JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Dixit, J.—Heard Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Vikas Budhwar, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and Sri K.M. Mishra learned counsel for respondent No. 4 and have perused relevant documents on record. 2. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 19.2.2010 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition) passed by Dy. General Manager -NCZ, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: (i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 19.2.2010 (Annexure No. 11 to this Writ Petition) passed by Dy. General Manager-NCZ Hindustan Petroleum Corporation. (i-a) issue a writ order or direction declaring the Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines/criteria of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation applicable for MSD/HSD dealership making classification made between women above 40 years with earning capacity and widow women below 40 years with earning capacity as unconstitutional, arbitrary, irrational without having nexus or with the object sought to be achieved and without being based upon any intelligible differentia, thus violative of fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction, as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (iii) Award cost of this petition in favour of the petitioner. 3. (i) In brief, the petitioner’s case is that an advertisement was made by the respondent No. 2 in the daily newspaper namely “Amar Ujala” on 23.6.2009 inviting the applications for appointing the retail outlet dealers for various locations. The petitioner applied for the location mentioned in the said advertisement on item No. 236.The petitioner received a letter dated 10.9.2009 intimating her to appear before the Selection Board for interview on 10.9.2009 under the procedure for selecting the candidate for retail outlet, the marks are awarded under the heading which are as follows: (a) Land and infrastructure - maximum marks 35. (b) Capability to arrange finance - maximum marks 25. (c) Education Qualification - maximum marks 15. (d) Age - maximum marks 4. (e) Experience - maximum marks 4. (f) Capability to Generate Business - maximum marks 10. (g) Business Acumen - maximum marks 6. (h) Personality - maximum marks 2. 3. (b) Capability to arrange finance - maximum marks 25. (c) Education Qualification - maximum marks 15. (d) Age - maximum marks 4. (e) Experience - maximum marks 4. (f) Capability to Generate Business - maximum marks 10. (g) Business Acumen - maximum marks 6. (h) Personality - maximum marks 2. 3. (ii) That the petitioner has been awarded higher marks than respondent No. 4 in all the categories except the experience where the petitioner has been illegally awarded (0) marks. The respondent No. 4 has also been illegally given the benefit of Corpus Fund Scheme. The capability to provide the land infrastructure facility and capability to arrange finance of the petitioner is much more than that of the respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 2 has acted mala fidely against the petitioner. That the petitioner had made complaint against the illegalities before the Chairman/Managing Director, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited on 29.9.2009 through registered post. By the impugned order dated 19.2.2010, the Dy. General Manager-North Central Zone Record note disposing of the complaint of the petitioner, as rejected. 3. (iii) That the impugned order dated 19.2.2010 suffers from manifest illegality as it interprets Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines. It includes widow below 40 years of age irrespective of earning of their parents under the Corpus Fund Scheme. The respondent No. 4 is having huge income out of the funds of his father-in-law Still she is eligible for the Corpus Fund Scheme whereas the petitioner is not eligible for the Corpus Fund Scheme. That the Clause 8 (B) (3) clearly prescribed that the Corpus Fund Scheme is available only to widow and unmarried women having without earning parents and above 40 years and respondent No. 4 satisfies neither of the aforesaid two conditions. The impugned order suffers from manifest illegality, that the classification made by the Clause 8 (b) (iii) between women having earning parents and widows having earning parents being without any rationale or having nexus with the object sought to be achieved by such classification and it being not based upon any intelligible differentia, it is clearly arbitrary and discriminatory : violative the fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus Clause 8 (b) (iii) is unconstitutional, so far as it permits widows below 40 years and having earning parents to be eligible for Corpus Fund Scheme. 3. 3. (iv) The petitioner is more well equipped to run a retailed outlet. The petitioner has given a certificate and she orally stated that she had done the managerial and supervisory job in M/s. Triveni Sahai & Sons from 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2008. The impugned order holding that the said certificate is only for learning clearly amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record. The experience certificate of respondent No. 4 is fake and forged and she also did not fulfil the requisite criteria in the Corpus Fund Scheme. The authorities have acted in manifest illegality in passing the impugned order. The impugned order suffers from patent error of law which vitiates the selection. 3. (v) Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments has placed reliance on the case of Kaliash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others, (2002) 6 SCC 562 . 