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2010 DIGILAW 243 (AP)

Sannala Brahma Rao @ Brahmaji v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Krishna District

2010-03-30

P.S.NARAYANA

body2010
JUDGMENT : Petitioner is resident of Bantumilli Village in Krishna District. Statedly his grandfather purchased land admeasuring Acs.0.60 in R.S.No.111/2 under a registered sale deed dated 17.6.1953 from Veera Satyanarayana. It appears that grandfather had also purchased another extent of Ac.1.00 in the same survey number under registered sale deed dated 11.2.1959 from Smt.Jaina Bibi. Petitioner and his brother succeeded to the property equally by virtue of registered Will dated 12.8.1977 executed by grandfather. Petitioner obtained pattadar passbooks and title deeds in respect of his share to an extent of Acs.0.80 in R.S.No.111/2. Some time in 2009, petitioner was selected as LPG dealer by Bharat Gas Company. As per the requirement, he obtained necessary explosives licence from the Joint Collector and constructed LPG cylinder godown. At that stage, second respondent initiated action under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (the Act), and issued notice in Form No.1 to assignee and notice in Form No.2 to alienee. Petitioner submitted explanation and the matter is pending before second respondent. An order under Section 4 of the Act is yet to be passed. In the mean while, second respondent issued impugned notice dated 07.3.2010, which reads as under. N O T I C E Sub:- Government Lands – Bantumilli Mandal – Construction of Bharat Gas distribution center by Sri Sannala Brahma Rao, S/o.Ratna Rao in Govt. land without any proper title over the land – prohibited to pen Bharat Gas distribution center against Civil Supplies Rules – Intimated. It is observed that Sri Sannala Brahma Rao, S/o. Ratna Rao of Bantumilli Village constructing pucca building for distribution of Bharat Gas in R.S.No.111/2 an extent of Acs.0.80 Cents out of Acs.4.09 Cents of the Bantumilli Village. As seen from the Village records the said land was assigned to Sri Shaik Hussain by the Government. As per the conditions laid down in the said patta the land is heritable but not alienable. Hence, Sri Sannala Brahma Rao, S/o.Ratna Rao who is now constructing a building in the Government assigned land is not at all eligible to purchase the condition patta land assigned to a poor man by the Government. I am therefore initiating action under Act of 9/77 in this regard. Hence Sri Sannala Brahma Rao, S/o.Ratna Rao, Bantumilli, is hereby directed not to enter into the Government land mentioned above and should not proceed further construction. I am therefore initiating action under Act of 9/77 in this regard. Hence Sri Sannala Brahma Rao, S/o.Ratna Rao, Bantumilli, is hereby directed not to enter into the Government land mentioned above and should not proceed further construction. He is also informed that Bharat gas distribution center shall not be constructed in Government lands as per the civil supplies rules. Sd/- xxx xxx Tahsildar, Bantumilli. To Sri Sannala Brahma Rao, S/o.Ratna Rao, Bantumilli. Assailing the said notice prohibiting the petitioner from entering the land in R.S.No.111/2 admeasuring Acs.0.80 present writ petition is filed. Second respondent filed counter affidavit giving details of the action taken under the Act and the notices issued in Form Nos.1 and 2 and explanation submitted by petitioner. It is admitted that an order under Section 4 of the Act has not so far been passed. This Court heard the counsel for petitioner and the Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue (Assignment). From the pleadings and the submissions made by rival counsel, the point that arises for consideration is whether the Tahsildar has power and jurisdiction under the Act and the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Rules, 2007, to prohibit a person in possession of assigned land from entering the land or enjoying the land. It is now well settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under the Act, such act must be done in that manner or not at all. In Taylor v Taylor 1875 (1) Ch.D 426, the principle is stated as under. When a statutory power is conferred for the first time upon a Court and the mode of exercising it is pointed out, it means that no other mode is to be adopted..........on a great varieties of Acts where application has been directed to be by petition, and it has been laid down that being the mode appointed by the Act which conferred the jurisdiction, it must exercise the jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Act. In the same way, when the Statute says who is the person to petition, it means that the person or persons so described, and no others, shall be entitled to petition, otherwise any one interested might petition under the general principle that when powers are to be exercised by a Court of law any person interested in calling those powers into execution is entitled to come before the Court, and the only reason for putting in such a section is to show that that is not the meaning of the Legislature, but that the right of calling for the exercise of the powers shall be confined to the persons so described. (emphasis supplied) In Nazir Ahmed v Emperor Air 1936 Pc 253 (2), Privy Council reiterated the principle. In G.E.Board v Giridharlal Air 1969 Sc 267 and State of Gujarat v Shantilal Air 1969 Sc 634 , the Supreme Court laid down that when power is conferred by the Legislature prescribing the mode for exercise of power, it must be exercised only in that manner and in no other manner. The principle was again reiterated in Shiv Kumar Chadha v Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993) 3 Scc 161 and Babu Verghese v Bar Council of Kerala (1999) 3 Scc 422 . The Act or the Rules do not contain any provision empowering the Tahsildar from passing an order such as the one impugned in the writ petition. Of course, if ultimately an order is passed under Section 4 of the Act for resumption of assigned land for contravention of the provisions under Section 3 of the Act subject to the right of appeal under Section 4-A and revision under Section 4-B of the Act, the land can always be resumed in which event all the constructions made on the land resumed shall vest in the Government and the person in possession cannot have any right to claim such property. Admittedly an order under Section 4 of the Act is yet to be passed by the second respondent and, therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable. This Court makes it clear that the observations made herein above are intended for the purpose of this order and they do not in any manner bind second respondent while deciding the case depending on the record and the evidence produced by the parties. This Court makes it clear that the observations made herein above are intended for the purpose of this order and they do not in any manner bind second respondent while deciding the case depending on the record and the evidence produced by the parties. The writ petition, with the above observations, is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.