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2010 DIGILAW 2391 (MAD)

T. A. Yuvaraj and Others v. T. Balakrishnama and Others

2010-06-15

P.R.SHIVAKUMAR

body2010
Judgment P.R. SHIVAKUMAR, J. The first defendant in the Original Suit is the appellant in A.S.No.159 of 2002. The defendants 2 to 6 in the Original Suit are the appellants in A.S.No.161 of 2002. The plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the original suit figure as respondents 1 and 2 in both the appeals. Both the appeals have been filed against the preliminary decree passed for partition in O.S. No.491 of 1993 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Erode. .2. Therespondents 1 and 2 in the appeals, as plaintiffs 1 and 2 filed the suit O.S. No.491 of 1993 on the file of the Principal Sub Court Erode for the relief of partition and separate possession of their share in the suit property. According to the plaint averments, the suit property was the self acquired property of their father Arumugham Naicker died Intestate in 1966 and his wives having predeceased him, the plaintiff’s and first defendant as the daughters and son of Arumugham Naicker became entitled to the suit property in equal shares. Thus, the respondents/plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to 2/3 share whereas the balance 1/3” share In the suit property alone would go to the first defendant (appellant in A.S.No.159 of 2002). Claiming that the first defendant/appellant was periodically giving some amount towards the share of the plaintiffs in the rental income derived from the suit property and stopped and refused to make such payment from January 1993 and that an attempt for an amicable partition pursuant to the mediation of Panchayatdars arranged by the plaintiffs became unsuccessful, they had to file the suit for partition. The suit was filed on 16. 1993 initially against the first defendant alone. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, the first defendant sold a portion of the suit property to the defendants 2 to 6 (appellants in A.S.No.161 of 2002) under a registered a sale deed dated 9. 1993. Hence, defendants 2 to 6 were subsequently impleaded as party defendants. .3. The suit was resisted by the first defendant by filing a written statement containing allegations, in brief, as follows; .The suit property was one among a number of properties jointly allotted to Arumugham Naicker, his wife Lakshmayee and his son Yuvaraj, the first defendant under a registered partition deed dated 112. 1943. .3. The suit was resisted by the first defendant by filing a written statement containing allegations, in brief, as follows; .The suit property was one among a number of properties jointly allotted to Arumugham Naicker, his wife Lakshmayee and his son Yuvaraj, the first defendant under a registered partition deed dated 112. 1943. Since Lakshmayee, predeceased Arumugham Naicker, Arumugham Naicker and his son Yuvaraj viz., the first defendant became entitled to the suit property in equal shares. The said Arumugham Naicker by virtue of a settlement deed dated 21. 1963 settled his 1/2share in favour of Yuvaraj, the first defendant/appellant in A.S.No. 159 of 2002. Ever since the execution of the said settlement deed, Yuvaraj, the first defendant/appellant in A.S.No.159 of 2002, enjoyed the property as his own to the exclusion of every other person including the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs. The rental income derived from the suit property was not shared by him with the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs as claimed by them in the plaint. In any event, even if it is assumed that the plaintiffs did have a right to have a share in the suit property, such right got extinguished by ouster. The first defendant/appellant in A.S.No. 159 of 2002 was dealing with the property through out as if he alone was the sole and absolute owner of the same for more than the statutory period and hence the claim of the respondents 1 and 2 herein/plaintiffs for partition should be rejected. 4. The defendants 2 to 6 besides adopting the writing statement of the first defendant, have also contended that they were the bona fide purchasers of the suit property for value without notice of the rights of the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs after getting encumbrance certificate and verifying the title deeds and also after consulting an advocate and that hence their right and title derived from the first defendant could not be defeated by the claim of the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs. 5. Based on the above said pleadings, five issues and one additional issue were framed by the trial Court which are as follows; Issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of partition as prayed for? 2. Whether the first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property as claimed in the written statement? 3. Whether the defendants have perfected title by adverse possession? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of partition as prayed for? 2. Whether the first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property as claimed in the written statement? 3. Whether the defendants have perfected title by adverse possession? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 5. To what relief the parties arejentitled?” Additional Issue: Whether the sale deed executed by the first defendant in favour of defendants 2 to 6 will bind the shares of the plaintiffs? 6. Based on the said pleadings of the parties and issues framed by the Court, the parties went on with the trial in which two witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2 and 9 documents were marked as Exhibits A-1 to A-9 on the side of the plaintiffs, whereas two witnesses were examined as D.Ws.1 and 2 and 18 documents were marked as Exhibits B-1 to B-18 on the side of the defendants. 7. The Court below, after considering the pleading and evidence in the light of the arguments advanced on either side, came to the conclusion that the suit property was jointly owned by Arumugham Naicker, his junior wife Lakshmayuee and Yuvaraj, son of Arumugham Naicker through Lakshmayee by virtue of a registered partition deed dated 112. 1943; that as such Lakshmayee had got 1/3 rd share whereas Arumugham Naicher and Yuvaraj got 1/3rd each; that on the death of Lakshmayee, her 1/3rd share devolved equally on her husband and children viz., Arumugham Naicker, Yuvaraj and plaintiffs 1 and 2 and thus the plaintiffs 1 and 2 became jointly entitled to 2/12 share; that Arumugham Naicker made a valid gift settlement of his 1/3rd share and the 1/12th share he got as a legal heir4 of his wife Lakshmayee to Yuvaraj, the first defendant by virtue of a registered settlement deed dated 25..1.1963 and that Yuvaraj, the first defendant thus became entitled to a total share of 10/12 in the suit property. The learned trial Judge also came to the conclusion that the plea of Ouster and adverse possession was not substantiated; that the plaintiffs were deemed to be in joint possession of the suit property; that the settlement deed dated 21. The learned trial Judge also came to the conclusion that the plea of Ouster and adverse possession was not substantiated; that the plaintiffs were deemed to be in joint possession of the suit property; that the settlement deed dated 21. 1963 executed by Arumugham Naicker in favour of Yuvaraj (the first defendant) was not binding on the plaintiffs in respect of their shares, that the suit was not barred by limitation and that hence the respondents 1 and 2 herein/plaintiffs 1 and 2 were entitled to a preliminary decree for partition and separate possession of their 2/12 share in the suit property. Based on the said findings, the Court below passed a preliminary decree directing division of the suit property into 12 equal shares and allotment of 2 such shares to the respondents 1 and 2 herein/plaintiffs. 8. Aggrieved by and challenging the correctness of the same, the first defendant has filed A.S.No. 159 of 2002 and the defendants 2 to 6 have filed A.S.No. 161 of 2002 on various grounds set out in the respective memorandum of appeal. 9. This Court heard the arguments advanced by Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel for the appellant who also figures as the 3rd respondent in A.S.No. 161 of 2002, by Mr. A.K.Kumarasamy, learned counsel for the appellants in A.S.No.161 of 2002 who also figure as respondents 3 to 7 in A.S. No. 159 of 2002 and by Sarvabhauman Associates for respondents 1 and2 in both the appeals viz. A.S. Nos. 159 and 161 of 2002. The entire materials available on record were also perused. 10. The points that arise for consideration in these appeals are as follows: “(1) Whether the settlement deed dated 21. 1963 executed by Arumugham Naicker in favour of his son Yuvaraj, the first defendant is true and binding on the respondents/plaintiffs? .(2) Whether yuvaraj, the first defendant has proved the plea of Ouster? .(3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? .(4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of partition? .(5) Whether the defendants 2 to 6’s rights are to be protected? Point No. 1 11. .(2) Whether yuvaraj, the first defendant has proved the plea of Ouster? .(3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? .(4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of partition? .(5) Whether the defendants 2 to 6’s rights are to be protected? Point No. 1 11. The respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs have come forward with the suit for partition based on the specific plea that the suit property was the self acquired and absolute property of their father Arumugham Naicker and that on the death of Arumugham Naicker intestate in 1966, the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the appellant in A.S. No. 159 of 2002/first defendant, as legal heirs of Arumugham Naicker in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, became entitled to 1/3 share each. It is not their case that they became entitled to any share in the suit property as legal heirs of Lakshmayee (the mother of the plaintiffs) who predeceased her husband Arumugham Naicker. In the said background, the plea of the plaintiffs for partition should be approached. .12. Lakshmayee was the junior wife of Arumugham Naicker. The senior wife of Arumugham Naicker was one Parvathi Ammal. Through Parvathi Ammal, Arumugham Naicker had got three sons, namely Venkatraman Naicker, Karupannasami Naicker and Gopalakrishnan. In their tender age, they lost their mother. After the death of Parvathi Ammal, Arumugham Naicker married Lakshmayee. The plaintiffs and the first defendant are the daughters 10 and son born to Arumugham Naicker through his junior wife Lakshmayee. Till those three sons of Arumugham Naicker born through his first wife attained majority, they were under the care and custody of their father Arumugham Naicker and step mother Lakshmayee. Thereafter on 9. 