4. (i) In the counter-affidavit of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 it was contended that in the array of parties the authority who had passed the order, has not been impleaded as respondent. Hence due to non-impleading the authority who have passed the impugned order on 19.2.2010, this present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of misjoinder and non joinder of proper and necessary party. The petitioner has not challenged the statement of performance of the candidates evaluated on 10.10.2009 by the Dealer Selection Committee which is on record as annexure No. 4 of the writ petition. 4.(ii) That a bare perusal of the Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines clearly reveals that in respect of corpus fund facilities for widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applied for dealership reserved for “Women” category are made eligible and they will not be assessed under the parameters, “capability to provide land and infrastructure facilities and capability to arrange finance” for determining the business and the priority to be given to such candidates over other women candidates, the marks secured by other women under these two parameters will be excluded from the total marks secured by them for the purpose of evaluation. For the purposes of widow, the condition of being over 40 years of age and without earning parents does not apply as the same only applies to unmarried women. For the purposes of widow, the condition of being over 40 years of age and without earning parents does not apply as the same only applies to unmarried women. That the interpretation which is being sought to be suggested by the petitioner with regard to the Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines is patently misconceived and is nothing but jeopardising the entire scheme which is in the form of the guidelines. The petitioner has not challenged the guidelines which is in existence. That the petitioner participated in the process of selection and could not succeed. Now it is not open for her to challenge the advertisement or to challenge the guidelines. That the petition is liable to be dismissed with cost. 4 (iii) Learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 placed reliance on the cases of Vipin Bihari Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(1) ADJ 533 (DB), decided by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court and Dhananjay Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal and others, (2008) 4 SCC 171 , decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 5. In the counter-affidavit of the respondent No. 4 it is contended that a bare perusal of Annexure-4 appended by the petitioner alongwith the writ petition would demonstrate that the respondent No. 4 has been awarded 80.2% marks, whereas petitioner has secured only 72.5% mark. That the criteria for awarding the marks has been provided in the guidelines and the respondent No. 4 has been awarded marks strictly in accordance with the Guidelines as contained in the Brochure itself. That it is incorrect to say that the respondent No. 4 has illegally been given the benefit of Corpus Fund Scheme. As a matter of fact, the respondent No. 4 has rightly been given the benefit of the Corpus Fund Scheme, as she is a widow and the location at item No. 236 was reserved for a Woman candidate, for which she duly applied. 6. In the petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken numbers of grounds, but at the time of arguments, he confined his submissions only to the extent that : 1. 6. In the petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken numbers of grounds, but at the time of arguments, he confined his submissions only to the extent that : 1. Classification of women for Corpus Fund Scheme as prescribed in Clause 8 (b) (3) of the guidelines is arbitrary and discriminatory, violative the fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus Clause 8 (b) (3) of the guidelines is unconstitutional. 2. The experience certificate of the petitioner has wrongly been interpreted by the respondent No. 2. 3. The respondent No. 4 was not eligible for the corpus fund scheme. 7. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the classification for corpus fund facilities for women as prescribed in Clause 8 (b) (3) of the guidelines for selection of retail outlet dealers (brochure- annexure-3) prescribed that the corpus fund scheme is available only to widow and unmarried women having without earning parents and above 40 years. The classification made by Clause (8) (b) (3) between the women having earning parents and widows having earning parents is without any rational or having nexus with the object sought to be achieved by such classification. It is not based upon any intelligible differentia. It is clearly arbitrary and discriminatory violative the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thus the Clause (8) (b) (iii) is unconstitutional, so far it permits widows below 40 years and having earning parents eligible for corpus fund scheme. 