Judgment :- M. SATHYANARAYANAN,J The present application is filed to review the order dated 27.06.2008 passed in W.A.No.875 of 2006, under which, the order dismissing W.P.No.19355 of 2006 filed by the petitioner herein, came to be confirmed. 2. The facts in brief for the disposal of this review application are as follows: (i) The petitioner joined the Dr.M.G.R Film and Television Institute, to undergo D.F.Tech and Direction and Screenplay Writing (D.S.P.W). The petitioner passed the first year examination and according to her, she stood first in the examination. The petitioner continued the second year Diploma Course from June 2005. (ii) The petitioners husband namely Tr.P.Velmurugan is employed as a Demonstrator in the Television Production Department of the respondent Institute. According to the petitioner, several writ petitions were filed against the Principal of the Institute levelling serious allegations of mismanagement and maladministration. The Principal has also acted malafidely against some of the staff of the Film Institute including the petitioners husband. Since the petitioner happened to be the wife of the said P.Velmurugan, the Principal started harassing her. (iii) It is the case of the petitioner in the writ petition that inspite of she was regular in attendance for second year, she was marked absent for many days. The petitioner despite in family way, was attending the classes regularly upto 16.09.2005. On 17.09.2005, she got admitted in the Hospital and on 19.09.2005, she delivered a baby through caesarian operation. Inspite of medical advice, the petitioner was forced to attend the classes of second year from 110. 2005 and inspite of such a handicap, the petitioner was attending the classes regularly.. The petitioner made a request to the first respondent herein to grant maternity leave. The request made by the petitioner for maternity leave was rejected by the first respondent on 20.12.2005. (iv) The first respondent has informed that the petitioner was lacking in attendance and in this regard, the petitioner sent a letter dated 212. 2005 stating that she had attended the classes regularly and therefore, there cannot be any shortage of attendance. The petitioner also requested the first respondent to furnish the details regarding the days of absence of the petitioner. The first respondent inspite of receipt of the said letter, has failed to respond to the same and also refused to accept the examination fees. The petitioner also requested the first respondent to furnish the details regarding the days of absence of the petitioner. The first respondent inspite of receipt of the said letter, has failed to respond to the same and also refused to accept the examination fees. Hence, the petitioner was constrained to file a writ petition in W.P.No.2201 of 2006 for a Writ of Mandamus directing the first respondent to furnish the details regarding the number of working days and the number of days on which the petitioner attended the classes. A Miscellaneous Petition was also filed praying for a direction directing the first respondent to accept the examination fee paid by the petitioner for the academic year 2005 - 2006. (v) The first respondent herein refused to provide the petitioner with hall ticket and hence, the petitioner filed another writ petition in W.P.No.10265 of 2006 for direction directing the first respondent to issue the hall ticket to her, so as to enable her to sit for examination for the second year. This Court vide order dated 12.04.2006, has issued the directions as prayed for by the petitioner. After summer holidays, the Institute was opened on 15.06.2006 and the petitioner went there to attend the classes. However, she was informed that her name does not find place on the rolls of the third year students. The first respondent also refused to receive the Tuition fees for the third year. Therefore, the petitioner filed W.P.No.19355 of 2006 for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents herein to permit the petitioner to continue her third year Diploma Course in Direction and Screenplay Writing for the academic year 2006 -2007 as a regular student in the first respondent Institute. (vi) The said writ petition came up for admission on 30.06.2006 and this Court passed orders on the same date dismissing the writ petition by the following order: “4. The requirement of attendance is fixed by the College depending on the course of study. It appears that in this case most of the training is practical training and therefore if the student is absent then his/her training will not be completed. The typed set of papers produced by the respondents would show that the petitioner has been lacking in attendance continuously over a period of years. In fact, in some months the petitioner has only 41.4% attendance. The typed set of papers produced by the respondents would show that the petitioner has been lacking in attendance continuously over a period of years. In fact, in some months the petitioner has only 41.4% attendance. When the Rules are clear that condonation can be done only up to 5% and a minimum of 75% is mandatory for a student to write his/her examination, we cannot issue a order contrary to the Rules. