Judgment 1. The Writ Petitioner/Claim Petitioner has filed this Writ Petition praying for an issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus in calling for the records of the Second Respondent pertaining to the order dated 22. 2004 made in Claim Petition No.297 of 2000 denying the claim so made and to quash the same and further to direct the First Respondent to calculate and pay the arrears of salary and other allowances as per the claim made in C.P.No.297 of 2000 along with interest. .2. The Principal Labour Court, while passing orders in Claim Petition No.297 of 2000 on 22. 2004, has, inter alia, observed that The Petitioner has not adduced any satisfactory and acceptable evidence for the claim amount of Rs. 7,35,2210. Since the Respondent has admitted in para 14 of the counter that the Petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,25,328.07. I hold that the petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,25,328.07 and consequently, computed the money value of the benefits due to the petitioner at Rs. 3,25,328.07p. .3. Theshort summation of the Petitioners case: .The Petitioner was employed as a Store Clerk Mechanic in the First Respondent/Construction Company. The Petitioner and others by means of an order dated 13. 1973 were terminated from services on 20.3.1973 by the First Respondent by an illegal order. This culminated in a reference being made by the Government to the Principal Labour Court, Chennai in I.D.No.45 of 1975. By an Award dated 23. 1990, the Principal Labour Court held that the termination was an illegal one. 4. The Principal Labour Court held that the Writ Petitioner is entitled to the backwages from the date of illegal termination i.e. 20.3.1973 till date of order i.e. 23. 1990. Inasmuch as the amount due was not determined, the Petitioner was directed to file a claim petition. The Petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs.365/- per month. As his termination was found to be an illegal one, he was deemed to be in service without any interruption till the date of an Award and as such, he is entitled to the benefits of the salary of respective categories made from time to time till 23. 1990 with interest. 5. The Petitioner, pending the Claim Petition, filed a Writ Petition No. 15434 of 1990 before this Court questioning the Award dated 23. 1990 with interest. 5. The Petitioner, pending the Claim Petition, filed a Writ Petition No. 15434 of 1990 before this Court questioning the Award dated 23. 1990 on the basis that the Principal Labour Court committed an error in denying his reinstatement into service. The said Writ Petition was allowed by this Court on 19. 1996. This Court modified the impugned award directing the reinstatement of the Petitioner into service of Management with all consequential benefits. In regard to the backwages, the contentions of the parties are left open to be raised before the Principal Labour Court in Claim Petition No.806 of 1990. In Claim Petition No.806 of 1990, the Principal Labour Court passed an order in regard to the backwages. The Principal Labour Court passed an order directing the Management to pay an amount of Rs. 1,37,185.90p to the Petitioner for the period from 23. 1973 to 23. 1990, which does not include any allowance as per the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement. Since the Petitioner is entitled to backwages till the date of reinstatement into service as per order of this Court dated 19. 1996 in W.P. No. 15434 of 1990, he is entitled to an amount of Rs. 7,35,222.21p. 6. According to the Petitioner, he is entitled to the monetary benefits being the backwages and other benefits payable to him from 23. 1990 till the date of his reinstatement into service of the Management. On 111. 1999, at the values in accordance with the agreement dated 9. 1994. As per the agreement, the basic salary is Rs. 2,445/-and the D.A. payable is Rs. 2,479.70p, amounting in all to Rs. 4,924.70p. The House Rent Allowance is 30% while the Medical Allowance is Rs. 500/-per annum. The Leave Travel Allowance is Rs. 3,600/- per annum. .7. The First Respondent/Management Contended that the Petitioner is not entitled for the salary for the period from 27. 1991 to 30.9.1992 and for the period from 8. 1993 to 23. 1995, totalling in all for a period of about 34 months. Though the First Respondent/Management considered that the Petitioner is entitled for an arrears of salary from 23. 1990 to 111. 1999 i.e. for 115 months, its main contention was that whenever there was no work, the redundant employees would be sent on leave initially special leave with wages and there afterwards long leave without wages. Though the First Respondent/Management considered that the Petitioner is entitled for an arrears of salary from 23. 1990 to 111. 1999 i.e. for 115 months, its main contention was that whenever there was no work, the redundant employees would be sent on leave initially special leave with wages and there afterwards long leave without wages. For the aforesaid 34 months, the Petitioner would have been on long leave without salary and also not earned any increments and this was calculated based on the individual similarly placed who are on long leave without salary. Thus, the Petitioner claimed the salary and increment for the aforesaid 34 months. The Management had not filed any documentary proof or examined any witnesses to prove the aforesaid contention. 8. The Second Respondent had failed to consider the admission of the of the Management in regard to the entitlement of salary to the Petitioner for the entire period of 115 months. When the First Respondent/Management had not proved the contention that the Petitioner was deemed to be on long leave without salary for 34 months and therefore, he is not entitled to claim salary for 34 months, then the Second Respondent should have granted the relief in respect of 34 months, the arrears of salary and increment to the Petitioner as per the calculation of the Management. 