JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard the counsel for the appellant Sri Manish Kumar, Sri H.P. Srivastava for the State and Sri Ram Prakash for respondent No. 4. 2. The appellant, Santosh Kumar Rai, is presently posted as Station House Officer in the Fire Department in district Barabanki. The respondent No. 4 is a Sepoy working under him. The respondent No. 4 was placed under suspension for alleged misconduct and thereafter during suspension, an order has been passed transferring him from Barabanki to Shahjahanpur. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed the present writ petition challenging the order of transfer on various grounds. 4. There was no allegation against the present appellant in the writ petition nor he was made a party. 5. The learned Single Judge, however, has come to the conclusion that the challenge of respondent No. 4 to his transfer does not have any merit and, therefore, he declined to interfere with the transfer of respondent No. 4, but made certain observations against the present appellant, saying that the very fact that the appellant has filed caveat to oppose the writ petition, shows his anxiety against the appellant, on whose behest the enquiry was also being held and the respondent No. 4 has been ousted from the district. 6. The learned Single Judge has also observed that the Caveator’s lawyer Sri Rakesh Kumar Yadav has not appeared before him and that it is a fact that the appellant is the complainant in this matter and the F.I.R. has been lodged at his behest on 16.5.2010. 7. Taking these factors into consideration, and after observing that for maintaining law and order situation, he issued a direction that the appellant be also transferred out of district Barabanki forthwith and necessary approval from the higher authorities may be obtained on the basis of the said direction. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has supported the aforesaid order saying that the very fact that the appellant filed caveat in a matter in which he was not impleaded as a party, shows mala fide on his part and the observation made by the learned Single Judge with respect to him, does not require any interference in this special appeal. 9. We have considered the arguments raised and gone through the record of the writ petition and the order under appeal, as well. 10. 9. We have considered the arguments raised and gone through the record of the writ petition and the order under appeal, as well. 10. At the outset, we would like to observe that in a given case, High Court may be justified in passing an order, namely, issuing directions for taking action against any Government servant/public servant. The Court can also direct for holding enquiry, in case charge of misconduct comes to its knowledge or is brought before the Court, may be either by ordering the public servant to be placed under suspension or to hold the enquiry without suspension. The direction for transferring an employee whose posting at a particular place is not warranted or is not in public interest or in the interest of the institution/office where he is working, can also be issued but the High Court has to exercise restraint in issuing such directions, as it would be in very rare cases, where the High Court would be obliged to take the aforesaid authority in itself and the responsibility of administration, on its own shoulders. 11. It is for the concerned authority of the department, may be the Government, to see whether the employee should be allowed to continue at a particular place of posting and if any misconduct is committed by such an employee, to hold an enquiry and pass appropriate orders. 12. In the instant case, we find that there was nothing on record of the writ petition, so as to persuade the learned Single Judge to issue a direction for transferring the appellant outside the district. 13. Care has to be taken in a case where a subordinate employee makes any allegation against his superior officer or immediate boss and unless the allegations of mala fide, victimization or oppression are, prima facie, proved, any direction which affects the superior officer need not be issued. 14. Interference by the High Court in matters, where superior officer is proceeding to take action against a subordinate employee, or has suggested any action because of his misbehaviour or misconduct and who is charged of indiscipline, punishing the superior officer at that stage, will create indiscipline and administrative chaos in the department. Such an action is not required. 15. 14. Interference by the High Court in matters, where superior officer is proceeding to take action against a subordinate employee, or has suggested any action because of his misbehaviour or misconduct and who is charged of indiscipline, punishing the superior officer at that stage, will create indiscipline and administrative chaos in the department. Such an action is not required. 15. Few words of caution are necessary at this juncture, namely, in all such matters where a complaint is made against the superior officer by a subordinate employee, the Court has to satisfy itself first, that conduct of the superior officer is not only uncalled for but is also a result of bias and leads to victimization and oppression, and if it is found that the wrong order passed by the superior officer or a direction issued, smacks of mala fide and his personal bias, adversely affecting the subordinate employee, appropriate directions can be issued, besides quashing the illegal and arbitrary orders. However, if any order is incorrect and illegal, but does not suffer from malice or bias, it will be liable to be set aside on legal grounds. 