JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Shri B. Dayal, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Pradeep Kumar learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 and learned Additional Chief Standing counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and perused the record. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 5.5.2008 passed by the respondent No. 3 (Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition) and for setting aside the acquisition proceedings with regard to the petitioner’s four plot Nos. 18, 94, 435 and 436 situated in village Makora, P.O. Pali, Greater Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar. 3. It appears from the record that the petitioners earlier filed a writ petition No. 38952 of 2007 seeking relief against the respondents restraining them from demolishing the petitioners Abadi and School building, which was finally decided on 21.8.2007 directing the respondent No. 3 (Greater Noida) to examine the matter as to whether the construction over the disputed plots was raised prior to the date of existence of Greater Noida or subsequent thereto. The respondent No. 3 decided the representation of the petitioner on 5.5.2008 without any finding with regard to period of construction and rejected the same. During this period of disposal of representation the respondents initiated the proceedings of acquisition of the land under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) was issued on 12.3.2008 (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition). 4. The petitioners have filed writ petition No. 24378 of 2008 with prayer to quash the above notification (Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition) and restrain the respondents from issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act without resorting to the procedure prescribed under Section 5(A) of the Act. Since the petitioners representation was not decided prior to 5.5.2008 and the petitioners were under impression that since their representation was not decided, therefore, interim order granted by this Court would continue. On 3.6.2008, the respondent’s officials reached the spot with intention to demolish the construction and school building of the petitioners as a result of which the petitioner was constrained to file this writ petition on 8.6.2008 in order to save their construction and school building. 5. On 3.6.2008, the respondent’s officials reached the spot with intention to demolish the construction and school building of the petitioners as a result of which the petitioner was constrained to file this writ petition on 8.6.2008 in order to save their construction and school building. 5. It has been mentioned in this writ petition that in pursuance of the provisions of Clause 3 of Article 348 of the constitution of India the Governor was pleased to issue notification No. 660/77-3-08-83 Arjan 08. Therefore in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) read with clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act 1976(U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976) and all other powers enabling in this behalf and with the previous approval of the State Government, the Noida framed the regulations for purposes of proper management of lands within the Rural Abadi Sites vested in the authority. These regulations are called New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Rural Abadi (Management and Regularisation for Residential purposes) Regulation, 2006 (hereinafter referred to in short as “Regulation 2006”). This regulation came into force with effect from publication of official gazette i.e. June 22, 2006 (Annexure No. 5 to this writ petition) 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the petitioners filed 29 documentary evidence including receipts of brick kiln in order to show that the building was constructed prior to the commencement of Greater Noida. The notice was also issued by the Land Management committee of the Gaon Sabha against the petitioner’s construction in the year 1985 but the respondents did not consider to take evidence from the Land Management committee or any other agency like the Public Works Department or any Engineering Department which could easily provide the life or age of the building. The land for which notification under Section 4(1) has been issued with regard to the plot Nos. 435 and 436, village Makora, Greator Noida is a Rural Abadi site as defined under the provisions of Regulation 2006. The sub regulation (f) and (g) of the Regulation 2 is quoted below : (f) “Rural Abadi site” means the rural area for residential purpose on the date of commencement of these regulations and on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894). The sub regulation (f) and (g) of the Regulation 2 is quoted below : (f) “Rural Abadi site” means the rural area for residential purpose on the date of commencement of these regulations and on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894). These regulations shall also extend to such Gram Sabha land which has been resumed by the Authority and on which any person has made residential accommodation. (g) “Residential Use” means the use of any land or building or part thereof for human habitation and such other uses incident to residential uses. 7. We have considered submissions made by learned counsel for parties and carefully examined the material on record and found that the petitioners filed sufficient material before the respondent No. 3 to this effect that the petitioners Abadi and construction were existing prior to Greater Noida, which came into force in January 1991 but the respondent No. 3 did not consider said material placed before him at the time of passing impugned order. This Court in order dated 21.8.2007 passed in Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 38952 of 2007 had directed the respondent No. 3 to decide the matter regarding existence of the construction whether it was constructed prior to the commencement of the authority i.e. 28 January 1991 or the construction was raised after Jan. 1991, but the respondent No. 3 did not consider this grievance of petitioners. The respondent No. 3 neither recorded any finding on this question nor afforded an opportunity to the petitioners of being heard. Consequently, the order dated 21.8.2007 passed by this Court could not be complied with in letter and spirit as this submission of petitioners was not considered as to whether the petitioner’s building or construction was existing before January 1991. 