JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. These two writ petitions are directed against the concurrent finding of facts arrived at by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) and Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as Appellate Tribunal). The basic facts and the grounds on which the writ petitions are structured being more or less the same and as agreed to by the learned Counsel for the parties, both the writ petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The Respondents State Bank of India had instituted two suits against the Appellants and one Ram Gopal Lohia for recovery of its debts. The said suits were registered and numbered as Money Suit No. 12/85 and Money Suit No. 14/85, which was subsequently registered and numbered as Money Suit Nos. 60/86 and 74/86 respectively. With the creation of the Debts Recovery Tribunal upon enactment of the recovery of debts due to "Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993", both the suits were transferred to the said Tribunal and were renumbered and registered as Original Application Nos. 84/97 and 87/97. 3. Both the suits were instituted against the Respondent No. 4 partnership firm and the individual Defendants who are the partners of the said firm. Late Ram Gopal Lohia was the alleged guarantor who during the pendency of the proceeding expired and accordingly his legal heirs i.e. the Petitioners were substituted in his place. Late Ram Gopal Lohia was also party Defendant to the suits. 4. Written statement was filed on behalf of Late Ram Gopal Lohia and other Defendants/Respondents. During the pendency of the proceeding, the Defendant No. 2 also died and was substituted by the legal heirs and they were brought on record of the proceeding. 5. In the O As, Late Ram Gopal Lohia filed independent written statement while the other Defendants filed joint written statement. So far as the written statement of Late Ram Gopal Lohia is concerned (Annexure-C), it was denied that there was any irrevocable Letter of Credit and was enhanced from time-to-time and that on the particular date (2.12.1981), the Defendant partnership firm through its partners and the guarantor had executed a fresh application and guarantee for Letter of Credit in the particular form for an enhanced sum. It was also alleged that the guarantee form was not a valid document and the same was not enforceable at law. He also denied that he had ever executed any guarantee bond and that stood guarantor in respect of the transaction. 6. The learned Tribunal by its order dated 31.8.2001 and 30.8.2001 respectively having decreed the Suits/O As holding that the Defendants are liable jointly and severally to pay the outstanding dues besides future interest and cost, etc. and also having held that the legal heirs of the original Defendants are also liable as legal heirs with other liabilities as indicated in the impugned orders, the present Petitioners approached the appellate Tribunal by way of filling two independent Appeals registered and numbered as DRAT/CAL/A-25/2001 and DRAT/CAL/A-26/2001. 7. In both the appeals, the grounds were the same. For a ready reference, main grounds urged in both the appeals are reproduced below: I For that the learned Tribunal erred in coming to the conclusion that mere signatures on the application and guarantee for Letter of Credit on Form 2(a) dated 4th December, 1981 hereinafter referred to as the said document made the erstwhile Defendant No. 4, the guarantor. II For that if at all, the said document is a guarantee, even then the liability of the guarantor cannot exceed Rs. 1,25,000/-. The alleged guarantee is to the extent of principal debtor can at all become a liable to a Bank in terms of the said guarantee. The said guarantee is for the Letter of Credit account opened by the Bank in which account the balance could not exceed Rs. 1,25,000/- revolving at any point of time. The maximum utilisation of the said Letter of Credit account is to the extent of Rs. 25,00,000/- being ceiling limit. In other words Letter of Credit worth Rs. 25,00,000/- can be opened by the principal debtors during the tenure of the agreement, subject to the outstanding balance in the account not exceeding Rs. 1,25,000/- at anyone point of time. III For that the claim on the alleged guarantee is premature. The guarantee provides that in default of payment by the guarantor, the Bank may sell the goods before or after arrival. The guarantor by the said document undertakes to reimburse the Bank for any shortfall that may occur as a result of such sale. III For that the claim on the alleged guarantee is premature. The guarantee provides that in default of payment by the guarantor, the Bank may sell the goods before or after arrival. The guarantor by the said document undertakes to reimburse the Bank for any shortfall that may occur as a result of such sale. The Bank, has, however, admittedly not sold the goods forming the subject matter of the Letter of Credit. Therefore, the undertakings to deposit on demand the shortfall that may occur arising out of such sale of the goods cannot be enforced. IV For that the said alleged Guarantee Deed is not duly stamped. V For that the said document is only witnessed by the said deceased as the introducer. The said deceased is nowhere described as the guarantor in the said document nor did not he ever intend to or at all guarantee repayment of any liability of the principal debtors. Therefore, the liability of the said deceased under the said alleged guarantee does not arise. VI For that the guarantor (if at all the said deceased was a guarantor) has been discharged upto