1943, Arumugham Naicker executed a registered settlement deed in favour of his second wife Lakshmayee in respect of his ancestral as well as self acquired properties. Pursuant to the execution of the said settlement deed, there arose a dispute between the sons of Arumugham Naicker through the first wife of on the one hand and Arumugham Naicker’s second wife and only son of Arumugham Naicker through the second wife viz., the first defendant on the other hand, pursuant to which there was a mediation at the intervention of the elders and well wishes resulting in the execution of a registered partition deed on 112. 1943. 1943. A certified copy of the said partition deed has been produced and marked as Exhibit A-4. Under Exhibit A-4, the suit property was allotted jointly to Arumugham Naicker, Yuvaraj and Lakshmayee. Exhibit A-5 is the certified copy of the settlement deed dated 9. 1943 which was the cause for and which preceded the partition under Exhibit A-4. It was agreed therein that no right shall be claimed by anybody under the settlement deed dated 9. 1943 executed by Arumugham Naicker in favour of Lakshmayee. The properties of the family divided into ‘A’ schedule and ‘B’ schedule and ‘A’ Schedule was jointly allotted to Arumugham Naicker, his wife Lakshmayee and Yuvaraj, the first defendant. The properties described in Schedule “B” in Exhibit A-4 were allotted to the three sons of Arumugham Naicker born through the first wife, Parvathi Ammal. Thus, there was a complete division in respect of the family properties between the two groups. .13. The suit property is the immovable property included in Schedule ‘A’ of Exhibit A-4 and allotted to Arumugham Naicker, Lakshmayee and Yuvaraj. The other properties included in the said ‘A’ schedule were cash of Rs.1,500/- and an iron box worth about Rs.1,00/-. After the said partition was effected under Exhibit A-4, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into effect. After the same came into effect, Lakshmayee, the mother of the plaintiffs and first defendant died intestate on 1. 1961. Exhibit A-2 is the certified extract of the Birth and Death Register of Lakshmayee, Arumugham Naicker died on 11. 1966. The Death Register Extract is Exhibit A3. Thus, it is obvious that Lakshmayee predeceased her husband. The above said facts have been admitted and not disputed. It is an undisputed fact and it is obvious from the contents of Exhibit A-4 that the suit property was allotted jointly to Arumugham Naicker, Lakshmayee and Yuvaraj under Exhibit A-4 partition deed dated 12. 1943. There is nothing in the document to show that Lakshmayee got only a right to enjoy the property till her life time and that after her life time the property would become the absolute property of Arumugham Naicker and Yuvaraj. The entire property was allotted jointly to those three persons. As such, the necessary legal consequence and the necessary inference snail be that ail the three would be entitled to equal rights in the property allotted to them jointly. The entire property was allotted jointly to those three persons. As such, the necessary legal consequence and the necessary inference snail be that ail the three would be entitled to equal rights in the property allotted to them jointly. It is not the case of either of the parties that Lakshmayee, one of the three persons in whose favour the suit property was allotted under Exhibit A-4, was added in the said deed only as a formal party without having any right to a share in the said property. It is also not the case of defendants that it was intended to give her a share with limited right to enjoy the same toll her life time in lieu of maintenance. Even in such an event, on the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, such a limited right would have enlarged into an absolute right. In this case, a gift had been made by way of a registered settlement deed by Arumugham Naicker on 9. 1943, registered as Document No. 2961 of 1943 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Erode. The properties that were the subject matter of the gift under the said settlement deed, admittedly comprised of Arumugham Naicker’s ancestral properties and self acquired properties. Yuvaraj (first defendant), Arumugham Naicker and the three sons of Arumugham Naicker born through his first wife were having interest in the ancestral property as coparceners. That is the reason why a dispute arose among them which resulted in a Panchayat settlement leading to the execution of Exhibit A-4 registered partition deed. Only recognition of her right at least to some extent by virtue of the gift made under the settlement deed dated 9. 1943 Lakshmayee was added as one of the three persons to whom the properties described in Schedule ‘A’ of Exhibit A-4 was allotted. That is the reason why there is absence of any recital in Exhibit A-4 that Lakshmayee would have only a limited right of enjoying her share till her life time. As such, this Court shall have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Lakshmayee got equal right along with her husband Arumugham Naicker and son Yuvaraj in respect of the suit property under Exhibit A-4 partition deed and that thus she became entitled to a common 1/3rd share in the suit property. As such, this Court shall have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Lakshmayee got equal right along with her husband Arumugham Naicker and son Yuvaraj in respect of the suit property under Exhibit A-4 partition deed and that thus she became entitled to a common 1/3rd share in the suit property. The finding of the Court below that Lakshmayee became entitled to 1/3 share in the suit property under Exhibit A-4 partition deed was made on proper appreciation of evidence and the same deserves confirmation. 