JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By making this application under Section 482, Cr.PC, the petitioners, who are accused in complaint case, which has been registered as CR Case No. 1540/2009, seeks to get set aside and quashed the complaint, which has given rise to the registration of a police case. 2. The accused-petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are Block Development Officer, Mandia Development Block, Barpeta, Secretary, Rajmika Gaon Panchayat and Junior Engineer, Jaleswar Development Block, respectively. While in his capacity as Block Development Officer, the accused-petitioner No. 1 has been working as Programme Officer under the provisions of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 ('the NREGA'), the accused-petitioner No. 2 has the responsibility of executing the schemes framed under the NREGA and the accused-petitioner No. 3 has the responsibility of preparing estimate of various schemes, supervise execution of the schemes and prepare bills for the execution of the schemes. All the accused are employees of the Government of Assam and are, according to the petitioners, public servants within the meaning of Section 21, IPC. 3. The opposite party herein, who is President of Kha unit of Sramik Santhi of village Rajmita, under Rajmita Gaon Panchayat of Jaleswar Block, has lodged a complaint, his case being, in brief, thus: The accused-petitioners engaged labourers along with the complainant for the earth filling work of the said village. For the said work, a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 was sanctioned. As against the amount so sanctioned, the work worth Rs. 48,000 was executed. In the same village, for the earth filling works of the road from the PWD Tinali (i.e., PWD tri-junction) to Goalpara Tinali (i.e., Goalpara tri-junction), a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 was sanctioned and against the amount so sanctioned, work worth Rs. 80,000 was executed. Thereafter, in the said village, for the earth filling work from Gaspara Masjid to Pantai Beel, earth filling work worth Rs. 40,000 was executed as against the sanctioned amount of Rs. 1,00,000. Thus, out of the total sanctioned amount of Rs. 4,00,000, earth filling work worth Rs. 1,68,000 was executed and the rest of the amount, namely, Rs. 2,32,000, was misappropriated. In order to misappropriate the said money without executing any work, accused-petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, at the instructions of the accused-petitioner No. 1, wanted job card from the labourers. The labourers, on good faith, gave their job cards to the petitioner Nos. 1,68,000 was executed and the rest of the amount, namely, Rs. 2,32,000, was misappropriated. In order to misappropriate the said money without executing any work, accused-petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, at the instructions of the accused-petitioner No. 1, wanted job card from the labourers. The labourers, on good faith, gave their job cards to the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3. In the said job cards, while engagement of 8/10 days had been shown, wages withdrawn were for as many as 30-35 days, In fact, in some of the job cards, while engagement shown are 20-25 days, wages had been withdrawn showing as if the work had been taken place for 50-60 days and, in some of the job cards, no daily wages was shown as withdrawn for even a single day. On completion of the earth filling work of the said three roads, when the labourers wanted their wages and also their job cards, the accused persons kept avoiding to return the job cards on one pretext to another for a period of one year and after preparation of forged muster roll, taking signatures/thumb impressions thereon of some labourers, the accused person misappropriated the entire amount of money of unexecuted works. In the year 2008, when the complainant and the witnesses, mentioned in the compliant, put pressure on the accused persons to return their job cards, accused No. 2 returned their job cards and it is only then that the modus operandi of the accused persons came to light. This apart, when the complainant and witnesses went to meet accused Nos. 2 and 3 at Lakhipur and asked for payment of the wages due to them, accused persons threatened them to kill if they come for the second time. 4. Based on the said complaint, CR Case No. 1540/2009 was registered and by order, dated 16.11.2009, the complaint was forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge, Lakhipur Police Station, for registration of a case and for investigation. Treating the said complaint as the First Information Report ('FIR'), Lakhipur Police Station Case No. 416/2009 under Sections 420/409/506/34, IPC has been registered on 17.12.2009 and investigation has been started. It is the registration of the said complaint, as FIR, and the investigation, now, under way, which are sought to be set at naught by the accused-petitioners with the help of this petition made under Section 482, Cr.PC. 5. I have heard Mr. It is the registration of the said complaint, as FIR, and the investigation, now, under way, which are sought to be set at naught by the accused-petitioners with the help of this petition made under Section 482, Cr.PC. 5. I have heard Mr. K.P. Sharma, learned senior counsel, for the petitioners, and Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. Appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioners, Mr. Sharma contends that the NREGA provides a special code for preparation of various schemes for developmental work, execution thereof and also provides redressal mechanism for the grievances, which one may have against preparation of scheme and/or execution of the work. This apart, penalty for non-compliance of the provisions of NREGA is provided in Section 25 and, at the same time, Section 30 bars institution of suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings of Programme Co-coordinator, Programme Officer, or any other person, who is deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of the Sub-section 21of the IPC, in respect of anything, which is, in good faith, done, or intended to be done, under NREGA, the rules and schemes made thereunder. 