the Bank allowing principal debtors to operate the Letter of Credit account contrary to the terms of the contract. VII For that the Bank and the principal debtors have varied the terms of the guarantee without the consent of the guarantor and as such the guarantor has been discharged of his liability under the alleged guarantee. VIII For that the Bank has allowed the liability of the principal debtors to exceed the maximum limit of Rs. 1,25,000/- and go; upto the astronomical figure of Rs. 12,96,206.70. Even if the said deceased was the guarantor, his liability could not exceed Rs. 1,25,000/-. IX For that the Bank has allowed, the principal debtors to dissipate their assets and properties and the Bank has acted contrary to it as the creditor and has impaired the eventual remedy available to a guarantor against the principal debtors. X For that the original guarantor being the said deceased has died and the Appellants are his legal heirs and representatives. Their liability cannot under any circumstances exceed the amount which come into their respective hands by way of inheritance from their father. 8. X For that the original guarantor being the said deceased has died and the Appellants are his legal heirs and representatives. Their liability cannot under any circumstances exceed the amount which come into their respective hands by way of inheritance from their father. 8. The Appellate Tribunal by its impugned judgment dated 19.2.2003 has disposed of both the appeals holding that there is no substance in the appeals and accordingly dismissed both the appeals. Being aggrieved, the Appellants have preferred the instant writ petitions. 9. I have heard Ms. M. Hazarika, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. A. Ajitsaria, learned Counsel for the Petitioners. I have also heard Mr. L. Talukdar, learned Counsel representing the Respondent Bank. I have also gone through the entire materials on records including the records received from the Tribunal. 10. Ms. Hazarika, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the findings arrived at by both the Tribunals is perverse being contrary to the evidence on record and accordingly liable to be interfered with. She submitted that the basic document i.e. the Letter of Credit having not been proved, the Tribunals ought not to have held the Petitioners liable. 11. On the other hand, Mr. L. Talukdar, learned Counsel for the Respondent Bank submitted that the concurrent finding of facts arrived at by both the Tribunals on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. According to him, the grounds urged in the writ petition being not the grounds in the appeals preferred before the Appellate Tribunal, cannot be allowed to be agitated. He also submitted that the Petitioners being the legal heirs of the original guarantor cannot avoid their liability and the grounds urged for absolving the guarantor from the liability apart from being evasive are also hit by the principles of estoppel. In this connection, he has referred to Order 8 Rules 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He also placed reliance on two decisions of the Apex Court which are AIR 1984 SC 1467 , Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation and AIR 1992 Delhi 174, Oriental Bank of Commerce, New Delhi v. S.R. Kishore & Co. 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. I have also perused the materials available on records including the records of the Tribunals. 13. 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. I have also perused the materials available on records including the records of the Tribunals. 13. Needless to say that the Writ Court exercising its power of judicial review under Articles226/227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit on Appeal over the findings arrived at by the fact finding authority unless such findings are shown to be perverse or that they are not based on any evidence at all. 14. In a catena of cases, it has been held that where dispute involves around questions of facts, on which findings have been arrived at by the fact finding authority, such findings should not be lightly interfered with under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Needless also to say that the Court exercising its writ jurisdiction cannot reappreciate the evidence as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural errors, if any, resulting any manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate authority. The proceedings under Articles 226/227 are not a substitute for an appeal. 15. In the instant case, the Tribunal by its impugned order dated 31.8.2001 and 30.8.2001 respectively answered the issues involved in the suits/O As in favour of the Respondent Bank. It is the clear finding of the Tribunal that Late Ram Gopal Lohia had signed both the application for granting LOC. They are dated 23.9.1981 (Ext. 1) and dated 8.1.1981 (Ext. 3). It has rightly been held that the Defendants including the Defendant No. 6 i.e. Late Ram Gopal Lohia cannot deny the fact of making application as partners and guarantor for grant of LOC. It is on record that the Defendants had availed the LOC facility of the Bank. On receipt of the bills, etc., the Bank had intimated the Defendants and on receipt of which initially the Defendants had paid some amount. But since May, 1982, the payment become irregular. Exhibit 5 to Exhibit 23 are the bills containing the relevant invoices in duplicate and sale/despatch note. Ext. 5 to Ext. 23 are the enclosures sent there with bearing the seals of the Respondent Bank. 16. But since May, 1982, the payment become irregular. Exhibit 5 to Exhibit 23 are the bills containing the relevant invoices in duplicate and sale/despatch note. Ext. 5 to Ext. 23 are the enclosures sent there with bearing the seals of the Respondent Bank. 16. The Tribunal under the head "the amounts of liability" has discussed in detail the liability of the Defendants. It is on record that the Defendants on reply to the demand letter had confirmed the outstanding balances on account of the nonpayment of 19 bills. Exhibits 42, 43, 44, 45 and 48 have been proved by the Respondent Bank through which the Defendants had acknowledged the liability to pay the outstanding dues. The Bank witnesses have also proved the statement of account for the 19 outstanding bills marked as Ext. 49. 