9. The Petitioner claimed arrears of House Rent Allowance, Medical Allowance and Leave Travel Allowance. The First Respondent/Management gave only the Leave Travel Allowance and Medical Allowance. These two allowances were not given for the year 1992 and 1994. 10. The Second Respondent has failed to direct the First Respondent/Management to pay the House Rent Allowance to the Petitioner. Hence, the order of the Second Respondent in calculating Rs.3,25,328.07p as the money value of benefits due to the Petitioner is not correct. In fact, there is no explanation whatsoever forthcoming from the First Respondent as to why they have withheld the amount payable to the Petitioner since 19. 1996. As such, the Second Respondent should have directed the First Respondent/Management to pay interest at 24% per annum. .11. In fact, there is no explanation whatsoever forthcoming from the First Respondent as to why they have withheld the amount payable to the Petitioner since 19. 1996. As such, the Second Respondent should have directed the First Respondent/Management to pay interest at 24% per annum. .11. Petitioners contentions: .According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the decision of the Principal Labour Court, Chennai in awarding only a sum of Rs.3,25,328.07p to the Petitioner is not correct in the eye of law because of the fact that the said decision has been arrived at based on no evidence and therefore, Article 226 of the Constitution of India will come to the aid of the Petitioner and before the Principal Labour Court in C.P.No.297 of 2000, the First Respondent/ Management has not let in any oral evidence to substantiate their case and in short, the Principal Labour Court, Chenni has accepted the counter filed by the First Respondent/ Management in C.P.No.297 of 2000 without any evidence and further, the First Respondent/Management on what basis they deducted the salary is not known and in the absence of these details, the Principal Labour Court placing reliance the averments made in the counter is clearly unsustainable in law. 12. Contentions of the First Respondent/Management: Per contra, the Learned Counsel for the First Respondent submits that the Writ Petitioner is entitled to Rs. 3,25,328.07p inclusive of allowances for the period from 23. 1990 to 111. 1999 and in the annexure to counter in C.P. No. 297 of 2000 details have been made mention of and in fact, the Petitioner cannot claim wages for all the period of his non employment and that the details of salary furnished by him is not correct and in a claim petition filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act no interest can be claimed in a claim petition and as such, the Writ Petitioner is not entitled to claim the interest and that the Principal Labour Court has rightly computed the monetary benefits due to the Petitioner as Rs. 3,25,328.07p which at this stage need not be interfered with by this Court. .13. 3,25,328.07p which at this stage need not be interfered with by this Court. .13. The Learned Counsel for the First Respondent/ Management contends that it is for the Writ Petitioner to prove the receipt of salary or wages concerned and to lend support of his contention, he relies on the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Range Forest Officer V. S.T. Hadimani (2002) 3 Supreme Court Cases at page 25 wherein it is held as follows: ."It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal to come to the conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for that period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside." .14. He also relies on the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Agnani V. Badri Das and others 1963 I LLJ 684 at page 688 wherein it is observed as follows: ."In dealing with this appeal, it is necessary at the outset to emphasize the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a plea for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226. This question has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court, and the law in relation to it is no longer in doubt. In order to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari. It must be shown that the impugned order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. It is clear that the error must be an error of law, not an error of fact, because an error of fact, though serious, and though it may be apparent on the face of the record, cannot sustain a claim for the writ of certiorari. It is clear that the error must be an error of law, not an error of fact, because an error of fact, though serious, and though it may be apparent on the face of the record, cannot sustain a claim for the writ of certiorari. It is only errors of law that justify the issue of the said writ, provided, of course, they are of such a character as would reasonably be treated as errors apparent on the face of the record. If a finding of fact is made by the impugned order and it is shown that it is based on no evidence, that would no doubt be a point of law open to be urged under Art.226-vide Nagendra Nath Bora and another V. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and others [1958 S.C.R. 1240]. If this distinction is not borne in mind, it is not unlikely that in entertaining an application for a writ under Art. 226, the High Court may unwittingly assume the jurisdiction of an appellate Court which clearly is distinct from the jurisdiction of the writ Court under Art. 226. This position has not been and cannot be disputed." .15. The Learned Counsel for the First Respondent brings it to the notice of this Court to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay V. Shashikant S. Patil and another (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 416 at page 417 wherein it is laid down as follows: ."The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/ disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But it cannot be overlooked that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution." 16. He seeks in aid of the decision in Sita Ram and others V. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 75 at page 76 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held that It would be on the workmen to prove that he had worked for two hundred and forty days in a year etc. and although at one point of time, the burden of proof used to be placed on the employer, in view of a catena of recent decisions, it must be held that the burden of proof is on the workman to show that he has completed 240 days in a year. 17. In regard to the contention that the Labour Court as per Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is only to interrupt an award or settlement and it cannot create right, the Learned Counsel for the First Respondent cites the decision of this Court in Union of India, rep. By the Divisional Railway Manager, Chennai V. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Chennai 2 and another 2007 (3) CTC 745 wherein it is held that a dispute relating to entitlement has to be preceded by earlier adjudication or recognition by an employer. .18. By the Divisional Railway Manager, Chennai V. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Chennai 2 and another 2007 (3) CTC 745 wherein it is held that a dispute relating to entitlement has to be preceded by earlier adjudication or recognition by an employer. .18. The Learned Counsel for the First Respondent cites the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Ganesh Razak and another 1995 (I) LLJ 395 at page 398 wherein it is observed as follows: ."This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workmans right rests like the Executing Courts power to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the same by the employer. This decision negatives instead of supporting the submission of learned counsel for the respondents." .19. He also relies on the further observation made in the aforesaid decision, at page 400 in para 12, which runs as follows: ."The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workman to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court, has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmens entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Courts power under Section 33C(2) like that of the Executing Courts power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution." 20. He also invites the attention of this Court to the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in State Bank of India V. Ram Chandra Dubey and others (2001) 1 Supreme Court Cases 73 wherein it is held that where in a reference of the question of validity of termination of workmen concerned to be entitled to reinstatement from the date of application filed under S.33-C(2) for computation of back wages on the basis of such award is not maintainable and the proper forum to determine the question was the forum to which the reference was made. 21. On the side of the First Respondent the decision of Honourable Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Limited and others V. Rajagopalan (P.S.) and others 1963 (II) LLJ 89 at page 95 and 96 is relied on to the following relevant observations: "... Instruction of Sub-sec.(2) it is clear that if a workmans right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the labour court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the labour court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the labour court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the labour court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the labour court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of Sub-sec.(2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The clause "where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit." The appellants construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. The clause "where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit" does not mean "where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit." The appellants construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words "admittedly, or admitted to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellants construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by Sub-Sec. (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the labour court to entertain the workmans application. The claim under S. 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of that right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to be main determination which has been assigned to the labour court by Sub-sec. (2). As Maxwell has observed: "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." [Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p.350.]" "... Besides, there can be no doubt that when the labour court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well-settled that it is open to the executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provisions of the decree. These limitations apply also to the labour court; but like the executing Court, the labour court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under S.33C(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under S. 33C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the labour court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmans right rests." 22. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under S. 33C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the labour court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmans right rests." 22. Besides the above, the Learned Counsel for the First Respondent cites the following decisions of Honourable Supreme Court. (a)In State of U.P. and another V. Brijpal Singh (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 58, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that The Labour Court cannot first decide workmans entitlement and then compute the benefit so adjudicated. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer, and thereafter for the purpose of implementation thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that power of interpretation is treated as incidental to Labour Courts power under S.33-C(2), like that of executing courts power to interpret the decree for purposes of its execution. The workman can proceed under S.33-C(2) only after Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under S.33-A or reference under S.10 that order of dismissal was not justified, and has set aside the same and reinstated the workman. (b)In D. Krishnan and another V. Special Officer, Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and another (2008) 7 Supreme Court Cases 22, the Honourable Supreme Court has laid down as follows: "The proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings. Such proceedings presuppose some adjudication leading to determination of a right, which has to be enforced. There has been no such adjudication in the present case. The appellants case is exclusively based on documentary evidence which consisted primarily of punch time cards and the representations they filed from time to time before the respondents. Claim raised by the appellants had been hotly disputed by the respondents." .23. There has been no such adjudication in the present case. The appellants case is exclusively based on documentary evidence which consisted primarily of punch time cards and the representations they filed from time to time before the respondents. Claim raised by the appellants had been hotly disputed by the respondents." .23. In regard to the preposition that in the absence of any provision in the impugned award itself towards the claim of interest, the same cannot be granted, the Learned Counsel for the First Respondent cites the decision of this Court in G. Ramadoss and others V. Management of Tansi Die Castings Industrial Estate, Chennai and two others 2000 (4) LLN 914 wherein it is held as follows: ."Though Labour Court has power to award interest in appropriate cases, in the absence of any provisions in the main award itself for interest, the same cannot be granted while computing the amount in a S. 33C(2) application." .24. It is useful to refer to the averments in Claim Petition No. 297 of 2000 filed by the Writ Petitioner before the Principal Labour Court, Chennai wherein he has among other things stated that he was drawing a salary of Rs. 365/- per month and since the termination was found illegal, he was found to be in service without any interruption till the date of award and further in the due course Memorandum of settlement was registered on 9. 1994 as per Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as per the Memorandum, the term of settlement was arrived at in following six parts: .Part I - Employment (Appointment/Recruitment) Policy Part II- Financial package Part III- Social Security and welfare Part IV- General Part V- Applicability of the Settlement Part VI- Implementation of the Settlement to which the Petitioner is entitled to. 25. Significantly, the Writ Petitioner in part of the Claim Petition No. 297 of 2000 has mentioned that the basic salary in accordance with the agreement is Rs. 2445/-, the DA payable is Rs. 2479.70p, totalling in all Rs. 4924.70p. The HRA is 30%. The Medical Allowance is Rs. 500/- per annum. The Leave Travel Allowance is Rs. 3,600/- per annum. 26. The claim made by the Writ Petitioner in his Claim Petition No. 297 of 2000 is as follows: Salary for 111 ½ months @ Rs. 4,924.70p Rs. 5,68,802.85 House Rent Allowance for 115 ½ months Rs. 4924.70p. The HRA is 30%. The Medical Allowance is Rs. 500/- per annum. The Leave Travel Allowance is Rs. 3,600/- per annum. 26. The claim made by the Writ Petitioner in his Claim Petition No. 297 of 2000 is as follows: Salary for 111 ½ months @ Rs. 4,924.70p Rs. 5,68,802.85 House Rent Allowance for 115 ½ months Rs. 84,719.25 Medical Allowance @ Rs. 5,000/- per annum Rs. 47,500.00 Travelling Allowance @ Rs. 3,600/- per annum Rs. 3200. 00 Total Rs. 7,35,222.10 27. The First Respondent/Management in its counter to C.P. No. 297 of 2000 has among other things mentioned that an order passed in C.P. No. 806 of 1990 is not contrary to the order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 15434 of 1990 [computing the total backwages for the period from 20.3.1973 to 23. 1990 is Rs. 1,37,185.90p], which was admitted by the company and the amount so computed in C.P. No. 806 of 1990 cannot be reagitated once again in the present claim petition and further that no salary can remain constant for a long period and as a matter of fact, the Petitioner has worked out his monthly salary as Rs. 4024.70p and applied the same uniformly for the entire period and almost for 10 years from 23. 1990 to 111. 1999 the salary cannot remain as it is. 28. It is the further contention of the First Respondent/Management that when it enters into contract for major construction works and when such projects were completed and till new projects are secured by a fresh contract, it is the practice of the company to send the redundant employees on leave, retaining their lien on service and in this regard, the Management and Union have entered into a settlement. Moreover, as mentioned in various settlements, whenever no work is available for the Respondent Company, the redundant employees will be sent on leave initially on special leave with wages and long leave without wages. Added further, in the statement indicates to a counter no credit is given for the period when the Petitioner would have on long leave without salary and consequently not earning any salary and also not earning any increments. This is based on the persons similarly placed who were on long leave without salary. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot claim wages during the period of his non employment. 29. This is based on the persons similarly placed who were on long leave without salary. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot claim wages during the period of his non employment. 29. Itis also the contention of the First Respondent/ Management that in a Claim Petition filed under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, no interest can be granted. 