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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 237 (MP)

Ramshree v. State of M. P.

2010-02-25

S.K.GANGELE, S.S.DWIVEDI

body2010
Judgment ( 1. ) Heard. ( 2. ) The appellant has filed this appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19/11/2009, passed in W.P.No. 4045/07. ( 3. ) The respondent No. 4 filed a petition before this Court challenging her order of termination of service on 1.6.2000. She pleaded in the petition that she was appointed as Anganwadi worker vide order dated 3.1.1992 by the Project Officer Integrated Child Development Project, Kelaras, District Shivpuri. Initially, the respondent was appointed at Kenwaya and thereafter she was shifted at Anganwadi Centre, Kherona. She continued in service upto the year of 2000 and thereafter vide order dated 1.6.2000, her appointment was terminated without giving any opportunity of hearing or conducting any enquiry. The respondent further submitted that one Smt. Kamlesh filed a petition before this Court challenging her termination of her service as Anganwadi worker without giving any opportunity of hearing or conducting any enquiry. This Court allowed the petition vide order dated 16.5.2005 passed in writ petition No. 104/203. The respondent further contended that because the order of termination was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing when conducing enquiry, hence, the order of termination was illegal. In the aforesaid writ petition the appellant resisted the claim of the respondent No. 4/original petitioner on the ground that the respondent No. 4 filed the writ petition after a period of seven years, hence, there was delay and laches on the part of the respondent. It was further contended that meanwhile the respondents also elected Panch of the Gram Panchayat. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent vide impugned order on the ground that the service of the respondent was terminated without conducting any enquiry or giving any opportunity of hearing, hence, the order of termination was bad in law. The learned Single Judge further observed that a similar petition W.P.No. 104/2003 has been allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, hence, the petition of the respondent also deserve to be allowed. On the basis of aforesaid findings, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition of the answering respondent. ( 4. The learned Single Judge further observed that a similar petition W.P.No. 104/2003 has been allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, hence, the petition of the respondent also deserve to be allowed. On the basis of aforesaid findings, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition of the answering respondent. ( 4. ) From the facts of the case, it is clear that the service of the respondent No. 4 from the post of Anganwadi Worker was terminated vide order dated 1/6/2000 and she filed the petition before the High Court in the year 2007 challenging the order of termination, nearly after a period of seven years. Although she explained the reason of delay in filing the petition that another petition of similarly situated employee against the order of termination was allowed by the High Court, hence, the petition of the original petitioner-respondent No. 4 be also allowed. ( 5. ) It is an undisputed fact that the respondent No. 4 filed the petition before the Court after a period of seven years. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council and another v. Sristidhar Biswas and others, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 , has held as under with regard to delay and laches :- "9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the person who had not approached the Court in time and waited for the result of the decision of other cases cannot stand to benefit. The Court only gives to benefit to the persons who are vigilant about their rights and not who sit on the fence. Mallick case was decided in 1987; in 1989 Dibakar Pal filed the petition and thereafter, petition filed by Dibakar Pal challenging the Panel of 1980 was hopelessly belated. Likewise, the present writ petition filed by the respondents herein. The explanation that the respondent waited for the judgment in Sirazul Haque Mallick case or Dibakar Pal is hardly relevant. 10. In this connection, learned counsel invited our attention to a recent decision of this Court in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh. In that case, referring to various decisions of this Court, it was observed that those who sit on the fence and wait for a favourable order and there after wake up to take up the matter, are not entitled to any relief. In that case, referring to various decisions of this Court, it was observed that those who sit on the fence and wait for a favourable order and there after wake up to take up the matter, are not entitled to any relief. In Para 13 of the judgment, this Court concluded as follows: (SCC p. 471) " 13. In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondent are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petition as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provision of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely required the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the Court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?" 11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the Court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the Court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matter of granting relief and Courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant about their rights. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the Court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matter of granting relief and Courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant about their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced." The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and another v. Jabar Singh and others, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 112, has held as under with regard to delay and laches :- "43. We are unable to countenance the above submission of Mr. Mehta and Mr. Sangal insofar is it relates to the non-maintainability of the writ petition and the delay and laches. It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraph supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the laches. We have already referred to the decision of this Court in U.P State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey. This Court speaking through Arijit Pasayat, J. has held in categorical terms that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out." ( 6. ) As per the principle of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court even some order has been passed in favour of a person, another person could not be permitted to get the relief after a long delay from the Court. The Court has specifically observed that the Court grants benefits to the persons, who are vigilant about their rights and not who sits on the fence". Looking to the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, in our opinion, no relief could be granted in favour of the answering respondent No. 4 on the ground of delay and laches. Looking to the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, in our opinion, no relief could be granted in favour of the answering respondent No. 4 on the ground of delay and laches. The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi reported in AIR 1996 SC 2520 ,which has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 is distinguishable on facts and it is not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. ( 7. ) Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. No order as to costs.