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected WPMPs are closed.” (vii) The petitioner aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition at the admission stage, preferred a writ appeal in W.A.No.875 of 2006 and the writ appeal was also dismissed on 13.07.2006. (viii) The petitioner filed Review Application No.99 of 2006 stating that due to advanced stage of pregnancy followed by a caesarian operation, she was not able to attend the classes and hence, such period has to be exempted for computation for minimum requirement of attendance. It is further contended by the review petitioner in the said review petition that the first respondent has conducted classes for the second year for 1568 hours instead of 1280 hours as stipulated in the syllabus and if the total number of hours had been taken as 1280 hours as stipulated in the syllabus, the petitioner had fulfilled the requisite attendance of 83% as against the requisite attendance of 75%. (ix) The first respondent has filed the counter affidavit in the review application interalia stating that the petitioner is running a Video Institute named as “Chennai Film Industrial School” and she is the Correspondent of the above school. The petitioner was frequently absenting herself from the classes and she was irregular from the beginning of the academic year. As regards the maternity leave, it is contended that she is not entitled for any maternity leave. The Director of Technical Education, vide their letter dated 111. 2005 has also clarified that 75% of the attendance is compulsory for Diploma Students and if there is any shortage of attendance, they can continue the course in the next year and this fact also informed to the petitioner vide letter dated 20.12.2005. (x) As regards the attendance, it is averred in the counter that the first respondent Institute conducted 1568 periods equivalent to 1339 clock hours and the review petitioner has attended only 1062 periods or classes equivalent to 909 clock hours. (x) As regards the attendance, it is averred in the counter that the first respondent Institute conducted 1568 periods equivalent to 1339 clock hours and the review petitioner has attended only 1062 periods or classes equivalent to 909 clock hours. Total clock hours of the classes work out to 196 x 6 Hours.50 Minutes i.e. 1339.20 Minutes only as against the syllabus of 1280 hours prescribed. Thus, 60 extra clock hours were conducted by the first respondent Institute. It is further stated in the counter that the petitioner has not secured 80% of the attendance right from the beginning of the academic year and it was also displayed in the Notice Board and intimation letters to the parents of the students who lack attendance, were also sent periodically. The petitioner was also requested to improve her attendance, but she never turned up and she did not have the courtesy to explain about the shortage of attendance. In fact, the petitioners husband also took the classes and the petitioner was absent and her absence was marked correctly by her husband. (xi) The first respondent also placed reliance upon Article 3.2 and 3.3 of the Board of Studies and Examination Handbook, wherein the guidelines have been issued, which are extracted below: “3.2 Requirements to appear for Examinations: The Examinations will be conducted at the end of the year for the first year subjects and at the end of each semester for semester subjects by the Board of Examinations. A candidate will be permitted to appear for the Boards Examinations, only if: (i) he/she secures 80% attendance in the year/semester concerned. (ii) he/she earns a progress certificate from the head of the institution for satisfactorily completing the course of study as required by the regulations, and (iii) his/her conduct was satisfactory during the course of study. 3.3 Condonation of Attendance: The minimum overall percentage of attendance (in all subjects of the current semester/year put together) required for a candidate to become eligible to write the Boards Examination is 80%. Under extraordinary circumstances, if there exist genuine and valid reasons, the Principal of the college has been empowered by the Chairman, to condone upto a maximum of 5% shortage to a candidate, subject to the condition that he/she satisfies all the other requirements to appear for the Boards Examination. Under extraordinary circumstances, if there exist genuine and valid reasons, the Principal of the college has been empowered by the Chairman, to condone upto a maximum of 5% shortage to a candidate, subject to the condition that he/she satisfies all the other requirements to appear for the Boards Examination. Under no circumstances a candidate with attendance less than 75% be permitted to write the Boards Examination. The condonement of 5% shortage shall not be done as a routine to all candidates, but only for genuine cases; it shall not be claimed as a matter of right by all candidates.” (xii) Thefirst respondent has also furnished the full details of the attendance of the petitioner and they are extracted below: Classes attended by Applicant Class Hours Clock Hours During Weeks Days - 982 Class Hrs. 838 Hrs.50 Min.