30. The Learned Counsel for the First Respondent/ Management informs this Court that the Management has enclosed a covering letter along with a cheque of IDBI Bank dated 16. 2009 for Rs. 3,25,328.07 in favour of the Petitioner. But the said letter and cheque handed over to the counsel who refused to receive the same etc. .31. Discussions: .It is an accepted notion of law that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act are like execution proceedings. The purview of the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act are limited to the granting of benefits which have crystalised in favour of the Writ Petitioner. .32. This Court aptly points out the decision in Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. V. Kherulla Hasanali Pathan and another 2005-I-LLJ 697 at page 698 wherein it is held as follows: ."Appellant-employers invocation of the limited scope of Labour Courts jurisdiction in deciding an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, failed in this case and such being its only plea against the order under appeal, the High Court dismissed it. It observed there was no impediment in the way of the respondent-workman claiming wages and seeking his remedy through an application under Section 33-C(2). The entitlement of the workman to wages claimed was not in dispute. The extent of employers liability could always be gone into in proceedings initiated under Section 33-C(2), the High Court added." .33. In Mahalaxmi Co-operative, Housing Society, Ltd. V. Dilip Singh Parocha and others 2008(1) LLN 180 at page 182 it is observed as follows: ."...To find out whether the plea is genuine and whether there is an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, the Labour Court will have to conduct incidental inquiry. In this case the determination of the question about computing the benefit to be claimed by the workmen will have to be preceded by an inquiry into the issues raised by the appellant. In this case the determination of the question about computing the benefit to be claimed by the workmen will have to be preceded by an inquiry into the issues raised by the appellant. The status of the respondent workmen and determination of identity of the appellant is incidental matter which the Labour Court must examine." 34. In Karamjit Singh and others V. State of Punjab and others 2003 Vol-3 LLJ 1167 at page 1168 it is observed that It appears to us that right of the petitioners stands settled and it is only consequential benefits in terms of money that are being denied by the respondents to the petitioners. 35. InM/s. Fabril Gasosa V. Labour Commissioner 1997(75) FLR at page 715 (SC) it is held that where money is due on basis of some amount predetermined like VDA, the rate of which stands determined in terms of settlement, an award or under chapter VA and VB and period for which arrears are claimed is also known the case would be covered by sub-section (1) as only calculation of the amount is required to be made. 36. In the decision Indian Registration Industries V. Presiding Officer Labour Court, 1974 (29) FLR 166 it is observed by the Honourable Supreme Court as follows: "In the instant case the Management had never alleged or established any dismissal or discharge of the workman subsequent to refusal to grant of approval of application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act and so no industrial dispute had been raised between the parties. The question whether the workman had reported for duty or the management had refused to give work to him was certainly a matter incidental to the question who there the Labour Court had jurisdiction to compute the benefits under Section 33-C(2) and so the Labour Court had ample jurisdiction to decide the matter under sub-section (2) of Section 33-C of the Act and consequently sub-section (1) would not come into play. Therefore the power and jurisdiction of the Labour Court to determine the question it has decided is unassailable. AIR 1964 SC 748, Relied on." 37. It cannot be lost sight of that a claim which is made as per Section 33C of the I.D. Act must rely to an existing to act referable to an award, settlement, provisions of the Act or subsisting contract. AIR 1964 SC 748, Relied on." 37. It cannot be lost sight of that a claim which is made as per Section 33C of the I.D. Act must rely to an existing to act referable to an award, settlement, provisions of the Act or subsisting contract. Besides, it should be a claim which ought not to depend upon the determination of another matter which might give rise to labour dispute falling under Section 10(1) or other provisions of the Act. 38. The Claim Petition No. 806 of 1990 filed by the Writ Petitioner pertains to the period from 20.3.1973 to 23. 1990. In the Claim Petition No. 297 of 2000 the Petitioner has made a claim for Rs. 7,35,222.10p being the salary for 115 ½ months at Rs. 4,924.70p etc. 39. It is not known as to how the Petitioner claims a sum of Rs. 7,35,222.10 and in fact, he has not marked any documents on his side. He has also not chosen to mark the Memorandum of Settlement registered on 9. 1994 (as an Exhibit) which deals with Employment (Appointment-Recruitment) Policy, Financial package, Social Security and welfare etc. Also, on the side of the Respondents no one witness was examined. When the First Respondent/Management made in the counter to the effect that the Writ Petitioner is entitled to only Rs. 3,25,328.07p, this Court opines that the First Respondent/Management ought to have examined somebody to substantiate their version apart from the documents Exs. R.1 to R.7 filed by them before the Principal Labour Court, Chennai. The reference to another settlement dated 28. 1989 in the counter of the Management has not also been filed. 