7. It is contended by Mr. Sharma that since a complete mechanism for redressal of grievances and penalty for non-compliance have been made under the NREGA and since NREGA also proved protection to the officers, who work under the NREGA in respect of the action taken by them in good faith, the action of taking of cognizance by the learned court below, registration1 of the complaint as FIR and investigation, undertaken by the police, are untenable in law. 8. As far as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is concerned, his submission is that since the FIR has been validly registered and investigation has been validly commenced, the present application, made under Section 482, Cr.PC, is misconceived in law. 9. Considering the fact that the accused-petitioner contend that the learned court below was barred from taking cognizance of offence, which the accused-petitioners are alleged to have committed, without requisite sanction having been granted by the competent authority for prosecution of the accused-petitioner and, hence, taking of cognizance was, in the present case, without jurisdiction, it needs to be pointed out as to what 'cognizance' is and when can a Magistrate be said to have taken 'cognizance'. 10. 10. What is also essential to answer is as to whether an act of a Magistrate of sending a complaint, received by him, to the Officer-in-Charge of the police station concerned with direction to register a case and investigate amount to taking of 'cognizance'. 11. While considering the questions posed above, it needs to be noted that the word 'cognizance' has not been defined under the Code. The word 'cognizance' really indicates the stage, when a Magistrate or a Judge, first, takes judicial notice of offence(s) and not of person(s) accused of such offence(s). It is Section 190 of the Code, which deals with taking of cognizance of offences by a Magistrate. It may be noted that Sub-section (1) of Section 190 embodies three different modes of taking 'cognizance' inasmuch as it enacts that any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class, specially empowered, in this behalf, under Sub-section (2) of Section 190, may take 'cognizance' of any offence: (a) upon receiving a 'complaint' of facts, which constitute such offence, or (b) upon a 'police report' of such facts, or (c) upon 'information' received from any person, other than a police officer, or upon his 'own knowledge', that such offence has been committed. 12. Whether a Magistrate has or has not, on the basis of a 'complaint', taken 'cognizance' of an offence may, in a given case, be reflected by the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, which the Magistrate may have taken. When the Magistrate, in order to ascertain if, on the basis of a 'complaint', he shall issue process to the person(s), who may have been alleged to have committed an offence, proceeds to examine the complainant under Section 200, he can be said to have taken 'cognizance', for, he cannot proceed to examine the complainant without taking 'cognizance' of the offence(s), which the 'complaint' may disclose to have been committed. When, however, the Magistrate takes, on the basis of a 'complaint', an action other than one, which is indicated hereinbefore, such as, when he directs 'investigation' by the police, he cannot be held to have taken 'cognizance', for, such exercise of power of directing 'investigation' is pursuant to the provisions of Section 156(3). 13. When, however, the Magistrate takes, on the basis of a 'complaint', an action other than one, which is indicated hereinbefore, such as, when he directs 'investigation' by the police, he cannot be held to have taken 'cognizance', for, such exercise of power of directing 'investigation' is pursuant to the provisions of Section 156(3). 13. Broadly speaking, thus, when, on receiving a 'complaint', the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections, contained in Chapter XV of the Code, he is said to have taken 'cognizance' of the offence within the meaning of Section190(1)(a). When, however, the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XV of the Code, but for taking action of some other kind, such as, ordering 'investigation' under Section 156(3) or directing issuance of search warrant, etc., he cannot be said to have taken 'cognizance'. [See R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1951) SCR 312 and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1672 ]. 14. Taking of 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'complaint', is different from that of taking of 'cognizance' on the haw of a 'police report'. When a Magistrate, on receipt of a 'complaint', decides to examine the veracity or sufficiency of the accusations, made in the 'complaint', in order to determine if process needs to be issued to the offender and, for this purpose, examines the complainant, 'cognizance' can be said to have been taken. When a Magistrate applies his mind to a 'police report', submitted under Section 173(2)(i), to determine if process needs to be issued against the person, who is accused to have committed an offence, 'cognizance' is taken. 15. Thus, 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'police report', implies making of mind of the Magistrate if process needs to be issued to the accused; whereas 'cognizance', in a case of 'complaint', means the Magistrate's application of mind for the purpose of deciding as to whether the 'complaint' needs to be proceeded as a 'complaint case'. 16. While considering the rival submissions made before this Court, it needs to be noted that in the present case, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara, has not examined the complainant under Section 200, Cr.PC. 16. While considering the rival submissions made before this Court, it needs to be noted that in the present case, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara, has not examined the complainant under Section 200, Cr.PC. What has merely been done, by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the present case, is that he has forwarded the complaint to the Officer-in-Charge, Lakhipur Police Station for registration of a case and for investigation. Thus, no 'cognizance' has been taken of any offence by the learned trial court inasmuch as the action, which the learned trial court below has taken, in the present case, is that instead of taking cognizance, on the basis of the complaint and proceeding therewith as a complaint case, the learned court below exercised its powers contained under Section 156(3) and directed investigation by the police into the alleged acts of not only criminal misappropriation of money, but also of commission of forgery. 