusal of the facts, which have been enumerated above, the following questions arise for the consideration of this Court:- A) Whether there was a justification for the Punishing Authority to dispense with the regular enquiry by invoking Clause (2)(b) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India? B) What is the effect of acquittal of the petitioner in a criminal case especially when the acquittal has been recorded by granting benefit of doubt? A perusal of the impugned order (Annexure P2), passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Sangrur, on 8.10.1987, reveals that the Punishing Authority had recorded its satisfaction to the effect that the conduct of the petitioner was highly prejudicial and detrimental to police working as well as against the public interest. It further noticed that the retention of the Head Constable in the Police Department was not desirable in the public interest. The following portion of the order requires attention of this Court:- "...3. And whereas I am further satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry under Punjab Police Rules 16.24 against this Head Const as in such departmental enquiry if instituted the said smugglers are not likely to depose against him on account of their links with him". 8. In support of the portion of the impugned order (Annexure P2), reproduced above, Mr. 8. In support of the portion of the impugned order (Annexure P2), reproduced above, Mr. J.S. Puri, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, appearing for the respondents, has relied heavily upon the enquiry report, conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Barnala. In the enquiry report, it was stated that one accused, during the course of interrogation, had disclosed regarding the involvement of the petitioner in the crime pertaining to Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Once the officials had interrogated the accused, who also named the petitioner, they could be conveniently examined by the Enquiry Officer. Furthermore, the evidence which has been led before the Criminal Court could also be produced before the Enquiry Officer. Apparently, there was no justification to dispense with the enquiry. The reasons stated in the order are too general and vague. These allegations can be imputed to any person. It is very easy to say that the delinquent employee had links with smugglers. It is in this context, the Courts have always held that the enquiry should not be lightly dispensed with. A Division Bench of this Court in Swaran Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, 1996(3) Service Cases Today 113 has observed as under: - "...7. In regard to Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, we find that not only the impugned order does not show application of mind by the competent authority to the requirement of constitutional provision, the record produced by Shri Walia also does not contain any material showing that the competent authority was satisfied, on the basis of good and sufficient reasons, that it was not reasonably practicable to hold inquiry. It is not a case in which the respondents have come forward with a plea that holding of inquiry against the petitioners was improbable. It was not a case in which the respondents have come out with a case that the persons from whom the petitioners had extorted money would not come forward to depose against the petitioners. It is also not a case in which the respondents have placed any material before the Court to show that the petitioners had threatened any person for giving evidence against them. Thus, we do not find any ground on the basis of which the impugned order can be sustained with reference to Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution. It is also not a case in which the respondents have placed any material before the Court to show that the petitioners had threatened any person for giving evidence against them. Thus, we do not find any ground on the basis of which the impugned order can be sustained with reference to Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution. In this connection, we may refer to two recent decisions of this Court in Ex-Constable Sangram Singh vs. State of Punjab and others, 1995(4) SLR 536 and Gurdev Kaur vs. State of Punjab and others, 1995(5) SLR 610. In both the cases, the court has analysed the provision of Article 311 and has referred to the decisions in Arjun Chaubey vs. Union of India, 1984(2) SLR 16, Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 385, Chief Security Officer and others vs. Singasan Rabi Das, 1991(2) SLR 140, Kedarnath Singh vs. Union of India and others, 1984(2) SLR 347, M.K. Kunjappan vs. President of India and others, 1984(2) SLR 669, and Shri Naresh Kumar and another vs. Commissioner of Police and others, 1992(7) SLR 177, and held that unless cogent material was placed before the Court to show that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, the order of dismissal passed with preference to Article 311(2) (b) cannot be sustained. In our opinion the principle laid down in these two decision is fully applicable to the case in hand and the impugned order is liable to be declared as void". To borrow the words from the judgment of Division Bench rendered in Swaran Singhs case (supra), this Court cannot observe that any cogent material has been placed before it to say that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry. 9. Learned Single Judge of this Court in Ex-Constable Balwinder Singh vs. The State of Punjab and Others, 2003(2) Service Cases Today 137 held that when the evidence could be led in a criminal case, why that evidence could not be led in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, non holding of regular enquiry by invoking the provisions of Clause (2)(b) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India