JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastav, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Standing Counsel on behalf of respondents. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and writ petition is being heard finally. 2. The prayer in the instant writ petition is for quashing judgment and orders dated 16.7.2001 passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, District Bijnor, Annexure-3 to the writ petition and 17.5.2002 passed by Joint Director Consolidation , Muzaffar Nagar, Annexure-7 to the writ petition. 3. The property in dispute was originally enemy property which was purchased by petitioner along with some others vide sale certificate dated 26.5.1976 issued by the Custodian of the Enemy Property at Lucknow, U.P. This sale was never challenged at any stage but according to the petitioner, they came to know that their names have not been recorded in the revenue records though they were actual owners on the basis of Sale-Certificate dated 26.5.1976 and were in possession. When the consolidation proceedings commenced in the year 1990-91 of the village where the disputed land is situated only then it came to their knowledge that the name of the petitioner could not be mutated. An objection under Section 9(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act was moved before the Consolidation Officer where the entry was challenged. The Sale-Certificate was produced before the Consolidation Officer who allowed the objections of the petitioner vide order dated 21.5.1994. Reliance was placed by the Consolidation Officer on a decision reported in 1987 RD, 17. It was held that consolidation Courts should enter the name of purchaser of the Enemy Properties if Sale Certificates issued by Custodian of Enemy Property in India is produced. It was also held that any objection regarding genuineness of the Sale Certificate can only be raised before the Custodian General and it can not be examined by the Consolidation Officer. In fact the limited power to the Consolidation Officer is to ascertain genuineness of the Sale Certificate. In the instant case, evidently, there was no contest or objection regarding genuineness of the said Sale Certificate. Accordingly name of the petitioner and 21 co-owners were recorded. Name of the petitioner was only for the portion mentioned in the original Sale Certificate issued by Custodian of Enemy Property. The State preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation challenging the order of the Consolidation Officer under Section 11(1) of the Act. Accordingly name of the petitioner and 21 co-owners were recorded. Name of the petitioner was only for the portion mentioned in the original Sale Certificate issued by Custodian of Enemy Property. The State preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation challenging the order of the Consolidation Officer under Section 11(1) of the Act. During pendency of the appeal, two respondents namely Sri Naseebudin son of Shri Alibeg respondent No. 1 and Sri Raziul Hasan son of Sri Innayat respondent No. 21 expired. Applications were filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 2.6.1999 and 9.4.1999 in appeal bringing this fact to the notice of the opposite party. This fact is specifically mentioned in paragraph 3 of the writ petition. However, this has been denied in the counter affidavit. 4. Subsequently the State of U.P. as well as Gaon Sabha moved substitution application on 25.4.2001 after lapse of two years. The claim set up by respondents was that Sri Naseebudin died issueless as such the property should revert back to the State. The main grievance which revolves in the present writ petition is that this substitution application was filed after lapse of two years without any application for condonation of delay. No application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act or any assertion in the form of explanation on affidavit was filed alongwith substitution application. Substitution application and objection of the petitioner have been annexed as Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition. There is positive assertion in paragraph 5 that neither date of death of the deceased persons was mentioned nor date of knowledge. Perusal of application shows that there is an assertion that since the application to substitute deceased party was liable to be moved from the date of knowledge, therefore, substitution application will be deemed to be filed within time. No date of knowledge or the date of death is mentioned. The Assistant Consolidation Officer allowed the substitution application vide order dated 16.7.2001 and permitted to enter the name of Gaon Sabha. Names of heirs of late Sri Raziul Hasan with their respective shares were mutated in the revenue records vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The petitioner along with others filed a revision before the Joint Director Consolidation against the order dated 16.7.2001 which was also dismissed on 17.5.2002. The two orders are impugned in the instant writ petition. 5. Names of heirs of late Sri Raziul Hasan with their respective shares were mutated in the revenue records vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The petitioner along with others filed a revision before the Joint Director Consolidation against the order dated 16.7.2001 which was also dismissed on 17.5.2002. The two orders are impugned in the instant writ petition. 5. The petitioner has annexed a questionnaire as Annexure-6 to the writ petition which denotes that there was no separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act along with substitution application and admittedly no affidavit which was filed after lapse of two years. 6. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Joint Director Consolidation erred in upholding the order dated 16.7.2001 as well as Consolidation Officer by allowing substitution application without explanation of delay whereas the natural consequence is that once the substitution application is filed within time then whether any party files an abatement application or not, natural consequence is that in absence of substitution application, the proceeding stands abated. It is only when application for condoning the delay supported by an affidavit giving explanation and reasons for delay, the substitution application can be allowed provided the Court accepts the explanation after giving an opportunity to the opposite party to file objections. 7. In the written submission learned counsel has also mentioned that a third person namely Alam deen son of Nazaur made his claim as heir of late Sri Naseebuddin on the basis of Will which was ignored by the Settlement Officer Consolidation as well as Joint Director Consolidation. However, at present the question of succession on the basis of Will is not involved in the present dispute. 8. Standing Counsel has disputed each and every arguments on behalf of respondents. Submission is that since the substitution application was filed within 90 days of knowledge, therefore, Settlement Officer Consolidation and Joint Director Consolidation did not commit any error whatsoever and writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. After hearing the respective counsels at length and going through entire record, admitted position is that substitution application was filed after lapse of two years and there was no application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. 