8. Consequently, the order dated 21.8.2007 passed by this Court could not be complied with in letter and spirit as this submission of petitioners was not considered as to whether the petitioner’s building or construction was existing before January 1991. 8. The petitioners had filed 29 documents including notice dated 7.3.1985 issued by the Land Management Committee of Gaon Sabha (Annexure No. 6 to this writ petition) in the year 1985 against the petitioner’s construction, but this important piece of evidence was not considered by the respondent No. 3, which could lead to this conclusion that the petitioner’s construction was existing prior to enforcement of the Authority and it could be held that the land for which notification under Section 4(1) was made pertaining to plot No. 435 and 436, village Makora, Greater Noida was a rural abadi site as defined under the Regulation 2006. As stated by the petitioners, in number of villagers, the Abadi site was exempted by the respondents from acquisition proceedings. 9. It appears from the record that on 21.8.2007 Writ petition No. 38952 of 2007 was decided finally with direction to the Chief Executive Officer, Greater Noida to examine the matter as to whether the construction over the plots in question was raised prior to the existence of Greater Noida and this fact was to be decided within three weeks, but it was not decided, as result of which a Contempt Petition No. 1657 of 2008 was instituted by the petitioners and notice was issued against the respondent No. 3 for non compliance of the order of this Court and due to this vengeance respondent No. 3 initiated proceedings of demolition of the construction of the petitioner just before summer vacation in the year 2008 with regard to the petitioner’s plots, which could be said to be mala fide and against the direction of this Court. In our view the order dated 5.5.2008 passed by the respondent No. 3 is liable to be quashed in view of the facts and circumstances of the case because respondent No. 3 did not afford an opportunity to the petitioners of being heard on their representation and failed to consider the documentary evidence filed by the petitioners in support of their representation. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended that the petitioners have been deprived of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners has further contended that the petitioners have been deprived of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The respondent No. 1 has invoked the provisions of Section 17 arbitrarily and dispensed with the enquiry provided under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kshama Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(7) ADJ 133 (DB), wherein the Division Bench of this Court has observed that there should be material before the Collector/State Government at relevant time so as to invoke provisions of Sections 17(1) and (4) with regard to the dispensation of enquiry under Section 5(A) of the Act and exception cannot be made to this rule. There is no justification to deviate from the normal procedure and to resort to exceptional mode under the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash notification under Section 4 of the Act if it is per se illegal and mandatory procedure prescribed has not been followed in issuing and publishing it. If there are legal mala fidies in issuing the same i.e. it has been issued for non-existing purposes or for any oblique motive, such notification is liable to be quashed. 11. The similar view has been expressed by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of Haryana (Supra) wherein it has been held as under : “where the very initiation of the proceedings are tainted with mala fidies, the notification under Section 4 of the Act can be challenged on the basis of a colourable exercise of power forthwith” 12. We are of the view that even though the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act is merely a proposal and is not a conclusive proof of acquisition, the Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the same if the notification is per se illegal and the mandatory procedure prescribed has not been followed in issuing and publishing the same and where the proposal is tainted by mala fides. 13. 13. The notification issued under Section 17(4) of the Act is open to be challenged independently even before the issuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act where prima facie there is no material before the authorities to record subjective satisfaction about urgency. Thus where the power is arbitrarily exercised without there being any material on record, the action can be subjected to the judicial review on the grounds permitted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the notifications under Sections 4 and 17(4) of the Act are simultaneously issued, the objectionable portion which suffers from the vice of arbitrariness alone can be quashed. 14. The scheme of Act contemplates the use of emergency powers only in exceptional circumstances provided there is real urgency where the Government cannot even wait for holding enquiry under Section 5A of the Act though in forming such a opinion elaborate reasons are not required to be given but nevertheless there must be something on record to show that the opinion of the Collector or Government has been formed on the basis of the material on record and is not arbitrary. 15. We are of the view that the decision of urgency is an administrative decision and is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government on the basis of material available on the record. The language of notification that the land is urgently needed is not conclusive of the fact that there is real urgency, therefore, it has been held that the Court is required to consider the material on the basis of which the decision to dispense with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act is taken so as to ascertain whether there is any urgency to exercise the powers under Section 17(4) of the Act. It requires consideration whether the urgency is of a type as to justify the dispensing of the enquiry. The State Government has not only to apply its mind to the urgency of the matter but also that the urgency is of such a nature that even summary proceedings contemplated by Section 5A of the Act are required to be dispensed with. Section 5 gives a statutory right to the person interested or to the person whose land is proposed to be acquired to file objection disputing the proposal to acquire the land. Section 5 gives a statutory right to the person interested or to the person whose land is proposed to be acquired to file objection disputing the proposal to acquire the land. If the objections are made, the Collector shall consider those objections and after hearing make his recommendation to the Government. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that in the present case there was no urgency for issuing the notification under Sections 17 (1) and 4 of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. There was no material before the Collector/State Government at relevant time so as to invoke the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 4 of the Act. 17. We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in view of the fact that there was no material available before the collector or the State Government in order to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A of the act. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the notification was issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act on 12.3.2008 but no notification under Section 6 of the Act has been issued till now. Therefore in view of this notification dated 12.3.2008, notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 (4) cannot be issued in view of clause 2 of proviso of sub- section (1) of Section 6. Consequently, the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) issued has become nullity. 19. We have carefully considered this argument of learned counsel for the petitioners and also examined the record. Clause (II) of proviso to Section 6 of the Act provides as under : “Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), (i)........................... (Ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment), Act 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification. 20. It can be seen from the aforesaid proviso to Section 6 that it is couched in negative language. It is well settled that when a Statute is couched in negative language it is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature. 21. 20. It can be seen from the aforesaid proviso to Section 6 that it is couched in negative language. It is well settled that when a Statute is couched in negative language it is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature. 21. The reliance has been placed on Vijay Narayan Thattee and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2009 SCCR 894, wherein the Hon. Apex Court has made certain observations which are quoted below. ‘“It is evident that the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. is totally made mandatory and bears no exceptions” 22. In the case of Padmasundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of T.N. and others, AIR 2002 SCC 1334, the Constitution bench of the Hon. Apex Court has clearly observed that the proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and notification issued after one year from the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act is barred by limitation. The language of the Statute is plain and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the legislature. It is only when the language of the Statute is not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can depart from the literal rule of interpretation. When there is conflict between the law and equity it is the law which must prevail. As stated in the Latin Maxim ‘dyra lex sed lex’ which means “ the law is hard but is the law” 23. There can be no estoppel against a Statute. Since the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to be followed. The proviso is mandatory in nature and must operate with its full rigour vide Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2007) 3 SCC 470 . 24. Since the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to be followed. The proviso is mandatory in nature and must operate with its full rigour vide Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2007) 3 SCC 470 . 24. In the present case, the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 12.3.2008 in order to initiate acquisition proceedings with regard to the land of the petitioners and no notification under Section 6 has been issued till now i.e. 19.8.2010 as admitted by the respondents in para 3 of the counter-affidavit, while the period for notification under Section 6 is one year and thus more than two years have elapsed. In this writ petition learned Single Judge had stayed the operation of the order dated 5.5.2008 passed by the respondent No. 3 under which the representation of the petitioner was dismissed and the proceedings in respect of construction existing in disputed plots were also stayed and the petitioner was permitted to continue with the possession over his plots. The learned Single Judge did not stay the operation of the notification issued under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) of the Act or the acquisition proceedings to be initiated against the petitioners in pursuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In this case the respondents were not restrained from issuing the notification under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the Act. Consequently, the notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) issued by the respondents has become nullity and thus notification dated 12.3.2008 issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act is quashed. The order dated 5.5.2008 passed by respondent No. 3 (Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition) on the representation of the petitioner is also quashed. With the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. ————