JUDGMENT A.K. Shrivastava, J. 1. This second appeal has been filed at the instance of Plaintiff-landlord whose suit on the ground of bona fide need as envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity, the "Act"), has been dismissed by the learned first appellate Court by allowing the appeal of the Respondent-tenant. 2. The Plaintiff-Appellant filed a suit for eviction on the grounds envisaged in Clauses (a) and (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act against the Respondent-tenant. So far as pleading of the Plaintiff of bona fide requirement is concerned, it has been pleaded by him that the suit accommodation is bona fidely required by him to carry on his business after getting the suit shop as well as other adjoining shops given to other tenants evicted, and he is not having any vacant non-residential accommodation of his own in his possession within the municipal limits of Gwalior. 3. The Defendant, by filing the written statement refuted this ground and further submitted that at present, the Plaintiff is carrying on business in a shop owned by his brother-in-law (wife's brother), and therfore, the need of the Plaintiff is not bona fide. Hence, it has been prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. The learned trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of parties, dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, however, need of the Plaintiff was found to be bona fide, and eventually, decreed the suit on that ground. 5. A first appeal was filed by the Respondent-tenant in which the Plaintiff filed cross-objections assailing the judgment of the learned trial Court not granting decree to him on the ground of non-payment of rent as envisaged under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The learned first appellate Court by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal of the tenant, dismissed the cross-objections of the Plaintiff, and dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff in toto. 6. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by the Appellant-Plaintiff. 7. This Court on 13.5.2002 admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: Whether the first appellate Court has erred in dismissing the suit by holding that the shop situated at Dal Bazar is the shop owned by the Plaintiff and is and alternate accommodation for satisfying his need? 8. 7. This Court on 13.5.2002 admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: Whether the first appellate Court has erred in dismissing the suit by holding that the shop situated at Dal Bazar is the shop owned by the Plaintiff and is and alternate accommodation for satisfying his need? 8. During the pendency of this appeal, three applications have been filed by the Respondent-Defendant. First application I.A. 14711/05 has been filed on 8.9.2005 under Order VI Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure to amend the written statement. Another application I.A.5976/09 has been filed by him on 22.4.2009 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Order VII Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure to amend the written statement on the basis of subsequent event, and third application I.A. 14248/09 has been filed by him on 3.9.2009 under Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure. 9. First application I.A. 14711/05 has been filed by the Respondent-Defendant to amend the written statement by adding certain facts that the Plaintiff-landlord got two shops evicted from tenants Vijay Kumar and Bhagwan Das one year prior to the date of filing of the application and another shop is in occupation of one tenant Biharilal and that shop is not still vacated and second appeal is pending in this Court. Till the shop in which Biharilal is tenaant is got vacated, the Plaintiff cannot start his business, and further that because the two shops got evicted from tenants Vijay Kumar and Bhagwan Das are still lying vacant and the Plaintiff has not started his business in those two shops, therefore, the need cannot be said to be bona fide and real intention of the Plaintiff is to sell the suit shop after getting it evicted. 10. So far as another application to amend the written statement (I.A. 5976/09) is concerned, the proposed amendment in the written statement which has been sought by the Defendant is that the Plaintiff is absconding because several criminal cases initiated against him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which are pending, in which arrest warrants against him have been issued, and therefore, the Plaintiff is not competent to start business, and presently also he is not carrying on any business. Alongwith the application under Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure (I.A. 14248/09), in order to substantiate the averment made in the amendment application I.A.5976/09 dated 22.4.2009, certified copies of two different complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed against the Plaintiff by Shrimati Umadevi and Vallabh Electronics, have been placed on record. 11. Appellant-Plaintiff refuted the averments made in all the applications by filing reply to all the three applications. Further it has been submitted that the amendment applications are mala fide because right from the very beginning, stand of the Plaintiff-Appellant is that after getting the four shops vacated, he will start the business. Three shops are given to other tenants and they are adjacent to the suit shop (fourth shop) and therefore, rightly the Plaintiff has not started the business after getting the two shops vacated from Vijay Kumar and Bhagwan Das. So far as third shop given to tenant Biharilal is concerned, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant-Plaintiff that second appeal No. 257/06 (Biharilal Bhardwaj v. Mahavir Prasad and Anr.) has been dismissed by this Court on 4.2.2008 and this Court has given time to Biharilal to vacate that shop within a period of one year and six months from the date of the judgment viz. from 4.2.2008. 