was held bad. Therefore, non holding of regular enquiry by invoking the provisions of Clause (2)(b) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India was held bad. The Honble Apex Court in Sudesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2005)11 Supreme Court Cases 525 held that an enquiry under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is a rule and dispensing with the enquiry is an exception. It was further held that the Authority, dispensing with the enquiry under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, must satisfy for reasons to be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry. The reasons stated that if departmental enquiry is instituted, the smugglers would not depose with whorh the petitioner had links is not a satisfied explanation. To rely upon the inference made by Jthis Court, it will be necessary to reproduce the following portionof the judgment rendered in Sudesh Kumars case (supra):- "...5. It is now established principle of law that an inquiry under Article 311(2) is a rule and dispensing with the inquiry is an exception. The authority dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) must satisfy for reasons to be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. A reading of the termination order by invoking Article 311(2)(b), as extracted above, would clearly show that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned as to why it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. The reasons disclosed in the termination order are that the complainant refused to name the accused out of fear of harassment; the complainant, being a foreign national, is likely to leave the country and once he left the country, it may not be reasonably practicable to bring him to the inquiry. This is no ground for dispensing with the inquiry. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by order dated 23.12.19999, the visa of the complainant was extended up to 22.12.2000. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr. Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry. 6. A reasonable opportunity of hearing enshrined in Article 311(2) of the Constitution would include an opportunity to defend himself and establish his innocence by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him and by examining the defence witnesses in his favour, if any. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr. Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry. 6. A reasonable opportunity of hearing enshrined in Article 311(2) of the Constitution would include an opportunity to defend himself and establish his innocence by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him and by examining the defence witnesses in his favour, if any. This he can do only if inquiry is held where he has been informed of the charges levelled against him. In the instant case, the mandate of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has been violated depriving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant". 10. This Court is conscious of the fact that the Honble Apex Court in Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab and Others, 1996(4) Service Cases Today 595, relying upon Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, 1985 Supplementary (2) SCR 131, has held that the satisfaction of the Punishing Authority cannot be lightly interfered and the power of the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be exercised in the manner as the Writ Court will sit over the judgment of the Punishing Authority like the Court of First Appeal. Even that being so, the legal position which emerges is that the Court should be reasonably satisfied that there was some cogent material before the Punishing Authority to dispense with the enquiry envisaged under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The words that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry must be justified by the Authority before the Court by placing some cogent material. Once the Court is satisfied that there was some material before the Disciplinary Authority it will be hesitant to apply its mind, regarding the truth and veracity of the allegations. 11. Thus, in view of the discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that the order of dismissal, passed with preference to Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India cannot be sustained, in view of the ratio of law as noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in Swaran Singhs case (supra). The impugned order dated 8.10.1987 (Annexure P2) along with subsequent orders dated 26.7.1993 (Annexure P4) and 17.11.1993 (Annexure P5), passed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, is liable to declared as void. The impugned order dated 8.10.1987 (Annexure P2) along with subsequent orders dated 26.7.1993 (Annexure P4) and 17.11.1993 (Annexure P5), passed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, is liable to declared as void. The above said view formulated by this Court is also fortified by a well reasoned judgment of this Court pronounced in Smt. Surinder KaurWd/o Sh. Labh Singh vs. State of Punjab through Director General of Police, Chandigarh, 2008(1) Service Cases Today 396. Question No.2. 