9. After hearing the respective counsels at length and going through entire record, admitted position is that substitution application was filed after lapse of two years and there was no application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. There is no explanation whatsoever and Settlement Officer Consolidation as well as revisional Court allowed substitution application illegally whereas they should have directed the State to file an affidavit giving detailed explanation and reason for delay on oath. The order dated 17.5.2002 passed by the Joint Director Consolidation as well as that of the Settlement Officer Consolidation suffers from apparent error of law. Section 40 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that proceedings before the consolidation Court are judicial proceedings and Section 41 of U.P. Land Revenue Act is also applicable. Meaning thereby the proceedings before the consolidation Courts are judicial proceedings and as such the provision of C.P.C. are squarely applicable. In absence of procedure under the Consolidation of Holdings Act or separate Rules for substitution, provision of Order 22 C.P.C. is applicable. It is settled law that an affidavit should support an application for condonation of delay and affidavit should contain all the detailed reasons, explanation and inability to substantiate a justifiable cause for condoning the delay. No doubt, the Courts have all along ruled that a liberal approach should be adopted while considering an application for condonation of delay in a substitution application but if there is no such application whatsoever, no liberty can be granted to any of the parties even if the party concerned is a State or Union of India. The law and procedure provided is same. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Ram Charan through its legal representatives, AIR 1964 SC 215 , held that the Court can not invoke any inherent powers for the purposes of impleading the legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had abated and the appellant has not taken appropriate steps within time to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on record. Mere allegation about belated knowledge of death of opposite party is not sufficient. Reasons leading to not knowing of death within reasonable time must be stated. Mere allegation about belated knowledge of death of opposite party is not sufficient. Reasons leading to not knowing of death within reasonable time must be stated. Paragraph 8 of the said decision is quoted below : “(8) There is no question of construing the expression ‘sufficient cause’ liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of his proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to explain away his default. It has to scrutinize it and would be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence led to establish the cause for the appellant’s default in applying within time for the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased or for setting aside the abatement. 10. Similar view was adopted in a recent decision by the Apex Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana and others v. Koppisetti Subba Rao and others, JT 2009 (5) SC 283. It was held by reason of various decisions of the Court that different considerations arise in the mater of condoning the delay in filing an application for setting aside an abatement upon condonation of delay in a suit and an appeal. It is further neither in doubt nor in dispute that such applications should be considered liberally. The Court would take a more liberal attitude in the matter of condonation of delay in filing such an application. 11. It is further neither in doubt nor in dispute that such applications should be considered liberally. The Court would take a more liberal attitude in the matter of condonation of delay in filing such an application. 11. It is thus apparent that the Apex Court has held that a liberal view should be adopted while considering an application for condonation of delay but in the instant case, there is no application whatsoever, neither an affidavit with some explanation and, therefore, in absence of any request for condonation of delay, the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Joint Director Consolidation could not have allowed the substitution application and natural consequence is that the proceedings stood abated. 12. In the case of Damodaran Pillai and others v. South Indian Bank Ltd., 2005 (99) RD 657, the Apex Court held that the principles underlying the provisions prescribing limitation are based on public policy aiming at justice, the principles of repose and peace and intended to induce claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. Hardship or injustice may be a relevant consideration in applying the principles of interpretation of statute, but cannot be a ground for extending the period of limitation. The starting period of limitation for filing of a restoration application would be the date of the order and not the knowledge thereabouts The period of limitation can not be stretched by invoking inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, apparently there is no legal justification for allowing the substitution application which was much beyond time without any explanation or request for condonation of delay. The orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation as well as Joint Director Consolidation impugned in the instant writ petition are therefore, manifestly erroneous and blatant disregard to the procedure provided by Code and in the circumstances, the impugned orders are without any basis. 14. There is yet another circumstance which I can not ignore. In a decision of this Court Niadar v. D.D.C. and others, 1987 RD 17, it was held that the order passed by Custodian became final and in case the petitioner was feeling aggrieved either with the order of Custodian or Sale Certificate in favour of the respondents, he should have preferred an appeal under Section 24 or revision under Section 27 of the Evacuee Properties Act but having failed to do so the said order can not be challenged. Any civil or revenue suit to challenge the order passed by the Custodian was completely barred. Besides, Section 48A of U.P.C.H. Act provides special provision with respect to Evacuee Property. Section 48A of U.P.C.H. Act completely prohibits to entertain any dispute on the orders passed by Custodian and it cannot be challenged before the consolidation authority. 15. In view of this, the writ petition stands allowed and orders dated 16.7.2001 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and 17.5.2002 passed by the Joint Director Consolidation are quashed. If any correction in the revenue records have been made by the consolidation authorities on the basis of impugned orders, the same are liable to be corrected and revenue entries be rectified. —————