14. In the foregoing paragraphs we have seen that Lakshmayee became entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property by virtue of the partition deed dated 112. 1943, a certified copy of which has been produced as Exhibit A-4. It is not in dispute that Lakshmayee, her husband Arumugham Naicker and their son Yuvaraj (the first defendant) were living together as one family till the death of Lakshmayee in 1961. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute over the fact that at the time of her death Lakshmayee was having a common 1/3 rd share in the suit property as a co-owner,. Since Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had come into force before the death of Lakhsmayee, succession to her 1/3rd hare shall be governed by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act regarding intestate succession. As per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, her husband and each one of her children became her legal heirs and each one of them was entitled to an equal share in the 1/3rd share of Lakhsmayee in the suit property. Arumugham Naicker, being her husband, Yuvaraj (first defendant) being her son and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 being her daughters were the four persons who became entitled to an equal share in the share of Lakshmayee in the suit property. Thus, plaintiffs 1 and 2 became entitled to 1/12 share each. The husband of Lakshmayee viz., Arumugham Naicker became entitled to 1/3 + 1/12 = 5/12 share in the suit property. Similarly, yuvaraj, the first defendant became entitled 1/3 + 1/12 = 5/12 in the suit property. .15. It is the case of the defendants that Arumugham Naicker claiming ½ share in the suit property executed a registered gift settlement deed, a certified copy of the said settlement deed dated 21. Similarly, yuvaraj, the first defendant became entitled 1/3 + 1/12 = 5/12 in the suit property. .15. It is the case of the defendants that Arumugham Naicker claiming ½ share in the suit property executed a registered gift settlement deed, a certified copy of the said settlement deed dated 21. 1963 has been produced and marked on the side of the defendants as Exhibit B-2, giving his entire share in respect of the suit property to Yuvaraj the first defendant. As pointed out supra, Arumugham Naicker was entitled to 5/12th share alone and not ½ share. However, on an erroneous assumption and on erroneous claim that on the death of Lakshmayee, her share in the suit property equally devolved upon Arumugham Naicker and Yuvaraj (first defendant) alone and the daughters of Lakshmayee viz., the plaintiffs stood excluded from the category of legal heirs entitled to succeed to the property of Lakshmayee, the said settlement deed came to be executed with the intention of making Yuvaraj, the first defendant, the sole owner of th suit property. Such an erroneous assumption and such a disposition under the said settlement deed within two years after the death of Lakshmayee, shall not have the effect of taking away the right of the plaintiffs to have a share in the suit property as the legal heirs of Lakshmayee. Therefore, the above said gift settlement deed executed by Arumugham Naicker in favour of his son Yuvaraj (first defendant) shall not be binding upon the plaintiffs insofar as their shares are concerned. The Court below has also arrived at a correct conclusion, in this regard, in holding that the said settlement deed shall not be binding upon the plaintiffs and the shares of the plaintiffs were not affected or extinguished by the said settlement deed, a certified copy of which has been marked as Exhibit B-2. .Point Nos. 2 and 3: 16. In the previous paragraph, it has been held that the settlement deed dated 21. 1963, a certified copy of which has been marked as Exhibit B-2 shall not be binding upon the respondents 1 and 2 /plaintiffs and their shares in the suit property as legal heirs of lashmayee was not affected by the same. 2 and 3: 16. In the previous paragraph, it has been held that the settlement deed dated 21. 1963, a certified copy of which has been marked as Exhibit B-2 shall not be binding upon the respondents 1 and 2 /plaintiffs and their shares in the suit property as legal heirs of lashmayee was not affected by the same. However, the defendants have taken a specific plea that the first defendant had perfected title in respect of the suit property in its entirety including the share of the plaintiffs by ouster and adverse possession, it is also the contention of the appellants/defendants 1 to 6 that the suit is bared by the law of limitation. Regarding the claim of ouster and adverse possession. It is the contention of the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs that any secret arrangement by the first defendant himself with his father Arumugham Naicker would not amount to Ouster and adverse possession so far as the shares of the plaintiffs are concerned; that since the plaintiffs were co-owners, the possession of the suit property by Yuvaraj, the first defendant/appellant in A.S.No. 159 of 2002 should be construed to be a possession on behalf of the plaintiffs also and that thus the plaintiffs wee deemed to be in joint possession of the suit property. It is their further contention that the suit property was not in actual possession of either the plaintiffs or the first defendant and that the same had been let out to tenants and that till January 1993, the first defendant was regularly paying a me agree amount towards the share of the plaintiffs in the rent. By making such a specific plea that they were in receipt of a small amount though not equal to their share from the rental income, the plaintiffs had claimed that the property was in the joint possession of the plaintiffs and the first defendant; that only from January 1993, when the first defendant refused to pay any amount towards the share of the plaintiffs in the rental income derived from the suit property, his possession could be taken to be one in assertion of his supposed absolute title to the suit property in its entirety; that the suit has been filed within one year thereafter i.e., on 17. 1993 and that hence the suit was not barred by limitation. .17. 1993 and that hence the suit was not barred by limitation. .17. Per contra, it is the contention of the defendants that at no point of time after the death of Lakshmayee, the plaintiffs were paid any amount as their share in the rental income derived from the suit property; that at no point of time the plaintiffs were in either actual or constructive possession of the suit property along with the first defendant and that at least from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed there was open assertion of hostile title by the first defendant and proclaimed exclusion of the plaintiffs from the enjoyment of the suit property as co-owners. It is also the contention of the defendants that right from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed the first defendant was dealing with the suit property as if he alone was the absolute owner of the same to the exclusion of all others and that such enjoyment with open assertion of title hostile to that of the plaintiffs and proclaimed exclusion of the plaintiffs for more than 12 years resulted in the extinguishment of the right of the plaintiffs by ouster and the perfection of title by ouster and adverse possession to the whole of the suit property by the first defendant. In this regard, besides the clear testimony of the first defendant as D.W.1, the defendants have also produced Exhibits B-3 to B-17 to show that the entire property was enjoyed by the first defendant as its absolute owner by the creating mortgages and discharging such mortgages. Exhibit B-3 is a certified copy of a mortgage deed dated 25. 1965 executed by the first defendant Yuvaraj in favour of one Shanmugavalli Aachi. The same was registered as Document No.1251 of 1965 on the file of the Joint Sub-Registrar, Erode. In the said document, the title of the mortgagor (the first defendant) was traced to Exhibit B-2 .settlement deed dated 21. 1963. 18. Exhibit B-4 is another registered mortgage deed executed by the first defendant in respect of a portion of the suit property in favour of one Haji Julaika Bibi on 18. 1983. The same was registered as Document No. 2973 of 1983 on the file of Joint Sub-Registrar No. 1, Erode. 1963. 18. Exhibit B-4 is another registered mortgage deed executed by the first defendant in respect of a portion of the suit property in favour of one Haji Julaika Bibi on 18. 1983. The same was registered as Document No. 2973 of 1983 on the file of Joint Sub-Registrar No. 1, Erode. The titled house and vacant space on the west of the building that had been leased out to post office was the subject matter of Exhibit B-4 mortgage deed. Exhibit B-5 is another registered mortgage deed dated 20.8.1983 executed by the first defendant in respect of another portion of the suit property. The same was registered as Document No. 2974 of 1983 in favour of the very same person Haji Julaika Bibi. Both Exhibits B-4 and B-5 were executed as usufrctuary mortgages. Exhibit B-6 is yet another registered mortgage deed dated 14. 1984 executed by the first defendant in favour of one Jayaparakasam as simple mortgage. Exhibit B-7 is another registered deed of mortgage dated 19. 1987 executed in favour of Haji Julaika Bibi as usufrctuary mortgage. Exhibit B-8 to B-11 are receipts issued by the mortgagees for the discharge of those mortgage debts. In all those mortgage deeds, the first defendant had traced his title to Exhibit B-2 settlement deed dated 21. 1963. Exhibits B-12 to B-16 are the House Tax receipts for the suit property in the name of the first defendant. The oldest of the House Tax receipts is of the year 1990. It is also evident from the admission of one Karunakaran examined as P.W.2 on the side of the plaintiffs that he had lent Rs. 10,000/- to Yuvaraj, the first defendant on a mortgage and he filed a suit for the recovery of the said mortgage debt and that the first defendant discharged the mortgage debt by making payment of a sum of Rs.20,000/- towards principal and interest. The discharge receipt issued by the counsel for P.W.2 in the execution petition in the suit filed by P.W.2 against the first defendant has been produced and marked as Exhibit B-17. 