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2010 DIGILAW 2473 (MAD)

SUGUNA POULTRY FARM LTD. v. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, UDUMALPET, SOUTH, COIMBATORE

2010-06-21

N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR

body2010
ORDER N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J. - The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the order of the third respondent dated October 14, 2005 confirming the order in the revision by the second respondent dated August 4, 2004 which in turn confirms the order of the first respondent dated February 19, 2004. The grievance of the petitioner is that when the petitioner applied for issuing form XVII declaration under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 the same was rejected by the first respondent on the ground that the assessee in the past has purchased egg trays for packing egg and wrongly availed of concession by use of the form XVII at the hands of the sellers. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to reject the issuance of the form XVII as there is no prohibition to issue form XVII and if the petitioner is not eligible to get tax concession and if the form is misused, penal provisions can be invoked and the respondents are bound to issue the form XVII. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that as per section 3(3) of the Act discretion is given to the first respondent to deny form XVII. Since the impugned order is passed by the first respondent relying upon the past conduct of the petitioner and the petitioner was not given any notice before rejection of form XVII, on the ground of his earlier alleged misuse of form XVII, the same is against the principles of natural justice. Further, denial of form XVII to the petitioner affects the civil rights of the petitioner attracting civil consequences. Hence the first respondent while rejecting the form XVII application is bound to issue notice and hear the petitioner particularly when past conduct is relied upon as a ground for rejection of form XVII. The Supreme Count in a decision reported in Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [2009] 2 CTC 185 considered the importance of following the principles of natural justice and fair play. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held as follows : "5. The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been caused. In the said decision, the Supreme Court held as follows : "5. The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice does not improve the situation, 'useless formality theory' can be pressed into service. 6. Natural justice is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 7. The expressions 'natural justice' and 'legal justice' do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence. 8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well-settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the 'megna carta'. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to 'vocate, interrogate and adjudicate'. In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [1863] 143 ER 414, the principle was thus stated : 'Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou ? hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat".' 9. Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 10. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 19. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice." In the light of the said circumstances, the impugned order passed by the first respondent and confirmed by the orders of the second and third respondents is set aside and the matter is remitted to the first respondent to consider the request of the petitioner seeking form XVII under TNGST Act and pass fresh order after considering all objections to be submitted by the petitioner after issuance of notice. With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs.