Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against judgment dated 8.1.2010 passed by the Appellate Authority, Fast Track Court, Ludhianawhereby the appeal of Amrik Singh (since deceased and now represented byhis legal representatives, i.e., respondent Nos. 1 to 3) was accepted, thejudgment dated 4.3.2009 of the Rent Controller,Ludhiana was set aside andthe petitioners along with proforma respondent No. 4 were ordered to handover the vacant possession of the suit property to the appellant within three months. 2. Amrik Singh filed an application under Section 13 of the EastPunjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,1949 (for short, `the Act) against thepetitioners and proforma respondent No. 4 for their ejectment from thedemised premises on the grounds of non-payment of rent and personalnecessity which was stated to be setting up of an electronics shop for hisson. 3. The petitioners and proforma respondent No. 4, upon notice, appeared and denied the personal need of the landlord by way of filing a written statement. It was pleaded that the landlord had initiated eviction proceedings against other tenants on the similar ground. In so far as the non payment of rent was concerned, it was averred that the same has been tendered and accepted by the landlord. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the respondents are in arrears of rent ? OPP 2. Whether the premises in question are required for bona fide need of the petitioner ? OPP 3. Relief. 5. After appraisal of the evidence led by the parties, the Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment application. 6. Feeling aggrieved, Amrik Singh had preferred an appeal which was accepted by the Appellate Authority resulting in the filing of the instant revision petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside as the landlord had no bona fide need. She further contended that the landlord owned other shops adjoining the demised premises qua which ejectment proceedings were initiated by him on the similar ground and the tenants therein were got evicted, but those shops were not utilized for the said purpose. She further contended that the landlord owned other shops adjoining the demised premises qua which ejectment proceedings were initiated by him on the similar ground and the tenants therein were got evicted, but those shops were not utilized for the said purpose. She made a reference to the site plan Exhibit PW2/1 to contend that the landlord did not require the demised premises because the same are sandwiched between the shops which were occupied by Kewal Krishan and M/S General Electronics who have since been got evicted and had he any bona fide need qua the same, he would have initiated eviction proceedings simultaneously. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 contended that the shops in occupation of Kewal Krishan and M/S GeneralElectronics were got vacated by filing eviction proceedings which wereupheld up to the Honble Supreme Court on the ground of personal necessityof the landlord and since he wanted to set up a business of dealing inelectronics for which more space was required, the ejectment of thepetitioners and proforma respondent No. 4 was sought and the AppellateAuthority has rightly appreciated his need and no fault can be found withthe judgment passed by it. It was further contended that the landlord is abest judge of his need and the tenant cannot dictate him and that the veryfact that he was filing successive ejectment applications against varioustenants showed his bona fide need. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1to 3 submitted that the objection of the petitioners that the need of thelandlord was not bona fide because ejectment proceedings were initiatedpiece-meal and not against all the tenants is also meaningless because it is a settled principle of law that the landlord is not obliged to do so. 9. In support of his contentions/ submissions, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 placed reliance on the following judgments :- 1. Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2003(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 42 : 2003(1) P.L.R. 371 (S.C.); 2. Kewal Krishan v. Amrik Singh, 2001(1) Rent Control Reporter 434 (P&H); 3. M/S General Electronics and others v. Amrik Singh, 2009(1) Rent Control Reporter 284 (P&H); 4. Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Limited, 1998(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 533 : 1999(1) P.L.R. 805 (S.C.); 5. Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr., 1999(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 508 : JT 1999(3) S.C. 283; 6. M/S General Electronics and others v. Amrik Singh, 2009(1) Rent Control Reporter 284 (P&H); 4. Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Limited, 1998(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 533 : 1999(1) P.L.R. 805 (S.C.); 5. Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr., 1999(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 508 : JT 1999(3) S.C. 283; 6. Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., 2000(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 135 : AIR 2000 S.C. 534; 7. Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Dass and others, 2004(1) Rent Control Reporter 580 (S.C.); 8. Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by Lrs., 1997(1) Rent Control Reporter 591 (S.C.); 9. M /S Gagan Traders v. Jaspreet Singh and another, 2010(1) Rent Control Reporter 521 (P&H); 10. P.L.Chopra v. Arun Aggarwal, 2002(2) Rent Control Reporter 628 (P&H); 11. Gobind Ram v. Gopal Krishan Gupta, 2009(1) Haryana Law Reporter 25 (P&H); 12. Baljit Singh v. Raghubir Singh, 2009(2) Rent Control Reporter 44 (P&H); and 13. Mohinder Singh v. Sohan Singh Sethi, 2009(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 23 : 2009(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 603 : 2009(3) Civil Court Cases 376 (P&H). 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned judgments, I am of the opinion that the instant petition has no merit. 11. The whole grievance of the petitioners stems from the fact that the landlord had got ejected other tenants while proceedings were not initiated against them simultaneously and since the shops so got vacated were not put to the intended purpose, the bona fide need qua the demised premises did not exist. 12. The aforesaid plea is not tenable. It is for the landlord to seek eviction of any of the tenants from the rented premises in the first instance. Moreover, in the instant case, the ejectment proceedings were started in quick succession and, therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the landlord. 13. Besides, it has come on record that one of the petitioners was a partner in M/S General Electronics which was in occupation of another shop having been got vacated by initiated separate proceedings. It has also been contended on behalf of the landlord and not denied by the petitioners that the ejectment of M/S General Electronics as well as that of other tenant, i.e., Krishan Kumar, has been upheld up to the Honble Supreme Court. It has also been contended on behalf of the landlord and not denied by the petitioners that the ejectment of M/S General Electronics as well as that of other tenant, i.e., Krishan Kumar, has been upheld up to the Honble Supreme Court. It is a settled proposition of law that the landlord is best judge of his need and the tenant cannot dictate to him whether his need is bona fide or whether the tenanted premises is sufficient to meet his need or not. 14. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr. (supra), the Apex Court observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment as follows :- "8. When a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation there is no doubt he has to prove it. But there is no warrant for presuming that his need is not bona fide. The statute enjoins that the court should be satisfied of his requirement. So the court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about the bona fides of the requirement it is for the landlord to clear such doubts. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord the court has to look into the claim independently albeit landlords burden gets lessened by such no-dispute. In appropriate cases it is open to the court to presume that the landlords requirement is bona fide and put the contesting tenant to the burden to show how the requirement is not bona fide." 15. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Limited (supra), the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act,1958, observed in paragraph 14 of the judgment as under :- "14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 16. Having regard to the aforesaid, no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority. 17. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.