19. From the above said documents and the admission of P.W.2 himself, it is quite obvious that right from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed i.e., from 21. The discharge receipt issued by the counsel for P.W.2 in the execution petition in the suit filed by P.W.2 against the first defendant has been produced and marked as Exhibit B-17. 19. From the above said documents and the admission of P.W.2 himself, it is quite obvious that right from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed i.e., from 21. 1963, the first defendant was asserting absolute title to the exclusion of others in respect of the suit property and was dealing with the same as if the same absolutely belonged to him in its entirety. P.W.2 himself has made a clear admission that the rent on the suit property was collected by the first defendant alone; that the first defendant had mortgaged the property to a Muslim women and that the plaintiffs did not join in the execution of the said mortgage deeds. Even in respect of the mortgage created in favour of P.W.2, he had chosen to proceed against the first defendant alone. Apart from the clear testimony of D.W,.1, regarding his assertion of hostile title from the date of Exhibit B-2 one Govindasami an attestor of the said settlement deed has given clear evidence regarding the execution of the settlement deed by Arumugham Naicker in favour of the first defendant. As against such voluminous evidence both oral and documentary adduced on the side of the defendants that the first defendant was asserting title to the entirety of the suit property right from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed, there is no evidence excepting the interested testimony of P.W.1 to show that at any point of time after the date of Exhibit B-2, the plaintiffs rights in the suit property were recognized or the plaintiffs were given a share in the rental income derived from the suit property. .20. Exhibit A-1 is the legal heir certificate issued by the Tahsildar showing the plaintiffs and the first defendant as the legal heirs of the deceased Lakshmayee. Exhibit A-2 is the Death Register extract showing the date of death of Lakshmayee. Exhibit A-3 is the death certificate showing the date of death of Arumugham Naicker. They shall not be enough to show that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property either actual or constructive or that they were receiving a share in the rental income derived from the suit property. Exhibit A-3 is the death certificate showing the date of death of Arumugham Naicker. They shall not be enough to show that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property either actual or constructive or that they were receiving a share in the rental income derived from the suit property. Exhibit A-7 is the certified copy of the Commissioner’s report and plan filed in I.A. No. 755 of 1996 in O.S. No. 681 of 1996 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Erode filed by the plaintiffs against the first defendant. The certified copy of the judgment pronounced in the said case by the I Additional District Munsif. Erode has been filed as Exhibit B-1. In the said case, they had prayed for an injunction not to alienate or encumber the suit property claiming that they had a common 2/3 share in the suit property. The said suit was ultimately dismissed by the trial Court as seen from Exhibit B-1. .21. A Certified copy of the decree passed in O.S. No. 350 of 1985 on the file of Principal Sub Judge, Erode, filed by PW2 against the first defendant for the recovery of mortgage debt by the sale of the suit property has been produced as Exhibit A8. It is pertinent to note that the said suit was filed only against Yuvaraj, the first defendant and not against the plaintiffs. The other document filed by plaintiff is Exhibit A-9, a post card allegedly written by Arumugham Naicker. The same shall not negative the claim of the first defendant that he has asserted absolute title to the suit property from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed. Though the authenticity of Exhibit A-9 is not admitted by the defendants, D.W.2 has admitted the signature found in Exhibit A-9 to be that of Arumugham Naicker. However, the contents of the said document are to the effect that the had fallen sick and he needed money for his expenses and that he wanted D.W.2 to get Rs.10/-from Karupannasami or Venkatesammal and give it to him. The same shall not be enough to negative the claim of the first defendant that he was asserting absolute title over the suit property right from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed. The same shall not be enough to negative the claim of the first defendant that he was asserting absolute title over the suit property right from the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed. As against such evidence both oral and documentary adduced on the side of the defendants which are more than sufficient to show that from the date of Exhibit B-2 i.e., 21. 