(838.80 Hrs.) During Saturdays - 80 Class Hrs. 68 Hrs.20 Min. 1062 Class Hrs. 907 Hrs.10 Min. Considering Classes conducted on 1062 Weeks Days and Saturdays = ------- x 100 1568 & Classes attended on Weeks Days & Saturdays = 67.73% (xiii) Assuming evenif the 18 days is taken into petitioners overall attendance, the petitioner will not secure 80% of attendance as seen from the following:- Total number of hours attended by Class Hours Clock Hours the petitioner 1062 907.125 Total number of hours for 18 days 144 123.00 Total 1206 1030.125 PERCENTAGE OF ATTENDANCE = 1030.125 ---------- = 76.91% 1339.33 (xiv) According to the first respondent, the petitioner had put up 76.91% which is far below of the minimum attendance of 80% for the second year classes. Therefore, the first respondent prayed for the dismissal of the review petition. (xv) Review Application No.99 of 2006 was taken up for final disposal by the Division Bench of this Court and the attention of this Court was drawn to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kavitha Rajagopal Vs. The Registrar, the Tamil Nadu Dr.Ambedkar Law University, reported in 2008(1) CTC 374. The Division Bench of this Court by taking into account the said judgment has allowed the review application and directed the Registry to post the writ appeal for hearing before the Division Bench presided over by the Honourable Mr.Justice P.K.MISRA. (xvi) W.A.No.875 of 2006 was taken up for final disposal by the Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (M.SATHYANARAYANAN,J) was a member. (xvi) W.A.No.875 of 2006 was taken up for final disposal by the Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us (M.SATHYANARAYANAN,J) was a member. The Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 27.06.2008 has dismissed the writ appeal holding that the applicability of the benefits conferred under the Maternity Benefits Act to the Educational Institutions, is essentially a policy decision taken either by the State Government or the Central Government. It has been further held that even assuming that such provisions can be made applicable to the petitioner, the petitioner was short in attendance and even if the period of 18 days is included, the percentage of attendance of the petitioner would work out to around 71%, whereas the minimum requirement is 80% with the provision of condonation of delay up to 5%. (xvii) The petitioner has filed the present review application on 27.08.2008 along with the application for condonation of delay and the same was ordered. The review application was taken up on file for final disposal. (xviii) In the grounds of review, the petitioner contended that 18 workings days where the petitioner attended the classes partially, should have been taken into account as full attendance, then the attendance of the petitioner would come within the condonation limit. (xix) M.P.No.1 of 2009 filed by the petitioner on 12. 2009 raising additional grounds stating that she obtained information from the first respondent as well as the Director of Technical Education under the Right to Information Act, is ordered. In the additional grounds, the petitioner raised the following grounds: “D)The Directorate of Technical Education Rules only states that 35 hours has to function in a week with 5 working days. The total course duration program is classified as 14 weeks for theory and 2 weeks for practical examination. All put together the total working hours for an academic year is 1120 as per the Directorate of Technical Education Rules. The calculation of attendance has to be derived taking into account these working hours as stipulated by this Directorate of Technical Education Rules. This rule was not known to me at the time of arguing the writ petition. This rule was not applied in my case. E)Even as per the Syllabus rules of respondent Institute, the total working hours are 8 in a day. The respondents Institute worked for 32 weeks with 5 working days in a week. This rule was not known to me at the time of arguing the writ petition. This rule was not applied in my case. E)Even as per the Syllabus rules of respondent Institute, the total working hours are 8 in a day. The respondents Institute worked for 32 weeks with 5 working days in a week. All put together the total working hours in a year is 1280 hours. For attendance calculation purposes these working hours has to be taken into account. If this is adopted, the petitioner would get 82.9 % of attendance for the second year which is much more than requirement. This information was provided by the Directorate of Technical Education for a query under RTI Act. These data were not within the knowledge of the petitioner when the writ petition was disposed. Therefore, the petitioner was not able to bring this to the knowledge of this Honourable Court. F)As per the Rules of Directorate of Technical Education, the attendance register of every month has to be counter signed by the students. In this instant case, if the respondent Institute produced that ledger, it will reflect the real attendance of mine. This was not produced by the respondents institute during the hearing of writ petition or writ appeal. G)The attendance registers were tampered with and they were not maintained in the order of in the manner required.” (xx) It is further contended by the petitioner that the first respondent has deliberately mislead the Court to pass an erroneous order and therefore, the order dated 27.06.2008 passed in W.A.No.875 of 2006, is to be reviewed. 3. Heard the submissions of Mr.P.T.Perumal, learned Counsel for the review petitioner and Mr.G.Sankaran, learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents. 4. Thelearned Counsel for the petitioner has filed nine typed sets running to several hundred pages and on behalf of the respondents, a typed set was filed containing sixteen documents. 