Judgment P.K. Jaiswal, J. ( 1. ) This second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 22.6.2005 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Sagar, reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissing the suit for ejectment filed by the appellant. ( 2. ) On 1.10.1981 appellant had filed the civil suit for ejectment of the respondent from the suit plot marked as A, B, C and D in the plaint map on the allegation that the respondent was his tenant. The agreed rent was Rs.1800/- per annum and the tenancy started from 15th August of each year and ended on the 14th August of the next year. It was stated that the suit plot having an area of 22,500sqft is situated at Makronia (Buzurg), Tehsil on Sagar-Kanpur road and on this plot there exists a petrol pump belonging to the appellant. It was also stated that the petrol pump was let out initially to "Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited" on 15.8.1961 vide lease deed dated 14.8.1961 (AnnexureEx.P/1). The letting out was for the period of 10 years, and thereafter, the lease continued as it was renewed every 10 years. The respondent took over after nationalization in the year 1976 and stepped into the shoes of "Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited" as a lessee on same terms. It was claimed that the tenancy was terminated by notice dated 22.12.1980 w.e.f.14.8.1981 and, therefore, after termination of the tenancy, the appellant was entitled to take possession. Further pleadings regarding termination of tenancy was that there was no renewal of tenancy since 14.8.1981 and, therefore, the tenancy expired by efflux of time. It was also claimed that after termination of the tenancy, the appellant was entitled to claim mesne profit of Rs.450/- at the time of filing of the suit and it was claimed that Rs.450/- per month be paid to the appellant during the pendency of the suit. It was alleged that the appellant required the suit plot bona fide for starting his business and he also wanted to construct for the purpose of his business certain building. It was also stated that the suit land was out of Municipal Corporation limit of Sagar. By saying this it appears that the appellant implied that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 did not apply. It was also stated that the suit land was out of Municipal Corporation limit of Sagar. By saying this it appears that the appellant implied that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 did not apply. In the plaint, it has been shown that the suit land was in the name of plaintiff in the village Makronia (Buzurg). ( 3. ) That in the lease deed (Ex.P/1), the lessee agreed with the lessor in clause (2)(b) as follows :- "2. THE LESSEE HEREBY COVENANTS WITH THE LESSOR AS FOLLOWS :- (a) xxxx xxxxx xxxxx (b) At the expiration of the said term or extended term or sooner determination thereof as the case may be to surrender and deliver up to the Lessor the demised premises after levelling the ground if and so far as may be required by the Lessor to do." and further, it was expressly agreed in clause 4(b) of the lease deed as under: "4. IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AS FOLLOWS :- (a) xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx (b) If the Lessee shall be desirous of taking a renewal lease of the demised premises upon the expiration of the term hereby granted, then the Lessor shall on receipt of a notice in writing to that effect, at least two months prior to the expiration of the lease, grant to the Lessee a fresh lease of the demised premises for a further periods not extending TEN (10) years each at the same rent and upon the same terms and conditions in all respects as are reserved and contained herein. Provided however that should the Lessee exercise the aforesaid option of renewal for a period lesser than full renewal period then in that ease the Lessee shall be entitled to a further option equal to the balance of the renewal period and the Lessee shall be entitled to continue to occupy and use the demised premises for such further period as it may desire notwithstanding whether a fresh lease has been executed and registered or not by the Lessor." ( 4. ) As per terms and conditions of lease deed dated 14.8.1961 (Ex.P/1) after expiry of the original period the lease was extended for further period of 10 years up to 14.8.1981 and thereafter, the lease was not renewed and prior to it respondents lease was determined vide notice dated 22.12.1980 (Ex.P/4) and the respondent was asked to vacate the leased out plot as per map (Ex.P/2) but the defendent company in stead of vacating the leased out plot brought a suit on 4.7.1984 for permanent injunction against the appellant restraining him from taking possession of suit plot on the ground that the lease deed automatically stood renewed because of it being a permanent tenant and having raised Pucca structure thereon. The suit of the respondent was dismissed on 29.8.2003 (Civil Suit No. 88- A/2000). ( 5. ) The appellant to counter the allegations made by the respondent in his suit for permanent injunction, filed two applications for amendment in para 6 of the plaint which relates to alternative plea about continuation of "cause of action". Amendment dated 8.4.1992 and amendment dated 5.4.2002 are relevant which read as under :- ( 6. ) The written statement filed by the respondent denied almost all the allegations in the plaint. The respondent contested the suit on the defence that the lease was of permanent character and the said lease of tenancy stood renewed up to 14.8.1991 because of notice dated 30th March, 1981 for renewal of lease, so institution of suit as such in absence of cause of action being "premature" deserves to be dismissed. ( 7. ) The learned Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence recorded findings that the respondent is lessee of plaintiff in disputed plot @ Rs.1800/- per year and the respondent has not delivered the vacant possession of the disputed plot to the appellant, despite the determination of lease vide notice