8. On behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, the submission of the learned counsel is that the petitioner has tried to misconstrue the provisions of Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the Guidelines, which is self-contained. In the aforesaid provision, the restriction of age has been imposed with regard to unmarried women with non-earning parents and not with regard to widow applying for dealership for women. That the aforesaid scheme is not in any manner arbitrary or discriminatory or violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. In the aforesaid provision, the restriction of age has been imposed with regard to unmarried women with non-earning parents and not with regard to widow applying for dealership for women. That the aforesaid scheme is not in any manner arbitrary or discriminatory or violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. For ready reference, the relevant Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the Guidelines for selection of Retail Outlet Dealers reads as under : “8 (b) (iii) Widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applying for dealership reserved for ‘Women’ Category will not be assessed under the parameters, “Capability to provide land and infrastructure/facilities and Capability to arrange finance.” For determining the priority to be given to such candidates over other women candidates, the marks secured by other women under these two parameters will be excluded from the total marks secured by them for the purpose of evaluation.” 10. In the case of Kailash Chand Sharma (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner the Hon’ble Apex Court observed in paras 33 and 34 of the judgment as under : “Para-33, The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that the award of bonus marks to the residents of the district and the residents of the rural areas of the district amounts to impermissible discrimination. There is no rational basis for such preferential treatment on the material available before us. The ostensible reasons put forward to distinguish the citizens residing in the State are either non-existent or irrelevant and they have not nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, spread of education at primary level. The offending part of the circular has the effect of diluting merit, without in any way promoting the objective. The impugned circular dated 10.6.1998 insofar as the award of bonus marks is concerned, has been rightly declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the High Court. ‘Para 34’ “One more serious infirmity in the impugned circular is that it does not spell out any criteria or indicia for determining whether the applicant is a resident of rural area. Everything is left bald with the potential of giving rise to varying interpretations thereby defeating the apparent objective of the rule. On matters such as duration of residence, place of schooling etc., there are bound to be controversies. Everything is left bald with the potential of giving rise to varying interpretations thereby defeating the apparent objective of the rule. On matters such as duration of residence, place of schooling etc., there are bound to be controversies. The authorities, who are competent to issue residential certificates, are left to apply the criteria according to their thinking, which can by no means be uniform. The decision in State of Maharashtra v. Raj Kumar, (1982) 3 SCC 313 , is illustrative of the problem created by vague or irrelevant criteria. In that case a rule was made by the State of Maharashtra that a candidate will be considered a rural candidate if he had passed SSC Examination held from a village or a town having only ‘C’ type municipality. The object of the rule, as noticed by this Court, was to appoint candidates having full knowledge of rural life so that they would be more suitable for working as officers in rural areas. The rule was struck down on the ground that there was no nexus between the classification made and the object sought to be achieved because “as the rule stands any person who may not have lived in a village at all can appear for SSC Examination from a village and yet become eligible for selection” (SCC p. 314 para 2). The rule was held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16. When no guidance at all is discernible from the impugned circular as to the identification of the residence of the applicants especially having regard to the indefinite nature of the concept of residence, the provision giving the benefit of bonus marks to the rural residents will fall foul of Article 14.” 11. In case of Vipin Bihari Singh (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court, in para 15 of the judgment that “Against this background, if we analyse the whole issue, we can get two aspects of the matter. Firstly, whether a person after participating in the interview can turn round and challenge the same; and secondly, whether the Rules, 2004 made for selection process in the year 2004 can be challenged after becoming unsuccessful in the year 2009, by way of this writ petition. Firstly, whether a person after participating in the interview can turn round and challenge the same; and secondly, whether the Rules, 2004 made for selection process in the year 2004 can be challenged after becoming unsuccessful in the year 2009, by way of this writ petition. We are of the definite conclusion on the strength of facts and law as well as analysis thereof that the petitioner’s claim is totally contrary to the settled position of law, therefore, they are not entitled to any relief as claimed herein either for declaration of Rule 15 (2) of the Rules, 2004 as ultra vires in nature or for any relief in connection with selection process, in which they have participated but failed.” 