JUDGEMENT 1. This writ petition has been filed by Mr. Brajesh Kumar Singh, Advocate, who was the erstwhile Secretary of District Bar Association, Supaul. He has challenged the proceeding of the Special Committee, Bihar State Bar Council, Patna dated 06.03.2009 (Annexure-4/1) by which the Executive Committee of District Bar Association, Supaul elected on 28.04.2007 was restrained from exercising its power under Rule 15 of the Model Rules and an Ad hoc Committee of seven members was constituted to take charge immediately of District Bar Association, Supaul. The proceedings of the meeting of the Bihar State Bar Council dated 23.04.2008 (Annexure-3) by which the said Executive Committee of District Bar Association was restrained from taking major decision having financial implication has also been challenged alongwith letter dated 02.04.2009 (Annexure-5) containing minutes of the proceeding dated 28.03.2009. The Bihar State Bar Council is further sought to be restrained from obstructing the democratic functioning of the District Bar Association, Supaul or from taking any coercive action against the petitioner and for other ancillary reliefs. 2. I.A. No. 7141 of 2009 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for adding further reliefs to the writ petition challenging Resolution No.04 of Special Committee dated 05.05.2009 and entire proceeding arising out of it and also Resolution dated 14.05.2009 of the Special Committee and the entire proceeding giving birth to D.C.E. no. 07/2009. The Special Committee of Bihar State Bar Council was also sought to be directed to pay exemplary amount of compensation as well as cost of petition as their alleged malafide acts had caused much trouble to the petitioner. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the aforesaid interlocutory application is allowed. Let the said relief be added to the reliefs already claimed in the writ petition. 3. I.A. No. 8575 of 2010 has been filed by the petitioner for impleading Mr. Prem kumar Jha, Advocate as respondent no.10 in the instant writ petition stating that all the steps against the petitioners executive committee had been initiated due to his mala fide. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the aforesaid interlocutory application is allowed. Let Mr. Prem kumar Jha, advocate be added as respondent no. 10 to the instant writ petition. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the Bihar State Bar Council and its Special Committee, namely respondent nos. 1 and 2. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the aforesaid interlocutory application is allowed. Let Mr. Prem kumar Jha, advocate be added as respondent no. 10 to the instant writ petition. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the Bihar State Bar Council and its Special Committee, namely respondent nos. 1 and 2. The said parties to the writ petition are the main contesting parties. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised three points in the instant case. The first point is that the Special Committee of the Bihar State Bar Council did not act as per Rule 15 of the Uniform Rules For Bar/Advocates/Lawyers Associations of Bihar, framed in 2003, which is commonly known as Model Rules. In this connection, he relies upon paragraphs 47, 49 and 53 of a decision of the Apex Court in case of S.Sundaram Pillai and Others V/s. V.R. Pattabiraman and Others, reported in (1985) 1 SCC 591 . The second point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the action of Bihar State Bar Council was discriminatory in nature as the petitioners Association was elected on 28.04.2007 which, according to Rule 15 of the Model Rules, had to expire on 28.04.2009, but taking help of the Explanation given in the said Rules, the petitioners Association was dissolved on 06.03.2009, whereas no other Association in the entire State had been dissolved on that ground. The third point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is the allegation of mala fide against Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate, who was initially appointed as observer in the election of the District Bar Association, Supaul in the year 2007 and was subsequently member of Bihar State Bar Council. 6. The third point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is the allegation of mala fide against Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate, who was initially appointed as observer in the election of the District Bar Association, Supaul in the year 2007 and was subsequently member of Bihar State Bar Council. 6. So far as the first point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is provided in Rule 15 of the Model Rules that the terms of the office bearers and the members of the Executive Committee shall be two years from the date of election, whereafter the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association shall cease to function and the President shall assume charge of the Committee and shall take steps to hold the election within a period of one month of his so assumption of charge and if the President fails to hold election within the aforesaid period he shall become functus officio and the Chairman of the Bar Council shall make interim/ad hoc arrangement for two months, which shall get the election of the office bearers completed within that period or any period so extended by the Bar Council. In the Explanation to the aforesaid Rule it has been specifically provided that the cut off date of the election of the office bearer/ bearers is 24th January of the year. 7. In the Explanation to the aforesaid Rule it has been specifically provided that the cut off date of the election of the office bearer/ bearers is 24th January of the year. 7. However, the Supreme Court in case of S. Sundaram Pillai and others (supra) relying upon several other decisions of the Apex Court had held that the object of an explanation to a statutory provision is to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself, where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve and to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful and it was further held that an explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the nature of the enactment or any part thereof which is relevant for the purpose of an explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act and the court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment cannot take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming any hindrance in the interpretation of the same. 8. From the facts and circumstances of this case, it is quite apparent that the Explanation to Rule 15 of the Model Rules does not provide any hindrance nor can be deemed to set at naught the working of the Rules, rather the Explanation helps in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment and makes it more meaningful and purposeful because a specific date has been provided for making such election which gives uniformity to the entire enactment and makes it consistent with the dominant object of the Model Rules. Hence the said decision of the Apex Court in case of S. Sundaran Pillai and others (supra) does not at all support the claim of the petitioners, rather it is in consonance with the case of the respondents. 9. In the said circumstances, although the election of the District Bar Association, Supaul should have been held in January, 2007, but for some reason, it was held on 28.04.2007 in which the Executive Committee (petitioner no.1) was elected with petitioner no.2 as its Secretary. 9. In the said circumstances, although the election of the District Bar Association, Supaul should have been held in January, 2007, but for some reason, it was held on 28.04.2007 in which the Executive Committee (petitioner no.1) was elected with petitioner no.2 as its Secretary. Had the election been held at the right time in January 2007, the provision of Rule 15 would have been applicable giving two years time for the next election, but since the said election was held belatedly in the month of April 2007, the new election was legally to be held in January, 2009 as per the cut of date provided in the aforesaid Explanation to Rule 15. In the said circumstances, this court does not find that the Bihar State Bar Council has in any way violated any provision of the Model Rules, including Rule 15. 10. So far as the second point of discrimination raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned it is claimed that the petitioners Executive Committee of District Bar Association, Supaul was formed on 28.04.2007 and it had to expire on 27.04.2009, but taking help of the aforesaid Explanation to Rule 15 of Model Rules, it was dissolved on 06.03.2009, but no other association in the State of Bihar in similar circumstance was dissolved and hence the dissolution of the petitioners Executive Committee was discriminatory. From the findings on the first issue raised by learned counsel for the petitioner it is quite apparent that it has already been held that election of the Executive Committee of District Bar Association should have been held by the said Executive Committee before 24.01.2009, but no such election having been held the term of the petitioners Executive Committee ended on 24.01.2009, whereafter the said Executive Committee ceased to function as per Rule 15. Thereafter the President of the Executive Committee was to assume charge solely and to get the election held within one month, but it was not done. 11. Hence the said procedure of law as prescribed in the Model Rules not having been followed, the Bihar State Bar Council acted in accordance with the provision of Rule 15 by passing the impugned order dated 06.03.2009 constituting an Ad hoc Committee for getting a new executive committee for District Bar Association, Supaul elected as per the provisions of the Model Rules. Furthermore, when the dissolution of the petitioners Executive Committee was in accordance with law, there was no question of any discrimination. If nothing has been done in similar situation in other Bar/Advocates/Lawyers Association by the Bihar State Bar Council it cannot affect the result of this case. Hence, this point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is absolutely baseless and frivolous. 12. So far as the third point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it is with regard to malafide alleged against Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate. It is stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that, in the election of petitioners Executive Committee of District Bar Association, Supaul on 28.04.2007 Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, advocate was appointed as an Observer and he submitted a report dated 09.03.2007 (Annexure-1/4) making frivolous allegations against the petitioner and the Returning Officer of that election and recommended cancellation of the entire election but Bihar State Bar Council rejected the said report. It is further stated that Election Petition No. 9 of 2007 was filed by one of the loosing candidates against the aforesaid election but that was dismissed by the Election Tribunal on 02.03.2008 (Annexure-2). It is also argued that due to the aforesaid developments the said Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate became vindictive and resorted to all sort of disturbances in the functioning of the petitioners Executive Committee and finally the Special Committee of the Bihar State Bar Council vide order dated 23.04.2008 (Annexure-3) stopped the petitioners Executive Committee of the District Bar Association from taking major decision having financial implication. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the term of the Bihar State Bar council is five years which expired on 03.03.2008, whereafter Special Committee was formed with Advocate General as its Chairman and two members, including Mr. Suraj Narayan Sinha, Senior Advocate and Mr. Prem Kumar Jha Advocate and the above mentioned order dated 23.04.2008 (Annexure-3) was passed by the said Special Committee and vide order dated 09.03.2009 (Annexure-4) it constituted an Ad hoc committee for the District Bar Association, Supaul. Learned counsel for the petitioner also avers that one Mr. Praveen Kumar, Advocate raised the matter before this court in CWJC No.4310 of 2008 which was allowed by a bench of this court on 10.07.2008 and is reported in 2009 (1) PLJR 260 . Learned counsel for the petitioner also avers that one Mr. Praveen Kumar, Advocate raised the matter before this court in CWJC No.4310 of 2008 which was allowed by a bench of this court on 10.07.2008 and is reported in 2009 (1) PLJR 260 . Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates that by the said order the Honble Single Judge had specifically directed that Advocate General will remain as the Chairman of the Special Committee and two members thereof shall be appointed as Mr. Suraj Narayan Sinha, Senior Advocate has already submitted his resignation, but that order was never given effect to and Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate continued. Hence he submits that malafide of Mr. Prem Kumar Jha is apparent from the aforesaid facts. 14. From the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record, no doubt Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate was an observer in the election of 2007 and his report was rejected by the Bihar State Bar Council vide its order of 2007 and the election petition filed against the election of the petitioners Executive Committee bearing Election Petition No. 9 of 2007 was dismissed vide order dated 02.03.2010 but there is nothing in those orders to show that there was any mala fide in the action of Mr. Prem kumar Jha, Advocate. A report or an action may be good, bad or indifferent according to the understanding of the person concerned, but merely because the report of Mr.Prem kumar Jha, Advocate did not find favour of the authorities, the Court cannot assume or hold mala fide against Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate, in absence of any concrete proof thereof, as the petitioners have miserably failed to support their allegations by any valid or reliable material. 15. So far as the reliance of learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of this Court in case of Praveen Kumar (supra) is concerned, it is quite apparent that even the name of Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate was not mentioned in the said order nor any direction for his removal was given by the said order and only the resignation of Mr. Suraj Narayan Sinha, Senior Advocate was accepted. Mr. Prem Kumar Jha is said to have filed a review petition before this court against the said order which even according to the petitioners counsel is pending. Suraj Narayan Sinha, Senior Advocate was accepted. Mr. Prem Kumar Jha is said to have filed a review petition before this court against the said order which even according to the petitioners counsel is pending. It had nowhere been mentioned in the order of the said case that Mr. Prem Kumar Jha should not be part of new Special Committee formed by the Bihar State Bar Council. Furthermore, duly appointed Special Committee of the Bihar State Bar Council did not pass any interim order against the petitioners Executive Committee except stopping it from taking any major decision having financial implication, as its term had already ended on 24.01.2009. Moreover, this order had never been challenged by anyone before any appropriate authority. So far the order of the Ad hoc committee of the Bihar State Bar Council dated 09.03.2009 (Annexure-4) is concerned, there is no material to show that it was passed or any impugned action was taken at the instance of Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, Advocate or due to any mala fide. 16. It is interesting to note that fresh election of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association, Supaul has been held in the year 2010 in which petitioner no. 2 himself worked as the returning officer and he had handed over the certificate of election to the newly elected Executive Committee of the District Bar Association, Supaul. The petitioner himself having acted in terms of the aforesaid provisions of the Model Rules, he cannot legally challenge the functioning of the present Executive Committee of the District Bar Association, Supaul and hence the entire exercise adopted by the petitioner is an exercise in futility and this litigation appears to be not so clean a fight between two groups of advocates which, in fact, embarrasses this court. Advocates are the strongest pillar of judiciary and are held in very high esteem by the society and its people as they are conversant with the provisions of law concerning the affairs and requirements of the society and its people. Hence they are not expected to stoop to hurl such haughty, scornful and frivolous allegations and abuses against each other nor can they be allowed to convert the Bar Council into a petty trade union. 17. Hence they are not expected to stoop to hurl such haughty, scornful and frivolous allegations and abuses against each other nor can they be allowed to convert the Bar Council into a petty trade union. 17. Before concluding, this Court thinks it necessary to point out that during the course of his argument learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the Judges are senior students of law whereas the advocates are junior students of law. This Court wonders from where this impression has come into the mind of learned counsel for the petitioner as the court of law is not a law college or a law school which teaches Law. The Judges or the advocates gain experience from their functioning in courts of law but there is no question of anyone being taught here. The advocates interpret the Law according to the claim of their clients which is called submissions, whereas the Judges interpretation depends upon the entire pleadings and evidence of all the parties as well as the facts and circumstances of the cases and is called decision, which becomes Law. Hence in these circumstances the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, apart from being absolutely frivolous and misconceived is also uncalled for and, accordingly, it is deprecated. 18. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of this case, all the three points raised by learned counsel for the petitioner fail. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.