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2010 DIGILAW 2530 (PNJ)

Surinder Singh v. Kalyan Singh

2010-09-06

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

body2010
Judgment Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. 1. Concisely, the facts, that need a necessary mention, relevant for a limited purpose of deciding the core controversy involved in the present appeal and emanating from the record, are that Kaiyan Singh son of Hira Singh, Kala Devi, Champa Devi daughters of Data Ram and Kirpal Singh son of Mahak Singh respondent-plaintiffs (hereinafter to be referred as the plaintiffs) filed the suit for a decree of permanent injunction restraining Ram Parkash son of Karta Ram, original defendant No.1 (since deceased), being represented by his legal representatives-appellant-defendants, Chamel Singh (since deceased), being represented through his legal representatives and others proforma-respondents defendants (hereinafter to be referred as the defendants) from receiving, drawing or withdrawing any compensation amount in respect of the acquired land in dispute from the Land Acquisition Collector (for short the Collector), unless and until, the rights and shares of the parties are fully and completely determined and decided by a competent Court of law under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity the Act) 2. The case set up by the plaintiffs, in brief, in so far as relevant was that the land in question had been acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Act through the Haryana Urban Development Authority (hereinafter to be referred as the HUDA) for establishment of Sector 16 at Karnal. During the course of acquisition proceedings, it revealed that the impugned mutations have been wrongly entered in the revenue record on the basis of various transactions, such as collusive decree and sale instances, ignoring the claim and entitlement of the plaintiffs. The mutations were stated to be illegal, without jurisdiction and not binding on their rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants have started claiming compensation of the acquired land in dispute, on the basis of wrong entries in the revenue record, irrespective of the fact that they are not entitled for any such compensation. The plaintiffs had filed the objection petition before the Collector under Section 30, but the defendants are adamant to receive the compensation as they are exercising political influence over the authorities under the Act. 3. Levelling a variety of allegations, in all, according to the plaintiffs, the impugned mutations incorporated in the revenue record on the basis of sale deed/collusive decree, ignoring their claim are illegal and not binding on their rights. 3. Levelling a variety of allegations, in all, according to the plaintiffs, the impugned mutations incorporated in the revenue record on the basis of sale deed/collusive decree, ignoring their claim are illegal and not binding on their rights. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the plaintiffs filed the suit for a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants in the manner described here-in above. The defendants contested the claim of the plaintiffs in this context. 4. The trial court, while deciding preliminary issue, held that Civil Court has got no jurisdiction and dismissed the suit being not maintainable. However, liberty was granted to the plaintiffs to approach the competent authority under the Act, by virtue of judgment dated 23.1.2001 and accordingly prepared the decree. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs filed the appeal. The Ist Appellate Court accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree and remanded the case back to the trial Court for its fresh decision, vide impugned judgment dated 22.2.2005. 6. The appellant-LRs of original defendant No.1 Ram Parkash did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgment of Ist Appellate Court and filed the present appeal. That is how, I am seized of the matter. 7. Assailing the impugned judgment of Ist Appellate Court, the learned counsel for the appellant-defendants contended with some amount of vehemence that once the land had already been acquired and possession was taken by the Collector, then the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. In this respect, he has placed reliance on judgments of Honble Apex Court in cases State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar and others 1 AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1955 and Laxmi Chand and others v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia and others 2 AIR 1996 Supreme Court 523. 8. On the contrary, hailing the impugned judgment, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs urged that since the plaintiffs have already filed the reference petition under sections 18/30 of the Act, so, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to injunct the defendants from receiving the amount of compensation of the acquired land in dispute, in view of judgment of this Court in case Shyam Lal and others v. Sham Lal and others 3 (2007-1) 145 PLR 822. 9. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, as the impugned judgment of first appellate Court cannot legally be sustained, therefore, the appeal deserves to be accepted for the reasons mentioned here-in-below. 10. As is evident from the record that the plaintiffs claiming themselves to be persons interested in the land, filed the simple suit for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from receiving or withdrawing any compensation money in respect of the acquired land in dispute till the final decision of the reference petition under Sections 18/30 of the Act. They did not claim any decree of declaration that they were the owners of acquired land in dispute. 11. Above being the position on record, now the sole question, that arises for determination in this appeal, is as to whether in such a situation, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 12. Having regard to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, to me, the Ist Appellate Court has fell in legal error in this respect. In the instant case, it is not a matter of dispute that the land in question had already been acquired by the State Government. Having completed all the codal formalities, the Collector announced the award and has taken over the possession of the land in dispute for establishment of HUDA Sector 16 at Karnal. 13. Section 16 of the Act postulates that "when the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Section 18 escalates that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested." 