12. In Dhananjay Malik and others (Supra) cited by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 7 and 9 of the judgment observed as under : “Para 7-it is not disputed that the respondent-writ petitioners herein participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the educational qualification was clearly indicated in the advertisement itself as BPE or graduate with diploma in Physical Education. Having unsuccessfully participated in the process of selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement and selection with regard to requisite educational qualifications were contrary to the Rules.” ‘Para 9’ once the candidates participated in the selection process without any demur, they are estopped from complaining that the selection process was not in accordance with the rules. If they think that the advertisement and selection process were not in accordance with the rules, they could have challenged the advertisement and selection process without participating in the selection process.” 13. In Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University and another, AIR 1989 SC 903 , it was observed by the Apex Court that it is now well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation, but does not forbid reasonable classification. Whether a classification is a permissible classification or not, two conditions must be satisfied, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the status in question. 14. 14. In the case of M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., AIR 1998 SC 145 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that Article 14 has inbuilt flexibility and it also permits different treatment to unequals as it only prohibits discrimination amongst the equals. Implicit in the concept of equality is the concept that persons who are in fact unequally circumstanced cannot be treated on a par. Equally under Article 14 is not indiscriminate. Paradoxical as it may seem, the concept of equality permits rational or discriminating discrimination. 15. In Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and others, 1986 (Supp) SCC 285, the Supreme Court discouraged the challenge to the examination after participating in the same without protest. 16. In G.N. Nayak v. Goa University and others, 2002 (2) SCC 712 , the Supreme Court has held that when a candidate was aware about the eligibility criteria for the post yet applied and appeared at the interview without protest, he cannot be allowed to contend that the eligibility criteria were wrongly framed. 17. In Anand Narain Singh v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board, Allahabad and others, 2003 (2) LBESR 899 (All), a Division Bench of this Court has held that once a candidate has taken a chance by appearing in interview, it is not open for him to challenge the advertisement or to challenge the rules. 18. In Jasvinder Singh and others v. State of J&K and others, (2003) 2 SCC 132 , we find the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that what ultimately required to be ensured is as to whether any oblique intention or arbitrariness is reflected or not. 19. In Union of India and others v. S. Vinodh Kumar and others, 2007 (8) SCC 100 , it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein are not entitled to question the same. 20. In Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 11 SCC 522 , it was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the appellants had appeared at the examination without any demur. They did not question the validity of fixing the said date before the appropriate authority. They are, therefore, estopped and precluded from questioning the selection process. 21. 20. In Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 11 SCC 522 , it was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the appellants had appeared at the examination without any demur. They did not question the validity of fixing the said date before the appropriate authority. They are, therefore, estopped and precluded from questioning the selection process. 21. In the case of Sadanand Halo and others v. Momtaz Ali Sheikh and others, (2008) 4 SCC 619 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is also a settled position that unsuccessful candidates cannot turn back and assail the selection process. 22. In the case of Dr. U.S. Sinha v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (2) ADJ 205 (DB), it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court that “Last, but not the least, point pertains to locus standi of the writ petitioners. Since they have participated in the selection process and become unsuccessful, cannot challenge the discretion of the selectors in respect of the experience, as categorically held in Trivedi Himanshu Ghanshyambhai v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and others, 2007 (7) Supreme 433, therefore, such latest view of the Supreme Court which is clearly applicable in these writ petitions, cannot be avoided under any circumstance.” 23. In the case of K.A. Nagmani v. Indian Airlines and others, (2009) 5 SCC 515 , it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that when Corporation did not violate the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the candidates having participated in the selection process alongwith the contesting respondents therein without any demur or protest, they cannot be allowed to turn round and question the very same process having failed to qualify. 