JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastav, J.—Heard learned Standing Counsel on behalf of petitioner and Sri K.R. Sirohi and Sri S.C. Dwivedi Advocates appearing on behalf of contesting respondents. 2. The order impugned in the instant writ petition is dated 28.11.1990, Annexure-7 to the writ petition. Facts of the case in brief are that ceiling proceedings commenced and an area of 26-4-0 was declared surplus on 6.1.1975. These proceedings later on abated and thereafter fresh proceedings started on 31.8.1976. In these proceedings an area of 39-12-5 was declared surplus. The Prescribed Authority rejected objection of the tenure holders. Appeal filed against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority also stood dismissed on 3.12.1976. Thereafter consolidation proceedings commenced and village was notified on 5.2.1981. During consolidation proceedings, the land of respondents was reduced considerably. Petitioner No. 1 Mahabir (since deceased) moved an application before the Prescribed Authority that while determining surplus area, the Prescribed Authority has considered an area which in fact did not belong to them and during consolidation proceedings after determining his share, area has been reduced and, therefore, the order of the Prescribed Authority be reconsidered. This application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. This order was challenged in an appeal. 3. Case of Mahabir was that 20 bighas of land has been reduced during consolidation operation and if this area is taken out then there is no surplus land and previous orders are liable to be set at naught. This Court has held in several decisions that the Prescribed Authority cannot shut its eyes or ignore the decision given during proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act while determining ceiling area. The Ist Additional District Judge while allowing the appeal placed reliance on two decisions of this Court; Jhandu v. State of U.P., 1977 AWC 318 and a decision of Division Bench in the case of Satya Pal Singh v. State of U.P., 1979 AWC, 217. On the basis of these decisions, the appeal was allowed and order of the Prescribed Authority was set at naught. The case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for afresh decision vide judgment and order dated 10.2.1982. Copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 4. The Prescribed Authority once again decided the case against land holders. The case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for afresh decision vide judgment and order dated 10.2.1982. Copy of the said order is annexed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 4. The Prescribed Authority once again decided the case against land holders. The Prescribed Authority directed that name of Mahabir son of Jagat Dhari may be given benefit of 6 bigha, 5 biswa vide order dated 13.4.1983 but since Mahabir was not satisfied with the said order, he preferred an appeal once again vide Appeal No. 9. The order passed in appeal is impugned in the instant writ petition. 5. The petitioner challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority laid emphasis on the order of the Consolidation Officer passed under Section 9A(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act Ramkali v. Mahabir which was decided on merits on 10.5.1983. Reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision Satya Pal Singh (supra) to demonstrate that the order passed by consolidation Courts are final and it cannot be re-adjudicated and principles of estoppal and res judicata are squarely applicable. The order of the Consolidation Officer allocating respective shares to Ramkali was 1/4, 1/4 to Raziya and 1/2 to Mahabir. The Consolidation Officer asserted that original holding belongs to one Haribhajan who had two sons Jagat Dhari and Satya Narayan. Mahabir was son of Jagat Dhari. Satya Narayan had two daughters Ramkali and Razia. While deciding objections, the respective shares of the shareholders was allocated. The Consolidation Officer had taken into account a decision of the revenue Court under Section 229B of U.P. Z.A.& L.R. Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) where Mahabir was given 1/2 share and the other 1/2 share was given to Ramkali and Razia and they were declared as Bhumidhar. Another order of the Consolidation Officer dated 8.6.1984 was also filed before the ceiling authority to substantiate that there was an application on behalf of Razia and Ramkali for mutation but the same was stayed by consolidation Courts as the land was within the clutches of land ceiling. Therefore, names of those two ladies could not be recorded which resulted in declaration of surplus land as the entire area was treated to be that of Mahabir. The State of U.P. has challenged that the judgment of the Consolidation Officer as well as decree under Section 229B of the Act cannot be given effect to but this objection is without any basis. The State of U.P. has challenged that the judgment of the Consolidation Officer as well as decree under Section 229B of the Act cannot be given effect to but this objection is without any basis. The decree in the suit under Section 229B of the Act is admittedly prior in time and the consolidation Courts have relied on the final judgment between the co-sharers. Thus the consolidation Courts are correct in deciding the objection after the village was notified in the light of final adjudication under Section 229B of the Act. The Appellate Court after hearing learned counsels was of the view that orders of the consolidation Courts cannot be ignored specially in view of the decisions given by this Court in the case of Satya Pal Singh (supra). The Appellate Court was of the view that order of the Consolidation Officer dated 10.5.1983 is legal as well as decree under Section 229B of the Act was on the basis of pedigree as mentioned above. There is no valid reason why ceiling authority should ignore those decisions which were never challenged at any stage whatsoever. 6. State counsel has tried to lay emphasis on the fact that after the land was declared surplus, it was allotted to different persons and those allottees were put in possession and consolidation proceedings commenced subsequently and, therefore, the judgment of the Consolidation Court should have no bearing after the land was handed over to the respective allottees. The order impugned in the instant writ petition dated 28.11.1990 was challenged by some of the allottees of the land declared surplus earlier belonging to Mahabir (since deceased) vide Writ Petition No. 21543 of 1991. The writ petition was dismissed vide judgment dated 2.2.2000. This order was challenged in the Apex Court vide S.L.P. No. 9152 of 2000 which was dismissed on 1.4.2002. The order passed in the writ petition is Annexure-7 to the counter-affidavit and order in S.L.P. is Annexure-8 to the counter-affidavit. In the circumstances, the order impugned in the instant writ petition stands confirmed by the Apex Court and previous adjudication by this Court on a writ petition filed by one of the allottees. Interestingly the State of U.P. was also a party in the said writ petition but it appears that it stood as a mute spectator without staking its claim or backing the allottees. Interestingly the State of U.P. was also a party in the said writ petition but it appears that it stood as a mute spectator without staking its claim or backing the allottees. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the State cannot re-agitate and reopen the matter without any valid reason, specially on the pretext that the land declared surplus in earlier proceeding stands allotted. 7. Standing Counsel very candidly accepted that State was a party in Writ Petition No. 21543 of 1991 but did not object or prefer any S.L.P. against the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 21543 of 1991 and did not contest the matter though the judgment of this Court in the said writ petition dated 2.2.2000 was challenged in the Apex Court. The S.L.P. was dismissed. It is also brought to my notice by counsel appearing on behalf of respondents that during pendency of S.L.P., an impleadment application was filed and heirs of late Mahabir were also brought on record though the impleadment application was contested but the same was allowed before the S.L.P. was dismissed. In the circumstances, the entire dispute stands resolved. In the circumstances, the writ petition filed on behalf of State has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. —————