5. In Parsion Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others reported in (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 715, the scope of the review has been considered and it has been held as follows: “Under Order 47,Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” 6. In State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4294, the issue for consideration was whether a Tribunal established under Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act can review its decision on the basis of the subsequent order/decision/judgment by a co-ordinate or larger bench of Tribunal or of superior Court or on the basis of subsequent event/development. The Honourable Supreme Court in the said decision, has considered number of judgments holding that allowing the review petition by the Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and culled out the principles from the said judgments, which are extracted below: “28. The principles which can be culled out from the above-noted judgments are : .(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a Civil Court under Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC. .(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47, Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression"any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47, Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. .(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). .(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. .(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). .(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. .(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the Tribunal or of a superior Court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Merediscovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier.” 7. TheHonourable Supreme Court in the said decision, opined that neither of the grounds set out in the Review Petition warranted exercise of power by the Tribunal under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and held that the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by entertaining and allowing the review petition filed by the respondents. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State of West Bengal was allowed and the orders passed in the review application was set aside. 8. Keeping the ratio laid down in the said decision in mind, we have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents and also perused the materials available on record. 9. A perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent in Review Application No.99 of 2006, would reveal that the review petitioner has raised the very same grounds and each and every point raised by the review petitioner was met by the first respondent in the said counter. 10. 9. A perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent in Review Application No.99 of 2006, would reveal that the review petitioner has raised the very same grounds and each and every point raised by the review petitioner was met by the first respondent in the said counter. 10. From the voluminous typed set of documents filed by the petitioner we have noticed that the Review-Petitioner filed number of applications under the Right to Information Act to the first respondent as well as to the Director of Technical Education and grounds are sought to be raised on the premise of those information obtained from various institutions like Anna University, Government Polytechnic College, Coimbatiore and contending that Rules applicable to other Institutes are one and the same. 11. The Director of Technical Education vide letter in 52901/M-1/2006, dated 31.05.2007, has informed the petitioner that the first respondent Institute does not come under the purview of the Director of Technical Education and hence, the procedure adopted by the Institute with regard to the standard of attendance cannot come under their control. It is further stated in the letter that inspite of repeated communications sent to the petitioner, she was going on filing applications under the Right to Information Act and consequently, the staff employed therein were put to great stress. The petitioner was also advised to contact the first respondent Institute in future if she required any further particulars. we are of the view that MGR Film and TV Institute does not fall under Directorate of Technical Education and the petitioner cannot invoke the rules and procedure prevalent in other Technical Institutes. 12. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that partial attendance is also to be taken as full attendance and in that event, the petitioner fulfils the minimum requirement of 80% of attendance. 13. The petitioner has also given a memo of calculation regarding attendance for class hours as well as for clock hours and it is extracted below: Total No. of days: Fully Present : 121 Partially Present: 18 Maternity Period: 18 157 days 157 X 8 periods= 1256 class hours. 13. The petitioner has also given a memo of calculation regarding attendance for class hours as well as for clock hours and it is extracted below: Total No. of days: Fully Present : 121 Partially Present: 18 Maternity Period: 18 157 days 157 X 8 periods= 1256 class hours. 1256 = -------- X 100% 1568 = 80.10 % Total Hours: 196 X 410 ------------- = 1339 60 Attended + Maternity Leave: 121 X 410 -------------- = 826.83 60 18 X 410 ------------ = 123.00 60 18 X 410 123.00 ------------ = ---------- 60 1072.83 1072.83 ----------- X 100 = 80.05% 1339 14. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader has also furnished the method of calculation of attendance done by the first respondent Institute and the same is extracted below: "Method of Calculation of Attendance (DTE Lr.No.52901/M1/2006, dated 02.01.2007). Classes Attended by Applicant During Weeks Days- 982 Class Hrs. - 838 Hrs.50Min.(838.50Hrs.) During Saturdays - 80 Class Hrs. - 68 Hrs.20Min. ------------------------------------------------- 1062 Class Hrs. -907 Hrs.10 Min.