24. In constitutional Law of India (By H.M. SEER VAI, 4th Edn. Vol. I at page439) what is meant by equal protection of laws is answered thus:— “If all men are created equal and remained equal throughout their lives, thus the same laws would apply to all men. But “we know” that men are unequal; consequently, a right conferred on persons that shall not be denied “the equal protection of the laws” cannot mean the protection of the same laws for all. It is here that the doctrine of classification steps in and gives content and significance to the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. But “we know” that men are unequal; consequently, a right conferred on persons that shall not be denied “the equal protection of the laws” cannot mean the protection of the same laws for all. It is here that the doctrine of classification steps in and gives content and significance to the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. According to that doctrine, equal protection of the laws must mean the protection of equal laws of all persons similarly situated. To separate persons similarly situated from those, who are not we must ‘discriminate’, that is, act on the basis of a differences between persons, or, observe distinctions carefully’ between persons who are and person who are not, similarly situated. But as the distinction is to be made for the purpose of making a law, how must the distinction be related to the law? This is answered by the central list for a permissible classification: “Permissible classification must satisfy two conditions, namely: (1) it must be founded on an intelligent differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (2) the differentia must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question with the qualification that the differentia and the object are different, so that the object by itself cannot be the basis of classification. A law based on a permissible classification, fulfils the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws and is valid. 25. In Venkataya Ramaiya’s law lexicon volume-1 ‘equality before law’ only means that amongst equals, the law should be equal and should be administered, and the life should be treated alive. 26. In the instant case in Clause 8 (b) of the guidelines for the selection of Retail Outlet Dealers provides corpus fund facilities for women. In Sub Clause (iii) of Clause 8 (b) it is provided that widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applying for dealership reserved for “women” category will not be assessed under the parameters, “capability to provide land and infrastructure/facilities and capability to arrange finance” For determining the priority to be given to such candidates over other women candidates, the marks secured by other women under these two parameters will be excluded from the total marks secured by them for the purpose of evaluation. This classification amongst women is not in any manner arbitrary or discriminatory. It is permissible classification which satisfies both the condition i.e. it is founded on an intelligent differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from other left out of the group and second the differentia having rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. It is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution of India forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification. In Clause 8 (b) (iii) it is made clear that widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applying for dealership reserved for women category are made eligible and they will not be assessed under the parameters, “capability to provide the land and infrastructure/facilities and capability to arrange finance.” For the purpose of widows the condition of being over and above 40 years and without earning parents does not apply, as the same only applied to unmarried women. 27. It is undisputed that the petitioner participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the corpus fund facilities for women scheme as prescribed was clearly indicated in para 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines for selection of retail outlet dealers without any demur; now she is estopped from complaining that the criteria for corpus fund scheme as prescribed in Clause 8 (b) (3) of the guidelines is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. She should not have participated in the selection process. The petitioner could have challenged the advertisement and selection process without participating in the selection process. 28. In various cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once a candidate has taken a chance for appearing before the Board at the time of selection then it is not open for him to challenge the selection proceedings or to challenge the rules or advertisement under which he has appeared and as such the candidate has no locus-standi. 29. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality amongst equals and not unequals, its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate against rational classification. 29. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality amongst equals and not unequals, its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the different treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by law. The Article does not require the thing which are different, in fact or in law to be treated as they they were the same. Equal protection means the absence of any arbitrary discrimination by the laws themselves or in their administration. None should be favoured and none should be placed under any disadvantage, in circumstances that do not admit of any reasonable justification for a different treatment. 30. Herein in the instant case, the petitioner has participated in the selection process without any demur; It is well settled law that unsuccessful candidates cannot run back and assail the selection process. Now she has no locusstandi. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in various cases as referred above, we are of the opinion that the Clause 8 (b) sub clause (iii) of the guidelines for selection process of Retail Outlet Dealer which provides corpus fund facilities for unmarried women (above 40 years of age and without earning parents), applied for dealership reserved for women category, is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary or violative of fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the result we hold that the Clause 8 (b) Sub Clause(iii) of the guidelines is not ultra vires in nature. 31. (i) The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been awarded higher marks than respondent No. 4 in all the categories except experience whereas the petitioner has been illegally awarded (0) marks. The capability to provide the land and infrastructure facilities and capability to arrange the finance of the petitioner is much more than that of the respondent No. 4. The petitioner is more equipped to run a Retail Outlet. The petitioner has given an experience certificate that she had done the managerial/supervisory job in M/s Triveni Sahai and Sons from 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2008. The petitioner is more equipped to run a Retail Outlet. The petitioner has given an experience certificate that she had done the managerial/supervisory job in M/s Triveni Sahai and Sons from 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2008. The impugned order holding that the certificate was only for learning clearly amounts to an error apparently on the face of the record. On the other hand the experience certificate of respondent No. 4 is fake and forged. (ii) The learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 submitted that the petitioner alongwith her application form had submitted a certificate issued under the signature of one Sri Vinod Sharma partner of M/s Pandit Triveni Sahai and sons, Station Road, Badayun, wherein it has been certified that the petitioner had undergone training for one year. It clearly reveals that the certificate is not in respect of managerial or supervisory experience but it is in the respect of training which she is alleged to have undergone for a period of one year and thus rightly enough zero marks have been awarded under the heading of business experience. (iii) We do not find any force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the experience certificate of the petitioner has wrongly been interpreted by the respondent no2, as we find no illegality or irregularity in the conclusion recorded by the Dy. General Manager-NCZ in the impugned order with regard to experience certificate of the petitioner which is reproduced as under : “4. The complainant has attached an undated certificate from M/s Triveni Sahaya & Sons, Badaun in support of Parameter Experience. This states that Smt. Rakhi Thareja has learnt work for about one year and she is expert in pump operations. The certificate is only for learning and not for supervisory/managerial job of minimum one year and hence does not qualify for the marks under parameter Experience. There is no other credible document in support of experience on record with her application. The claim of the complainant that her application and said certificate has dates from 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2008 is false. No such dates are noted in application or certificate. Infact in her complaint she accepts that she has only gained good information of trade without getting any payment. This cannot be construed as managerial/supervisory business experience of minimum one year. 5. The claim of the complainant that her application and said certificate has dates from 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2008 is false. No such dates are noted in application or certificate. Infact in her complaint she accepts that she has only gained good information of trade without getting any payment. This cannot be construed as managerial/supervisory business experience of minimum one year. 5. The complainant has alleged that the Experience certificate of first empanelled applicant Smt. Mohini Gupta is fake. Smt. Mohini Gupta has provided a certificate dated 25.7.2009 from M/s Nidhi Service Centre, Aonla certifying that Smt. Mohini Gupta has been working at the outlet for last five years as Manager. During, investigation, the certificate has been verified and the issuing dealer Shri Harikrishna Gupta has confirmed it to be true and issued by him in writing vide letter dated 10.2.2010 in presence of Ex Sales Officer deputed for the job.” 32. (i) The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent No. 4 has been illegally given the benefit of corpus fund scheme, the capability to provide the land infrastructure/facilities and capability to arrange finance of the petitioner is much more than that of respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 4 is having huge income out of fund of her father-in-law still she is eligible for the corpus fund scheme whereas the petitioner is not eligible for the said scheme. He further submitted that the Clause 8 (b) (iii) clearly prescribed that the corpus fund scheme is available only to widow and unmarried women without earning their parents and above 40 years of age and the respondent No. 4 satisfying neither of the aforesaid two conditions hence the impugned order dated 19.2.2010 suffers from manifest illegality. (ii) The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. (ii) The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is that Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines clearly reveals that in respect of corpus fund facilities for widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applied for dealership reserved for “Women” category are made eligible and they will not be assessed under the parameters, “capability to provide land and infrastructure facilities and capability to arrange finance” for determining the business and the priority to be given to such candidates over other women candidates, the marks secured by other women under these two parameters will be excluded from the total marks secured by them for the purpose of evaluation. Apart from the same, the application form submitted by the respondent No. 4 wherein respondent No. 4 had applied for corpus fund facilities. For the purposes of widow, the condition of being over and above 40 years and without earning parents does not apply as the same only applies to unmarried women. 