17. It is on the basis of such evidence, the Tribunal by its impugned order dated 31.8.2001 and 30.8.2001 held the Defendants liable jointly and severally including the legal heirs of Late Ram Gopal Lohia, who are the instant Petitioners. 18. The main grounds on which the Petitioners had approached the Appellate Tribunal have been noticed above. In none of the grounds it was urged that the particular document was not proved. However, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the parties that the document on the basis of which the Bank had filed the plaint were merely the application forms, yet in the plaint it had been pleaded as through those were the LOC. It was further argued that the Bank had failed to produce the alleged LOC which, if at all, in existence, ought to have been in the custody of the Bank. 19. Dealing with the above submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants, the Appellate Tribunal has rightly observed that there is no denial of the signature of Late Ram Gopal Lohia in any of the documents. It is quite clear from the proceedings before the Tribunal that the Appellants/Petitioners did not raise any objection to the effect that the LOC had not been proved. Same was proved after the Appellants had cross-examined the Bank's witnesses on the documents. The particular argument raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants before the Appellate Tribunal and so also by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in this proceeding are not based on records. Same was proved after the Appellants had cross-examined the Bank's witnesses on the documents. The particular argument raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants before the Appellate Tribunal and so also by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in this proceeding are not based on records. This aspect of the matter has been elaborately discussed by the learned Appellate Tribunal. 20. Referring to the principal grievance in the appeals that the two documents marked Exts. 1 and 3 before the Tribunal and the annexures in the stay application before the Appellate Tribunal were mere application forms requesting the Bank to open LOC and that the Bank was unable to produce the subject Letters of Credit before the Tribunal, because in fact, there were none has been dealt with by the learned Appellate Tribunal. It has rightly been observed that there is no whisper in the written statement or in the proceedings before the Tribunal or even in the grounds of appeal noted above. It was never the grounds in the written statement or in the proceeding before the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal that the LOC which have been pleaded and proved before the Tribunal were not the same. 21. The grounds of appeal noticed above do not include any allegation that the claim was awarded on the basis of a document, which had not been pleaded in the complaint. Admittedly, documents had been disclosed by the parties before the commencement of the proceedings before the Tribunal and there is nothing on record to show that there was any objection on behalf of the Appellants. It is in this context, Mr. Talukdar, learned Counsel representing the Respondent Bank specifically referred to the following findings and the observation of the Appellate Tribunal in the impugned judgment. "The two letter of credit were proved before the Presiding Officer, and there was cross-examination of the Bank's witness by the Advocates for the Appellants. The documents were marked as Exhibits 1 and 3, without any objection on behalf of the Appellants. I find no reason to interfere with the finding of the Presiding officer that the document on which the suit was field was the original Letter of Credit. The documents were marked as Exhibits 1 and 3, without any objection on behalf of the Appellants. I find no reason to interfere with the finding of the Presiding officer that the document on which the suit was field was the original Letter of Credit. The facts of the case as also the conduct of the Appellants in these proceedings make it abundantly clear that fresh Letters of Credit had been issued thereafter, and the Bank thought it fit to produce and prove only the relevant letters of credit, and the documents of guarantee before the Presiding Officer. There was no submission on behalf of the Appellants as to why the Appellants did not raise any objection in that respect, at any time until in the submissions before this Appellate Tribunal. It was clearly as afterthought. Having participated in the proceedings allowing the documents to be proved and marked as exhibits, the Appellants dissatisfied with the judgment of the Presiding Officer can not be heard to allege that the suit was filed on certain documents and the judgment has been delivered on a different set of documents. Admittedly judgment had been delivered on the basis of the documents which had been proved in the