40. The burden of proof, in the sense of burden of introducing evidence to establish a particular fact may, and constantly does, shift during the trial. No doubt, the amount of evidence required to shift upon a party the burden of displacing the fact may depend on the given circumstances of each case. In law, a party who asserts the affirmative, must prove the same and in this regard, the burden of establishing the same lies on him. 41. As a matter of fact, the term burden of proof is employed in two meanings. In law, a party who asserts the affirmative, must prove the same and in this regard, the burden of establishing the same lies on him. 41. As a matter of fact, the term burden of proof is employed in two meanings. (1) The burden of establishing a case, whether by preponderance of evidence [as in civil cases] or beyond reasonable doubt [as in criminal proceedings]; (2) The necessity of introducing evidence either to establish such a case or to meet evidence sufficient to constitute rebuttal of a primafacie case proved by the other party. In short, the burden of proof in a civil case depends on the state of pleadings. The burden is fixed at the start of the trial by the state of the pleadings and is one that never changes under any circumstances. 42. The burden of proof, in the sense of burden of evidence, is a burden which may shift continually throughout the trial according to the evidence on one scale or the other preponderates as per decision in Pickup V. Thames Insurance Company (1878) 3 QBD 594. The initial burden of proving a primafacie case is on the Petitioner. When he tenders such evidence as will support primafacie case, the onus shifts on the Respondent to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the Petitioner. As the case continues to develop, the onus may shift back again to the Petitioner. 43. Indeed, the burden of proof is often of a shifting nature and may change from one side to the other as facts are proved rendering case of one side more probable than that of the other. It is, of course, not quite easy to determine at what particular stage, in the course of evidence, the burden shifts from one side to the other, in the considered opinion of this Court. 44. One cannot ignore a fact that the word especially means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within ones knowledge. Lord Mans Field in Blatch V. Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 53 at page 65; cross 5th Edn. at page 103 has observed that It is certainly a maximum that all evidence is to be weighted according to the proof of which it was in the power of one side to produce, and in the power of the other to have contracted. 45. at page 103 has observed that It is certainly a maximum that all evidence is to be weighted according to the proof of which it was in the power of one side to produce, and in the power of the other to have contracted. 45. In Section 33C(2) proceedings of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 some adjudication pertaining to the determination of a right which has to be enforced can be gone into. 46. On a careful consideration of respective contentions and in the light of the detailed discussions mentioned supra, this Court opines that the burden of proving his case rests on the Writ Petitioner initially and since the onus is a question of law and also the First Respondent/ Management has to prove its case with a relevant documents especially which are in their possession and also the facts which are within its knowledge which have to be proved by means of legal burden and in the instant case on hand, both the Petitioner and the First Respondent have not discharged their onus in the manner known to law. Therefore, this Court provides an opportunity to both sides to let in oral and additional documentary evidence before the Principal Labour Court in C.P. No. 297 of 2000. The respective parties are permitted to examine additional witness/witnesses. Since the Principal Labour Court, Chennai has accepted the case of the First Respondent/Management and granted only a sum of Rs. 3,25,328.07p to the Petitioner as the money value of benefits in the absence of oral evidence being tendered on the side of the First Respondent/Management and also in the absence of relevant documents like Memorandum of Settlement registered on 9. 1994 [which came into force from 4. 1994] and also the another settlement dated 28. 1989 etc., this Court comes to an inevitable conclusion that the decision arrived at by the Principal Labour Court, Chennai in C.P. No. 297 of 2000 dated 22. 2004 in computing the monetary benefits due to the Writ Petitioner suffers from material irregularity and patent illegality, the error being an error of law, this Court interferes with the order so passed by the Principal Labour Court and set aside the same and resultantly, allows the writ petition. 2004 in computing the monetary benefits due to the Writ Petitioner suffers from material irregularity and patent illegality, the error being an error of law, this Court interferes with the order so passed by the Principal Labour Court and set aside the same and resultantly, allows the writ petition. Further, this Court remits back the entire gamut of the matter in C.P. No. 297 of 2000 to the Principal Labour Court, Chennai for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. 47. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The order passed by the Principal Labour Court, Chennai in C.P. No. 297 of 2000 dated 22. 2004 is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Principal Labour Court, Chennai for fresh adjudication in the manner known to law. The parties are directed to let in oral, additional documentary evidence and also to examine further witness/witnesses to prove their respective stands. The Principal Labour Court, Chennai is directed to provide due opportunities to the parties and to dispose of the C.P. No. 297 of 2000 within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order and report compliance to this Court without fail. The parties are directed to lend a helping hand to the Principal Labour Court, Chennai in completing the proceedings in C.P. No. 297 of 2000. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.