dated 22.12.1980 (Ex.P/4). The Trial Court also held that the cause of action arose on 15.8.1981 and the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable and not premature and could be filed legally prior to 15.8.1991. The Trial Court also held that the cause of action arose on 15.8.1981 and the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable and not premature and could be filed legally prior to 15.8.1991. With the above finding the Trial Court decreed the suit and granted a decree that the plaintiff is entitled to get back the vacant possession of leased out demised premises from the respondent and also directed the respondent to handover the vacant possession of the appellant peacefully and also granted damages @ 1800/- per year till the date of possession. ( 8. ) The appellant challenged the said judgment and decree of the Trial Court by filing first-appeal before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate court on the basis of amendments made by the appellant came to the conclusion that period of lease stood automatically renewed up to 14.8.1991 and the suit instituted on 1.10.1981 was premature, the lower appellate court reversed the finding recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the suit as premature. ( 9. ) The following substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission of this second appeal by order dated 25.9.2006 :- "Whether the lower appellate court was justified in law in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court on the ground that there was no cause of action to file the suit on 14.8.1981, despite the fact that the lease was determined vide notice Ex.P.4 ?" ( 10. ) In the written statement it was pleaded by the respondent that the suit premise was let out to the "Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited" vide lease deed dated 14.8.1961 for a period of 10 years and later on in terms of clause 4(b) of lease deed, the lease was extended for a further period of 10 years on 14.8.1971 and during this extended period the assessts of "Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited" were taken by the Union of India under the special law "The Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 (in short "Act of 1976") and in consequence thereof the right, title arid interest of Burmah Shell, in relation to its undertaking in India, stood transferred to, and shall vested, in Central Government. As per Section 5(2) of the Act of 1976 on the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy, such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Burmah Shall immediately before the appointed day i.e. 24th January, 1976. It is not in dispute that the respondent-defendant did not avail and exercised the option for renewal and thereafter lease was determined/terminated by the appellant vide notice dated 22.12.1980 on expiry of its second term on 15.8.1981. Y.Shrinath (DW-1) in his statement very categorically stated that the respondent company after expiry of the lease period never requested for renewal of lease for a further period of 10 years w.e.f.15.8.1981. No document has been filed by the respondent to prove that by registered notice dated 30.3.1981 they prayed for renewal of the lease agreement nor such document is on record and; therefore, both the Courts below very categorically stated that lease was valid up to 14.8. 1981. It is also not in dispute that vide notice dated 22.12.1980 (Ex.P/4) the appellant prior to expiry of lease period determined the lease and respondent was asked to vacate the lease plot and deliver the vacant possession to the appellant. ( 11. ) Learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to the averments made in the plaint particularly the amended portion of the plaint and submits that the said amendment was made just to counter the allegations made in a suit for permanent injunction filed by the respondent and the said plea was taken only as an alternative plea and the same cannot be treated as admission made by the appellant that the period of lease was valid up to 14.8.1991. It is also submitted that once the tenancy/lease comes to an end on expiry of the fixed period under the lease deed or by efflux of time in and thereupon status of tenant/lessee becomes of a tenant- at- sufferance and then it was not necessary to again determine the tenancy of lease by giving fresh notice and there was no need of issuing any notice to the respondent, if term of tenancy/lease has expired and notice is required only when lease/tenancy is in existence. He submits that the lower appellate court misconstrued the provisions of law and committed a legal error in reversing the finding recorded by the Trial Court and dismissing the suit of the appellant. ( 12. ) On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent drew my attention to amendment dated 8.4.1992 and 5.8.2002 and submitted that the appellant himself in his plaint very categorically admitted that the period of lease was renewed up to 14.8.1991. The lower appellate court has not committed any legal error in dismissing the suit. His submission was that the admission made by the appellant is a best piece of evidence on which the opposite party can rely upon and the said admission is not required to be proved. With the above submission, learned senior counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. ( 13. ) I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. ( 14. ) The parties could not by their pleadings alter the intrinsic character of the lease or bring about a change of the rights and obligations flowing therefrom. The lease was a lease for a definite term and, therefore, expired by efflux of time by reason of Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not disputed by the parties that thereafter the said period was never extended and prior to the expiry of lease period, the lease of the respondent was determined by notice dated 22.12.1980. On termination of the lease the possession of the lessee was that of a tenant- at- sufferance as being one who came in by right