proceedings, and on record there was no objection on behalf of the Appellants. It was significant that though the principal debtors had filed a joint written statement with the guarantor, they had refrained from contesting the proceedings both before the Presiding Officer as also before this Appellate Tribunal. Clearly therefore they had admitted the entire case of the Bank. In that view of the matter, the contention by the Appellants that the Exhibits 1 and 3 were mere application forms and not the Letters of Credit was superfluous and quite baseless. On a plain reading of the documents, it required no interpretation any way to comprehend that the first part of the document containing the necessary 'Application And Guarantee For Letter of Credit On Form 2(a)', while immediately below thereto was the 'Confirmed Letter of Credit No. .... Irrevocable Without Recourse To Drawers'." 22. On a plain reading of the documents, it required no interpretation any way to comprehend that the first part of the document containing the necessary 'Application And Guarantee For Letter of Credit On Form 2(a)', while immediately below thereto was the 'Confirmed Letter of Credit No. .... Irrevocable Without Recourse To Drawers'." 22. During the course of hearing of the writ petitions, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners upon a reference to the statements made in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the writ petitions, argued that Late Ram Gopal Lohia could not have been saddled with the liability as guarantor, inasmuch as, his signature appealing in the particular document was not in the capacity of a guarantor but at best was in the capacity of a witness to the execution of the said document (Annexure D/Ext. 1). According to the learned Counsel, the signature appearing in Annexure E/Ext. 3 is the signature not in the individual capacity of the signatory but as partner of the firm and thus the predecessor in interest of the present Petitioners stood, if at all, as guarantor in his limited capacity as partner of the said firm and, therefore, on his death, the Petitioners cannot be made liable for any debt of the partnership firm without dissolution of the partnership firm or settlement of amounts at the instance of the Respondent Bank. 23. The aforesaid pleas raised in the writ petition are not to be found in the proceeding before the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal and has been raised for the first time in the writ petitions. The scope, ambit and jurisdiction of the Writ Court in respect of findings of facts arrived at by the fact finding authorities have been noted above. The writ petitions assailing the legality and validity of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal cannot be projected as further appeal. Even if that be so, certainly not on new set of pleas never raised before the fact-finding authorities. 24. It is in this context Mr. Talukdar, learned Counsel representing the Respondent Bank has placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce, New Delhi (supra). In that case, a suit against the partnership firm was instituted by the Bank Manager on behalf of the Bank. 24. It is in this context Mr. Talukdar, learned Counsel representing the Respondent Bank has placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce, New Delhi (supra). In that case, a suit against the partnership firm was instituted by the Bank Manager on behalf of the Bank. The plea was raised that the particular Defendant, in fact, was not a partner and that the transaction was a sham and bogus transaction. It was observed that if that was so, the Defendant No. 4 ought to have informed the Bank to that effect. However, he kept quite all through and thus held to have acquiesced in and agreed to the transactions. 25. The decision in Sadhu Ram (supra) has been pressed into service to remind the Court that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, though wide but for that very reason it has to be exercised with great circumspection. In paragraph 3 of the decision, the Apex Court observed thus: We are afraid the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Article226 of the Constitution is truly wide but for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate Court over Tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management. There was a conciliation proceeding, the conciliation had failed and the Conciliation Officer had so reported to the Government. The Government was justified in thinking that there was an industrial dispute and referring it to the Labour Court. 26. There was a conciliation proceeding, the conciliation had failed and the Conciliation Officer had so reported to the Government. The Government was justified in thinking that there was an industrial dispute and referring it to the Labour Court. 26. Considering the entire materials on record and the findings arrived at by the learned Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, I see no reason to interfere with the same. It is not a case which can be said to be a case where findings of facts have been arrived at concurrently both by the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of no evidence or such findings are perverse. The findings arrived at by both the Tribunals are cogent, based on evidence on record and are not liable to be interfered with exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 27. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions and accordingly they are dismissed. The Registry shall send down the case records to the Tribunals along with a copy of this judgment and order. Petition dismissed