12. Learned Counsel for the Appellant-Plaintiff further contended that the amendment application dated 22.4.2009 (I./A.5976/09) is mala fide. Merely because some cases have been initiated by some persons against the Plaintiff-Appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the bona fide need of the Plaintiff would not vanish and it would still persist, and therefore, the application dated 3.9.2009 (I.A. 14248/09) filed under Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure filed along with certified copies of the complaints against the Appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot be allowed. 13. Addressing on the substantial question of law, it has been argued by Shri Rajmani Bansal, learned Counsel for the Appellant-Plaintiff that the learned first appellate Court has dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff on the ground that he is carrying on the business in the shop of his brother-in-law (wife's brother), but since, that shop is not owned by the Plaintiff, said shop cannot be said to be reasonably suitable alternative accommodation of his own as envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Learned Counsel further submitted that bona fide need of the Plaintiff is required to be seen at the time of the institution of the suit. In this context, he has placed heavy reliance on a decision of the apex Court in Ramkubai v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak AIR 1999 SC 3089 . 14. On the other hand, Shri K.N. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondent-tenant has argued in support of the impugned judgment. Further it has been contended by the learned senior counsel that by allowing the abovesaid two amendment applications as well as the application under Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure, the matter be remanded to the learned trial Court after setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court to hold an enquiry after recording the evidence. 15. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed. Regarding I.A. No. 14711/05: After going through the plaint averments, this Court finds that right from very beginning, the stand of the Plaintiff in his suit is that after getting the three shops as well as the suit shop which is fourth one, vacated he would start business by constructing these shops into one premises. Hence, there is nothing unusual if the Plaintiff-landlod has not yet started the business in those two shops which were earlier occupied by Vijay Kumar and Bhagwan Das after they were vacated by these tenants. During the pendency of this second appeal, third shop in which Biharilal was the tenant has also been directed to be evicted by this Court in second appeal No. 257/06 on 4.2.2008. Copy of the order has been placed on record and passing of such type of judgment has not been disputed by learned senior counsel for the Defendant. Thus, today, two shops which the Plaintiff got vacated from Vijay Kumar and Bhagwan Das are with him and eviction order has already been passed against third tenant Biharilal and time of one year and six months has been allowed to him to vacate the said shop. Thus, the Appellant will get possession of the third shop in which Biharilal was the tenant somewhere in the month of August of this year. Fourth shop is the suit shop. Thus, the Appellant will get possession of the third shop in which Biharilal was the tenant somewhere in the month of August of this year. Fourth shop is the suit shop. Indeed, it is the case of the Plaintiff right from very beginning that he requires the suit shop as well as the three shops adjacent to the suit shop to start his business, and therefore, I.A. 14711/05 which is an application to amend the written statement is nothing but a mala fide application and the same is hereby dismissed. 16. Regarding IA. No. 5976/09: So far as this application under Order VI Rule 17 read with Order VII Rule 7 Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, merely because two complaints have been filed against the Appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, according to me, it cannot be said that bona fide need of the Plaintiff has been vanished. Even for the sake of argument, if the Plaintiff is hiding his identity in order to avoid his arrest in those two criminal cases, it cannot be said that his bona fide need has come to an end and therefore, I.A.5976/09 is also dismissed since it is a mala fide application. 17. Regarding I.A. 14248/09: Since I.A. No. 5976/09 has been dismissed, certainly, this third interlocutory application which has been filed under Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure is also to be dismissed because in support of I.A.5976/09 additional evidence has been sought to be adduced by the Defendant. Accordingly, this application is also dismissed. 18. Regarding substantial question of law: On going through the findings rendered by the learned first appellate Court, it is gathered that the shop in which the Plaintiff is presently carrying on his business was owned by his brother-in-law. The tenant has also admitted in his written statement, special plea para 11 that the said shop is of brother-in-law of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff is also confronted with this fact in his cross-examination. Hence, at the most this can be said that presently the Plaintiff is carrying on the business in the shop of which he is admittedly not the owner, but his brother-in-law is the owner. Hence, at the most this can be said that presently the Plaintiff is carrying on the business in the shop of which he is admittedly not the owner, but his brother-in-law is the owner. Under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, Plaintiff is required to prove that he is not having any other reasonably suitable vacant non-residential accommodation of his own in the town concerned, and therefore, presently even if the Plaintiff is carrying on business in the shop not owned by him but owned by his brother-in-law, and because that shop is not of his own, said accommodation cannot be said to be a reasonably suitable vacant non-residential accommodation of the Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff wants to start business of his own in his own shops (including the suit shop) honourably, he should not be asked by tenant-Respondent to carry on usiness in the shop of his brother-in-law (wife's brother), on the mercy of his brother-in-law. Hence, the finding by the learned first appellate Court holding that presently the Plaintiff is carrying on business in the shop of his brother-in-law, therefore, his need is not bona fide, runs de hors the real spirit of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 19. The need of the Plaintiff is required to be seen on the date of filing of the suit and in this context, learned Counsel for the Appellant has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of the apex Court in Ramkubi (supra). In a later decision in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava (2001) 1 SCC 604, again this principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court. In this decision, in paragraph 10, the Supreme Court has held that the crucial date for deciding as to bona fide requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. Further, it has been held that if every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord, there would perhaps be No. end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. It would be appropriate to quote para 10 of the judgment of Gaya Prasad (supra), which reads thus: We have No. doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. It would be appropriate to quote para 10 of the judgment of Gaya Prasad (supra), which reads thus: We have No. doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be No. end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young enterpreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthly longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. The Supreme Court in the abovesaid decision, in para 15 further held that the judicial tardiness for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. The Supreme Court in the abovesaid decision, in para 15 further held that the judicial tardiness for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many events are bound to take place and if the cause of action is to be sub-merged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system, it would shatter the confidence of the litigant despite the impairment already caused. Para 15 of the said decision reads thus: The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety causes the lis to creep through the line for long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many events are bound to take place and if the cause of action is to be sub-merged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system, it would shatter the confidence of the litigant despite the impairment already caused. Hence, according to me, the bona fide need of the Plaintiff is fully established. 20. Thus, the substantial question of law is answered that the learned first appellate Court has erred in dismissing the suit of the Plaintiff-Appellant by holding that the shop situated at Dal Bazar is the shop owned by the Plaintiff and is an alternative accommodation. 21. For the reasons stated herein above, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. Impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is hereby restored. Respondent shall bear the cost of this appeal. Counsel's fee Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten thousand) if pre-certified. 22. At the last, Shri K.N. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondent-tenant submitted that two years breathing reasonable time be given to the Defendant to vacate the suit premises. Present suit was filed on 9.7.1987, viz. more than twenty-two years ago. In between, the Plaintiff has fought against three other tenants also and now he is able to reap the fruit of the decree. Therefore, the prayer made by the learned senior counsel for the Respondent that two years time be granted to vacate the suit shop cannot be allowed. more than twenty-two years ago. In between, the Plaintiff has fought against three other tenants also and now he is able to reap the fruit of the decree. Therefore, the prayer made by the learned senior counsel for the Respondent that two years time be granted to vacate the suit shop cannot be allowed. However, looking to the facts and circumstances that another tenant Biharilal Bhardwaj has been directed to vacate the shop in which he was the tenant till August, 2010, it is hereby directed that the Respondent-tenant shall vacate the suit premises on or before 31st August, 2010 on the following terms and conditions: (i) The Respondent shall vacate the suit premises on or before 31st of August, 2010 and will not create any third party interest in the suit shop; (ii) entire costs of two Courts below as well as cost of this appeal shall be deposited by the Respondent before the learned trial Court on or before 31st March, 2010; (iii) the Respondent shall also deposit the entire amount of rent, if any due, before the learned trial Court on or before 31st March, 2010; (iv) the Respondent shall continue to deposit the monthly rent in accordance with Section 13 of the Act regularly in the learned trial Court; (v) aforesaid amount which shall be deposited by the Appellant the same may be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellant; and (vi) usual undertaking shall be submitted by the Respondent in that regard before the learned trial Court on or before 31st March, 2010. It is further made clear that if any of the conditions is violated by the Respondent, the Appellant shall be free to get the decree passed by the learned trial Court executed. 23. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and is disposed of.