JUDGMENT : D.H. Waghela, J. In all these appeals, argued and requested to be disposed together, the sole issue presented for resolution by this Court was: whether the policy of the Government for compassionate appointment, prevalent at the time of application for compassionate appointment should govern the decision, or whether the policy and the recruitment rules as prevailing at the time the Government decides to grant or not to grant compassionate appointment should be applicable ? 2. Learned AGPs, Ms. Moxa Thakker and Mr. N.J. Shah, vehemently argued that after several years of death of a Government employee in harness, to whose heir the policy of compassionate appointment were to be applied, there should be a presumption of good financial condition of the family in distress, which would have otherwise not survived; and while considering such applications, the policy as on the date of such consideration and the relevant recruitment rules have to be taken into account by the authorities concerned. It was submitted that the purpose and policy of making appointment on compassionate ground is obviously and admittedly to help the family of the deceased Government servant and, as held by the Apex Court in State of J.&K. & Anr. v. Sajad Ahmed Mir [ (2006)5 SCC 766 ] if sufficient time has elapsed, a family member may not be entitled as a matter of right to an appointment on compassionate ground. The authority would be legally justified in refusing such appointment in view of the successive changes in the policy for making such appointments; and the requirement of higher educational qualification for appointment even on the post of the lowest cadre has to be fulfilled by the applicant. In support of such submission, learned counsel relied upon Government Resolution dated 29.03.2007 wherein minimum educational qualification for appointment on the post in Class-IV, even on compassionate ground, is prescribed to be SSC pass. It was also submitted that the criterion of income of the bereaved family has also undergone changes from time to time and relying upon the Division Bench decision of this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.J. Shethna & Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.C.Patel) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 83 of 2006, it was submitted that subsequent changes in the rules regarding qualification has to be taken into account, as compassionate appointment was not a matter of right. 3. Justice B.J. Shethna & Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.C.Patel) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 83 of 2006, it was submitted that subsequent changes in the rules regarding qualification has to be taken into account, as compassionate appointment was not a matter of right. 3. There was no controversy about the fact that in all the judgments and orders of learned Single judge of this Court, which are called into question in each of the appeals, the direction is restricted to considering the cases of the original applicants on the basis of the policy and recruitment rules prevalent at the time of making of the applications for compassionate appointment. The bone of contention was that none of the original applicants could claim any appointment as a matter of right, but each of the applicants was entitled to consideration for such appointment, if he/she were eligible on the date of making of the application, in terms of the policy and the recruitment rules of the State Government which were prevalent at that time. Therefore, the sole issue, as aforesaid, is purely a legal issue as to whether the subsequent changes in the policy or the changes in the requirement of minimum qualification could be applied in the cases of the original applicants. That issue appears to be squarely covered by recent decisions of the Supreme Court, which are quoted and followed in most of the impugned judgments. Reference may be had to the clear observations recently made by the Apex Court in State Bank of India and others v. Jaspal Kaur [ (2007) 9 SCC 571 ], wherein the pertinent observations read as under: "20. The law with regard to employment on compassionate grounds for dependents of a deceased employee was laid down by this Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana [ (1994)4 SCC 138 ], where this Court observed that: Appointments in the public services are made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. However, exceptions are made in favour of dependents of employees dying in harness and leaving their family in penury and without any means of livelihood...... 21. ..... 22. ..... 23. Hence, a major criterion while appointing a person on compassionate grounds should be the financial condition of the family the deceased person left behind. Unless the financial condition is entirely penurious, such appointments cannot be made. ...." 4. 21. ..... 22. ..... 23. Hence, a major criterion while appointing a person on compassionate grounds should be the financial condition of the family the deceased person left behind. Unless the financial condition is entirely penurious, such appointments cannot be made. ...." 4. Other pertinent observations as under were recently made by the Supreme Court in V. Sivamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [ (2008)13 SCC 730 ] : "9. Article 16 of the Constitution bars discrimination in employment on the ground only of descent. If the service rules or any scheme of the Government provides that whenever a Government servant retires from service, one of his dependents should be given employment in his place, or provides that the children of Government servants will have preference in employment, that would squarely fly in the face of prohibition on the ground of descent. Employment should not be hereditary or by succession. But where the policy provides for compassionate appointment in the case of an employee who dies in harness or an employee who is medically invalidated, such a provision is based on a classification which is not only on the ground of descent. The classification is based on another condition in addition to descent; that is death of the employee in harness, or medical invalidation of the employee while in service. .... 35. .... Compassionate appointment being an exception to the general rule of appointment, can only be claimed strictly in accordance with the terms of scheme and not by seeking relaxation of the terms of the scheme. The fact that on account of certain delays in processing the application, a Government servant may lose the benefit of the scheme, is no ground to relax the terms of the scheme. If in a particular case the processing of an application is deliberately delayed to deny the benefit to the Government servant, the inaction may be challenged on the ground of want of bona fides or ulterior motives. ...." 5. Earlier, in Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana and others [ (2006) 12 SCC 44 ], the Apex Court made categorical observation to the effect that the case for compassionate appointment would be required to be considered in terms of the rules which were in existence at the time of death of the public servant or making of the application. 6. 6. As against above decisions, the appellants have relied upon the latest decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of India & Anr. v. Raj Kumar [2010 I CLR 1027]. In the facts of that case, an employee of the bank died on 01.10.2004, applications for compassionate appointment were made on 06.06.2005 and 14.06.205 and while the applications were being processed and verified, the scheme was substituted by a scheme for payment of ex-gratia lump sum amount with effect from 04.08.2005. The new scheme abolished the old scheme and compassionate appointment was no longer permissible. Therefore, the bank called upon the applicant to apply under the new scheme. The Supreme Court held that an appointment under the scheme can be made only if the scheme was in force and not after it is abolished or withdrawn. The Court noted that in most of the cases, the scheme does not create a right for immediate or automatic appointment merely on an application; and in many cases the applicant only acquires a right to be considered for appointment against a specified quota, even if he fulfils all the eligibility criteria. In that context, the Court observed: "8. .... As none of the applicants under the scheme has a vested right, the scheme that is in force when the application is actually considered, and not the scheme that was in force earlier when the application was made, will be applicable. Further where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. ...." (emphasis supplied) 9. .... 10. ..... The new scheme specifically provided that all pending applications will be considered under the new scheme. Further where the earlier scheme is abolished and the new scheme which replaces it specifically provides that all pending applications will be considered only in terms of the new scheme, then the new scheme alone will apply. ...." (emphasis supplied) 9. .... 10. ..... The new scheme specifically provided that all pending applications will be considered under the new scheme. Therefore, it has to be held that the new scheme which came into force on 04.08.2005 alone will apply even in respect of pending applications." 6.1 The important distinguishing feature in the facts of the above case before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India (supra) was that the scheme for compassionate appointment was abolished altogether, leaving no room for consideration of application therefor, with the clear stipulation in the new scheme that all pending applications will be considered in terms of the new scheme and brief period legitimately required for processing the original application for compassionate appointment had not expired, before which the scheme was substituted. In the facts of the cases before this Court, almost invariably the appellant authorities have just not considered the applications for years and the original scheme is not abolished or substituted, but the qualifications and requirements required to be fulfilled are so upgraded or revised that the applicants are ousted from even consideration of their cases after years of pendency of their applications. Such attitude or inaction on the part of the authorities were not even claimed to be justified or bona fide. These facts necessarily lead to an inference of discrimination and lack of bona fide insofar as the applicants, whose applications were considered and granted under the erstwhile scheme, would have been appointed while the applicants such as the respondents herein were admittedly deprived of even consideration of their applications when they would have required the job the most, if they were eligible for appointment. In a sense, the subsequently revised requirement of higher qualification even for the job of the lowest grade and denial of appointment only on that ground after years of inaction on the part of the authorities would only add insult to injury. 7. In a sense, the subsequently revised requirement of higher qualification even for the job of the lowest grade and denial of appointment only on that ground after years of inaction on the part of the authorities would only add insult to injury. 7. In view of the above clear dicta of the Apex Court on the subject, the arguments of the appellants could not be accepted and delay or default in considering the applications for compassionate appointment could not be allowed to be used for escaping the responsibility of considering the applications at the appropriate time and as early as practicable, in view of the purpose and policy of granting appointment on compassionate ground. Since the appointment on compassionate ground is an exception to the general rule and constitutional policy embodied in Articles 14 and 16, exception also has to be made in application of the recruitment rules prevalent at the time of considering the case for appointment on compassionate grounds, because in each of the cases, the appellants clearly appeared to have taken years in considering the applications before rejecting the applications on the basis of the revised policy which was not in existence at the time the applications were made and the original applicants had certainly become entitled to consideration for compassionate appointment. It was seen from the record that, factually, the applications made in the years from 1991 to 2006 were kept pending without any positive response, for two to ten years by the authorities. According to the relevant Government Resolution dated 10.03.2000, the new scheme for compassionate appointment was expressly made prospective with the clarification that the cases of death prior to that date would be governed by the scheme prevalent at the relevant time. The detailed instructions attached to that Government Resolution mandated immediate actions for helping the family in distress and such express instructions were clearly violated by the authorities in the facts of most of the cases before this Court. Under such circumstances, the attempt at defeating the claims of the original applicants by placing reliance upon the subsequent Government Resolution dated 29.03.2007 cannot be countenanced. 8. Under such circumstances, the attempt at defeating the claims of the original applicants by placing reliance upon the subsequent Government Resolution dated 29.03.2007 cannot be countenanced. 8. The last argument on behalf of the appellants, that the recent and latest Government Resolution of 29.03.2007 is superseding all the earlier Government Resolutions, has no merit as the rights of the original applicants for consideration had accrued on the basis of the policy and the recruitment rules prevailing at the time of making their applications and the authorities concerned were duty bound under the policy itself to consider their applications immediately. It does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to take benefit of their own wrong or default in not deciding the applications of such a nature for several years. 9. Therefore, with the clarification that the authorities concerned shall be at liberty to examine the case of each of the original applicants strictly in terms of the policy prevalent at the time of submission of the applications for compassionate appointment, the appeals are dismissed and the appellants are directed to consider the cases of the original applicants in accordance with law, as aforesaid, and convey the decision to each of the applicants concerned within a period of six weeks from today. Direct service is permitted. Civil Applications stand disposed as not surviving. Appeal dismissed.