and held over without right. The Apex Court in a case reported as Pooran Chand v. Motilal, AIR 1964 SC 461 observed as under :- "It is, therefore, manifest that the lease was for a period of one year and that it is not a monthly tenancy. As the term fixed under the deed had expired, the appellant was not entitled to any statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. ( 15. ) In the present case, the tenancy come to an end vide Ex.P/1. Thereafter there was no lease deed in his favour. As the term fixed under the deed had expired, the appellant was not entitled to any statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. ( 15. ) In the present case, the tenancy come to an end vide Ex.P/1. Thereafter there was no lease deed in his favour. It is well settled that when the period of lease is fixed by a contract and it comes to an end then the tenant is not entitled to a notice under Section 106 of the Act after expiry of the period of termination of the lease, the possession of the lessee was that of a tenant- at- sufferance as being one who came in by right and held, over without right. Such a person can be evicted without notice. ( 16. ) Lease of urban immovable property represents a contract between the lessor and the lessee. If the contract is to be put to an end it has to be terminated by a notice to quit as envisaged under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. But it is equally clear as provided by Section 111 of the T. P. Act that the lease of immovable property determines by various modes therein prescribed. Now, if the lease of immovable property determined in any one of the modes prescribed under Section 111, the contract of lease comes to an end, and the landlord can exercise his right of reentry. In the present case the contract comes to an end and lease was determined under Section 111 of the T.P. Act. The Courts below has apparently being misled by the amendment made by the appellant in para-6 of the plaint that because the lease was renewed up to the period 14/8/1991, there was no cause of action to file the suit on 14/8/1981. In fact the lease deed dated 14/8/1961 (Ex.P/1) as well as its renewal from 1971 to 1981 were compulsorily registrable under Section 107 of T.P.Act, whereas lease deed in question being unregistered. The presumption about the duration of the lease under Section 106 of the T.P. Act and as such defendant lease was legally valid under Section111 (a), (b) and (h) of the T.P. Act vide notice Ex.P/4. ( 17. The presumption about the duration of the lease under Section 106 of the T.P. Act and as such defendant lease was legally valid under Section111 (a), (b) and (h) of the T.P. Act vide notice Ex.P/4. ( 17. ) It may be seen that the lease in question is an unregistered lease deed and the question of recording of finding that fresh tenancy came into existing after 14/8/1981 and the period was renewed for a further term often years till 14/8/1991 is not sustainable. The status of respondent was that of a tenant- at- sufferance. ( 18. ) On determination of a lease it is the duties of the lessee to deliver the possession of the demised premises to the lessor. If the lessee continues in possession even after the determination of the lease, the landlord obviously has a right to eject him forthwith. It is also to be seen that a notice for determination of lease was served to the respondent by registered post and thereafter the suit was filed on 1.10.1981, after expiry of the original period of the lease, the lower appellate court on the basis of alternative plea made by the appellant cannot be said mat period of lease was. automatically renewed till 14.8.1991 when admittedly no renewal was made nor any lease deed was executed between the parties. On the basis of said admission, it cannot be said that no cause of action arose on 1.10.19 81 and the suit filed by the appellant was premature. Thus, by way of abundant caution and as alternative plea an admission made by way of amendment cannot overrule the statutory provision of Section 111 of T.P. Act nor on the basis of admission as an alternative plea it can be said that the lease period was renewed till 14.8.1991. The renewal for a period of 10 years will become admissible only when the renewal is made for the aforesaid period of 10 years by a. registered lease deed as laid down under Section 17 of the Registration Act read with Section 107 of the T.P. Act. The lower appellate Court committed an error in reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on the ground that there was no cause of action to file the suit on 14.8.1981. ( 19. ) Admission in itself does not create any interest or title in the property. The lower appellate Court committed an error in reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on the ground that there was no cause of action to file the suit on 14.8.1981. ( 19. ) Admission in itself does not create any interest or title in the property. Leasehold right is an interest in the property and unless the lease was duly executed and registered lease hold rights cannot be created. As already stated hereinbefore that in absence of renewal there was no extension of the period of the lease and the lease was duly determined by notice the position of the respondent was that of a tenant- at- sufferance. Such a person is not a tenant at all. He has no estate or interest in the property. He has only a protection of statute. ( 20. ) For the above mentioned reasons the substantial question of law is decided in favour of appellant by holding that the lower appellate court committed an error in reversing the well considered judgment of the Trial Court on the ground that there was no cause of action to file a suit on 14.8.1981 despite the fact that the lease was determined vide notice dated 22.2.1980 and thereafter the original period of the lease had also expired on 14.8.1981. ( 21. ) In the result, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is restored. The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed with cost. Counsel fee Rs.3000/-. Appeal allowed.