(907.10Hrs.) ------------------- Considering Classes conducted on Week Days & Saturdays 1062 = ------X 100 1568 & Classes attended on Week Days & Saturdays = 67.73% Benefit of the applicant Even if these 18 days are accounted for and considered in her favour, her percentage of attendance i.e. 121days + 18 days Totalling 139 days works out as follows: Class Hours Total No. of days conducted: 196 days x 8 periods = 1568 class hours Total No. of Days Present: 121 days + 18 “ 139 days x 8 periods = 1112 class hours 1112 = -------x100 = 70.91% 1568 Clock Hours Total No. of days conducted: 196 days in Clock Hours 196x410 ---------- = 1339.33 60 121 days = 826.83 18 days = 123.00 949.83 (or) 950.23 950.23 ---------- x 100 = 70.94% 1339.33 15. It is submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that even if the period of 18 days treated as maternity leave, still the petitioner has not secured 80% of the attendance. It is further submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that partial presence of the applicant for 18 days cannot be taken as attendance for full day. 16. It is submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that even if the period of 18 days treated as maternity leave, still the petitioner has not secured 80% of the attendance. It is further submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that partial presence of the applicant for 18 days cannot be taken as attendance for full day. 16. We, on a careful consideration and appreciation of entire materials available on record, find that all these points have been urged by the review petitioner even at the time of earlier review application in Review Application No.99 of 2006 and the first respondent has filed a detailed counter denying each and every one of the allegations. The facts urged by the review petitioner are seriously disputed by the first respondent. 17. It is trite law that an error of procedure apparent on the face of the record, must be one which strikes one on merely looking at the record and which would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on a point where there may conceivably be two opinions. 18. Observing that power of review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction, in AIR 1963 SC 1909 [Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab], the Supreme Court held that "power of review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. This decision indicates that the Courts power of review while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice". 19. Inexercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, discussed the law laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court and observed that "Review can be allowed only on (1) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review, or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or (2) when some mistake or error on the face of record is found, or (3) on any analogous ground. But review is not permissible on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits as the same would be the province of an Appellate Court." 20. But review is not permissible on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits as the same would be the province of an Appellate Court." 20. In AIR 1964 SC 1372 [Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh], the Supreme Court held that "the distinction between an erroneous decision and a decision which can be characterised a vitiated by errors apparent is brought out. "where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." W do not find any error apparent on the face of record to review the earlier order. 21. Review cannot be sought to supplement the evidence or to entertain the new evidence. It is also settled position of law that the party is not entitled to seek a review or an order/judgment, merely for the purpose of a re-hearing and fresh decision of the case. The Review Petitioner has not established that why she did not raise those grounds in the writ petition or writ appeal. The normal principle is that an order/judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. The said ratio has been laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1965 SC 845 . 22. We find that the petitioner at the time of filing the review application on 27.08.2008 has not raised any new ground and only on 12. 2009, has filed M.P.No.1 of 2009 to raise additional grounds. Even in the additional grounds, no new points were urged. As already stated above, the counter affidavit of the first respondent in Review Application No.99 of 2006 had extensively dealt with each and every point urged by the petitioner. 23. The Division Bench of this Court while dismissing W.A.No.875 of 2006 earlier, has also considered the entire points urged by the petitioner. 24. We find that the petitioner under the guise of review, requires this Court to rehear the writ appeal afresh which is not permissible under law. 25. 23. The Division Bench of this Court while dismissing W.A.No.875 of 2006 earlier, has also considered the entire points urged by the petitioner. 24. We find that the petitioner under the guise of review, requires this Court to rehear the writ appeal afresh which is not permissible under law. 25. In our considered opinion, there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the order passed in W.A.No.875 of 2006. The present review application lacks merit and substance. 26. Therefore, the review application is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2009 is closed.