33.(i) Admittedly respondent No. 4 is a widow and has applied under the corpus fund scheme. According to Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines, Widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applying for dealership reserved for “Women” Category will not be assessed under the parameters, “Capability to provide land and infrastructure/facilities and Capability to arrange finance” For determining the priority to be given to such candidates over other women candidates, the marks secured by other women under these two parameters will be excluded from the total marks secured by them for the purpose of evaluation.” (ii) From a bare perusal of the guidelines it transpires that the widows and unmarried women (above 40 years of age without earning parents) applied for dealer reserved for women category are made available and they will not be assessed under the parameters, the capability to provide the land and infrastructure/facilities and capability to arrange the finance. The purchase of the land by any of the kith and kin of respondent No. 4 or transfer of the same to the respondent No. 4 in no manner whatsoever can be a ground to disqualify the respondent No. 4. Also the condition of 40 years of age without earning parents is only for unmarried women and not for widows who are eligible irrespective of their age and status of their parents. Also the condition of 40 years of age without earning parents is only for unmarried women and not for widows who are eligible irrespective of their age and status of their parents. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 4 is not eligible for the corpus fund scheme. In the impugned order dated 19.2.2010 the concerned Authority while disposing the complaint of the petitioner has made observations as under : “(1) The complainant is trying to confuse two categories of Widows and unmarried women. In instant case, the applicant Smt. Mohini Gupta is widow as also accepted by the complainant herself and of 32 years of age. The location, IN/AROUND BISHENPURI CHAURAHA (ON RAM NAGAR TO SHAHBAD ROAD BETWEEN KM STONE NOS 41 & 43) Dist. Bareilly is reserved for woman. Accordingly, Smt. Mohini Gupta is eligible for Corpus Fund. Her staying with her father in law and his income does not disqualify her. (2) The allegation that the extending Corpus Fund benefit to Smt. Mohini Gupta is after though is baseless and frivolous as the applicant has clearly applied for Corpus Fund at appropriate place in her application. Conducting, technical feasibility of land noted by the applicant is only an advance action by technical committees while assessment of applications is done by another three member committee. The complainant is unnecessarily trying to confuse two stage of selection which are independent of each other and do not affect evaluations at subsequent stages other than weightage for land if applicable. 3. The claim that the complainant is more capable in parameters Land & Infrastructure and Capability to arrange finance is of no relevance in instant case as in case of any applicant being eligible for Corpus Fund, the evaluation is done without two parameters of “Capability to provide land and infrastructure/facilities and capability to provide finance” for determining the priority to be given to such candidates over other women candidates. (Refer 8 (b) (iii) of the Guidelines quoted above).” We do not find any valid reason to interfere with the observations made by the concerned Authority with regard to Corpus Fund Facility provided to the respondent No. 4 in the impugned order as noted above. (Refer 8 (b) (iii) of the Guidelines quoted above).” We do not find any valid reason to interfere with the observations made by the concerned Authority with regard to Corpus Fund Facility provided to the respondent No. 4 in the impugned order as noted above. In the result we are of the definite view that the respondent No. 4 was eligible for corpus fund scheme and was rightly given the benefit of the said scheme. 34. (i) We are of the definite opinion on the strength of the facts and law laid down in the above noted cases that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed herein either for declaration of Clause 8 (b) (iii) of the guidelines as ultra vires in nature or for any relief in connection with the selection process in which she has participated but could not succeed. (ii) For the foregoing conclusions, we are of the considered view that there is no merit in the petition. This writ petition stands dismissed, but however in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to their own cost. (iii) Before parting with the case, we record our appreciation to learned counsel for the parties in rendering full assistance to the Court during the course of hearing. ————