12. Now it is well settled that the rules governing a criminal trial are so stringent that a delinquent official, as an accused, may get benefit of doubt and the resultant acquittal may not necessarily entitle the employee for exoneration in the departmental enquiry. A Division Bench of this Court in Krishan Chandervs. Union of India and Others, 2008(1) Service Cases Today 613 has observed as under:- "...11. In our opinion, this order did not preclude the respondents from taking departmental action. The rules governing a criminal trial are so stringent that a delinquent official as an accused may get benefit of doubt and resultant acquittal, but that necessarily may not entitle him clearance in the departmental inquiry. It is well-settled that departmental proceedings can be continued even after acquittal of the delinquent in the criminal case and the disciplinary authority can pass appropriate order on the basis of evidence produced during the inquiry. The object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender/delinquent, while the purpose of departmental proceedings is to deal with the delinquent official in such a manner as to serve as a deterrent to other employees. In criminal trial, confession made by the accused before someone or before the superior officers is inadmissible in evidence against him, which is not the case in the departmental inquiry. The strict rules of evidence and procedure do not apply in departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessarily required in order to record a conviction against the accused is also different as compared to the punishment in departmental proceedings. However, the fact remains that merely because the delinquent has been acquitted, the power of the department to continue with the departmental proceedings is not taken away or in any way fettered to proceed against the accused departmentally. However, the fact remains that merely because the delinquent has been acquitted, the power of the department to continue with the departmental proceedings is not taken away or in any way fettered to proceed against the accused departmentally. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, it has been held by the Apex Court that the report of the Inquiry Officer that the judgment of the Magistrate holding a criminal trial against a public servant could not always be regarded as binding in a departmental inquiry against that public servant was not suffering from any error. It was further held that the conclusions of the departmental officers were borne out from the evidence before them and the High Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the order either on the ground that the approach to the evidence was not consistent with the approach in a criminal case nor on the ground that the High Court would have on that evidence come to a different conclusion". In the judgment rendered in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh, (SC) 2006(2) Service Cases Today 441, the Honble Apex Court observed as under:- "...12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different. Whereas in a criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the purpose. [See Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of W.B. and Others, 2002(1) SCC 555. 13. It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has. been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed. 14. 13. It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has. been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed. 14. In Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore vs. S. Mani and Others, 2005(5) SCC 100, this Court held : "It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding upon the employer..." [See Bank of India and Another vs. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(5) SCC 762; Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Others, 2005(7) SCC 764]". Thus, an acquittal of a delinquent official ipso facto may not absolve him of undergoing disciplinary enquiry. However, where the charges were absolutely identical, ordinarily the same enquiry ought not to be resorted to. In Sham Sunder Gupta vs. State Bank of India (P&H), 1996(3) Service Cases Today 444, it was held that the employer is not barred from initiating enquiry against the delinquent employee, after his acquittal unless the Criminal Court had returned the finding that the charge levelled against the delinquent was frivolous or false. 13. In the present case, the conclusion of the judgment of acquittal reveals that the Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala, who tried the petitioner in the judgment dated 4.2.1992 (Annexure P3) had recorded acquittal of the petitioner by granting benefit of doubt. 14. Another question which arises for consideration of this Court is that where even though the acquittal has been recorded by granting benefit of doubt, whether the Court can examine the judgment of acquittal to say that even benefit of doubt meant honourable acquittal. A Division Bench of this Court in Bhag Singh vs. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2006(1) Service Cases Today 175, has held that mere mentioning of words "benefit of doubt" by the Criminal Court is not sacrosanct. That question has been left open to the discretion of the Enquiry Officer. It will be apposite here to reproduce below the relevant portion of Bhag Singhs case (supra):- "...In both the cases, he was acquitted by the Designated Court, Sangrur. That question has been left open to the discretion of the Enquiry Officer. It will be apposite here to reproduce below the relevant portion of Bhag Singhs case (supra):- "...In both the cases, he was acquitted by the Designated Court, Sangrur. In the trial held on the basis of FIR dated 10.12.1988, the trial Court, whilst acquitting the petitioner, observed as follows :- "6. In this case the charge against the accused persons is that on 10.8.88 they had assembled in the area of V. Ghabdan armed with deadly weapons and were making preparation for dacoity and they were holding meeting and talking about the same. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has repeated the words uttered by each of the accused. It cannot be believed that the secret informer heard their talks and he told the talks to the police and when I.O. came to the spot, they repeated the same utterance. It cannot be believed that accused will be holding a meeting near the main road where they can easily be spotted. There is no independent corroboration. The prosecution case rests solely on the testimony of official witnesses. The accused have been involved in two other cases as also.one u/s 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, 307/34 IPC, 397 IPC, 120-B IPC and Section 3 TADA Act and the other under Section 25 Arms Act wherein they have been acquitted today. No weapon has been shown to have been recovered from the accused in this case, nor the recovered weapons have been produced at the time of statement of I.O. or other P.W. From all this I am of the considered view that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to benefit of doubt and acquitted." Records be consigned. Pronounced Sd/- AAddl. Judge 3.6.98 Designated Court, Sangrur" FIR No. 152 was under Sections 307/34, 307, 120-B, IPC, 302/34 IPC, read with Section 3 of the TADA Act, 1987. During trial, 22 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Again the petitioner has been acquitted with the following observations:- "The prosecution case was that on 25.11.88 Varinder Singh Cashier handed over currency notes of Rs. 1.5 lac to Sh. Bharpur Singh Cashier for depositing the same at Bhawanigarh Branch of the bank. During trial, 22 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Again the petitioner has been acquitted with the following observations:- "The prosecution case was that on 25.11.88 Varinder Singh Cashier handed over currency notes of Rs. 1.5 lac to Sh. Bharpur Singh Cashier for depositing the same at Bhawanigarh Branch of the bank. Bharpur Singh Cashier alongwith Sukhdev Singh Gunman went on Scooter No. PAS 4995 for depositing the amount and when they reached near bus stop Jhuneri three Sikh gentlemen came from behind on scooter and brought near the scooter of Bharpur Singh and fired shot hitting Sukhdev Singh Gunman on right temple and when he fell down some more shots were fired. Sukhdev Singh was killed, Bhupinder Singh was injured. This Bhupinder Singh Cashier did not support the prosecution version. He is injured and star witness of the prosecution. He was declared hostile and even in his cross-examination prosecution could not bring anything in its favour. None of the remaining witnesses whose evidence has been discussed has stated that accused Bhag Singh, Mohinder Singh were involved in the crime in any manner. The witnesses even did not identify them in Court. In theses circumstances l/hold the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge to the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. The accused are, therefore, given benefit of doubt and are acquitted of the charge framed against them. They are on bail and their bail bonds are discharged. Records be consigned. Pronounced 3.6.98 Sd/-Add. Judge Designated Court, Sangrur." In both the cases, inspite of the clear observations that there was no evidence against the petitioner, the trial Court observed that the accused are given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charges framed against them. Relying on the aforesaid observation, the respondents have denied the benefit of full pay and allowances to the petitioner. In our opinion, the mere use of the expression "benefit of doubt" or "not proved beyond reasonable doubt" by the trial Court or the appellate Court, cannot be permitted to convert an acquittal on the ground of no evidence, to something less than that. The concepts of "Honourable Acquittal", "fully exonerated" or "acquitted of blame" are all unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Therefore, the term "benefit of doubt" cannot detract from the impact of the acquittal. The concepts of "Honourable Acquittal", "fully exonerated" or "acquitted of blame" are all unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Therefore, the term "benefit of doubt" cannot detract from the impact of the acquittal. A similar view has been expressed by this court in the case of Jagmohan Lal vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR (54) 1967 Punjab and Haryana 422 as follows :- "J.N. Kaushal, J.- (3)In my opinion, the relevant rule is 7.5. The heading under which this rule has been framed is "Suspension During Pendency of Criminal Proceedings etc." The rule reads like this :- "7.5 A servant of Government against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment and not allowed to draw any pay and allowances (other than any subsistence allowance that may be granted in accordance with the principle laid down in Rule 7.2) for such periods until the final termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin duty, as the case may be. An adjustment of his allowance for such period should thereafter be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of blame or (if the proceedings taken against him were for his arrest for debt), of its being proved that the officers liability arose from circumstances beyond his control or the detention being held by the competent authority to be unjustified." There is no doubt that the rule contemplates the payment of the full amount only in the event of the officer being acquitted of blame. The stand of the Government indicated in Annexure" D was in these words - ".............According to Rule 7.5 ibid full amount has to be given only if the official is acquitted of the blame. The words of blame are not redundant. As the petitioner was given benefit of doubt it cannot be said that he was acquitted of blame. The stand of the Government indicated in Annexure" D was in these words - ".............According to Rule 7.5 ibid full amount has to be given only if the official is acquitted of the blame. The words of blame are not redundant. As the petitioner was given benefit of doubt it cannot be said that he was acquitted of blame. In the circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to his full pay and allowances for the period of suspension." The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for other reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are "discharged" or "acquitted". The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted "It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal Courts as are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused." A Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (S.S. Nijjar, J.) was a member, has earlier considered the term of "benefit of doubt" in the case of Shashi Kumar vs. Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam through its Managing Director, Panchkula and Anr., 2005(1) SLR 659. It has been held as under :- "A perusal of the order passed by the respondents removing the petitioner from service shows that the respondents had passed the same basing it purely on the conviction of the petitioner. The order states that in view of the conviction, the petitioner is removed from service on account of conduct which led to his conviction. Excepting for the aforesaid sentence, the order does not elude to any circumstances which could be related to the conduct of the petitioner leading to the conviction. Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned order is liable to be quashed on this short ground as it has been passed, without taking into consideration the relevant material. In any event, the petitioner having been acquitted in appeal, the justification of the order of removal no longer existed. The High Court has ordered the acquittal of the petitioner after threadbare examination of the evidence. It has been noticed that the complainant, Puran Singh PW-8 was the owner of 8-1/2 Killas of land situated in villages Jundla. He further stated that about two years prior to the recording of the statement in Court on 5.8.1997, he had gone to the office of Vigilance Department and reported against Haryana State Electricity Board Officer Natha Ram for demanding Rs. 7500/-. This amount had been demanded for installation of new transformer as old transformer was overloaded and his tubewell meter was not functioning property. He also stated that he had earlier paid Rs. 3200/- to Natha Ram. He further stated that Junior Engineer of his feeder was Sukhbir Singh Malik. He then categorically stated that he did not know Shashi Kumar, the petitioner. It was also stated by him that the petitioner never remained Junior Engineer of his feeder. He never demanded any amount from him nor he paid any amount to him. This witness was declared hostile, but nothing useful emerged from his cross-examination. In fact in the cross-examination, he further admitted that there was a scuffle among HSEB employees and the police employees. He reiterated that he did not pay any amount to the petitioner. Therefore, the High Court concluded that according to the statement of the complainant, the petitioner did not know the complainant nor did the petitioner demanded any amount from him. Even the trap witness PW2 in the cross-examination admitted that he was an employee of the Vigilance Department, Karnal. He reiterated that he did not pay any amount to the petitioner. Therefore, the High Court concluded that according to the statement of the complainant, the petitioner did not know the complainant nor did the petitioner demanded any amount from him. Even the trap witness PW2 in the cross-examination admitted that he was an employee of the Vigilance Department, Karnal. He had remained posted as a Peon for the last 10 to 15 years at Karnal. He further admitted that he had joined 3-4 raids with the Vigilance Officer. Therefore, the High Court came to the conclusion that PW was not an independent witness as he was under the control of DSP (Vigilance). The High Court relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. J.B. Singh, 2000 Crl.L.J. 4591 wherein it has been held that an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act would not be established unless there is evidence to prove the act of demand of illegal gratification. Relying on the aforesaid ratio of law, the petitioner has been acquitted. In such circumstances, it can hardly be said that the acquittal of the petitioner is not honourable." (Emphasis supplied) The expression "honorable acquittal" has been considered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Mad. 325. In that case, Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment, observed as under :- "There is no conception like "honourable acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which say that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply." Another Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Kumar Goel vs. State of Haryana and Another, 2007(1) Service Cases Today 739, has observed that in case the Criminal Court recorded finding that there was no evidence to prove the charge of corruption against the charged employee, notwithstanding the observations as to acquittal by benefit of doubt, it will be considered as honourable acquittal. 