JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The petitioner is a body corporate created under Section 80 of the U.P. Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975. 2. Admittedly, name of Arvind Kumar son of Ramnarain, respondent No. 2 herein (hereinafter to called as respondent) was sent by I.T.I. Kanpur to the petitioner for giving him appointment as an apprentice. The respondent according to his own showing was appointed as apprentice. There is a dispute with regard to apprenticeship period. It was one year according to the respondent, but was two years according to the petitioner. The period commenced on 16th of March, 1994, which ended on 15th of March, 1996 as per the petitioner’s case. 3. The following industrial dispute was referred by the State Government under the provisions of Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act : Whether the services of workman Sri Arvind Kumar son of Sri Roopnarain Plumber was rightly and legally terminated on 29th of March, 1996? If it was not so, to what relief the workman is entitled? 4. The respondent in his written statement before the Industrial Tribunal stated that he was appointed as plumber for one year in the Meter Section as an apprentice by the order dated 7th of March, 1994 and he worked from 16th of March, 1994 to 28th of March, 1999 and was paid salary. But when he demanded the pay scale of plumber, he was put off from duties on 29th of March, 1996. The vacancy has been filled up by making fresh appointments. The order dated 29th of March, 1996 is bad as no notice of termination of employment was given nor any amount in lieu thereof was paid. He was not paid even the retrenchment compensation. 5. The petitioner in its written statement came out with the case that the respondent was appointed as an apprentice for a period of two years. The petitioner is not his employer nor the provisions of labour laws including the Industrial Disputes Act are attracted. The respondent does not come within the definition of “workman” as per Section 2(S) and 2 (Z) of Central and U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has no status of workman as per the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and no question of his termination, discharge, dismissal, retrenchment from service arises. The respondent does not come within the definition of “workman” as per Section 2(S) and 2 (Z) of Central and U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has no status of workman as per the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and no question of his termination, discharge, dismissal, retrenchment from service arises. In addition, it was also pleaded that the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Sri M.P. Singh who made the reference was not competent to make it. Reference could only be made by the State Government Secretary or Deputy Secretary to the State Government. 6. A reply to the written statement of the petitioner was filed by the respondent wherein he reiterated that he was engaged as apprentice though for a period of one year. He has been working since then. After the expiry of the apprenticeship period, he has got the status of workman and as such the provisions of Sections 6N, 6P, 6Q of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act are applicable. 7. The parties led evidence oral and documentary in support of their respective cases. 8. Noticeably, the Industrial Tribunal conveniently refused to decide the legal pleas raised by the petitioner on short ground that those pleas were not substantiated before it. It proceeded to deliver the award on the footing that the respondent was engaged as an apprentice for a period of two years instead of three years as provided under the Apprenticeship Act, 1962 and worked up to 28th of March, 1996. Thus, having completed 240 days in a year, he could not be disengaged without giving a notice or wages in lieu of notice. That having not been done, the petitioner has violated the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, the respondent is entitled for reinstatement with continuity of services w.e.f. 29th of March, 1996 and consequently it ordered to pay him salary of plumber from the date of award. 9. Sri R.M. Saggi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the respondent was indisputably posted as an apprentice plumber for a period of two years, he cannot be treated as a workman after the expiry of apprenticeship period. In other words, the provisions of labour laws including the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted in view of the specific provisions as contained in the Apprentice Act, 1961. Even otherwise also, the respondent has not completed 240 days in a year. In other words, the provisions of labour laws including the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted in view of the specific provisions as contained in the Apprentice Act, 1961. Even otherwise also, the respondent has not completed 240 days in a year. 10. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent was apprentice for a period of one year and after the expiry of said period he became workman. 11. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to bear in mind the scheme of Apprenticeship Act, 1961. The scheme of the Apprentice Act was examined in depth by the Apex Court viz. a vis. the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board v. Shiv Mohan Singh, 2004 AIR SCW 5623. It has been held therein that apprentices are trainees and not workman and if any dispute arises, then, the settlement has to be done under the Apprenticeship Advisor as per Section 20 of the Apprenticeship Act and his decision thereof is final. It is clear from the scheme of the Act, 1961 that nature and character of apprentice is nothing but that of a trainee and he is supposed to enter into a contract and by virtue of that contract he has to serve for a fixed period on a fixed stipend. On the expiry of training, there is no corresponding obligation on the employer to employ him which is also very clear from Section 7 that contract of apprenticeship trainee shall terminate on the expiry of period of apprenticeship training. It further makes it clear that by virtue of Section 18 all apprenticeship trainees are not workers. It has been further laid down that in the Apprenticeship Act throughout emphasis has been laid that the apprentices are never being treated as workers. Sections 22 and 22 of the Apprenticeship Act have also been considered. It further makes it clear that by virtue of Section 18 all apprenticeship trainees are not workers. It has been further laid down that in the Apprenticeship Act throughout emphasis has been laid that the apprentices are never being treated as workers. Sections 22 and 22 of the Apprenticeship Act have also been considered. The conclusion drawn in para 49 of the said report from the scheme of the Apprenticeship Act is reproduced below : “The survey of all these provisions of the Acts and the Rules as mentioned above, makes it clear that the character and status of apprentice remains the same and he does not become workman and labour laws are not attracted.” The portion quoted above in my considered view is suffice to dispose of the present writ petition. 13. As delineated herein above, it is common case of the parties that the contesting respondent was appointed as an apprenticeship trainee. The apprenticeship period came to an end according to the petitioner on 15th of March, 1996. 14. Before this Court a dispute was sought to be raised by the respondent regarding his apprenticeship period on the ground that it was only one year instead of two years. It is not necessary for this Court to address the said issue as even the Industrial Tribunal proceeded to deliver the award on the premises that the respondent was a trainee for a period of two years. Reference can be made to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the award. This being so, the respondent was apprentice trainee at least up to the period of 15th of March, 1996 and obviously, he could not acquire the status of workman even if he has worked for few days thereafter. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the respondent, placed reliance upon Annexure-CA 1 to the counter-affidavit which purports to be an office order dated 7th of March, 1994 in support of his case that he was trainee for a period of one year. In contra, the petitioner has referred the form filled up by the respondent in his own handwriting which contains his personal details wherein the period of training as per contract has been shown as two years from 16th of March, 1994 to 15th of March, 1996. The said form has been signed by the respondent and it also contains his photograph. The said form has been signed by the respondent and it also contains his photograph. The respondent has not explained the above document in his reply (counter-affidavit). He has not disputed his signature nor the photograph. It is not necessary to say anything further in the matter. 15. The other aspect of the case is that apprentice remains a trainee as held by the Apex Court and will not get status of workman unless there is some cogent material on record by way of appointment letter etc. which is not so here. 16. “Workman” has been defined in Section 2 (z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and includes apprentice. The said sections reads as follows : “ ‘Workman’ means any person (including apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person — (i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934; or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages (wages exceeding Rs. 1600 per mensem, as per S. 2(s)(iv) of I.D. Act, 1947) exceeding five hundred per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 17. A bare perusal of the aforesaid definition would show that apprentice has been included within the definition of “workman”. A dispute arose as to whether an apprentice appointed under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 is a workman in view of the aforesaid definition as contained in Section 2 (z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board (supra). A dispute arose as to whether an apprentice appointed under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 is a workman in view of the aforesaid definition as contained in Section 2 (z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board (supra). The matter was examined with the angle that the Apprenticeship Act is complete code itself and it provides that an apprentice is not a workman. It has been held that application to U.P. Industrial Disputes Act automatically stands excluded in view of the scheme of Apprenticeship Act which is a Central Legislation and also enacted later in point of time. Relevant paragraph 54 is reproduced below : “It is also necessary to mention here that the definition of the word ‘workman’ as given in Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Both