Arjun Prasad, Son Of Sri Ram Pati Singh v. State Of Bihar
2010-11-02
BIRENDRA PRASAD VERMA, S.K.KATRIAR
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT Sudhir Kumar Katriar, J. 1. The writ petition has been preferred with the prayer to set aside the order dated 17.5.1996 (Annexure-2), passed by the District Transport Officer, Nalanda, in Case No. 475 of 1994-95, and the consequential demand notice dated 17.5.1996, Nalanda, whereby the Petitioners application under the provisions of Section 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for surrender of his trailer has been rejected. The writ petition is further directed against the consequential order dated 17.5.1996 (Annexure-3), which is in the nature of demand notice to pay the road tax. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this writ petition may be indicated. The Petitioner was, at the relevant point of time, owner of a trailer bearing registration No. BHY 5732. The Petitioner submitted his application dated 8.3.1994 (Annexure-1), to Respondent No. 5, stating therein that the trailer has been rendered useless and functionless because of wear and tear. On account of poor financial condition, he is unable to have the same repaired and is, therefore, lying unused at his residence. It was further stated in this application that he was simultaneously surrendering the owner book as well as tax token with the request that the licence may be cancelled. It is relevant to state that a photo-copy of the same is marked Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. It was registered as Case No. 475 of 1994-95, has been rejected by the order dated 17.5.1996, followed by the demand notice of the same date (Annexure-3), and impugned herein. 3. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. It appears to us from a perusal of order-sheet marked Annexure-2 to the writ petition that, Respondent No. 5 had inspected the parking space of the trailer in question, and on all the occasions had found it parked at home. This evidently leads to the conclusion that after the trailer was surrendered, it was not plied by the Petitioner. It is entirely Petitioners volition to ply or not to ply his vehicle. The tax under the Act is in the nature of a compulsory exaction and, has, therefore, to be within the strict parameters of law. 4.
This evidently leads to the conclusion that after the trailer was surrendered, it was not plied by the Petitioner. It is entirely Petitioners volition to ply or not to ply his vehicle. The tax under the Act is in the nature of a compulsory exaction and, has, therefore, to be within the strict parameters of law. 4. We must also note the contention advanced on behalf of the learned Government counsel that the Petitioners application dated 8.3.1994, does not state, nor is there any material on record to show, that the Petitioner had surrendered the trailer. The contention is stated only to be rejected. Surrender of the trailer does not imply that the possession of the trailer has to be handed over to the authorities at their office. Surrender in this connection means intention of the owner of the trailer not to ply it accompanied surrender of documents. These ingredients of Section 55 of the Act are clearly met. We find no justification for the impugned order and the demand notice. 5. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.5.1996 (Annexure-2), and the consequential demand notice dated 17.5.1996 (Annexure-3), are hereby quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.