Judgment : 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for Rl and the learned counsel appearing for R2. 2. The writ petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India to issue a writ of certiorari, calling for the records pertaining to the proceeding of the first respondent herein in Na.Ka.Aa. 9/74569/2004 dated 30.5.2006 and signed by him on 15.6.2006 and thereby quash the same. 3. As per the case of the petitioner, there was a dispute between the petitioners and the second respondent, the property in Survey No. 194/1 an extent of 10 cents in Veeramur Village, Villupuram Taluk. A suit was filed by the second respondent in O.S. No. 13 of 2002 on the file of Additional District Munsif, Villupuram against the first petitioner herein for declaration of title and permanent injunction. However, the suit was dismissed by the court below, by judgment and decree dated 8.10.2003. 4. In the affidavit, the first petitioner has specifically stated that appeal was preferred by the second respondent in A.S. No. 30 of 2005 on the file of the Principal District judge, Villupuram and subsequently, however, the appeal was also dismissed by the aforesaid Court. It is further contended that pursuant to the order passed by the District Munsif, the Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-Executive Magistrate, by the proceedings, dated 26.7.2004 in Na.Ka. No. 6/506/2004 negatived the claim of the second respondent that he had claimed 2/5 share in the brick-built well. After the dismissal of the application filed under Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code, second respondent preferred an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Villupuram in Na.Ka.Aa. 4/393/2004, which also dismissed on 28.10.2004 as not maintainable. However, as per the order of District Revenue Officer, dated 30.5.2006 in Na.Ka. No. 9/74569/2004 contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court and the decision taken by the Tahsildar and the RDO. The District Revenue Officer, first respondent herein held that the second respondent is having right in the property in dispute. 5. The District Revenue Officer has also decided in the impugned order that the second respondent is having a 2/3rd right in the well and also a prohibitory order more or less equivalent to injunction restraining the petitioners herein from interfering with the said right of the second respondent. 5. The District Revenue Officer has also decided in the impugned order that the second respondent is having a 2/3rd right in the well and also a prohibitory order more or less equivalent to injunction restraining the petitioners herein from interfering with the said right of the second respondent. The relief granted by the first respondent declaring the right and title of the second respondent and the prohibitory order passed by him are without jurisdiction. 6. In spite of service of notice, there is no representation for the second respondent and the second respondent was also called absent. 7. The first respondent herein, by the impugned order has declared the right and title of the second respondent in the immovable property and also granted prohibitory order against the petitioner in the nature of injunction without jurisdiction. 8. As contended by the learned counsel fertile petitioners, the power vested with the first respondent under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is limited to the extent of maintaining law and order. For deciding the title and the possession of the property, the competent forum is only the Civil Court. The first respondent, being an Executive Magistrate has no authority to decide the title and the possession of the property, as contemplated under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. In this regard, the decision rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in AIR 2000 SC 1504 : (2000) 4 SCC 440 is relied on, wherein it has been held as follows: “It cannot be said that in every case where a civil suit is filed, Section 145 proceedings would never lie. It is only in cases where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the civil Court that proceedings under Section 145 should not be allowed to continue. This is because the civil Court is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil Court would be binding on the Magistrate.” 9. This is because the civil Court is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil Court would be binding on the Magistrate.” 9. It is a settled proposition of law that only the Civil Court is competent to decide the title and possession of any immovable property, which cannot be decided by an Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C and the decision of the competent Civil Court is binding on the Magistrate, who can pass any order under Section 145 Cr.P.C. 10. In the instant case, the suit in O.S. No. 13 of 2002 is pending on the file of the District Munsif, Villupuram was held that the second respondent herein could not establish his claim and accordingly dismissed the suit. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the appeal preferred by the second respondent is also dismissed. Based on which, the Executive Magistrate, Villupuram dismissed the proceedings initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the same is confirmed by the Revenue Division Officer, by his order dated 28.10.2004. However, the District Revenue Officer has granted relief, as per order dated 30.5.2006 under the impugned proceedings, which is against the scope of Section 145 Cr.P.C. Since the right of patta dispute is between the parties having been decided by the competent Court, the Executive Magistrate, cannot pass any order. Similarly, the District Revenue Officer has no authority to declare the title and grant prohibitory order or any injunction. It is settled prohibition of law, which has been granted by the Civil Court and that is not disputed by the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent. 11. On the aforesaid facts and circumstances, as contended by, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, I am of the view that the impugned order is clear abuse of process of the Court, since the same has been passed without jurisdiction, after the same was decided by the Civil Court. 12. Heiace, in the light of the decision in Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey and Another (supra), this Court is of the view that the writ petition has to be allowed and the impugned order passed by the first respondent is liable to be set aside. 13. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the first respondent is set aside. 13. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the first respondent is set aside. However, no order as to costs.