the definitions includes apprentice. But the expression appearing in Section 2 (z) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Disputes Act 1947 are not applicable to the apprentices appointed under the Apprentices Act, 1961. The Apprentices Act is a code in itself and it clearly stipulates that in Section 2 (aa) apprentice means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of contract of training and the workers are employed for wages for work done by them. Section 18 clearly mentions that the apprentices are not workmen and “the provisions of any law with respect to labour law shall not apply or in relation to such apprentices”. Therefore, reading of definition of apprentice in Sections 2(aa) and 2(r) read with Section 18 of the Apprentices Act leaves no manner of doubt that this Act which is special Act it does not cover the apprentices and it precludes the application of any other labour laws, i.e. U.P. Industrial Disputes Act & Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. When both these Acts are not applicable then labour Court/industrial Tribunal will not have any jurisdiction to entertain any dispute arising therefrom. The application of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 automatically stand excluded.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC and others, JT 2004 (7) SC 232, the Apex Court examined the status of a trainee after the expiry of training period under the Apprenticeship Act. The application of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 automatically stand excluded.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC and others, JT 2004 (7) SC 232, the Apex Court examined the status of a trainee after the expiry of training period under the Apprenticeship Act. It has laid down in no uncertain terms that the onus is upon the apprentice to prove that he is a workman, vide para 14. Necessarily, there has to be pleading in this regard and the requisite facts have to be proved. In the absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought about, an apprentice cannot be held to be workman. In this connection para 37 from the report is reproduced below : “In case any person raises a contention that his status has been changed from apprentice to a workman, he must plead and prove the requisite facts. In absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought about, an apprentice cannot be held to be workman.” 19. On the facts of the present case, neither there is a pleading nor there is any proof that the respondent became workman at any given point of time. The written statement filed by the respondent has been noticed with some detail in the earlier part of this judgment. The said document is a small document which consists of six paragraphs only. A close reading of the said document does not even whisper that after the completion of training period (may be one year or two years), the respondent was engaged or employed as a workman or there was a de novo contract. On the contrary, a plain reading of the said document would show that the respondent came out with the case that he joined as trainee on 16th of March, 1994 and when he demanded the regular pay scale, the employer became annoyed and asked him not to come on work on 29th of March, 1996. Neither any notice nor any amount in lieu of notice nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. Neither any notice nor any amount in lieu of notice nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. In my considered view the said pleading is not sufficient to show that there was a de novo contract or a contract of employer and employee has come into existence between the parties by conduct or otherwise. 20. The petitioner is a U.P. State Government Undertaking, no person can be appointed without following the process of selection or without inviting applications from public at large. It is not the case of respondent that he was selected through some selection process. This also supports the case of petitioner that the respondent remained throughout as trainee. The Apprenticeship Act further provides that on completion of successful training a certificate shall be issued to the person concerned. There is no averment as to whether any such certificate was issued to the respondent. 21. In Ramesh Dhar Dwivedi v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (3) ADJ 458 ), it has been held by this Court that a person who has got apprenticeship training under the Apprenticeship Act cannot claim recruitment without competing in any direct recruitment selection. 22. The upshot of the above discussions is that the Industrial Tribunal has approached the matter with a wrong angle. It failed to consider the relevant aspects of the case. It wrongly treated the respondent as a workman. On admitted facts, the Industrial Tribunal has posed wrong questions, resultantly it committed mistake in passing the impugned award. 23. Before saying omega to the case, it is relevant to note that on 15th of September, 2000 interim order was passed directing the petitioner to deposit the entire amount of back wages under the award. The amount, if any, deposited alongwith the accrued interest shall be refunded to the petitioner forthwith. 24. Viewed as above, there is force in the writ petition and it deserves to be allowed. The impugned award dated 24-12-1999 is hereby set aside. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. But no order as to costs. —————