16. The mere fact that an impression was given by the respondent No. 4 that the F.I.R. was lodged because of the action taken by the appellant, would not mean that it was a mala fide or deliberate action, for the reason that if there was a case of lodging F.I.R. against respondent No. 4, the appellant being the superior officer, had to take the steps, which were required under law. 17. Sri Manish Kumar, at this juncture, explains that, in fact, the appellant made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Barabanki, about the gross misbehaviour of the respondent and intemperate language used by him, who directed on the same day for lodging the F.I.R. 18. There was nothing on record before the learned Single Judge or before us, to find out the truthfulness of the F.I.R. nor we are adjudicating upon the correctness or validity of the F.I.R., so lodged. 19. The observation of the learned Single Judge that because the appellant filed a caveat and his counsel did not appear, coupled with the allegation regarding lodging of F.I.R. taking it as manipulation, again cannot be a ground for issuing a direction for transfer of the appellant. 20. 19. The observation of the learned Single Judge that because the appellant filed a caveat and his counsel did not appear, coupled with the allegation regarding lodging of F.I.R. taking it as manipulation, again cannot be a ground for issuing a direction for transfer of the appellant. 20. As a matter of fact, the F.I.R. has been lodged on the direction of the Superintendent of Police, on the complaint made by the appellant, validity of which can only be adjudged in the trial or in the appropriate forum, as the case may be. 21. It appears that the appellant in the circumstances in which he was working alongwith the respondent, was apprehensive that may be while challenging the order of transfer in the Court, he may be impleaded as a party and, therefore, by abundant precaution, he filed the caveat. 22. Though the appellant was not impleaded as a party but the respondent served a copy of the writ petition upon him and since the appellant found that there was no allegation against him in the writ petition, he did not find any occasion to appear in the case. 23. No exception can be taken, if looking to the pleadings in the writ petition, the appellant thought of not intervening in the matter, rather, he gave liberty to the respondent to seek his remedy from the Court, without any hindrance being created by him. 24. We are thus, satisfied that there was no case before the learned Single Judge nor there was anything on record to infer that presence of the appellant at Barabanki would create any law and order problem, and if any situation had arisen or was likely to arise, it was obviously because of the presence of the respondent in the district, against whom F.I.R. had already been lodged, and not because of the respondent. Besides, when the respondent had already been shifted from Barabanki, there cannot be any ground for transferring the appellant for no fault on his part, on the direction of the Court. 25. We are also constrained to observe that opposition of the present appeal on behalf of respondent No. 4, does not appeal to reason, for the fact that he is not going to get any advantage from the order of transfer of the appellant outside the district of Barabanki. 25. We are also constrained to observe that opposition of the present appeal on behalf of respondent No. 4, does not appeal to reason, for the fact that he is not going to get any advantage from the order of transfer of the appellant outside the district of Barabanki. His eagerness to get the order maintained, makes us feel that, in fact, he is trying to push the appellant, outside Barabanki and, therefore, he has come to this Court for opposing the appeal, though it does not affect him, at all, whether the appellant is transferred or not, he having already been transferred outside Barabanki. 26. We thus, do not find any reason to maintain the direction issued by the learned Single Judge, with respect to the transfer of the appellant. The observation made against him does not have any factual basis nor legal support nor any material has been filed by the respondent which could make out such a case nor there was any pleading or any allegation against the appellant, in the writ petition. 27. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in so far it makes the observations with respect to the appellant and directs for transfer of the appellant. Consequently, we direct that the appellant shall be allowed to continue at the present place of posting and shall not be transferred in pursuance of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge. 28. Rest of the order remains intact. 29. We may clarify that this order would not come in the way of the respondents if the appellant is to be transferred in exigency of service, whenever such an exigency occurs. 30. The special appeal to the aforesaid extent is allowed. No order as to costs. —————