1963, the fist defendant was asserting his absolute title over the suit property and that at no point of time subsequent to the above said date, the plaintiffs were either in actual or constructive possession of the suit property or in receipt of any share in the rental income derived from the suit property. There is no document to show that they paid any share towards the payment of House Tax. There is also no scrap of paper to show that their right to be in joint possession was recognized by the first defendant at any point of time after the date of Exhibit B-2. It is pertinent to note that the plaintiffs themselves have not chosen to claim that they are entitled to a share in the suit property by way of succession as legal heirs of Lakshmayee. On the other hand, they have made a plea that the suit property was the self acquired property of their father and that hence on the death of their father they, along with the first defendant became entitled to a share in the suit property. The very fact that the plaintiffs have chosen to take such a stand will go to show that at no point of time the plaintiffs either asserted or exercised their right as co-owner in respect of the suit property as legal heirs of their mother Lakshmayee. If all these factors are taken into consideration and properly analysed, then the Court can conveniently arrive at a conclusion that the defendants have made out a clear case of ouster and adverse possession in respect of the 2/12 share of the plaintiffs in the suit property as they were excluded from possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the open assertion of absolute title by the first defendant which was hostile to the interest of the plaintiffs from 21. 1963 for more than 12 yeas and upto the date of filing of the suit. 1963 for more than 12 yeas and upto the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that defendants had not substantiated their case of ouster deserves to be reversed. .22. Inthe previous paragraph, it has been pointed out that a case of ouster and adverse possession extinguishing the right the plaintiffs in the suit property has been made put by the defendants. It has also been held that the possession of the first defendant became adverse to that of the plaintiffs from 21. 1963, the date of Exhibit B-2 settlement deed. Therefore, from the said date the possession of the property by first defendant became one for himself and it shall not be deemed to be a possession on behalf of the plaintiffs also. As such, the limitation for seeking partition and separate possession viz., started from the said date 21. 1963. The contention of the plaintiffs that they were not aware of the existence of such a settlement deed cannot be believed, as there are sufficient evidence to show that despite the fact that the first defendant was dealing with the property as if it were his absolute property by executing registered documents, the plaintiffs kept quite. As the suit has not been filed within 12 years from the date on which the possession of the first defendant became adverse, the present suit filed by the plaintiffs it s to be held as one barred by limitation. We have seen that though Lakshmayee, the mother of the plaintiffs did have a common 1/3rd share in the suit property by virtue of Exhibit A4 partition deed, after her death in 1961, Arumugham Naicker executed a settlement deed under Exhibit B-2 on the supposition that Arumugham Naicker and yuvaraj alone wee the legal heirs entitled to succeed to the share of Lakshmayee and thus, they were entitled to the suit property in equal moieties. The same was done purporting confer title in respect of his ½ share and thus making the first defendant Yuvaraj, as the absolute owner of the suit property. The same was done purporting confer title in respect of his ½ share and thus making the first defendant Yuvaraj, as the absolute owner of the suit property. It is the case of the defendants that thereafter the first defendant perfected title to the suit property in its entirety by ouster and adverse possession by excluding the plaintiffs over and above the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act and that thus the rights of the plaintiffs got extinguished by ouster. It has also been held that the suit is barred by limitation. Therefore, the suit filed by the respondents herein/plaintiffs for partition deserves to be dismissed on that score alone. .Point No. 5: .23. Defendants 2 to 6 have chosen to purchase the suit property under a sale deed dated 9. 1993, a certified copy of which has been marked as Exhibit B-18. As the said sale was effected during the pendency of the suit, the same shall be subject to the result of the lis. Since the plaintiffs’ claim for partition is negatived and it has been held that their right in the suit property has got extinguished by ouster, the right of the defendants 2 to 6 derived under Exhibit B-18 sale deed is not affected. .Point No. 4 .24. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that the decision arrived at by the Court below that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary decree for partition and the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court directing division of suit property into 12 equal shares and allotment of two such shares to the plaintiffs shall be held defective, informs and liable to be set aside and reversed in this appeal. Accordingly, the preliminary decree shall be set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed. Considering the nature of the case and other facts and circumstances of the case, it shall be appropriate to direct the parties to bear their respective costs fo litigation in both the Courts. 25. In the result, both the appeals are allowed without cost and the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court is set aside. The original Suit No.491 of 1993 on the file of Principal Sub Judge, Erode, shall stand dismissed without cost.