15. In the light of the above observations, it will be necessary to examine the judgment of the Criminal Court (Annexure P3) whereby acquittal of the petitioner was recorded. The prosecution story, as set out against the petitioner, is that he along with two persons was found sitting on the gunny bags containing poppy husk. On seeing the police party, the petitioner escaped from the spot and was not apprehended. The trial Court came to a conclusion that the entire prosecution case against the petitioner was based upon the solitary testimony of Balwant Singh, Sub Inspector. The Court held that Balwant Singh, Sub Inspector was not a truthful witness. Para 7 of the judgment of acquittal (Annexure P3) reveals as under: - "...7. After going through the evidence on the record and hearing both sides, I agree with the learned defence counsel that the prosecution has ailed to prove the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As already stated, the case against the accused rests on the solitary statement of S.I. Balwant Singh. There is no corroboration to his statement Gurdeep Singh and Pritam Singh were stated to be witnesses of the alleged recovery. But Gurdeep Singh has contradicted S.I. Balwant Singh while appearing as PW2 that the accused or their deceased companion were sitting on the bags containing poppy husk when they reached there. There was no reason for him to make a false statement. He does not belong to the village of the accused and as no connection with them. He belongs rather to the village of S.I. Balwant Singh and S.I. Balwant Singh also admits this fact. There was no reason for him to make a false statement. He does not belong to the village of the accused and as no connection with them. He belongs rather to the village of S.I. Balwant Singh and S.I. Balwant Singh also admits this fact. It appears that S.I. Balwant Singh has obtained the signatures of this witness on the recovery memo Ex.Pp showing the recovery in the manner stated by him on account of his influence over this witness Gurdeep Singh who is a driver of a private jeep and belongs to his village. Therefore, the testimony of Gurdeep Singh has the ring of truth and he says that no person was near the bags when they reached there and that he did not know any of the accused before the recovery of the bags. His testimony gives a lie to the testimony of Balwant Singh that the accused and their deceased companion were sitting on the bags and that they ran away on seeing the police officials. 16. Furthermore, the Criminal Court held that the prosecution version set out against the petitionerwas unnatural, improbable and unconvincing. The fact that the petitioner had escaped in the presence of 20-25 police officials, who had reached the spot, in three vehicles, was not held reliable. It was observed in para 8 of the judgment (Annexure P3) as under: - "...8. Even otherwise, the prosecution version that the accused had run away on seeing the police officials does not appeal to reason Police officials had reached the spot in three vehicles. They were 20/25 persons in all. According to Balwant Singh they had also chased the persons who were sitting on the bags. It is difficult to believe that if anybody was sitting on the bags at the relevant time so many police officials having three vehicles with them could have allowed him or them to run away from the spot. Therefore, the prosecution version is quite unnatural". 17. Furthermore, the Court gave a categoric finding that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the accused who had run away from the spot. A detailed discussion has been made in para 9 of the judgment (Annexure P3) to conclude that the identity of the persons, who ran away from the spot on seeing the police officials, has not been satisfactorily established. 18. A detailed discussion has been made in para 9 of the judgment (Annexure P3) to conclude that the identity of the persons, who ran away from the spot on seeing the police officials, has not been satisfactorily established. 18. Once the solitary prosecution witness was held not to be truthful, the prosecution version was discarded being unnatural and it was held that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the accused as the person, who was present at the spot, even though in the conclusion, persons acquittal has been recorded by giving benefit of doubt, it cannot be said that acquittal of the petitionerwas not honourable. Thus, even though the words "benefit of doubt" has been used, the petitioners acquittal was due to prosecutions failure to prove the case against him. 19. Having said that the Punishing Authority was not justified in dispensing with the enquiry by invoking Clause (2)(b) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the acquittal of the petitioner was on merits and was not the result of benefit of doubt, this Court has to ponder as to what relief the petitioner is entitled to, after he was acquitted in a case registered against him in the year 1987. This Court is also conscious of the fact that the impugned order (Annexure P2), whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service, was passed on 8.10.1987. A long period of 23 years are going to elapse. The petitioner, by now, may have attained the age of superannuation or may be on the verge of superannuation. Holding of a de novo enquiry, at this stage, may not serve the ends of justice as the acquittal of the petitioner, as held earlier, was on its merits and not by grant of benefit of doubt. 20. In view of the discussion made above, this Court has already held the impugned order dated 8.10.1987 (Annexure P2) along with subsequent orders dated 26.7.1993 (Annexure P4) and 17.11.1993 (Annexure P5), passed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, as illegal. However, this shall not prevent the respondents from passing an order afresh, in accordance with the provisions of iaw taking into consideration observations made in this judgment. However, this shall not prevent the respondents from passing an order afresh, in accordance with the provisions of iaw taking into consideration observations made in this judgment. Since the petitioner has not discharged his duties, during the intervening period, the maxim of "No Work No Pay" shall apply and he shall not be entitled to any monetary benefits in the form of back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of passing of this order. However, the petitioner shall be entitled to retiral benefits in case the respondents opt to reinstate the petitioner into service. With the observations made above, the present writ petition is disposed of.