14. Sequelly, Section 30 posits that when the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof, is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. 15. Likewise, Section 31 further provides that on making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section and if they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted. 16. Similarly, Section 33 envisages "when any money has been deposited in Court under this Act for any cause other than mentioned in the last preceding section, the Court may, on the application of any party interested or claiming an interest in such money, order the same to be invested in such Government or other approved securities as it may think proper, and may direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated and paid in such manner as it may consider will give the parties interested therein the same benefit therefrom as they might have had from the land in respect whereof such money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be." 17. A co-joint reading of these provisions would reveal that if any dispute arises with regard to the apportionment of the compensation including the question of title between the persons interested, not only that the Court under the Act has the jurisdiction to decide such disputed question under sections 18/30, it has power to make interim arrangement with respect to the disbursement of the amount deposited in the Court by the Collector as well. Therefore, such matter squarely falls within the jurisdiction of L.A.Court. 18. Therefore, such matter squarely falls within the jurisdiction of L.A.Court. 18. Ex facie, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that in such like cases, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction, is neither tenable nor the observations of this Court in Shyam Lals case (supra) are at all applicable to the present controversy, wherein, the dispute between the parties was regarding establishment of title over the suit property on the basis of decree for preemption and collusive decree dated 15.3.1984. The plaintiffs took the stand that the preemption money, in pursuance of the decree for pre-emption was deposited and possession was taken over by Banwari alone. The trial Court therein held that after consolidation, out of the entire property measuring 602 Biswas, Rulia has right, title or interest only to the extent of 321/1204 shares and mutation No.2979, Exhibit P-5, does not create absolute right in favour of Banwari and that the possession of the defendants over the suit property cannot be treated as adverse. 19. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, it was observed that where the dispute between the parties was regarding establishment of title over the suit property on the basis of decree of pre-emption and collusive decree, then the Civil Court has also the jurisdiction to entertain the suit to determine the question of title. 20. Possibly, no one can dispute with regard to the aforesaid judgment, but the same would not come to the rescue of the respondent-plaintiffs. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have only sought a simple decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from receiving the compensation of the acquired land fn dispute till the final decision of reference petition under sections 18/30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Court. The plaintiffs have not filed the suit for a decree of declaration declaring them as owners of the disputed acquired land or for deciding the question of title between the parties in this context. 21. An identical question arose before the Honble Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Laxmi Chands cases (supra). Having considered the relevant provisions of the Act, it was observed that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. Having considered the relevant provisions of the Act, it was observed that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The Civil Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has, is to approach the constitutional Courts, viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively. The sameview was reiterated by Honble Apex Court in case Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. K.S.Narayan AIR 2006 Supreme Court 3379. 22. Hence, it would be seen that if the matter squarely falls within theambit of scheme of the Act, then only Court under the Act (and not ordinary Civil Court) has the jurisdiction to determine such question of apportionment of compensation based on title. 23. There is another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed from a different angle. The plaintiffs have sought permanent injunction against the defendants not to receive the compensation of the acquired land in dispute, which is to be paid by the Collector in discharge of his official duty, in exercise of statutory powers under the Act. In that eventuality, no injunction can be granted to restrain the defendants from instituting or prosecuting their statutory proceedings as it would amount to restrain the authorities under the Act from discharging their statutory duty, which is legally barred as contemplated under section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 . 24. Thus, seen from any angle, I am of the considered view that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiffs restraining the defendants from claiming compensation or to restrain the Collector from exercising his statutory duty and only the Court under the Act has the jurisdiction to decide the matter of apportionment of compensation based on title under sections 18/30 and to make interim arrangement with regard toinvestment/disbursement of the compensation deposited in the Court by the Collector under sections 30, 31 and 33 of the Act, as discussed here-in-above. 25. 25. Therefore, the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants have considerable force and the contrary arguments of learned counsel for the respondents stricto sensu liable to be and are hereby repelled and the impugned judgment of Ist Appellate Court deserves to be and is hereby set aside under the present set of circumstances. 26. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the instant appeal is hereby accepted, the impugned judgment of Ist Appellate Court is set aside and that of trial Court is restored in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 27. NeedleSsrto say, the Collector while performing his statutory duty, will naturally refer the matter under Sections 18/30 to the Court and duly observe the provisions of the Act in letter and spirit. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Court would decide the matter on merits and make arrangement with regard to the disbursement of the compensation deposited by the Collector in accordance with law.