17. The question, therefore, is as to whether, in the light of the provisions contained in Section156(3), registration of the FIR and/or the investigation, now, carried out, pursuant to the directions issued by the learned Magistrate, under Section 156(3), is bad in law. 18. While considering the present case, it needs to be noted that the petitioners rely, on the provisions of Section 197, Cr.PC, to contend that their prosecution is barred under the law. In order to correctly appreciate the petitioners' contention that the registration of the FIR and the investigation, which is being carried out, is untenable in law, it is necessary that the provisions, contained in Section 197, Cr.PC, be taken note of Section 197, Cr.PC reads: Prosecution of Judges and public servants. In order to correctly appreciate the petitioners' contention that the registration of the FIR and the investigation, which is being carried out, is untenable in law, it is necessary that the provisions, contained in Section 197, Cr.PC, be taken note of Section 197, Cr.PC reads: Prosecution of Judges and public servants. - (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction - (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government: Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in Clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under Clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, Clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted. (2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of Sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that Sub-section will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the expression "State Government" were substituted. (3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under Clause (1) of Articled356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under Clause (1) of Article356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon. (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the court before which the trial is to be held. 19. A bare reading of Section 197 shows that the provisions, contained therein, bar taking of cognizance' by a Magistrate of offences, which may be committed by a public servant of the category, which are mentioned in Section 197, Cr.PC, provided further that the offence is committed in discharge of the public servant's official duty or in purported discharge of his official duty. 20. Thus, the protective mechanism of sanction, which Section 197 embodies, is not available to a person, who does not fall within the category of those persons, which Section 197(1), Cr.PC mentions, and/or whose acts, constituting an offence, are not in the discharge of his official duty as a public servant or in the purported discharge of his official duty as a public servant. Above all, what Section 197, Cr.PC bars is taking of 'cognizance' of an offence and not investigation of an offence by the police if so directed by a Magistrate, under Section 156(3), Cr.PC. When a Magistrate, instead of taking 'cognizance' of an offence, which a complain may disclose, chooses to direct investigation by police in exercise of his powers under Section 156(3), Cr.PC, he cannot be said to have taken 'cognizance'. To an order passed by a Magistrate directing the Officer-in-Charge of a police station to register a complaint as First Information Report and investigate the case, provisions of Section 197, Cr.PC do not apply. 21. In the present case, I have already indicated above that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has not taken 'cognizance' and, hence, Section 197, Cr.PC does not at all come into play. 22. The question, now, is as to whether the statutory provisions of the NREGA would by itself bar criminal prosecution for offences under the Indian Penal Code. The answer to this question has to be an emphatic 'no'. The reason is that the redressal mechanism, which Section 19 provides, does not prohibit criminal prosecution for an offence under the Indian Penal Code. Far from this, the redressal mechanism relates to resolution of disputes of civil nature. As far as Section 25 is concerned, the same makes contravention of the provisions of the NREGA punishable. These penal provisions do not bar prosecution of a person for an offence committed under the Indian Penal Code inasmuch as Section 25 merely makes contravention of the provisions of the NREGA punishable and does not bar prosecution of a person, who commits an offence under the Indian Penal Code. As far as Section 30 is concerned, it bars institution of suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings against persons, who are deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Section21 IPC, for anything, which may have been done by them in good faith or intended to be done in good faith. Section 30, as such, does not bar investigation of an offence under the Indian Penal Code, more particularly, when the offence alleged, as in the present case, is one, which, by no means, can be said to be an act, which has been done in discharge or purported discharge of official duty. Section 30, as such, does not bar investigation of an offence under the Indian Penal Code, more particularly, when the offence alleged, as in the present case, is one, which, by no means, can be said to be an act, which has been done in discharge or purported discharge of official duty. Manipulation of records and/or making of false documents and thereby committing acts of forgery can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be acts done in good faith and such acts cannot per se bar prosecution of a person even if he be a public servant. Considered from this angle, the registration of the FIR and the investigation by the police cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, illegal or untenable in law. Whether the allegations of manipulations of records, making of false documents and/or commission of acts of forgery are or are not true would be determined, when the investigation is allowed to be effectively carried out and completed. There is no justification to seek quashing of the FIR and launching of investigation when accusations of acts, constituting offences aforementioned, have been prima fade made out and are being investigated. 23. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Court does not find that the petitioners have been able to make out any case warranting this Court's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.PC. This criminal petition, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 24. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed