JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is filed invoking Certiorari jurisdiction of this Court to quash the order dated 07.2.2010 passed by the third respondent, namely, District Collector, in exercise of revisional powers under Clause 21 of Andhra Prdesh State Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2008 (Control Order, for brevity). It is mainly contended that the impugned order is vitiated by non-disclosure of reasons for dismissing the revision petition submitted by petitioner against the order of second respondent, namely, Joint Collector, who confirmed the order of first respondent, namely, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Madanapalle (RDO). Be it noted that RDO by an order dated 21.11.2007 cancelled Fair Price Shop (FPS) authorization of petitioner, which was confirmed by the appellate authority against which revision was filed before the third respondent. 2. The fact of the matter is not in dispute. The petitioner was appointed as FPS dealer of Kuppanapally Village by proceedings dated 05.3.2005. As many as 246 ration cards are attached to petitioner’s FPS. First respondent initiated disciplinary action under Clause 5(5) of the Control Order and issued show cause notice dated 13.5.2007 calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation with regard to six charges. These related to non-supply of 635 liters of kerosene to the card holders for the month of February 2007, diversion of kerosene stock to black-market, non-display of the quantity and price board in the shop, running FPS at non-notified place, delay in lifting the stocks of essential commodities and distributing kerosene at higher rates. Petitioner submitted explanation on 12.5.2007. Considering the explanation first respondent came to the conclusion that the charges are proved and, therefore, by proceedings dated 18.7.2007 cancelled the authorization under Clause 5(5) of Control Order. 3. Aggrieved by the cancellation of authorization, petitioner preferred appeal before the second respondent under Clause 20 of Control Order. The same was dismissed by order dated 21.11.2007 agreeing with the findings of the RDO. As noticed supra, the petitioner was unsuccessful before third respondent in his revision petition. The Revisional authority while dismissing the revision, made the following observations. The case has been taken on filed and notice was issued to the Revision Petitioner. The case was initially called on 21.1.2008 and finally came up for hearing on 21.11.2009. As noticed supra, the petitioner was unsuccessful before third respondent in his revision petition. The Revisional authority while dismissing the revision, made the following observations. The case has been taken on filed and notice was issued to the Revision Petitioner. The case was initially called on 21.1.2008 and finally came up for hearing on 21.11.2009. The Advocate for the Revision Petitioner present and filed written submissions denying all the charges framed against him and also stated that the Revision Petitioner is a physically handicapped person and requested to allow the Revision Petition and set aside the orders of the lower court and restore the F.P.Shop dealership to the Revision Petitioner. Heard the plea of the Revision Petitioner and perused connected records placed before me. The Revision Petitioner has not advanced any new grounds that would merit consideration. I therefore see no reason to interfere with the impugned proceedings. The Revision Petition is therefore dismissed. The stay orders passed vide this office proceedings Roc.C1/1634/07 dated 1.1.2008 is hereby vacated. 4. The counsel for petitioner made two submissions. The impugned order is bad and unsustainable as it is bereft of reasons and, therefore, the matter may be remanded to the original authority, who also failed to give reasons. Per contra, the Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies contends that the RDO as well as appellate authority and revisional authority gave adequate reasons and, therefore, no interference is called for. She also submits that when the appellate/revisional authority confirmed the order of original authority, requirement of giving elaborate reasons is not mandatory. 5. As the question raised is one of law, with the consent of both the sides, the matter is heard at the stage of admission and is being disposed of by this order. 6. First respondent is appointing authority as well as disciplinary authority in relation to FPS dealers. Clause 5(5) of Control Order empowers the disciplinary authority to inter alia suspend or cancel authorization, “for reasons to be recorded in writing”. The order of cancellation is made appealable to the second respondent under Clause 20 of Control Order to Collector (Civil Supplies), which means Joint Collector under the relevant delegation of powers order. Against the order of Joint Collector, revision lies to District Collector under Clause 21 of Control Order. The order of cancellation is made appealable to the second respondent under Clause 20 of Control Order to Collector (Civil Supplies), which means Joint Collector under the relevant delegation of powers order. Against the order of Joint Collector, revision lies to District Collector under Clause 21 of Control Order. A reading of Clauses 5(5), 20 and 21 of Control Order makes it clear that any order of suspension or cancellation of authorization must be for the reasons to be recorded in writing. When once relevant statute contemplates recording of reasons, it goes without saying that the person against whom an adverse order is passed is entitled to be communicated with those reasons. The authorities under the Control Order may not strictly exercise quasi-judicial powers but when the cancellation is effected, it is likely to result in stigma to FPS dealer for reasons more than one. Therefore the dealer has right to know the reasons. In addition every quasi-judicial or administrative order subject to inherent limitations is amenable to judicial review. Unless reasons are disclosed the judicial review Court would not be in a position to effectively review the order. Therefore, recording of reasons by revisional authority is mandatory. 7. Even as per the precedents, it is now well settled that every executive action, be it an action based on subjective or objective satisfaction of the authority, must be supported by reasons. It is also well settled that in all cases and in all situations reasons should be communicated to the person at whose instance a decision is taken. May be some decisions taken by the executives do not require any reasons. Some times, the policy laid down by the political executive would itself be a sufficient reason for executive action. However, it must be noted that when an action is taken under a statute and statute itself specifically requires a decision to be supported by reasons, all such decisions should be supported by reasons. Even in a situation of statutory silence, disclosure and communication of reasons, is minimum requirement of rule of law although there may be extension to general rule. A reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1984 and Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v Jagdish Sharan Varshney (2009) 4 SCC 240 . 8. A reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1984 and Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v Jagdish Sharan Varshney (2009) 4 SCC 240 . 8. In S.N. Mukherjee (supra) a question arose whether the Government of India while exercising power of revision/review under the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, is required to record reasons. The court considered two questions: (i) Is there any general principle of law which requires an administrative authority to record the reasons for the decision arrived at? and (ii) If so, does the said principle apply to an order confirming the findings and sentence of Court Marshall and post-confirmation proceedings under the Act? After referring to the precedents in other jurisdictions like U.S.A. and U.K. as well as the precedents of the Supreme Court, the court came to the conclusion that nondisclosure of reasons for an administrative decision violates the principles of natural justice. Though there is a general rule for recording reasons, there is no general rule that reasons should be communicated in every case. It depends on the nature of the power exercised. When quasi-judicial power is exercised, it goes without saying that reasons not only have to be recorded but must be communicated to the aggrieved person. The same is not the case when the authorities exercise administrative powers. When the recording of reasons is either explicitly or impliedly dispensed with by the statutory or authorized instrument, it is not necessary to record reasons. The relevant passage from the said judgment must be excerpted, which is as under. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. (emphasis supplied) 9. In Jagdish Sharan Varshney (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question whether appellate order of confirmation does not require any reasons. Relying on S.N. Mukherjee (supra), Divl. Forest Officer v Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 3 SCC 469 , Seimens Engg. & Mfg. Co of India Ltd v Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 981 = AIR 1976 SC 1785 and M.P. Industries Ltd v Union of India AIR 1966 SC 671 , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle as under. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279 , has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority. 10. The order passed by third respondent is extracted herein above. The same does not have any reasons and, therefore, it is unsustainable. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority. 10. The order passed by third respondent is extracted herein above. The same does not have any reasons and, therefore, it is unsustainable. As the order of original authority as well as the order of appellate authority merged in the order of revisional authority, it is only the revisional order, which is under review and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to remit the matter to original authority. It is not permissible in law by application of doctrine of merger. 11. In the result, for the above reasons, the impugned order passed by the District Collector is set aside. The said revisional authority shall give notice to petitioner, rehear the matter and pass orders giving adequate reasons considering all the grounds urged by the petitioner in his revision petition. Till the matter is disposed of by the District Collector, petitioner shall be allowed to function as FPS dealer of Kuppanapally Village. 12. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs.