Judgment ( 1. ) The judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court has been made pivot by the plaintiffs in this second appeal. ( 2. ) Originally, the plaintiffs filed the present suit against the defendant/ Municipality, Kailaras for declaration of title and injunction in resepct of a well situated at survey number 82 of village Kailaras, Tahsil Sabalgarh, District Morena. According to the plaintiffs, they are the Bhumiswami of the well, as well as the land bearing survey number 82 on which this well exists, and for injunction that the defendant be directed to remove the water pump, etc. installed in the said well, with a further relief to pay compensation of Rs. 1,200.00, as well as mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 400.00 per month till the water pump and its accessories are removed from the disputed well. Later on, the suit has been amended and relief of declaration has been deleted. Thus, the present suit out of which this second appeal has arisen is in respect of relief of injunction only. In para 1 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have specifically pleaded that they are the owners having possession of survey number 82 on which the well in dispute is constructed. ( 3. ) In very specific words, the defendant has admitted the possession of the plaintiffs on the disputed well in its written statement. However, the learned trial Court instead of decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs, straightway in terms of Order XV Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, framed issues and recorded evidence of parties. The learned trial Court, on the basis of the evidence placed on record, categorically held that the plaintiffs are possessing the disputed well and, hence, directed the defendant to remove the electric motor pump and its accessories from the well and also passed the decree to pay compensation, etc. as directed in its judgment. ( 4. ) Appeal which was filed by the defendant has been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree and the learned First Appellate Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. ( 5. as directed in its judgment. ( 4. ) Appeal which was filed by the defendant has been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree and the learned First Appellate Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. ( 5. ) In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs which has been admitted by this Court on 23/7/2007 on the following substantial question of law : "Whether, learned first appellate Court has erred in reversing the judgments and decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs by the trial Court particularly when admittedly, the plaintiff is owner of the well and as per order of settlement passed by the Govt, is without affording opportunity of hearing to the plaintiffs?" On going through the aforesaid substantial question of law, on account of typographical error, instead of correct word "well", incorrectly the word "wall" has been typed, because the dispute between the parties is in respect to well only. ( 6. ) The contention of Shri Naik, learned counsel for the appellants is that since the defendant has categorically admitted the possession of the plaintiffs on the disputed well, therefore, since there was no dispute in respect to the possession of the plaintiffs on the disputed well, therefore, the learned First Appellate Court ought to have dismissed the appeal of the defendant and by not doing so, the learned First Appellate Court has erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. The further contention of the learned counsel is that the admission made in the written statement is having higher evidentiary value and, in this reagard, learned counsel has invited my attention to the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain and others v. Ramkant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 . Learned counsel has also placed reliance on Single Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Mohini and others v. Smt. Vidhayawati Rathore and others, (2004) 3 MPHT 68 in this regard, and hence, it has been contended by the learned counsel that by allowing this appeal, the impugned judgment be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court be restored. ( 7. ( 7. ) Combatting the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, vehemently, it has been contended by Shri Bhupendra Singh Dhakad, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/defendant that since the plaintiffs are not the owners of the disputed well and the disputed well is of the Government of Madhya Pradesh, therefore, rightly the suit of the plaintiffs has been dismissed, even though, they are in possession of the disputed well. ( 8. ) Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed. Regarding substantial question of law: In the present case, there is a specific pleading of the plaintiffs in para 1 of the plaint that they are possessing the disputed well. Specifically, in very clear words, the defendant while submitting its written statement, in para 1 has categorically admitted the averment made in the plaint and further added that the then Gram Panchayat carried out necessary repairs in the well. According to him, since specifically the defendants has admitted the possession of the plaintiffs on the disputed land and the suit as amended, is for injunction only, straightway, it should have been decreed under Order XV Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and no enquiry was necessary. According to me, merely because, electric motor pump has been installed by the defendant with the consent of the plaintiffs would not confer any possessory title in the defendant. It is borne out from the record that only for one year, plaintiffs accorded permission to the defendant to install water pump in their well, and because after the expiry of one year since the respondent/defendant did not remove the water pump and its accessories despite having served notice on the defendant, it made a cause to the plaintiffs to file the present suit with a prayer that the water pump and its accessories be removed from the well of the plaintiffs. On bare perusal of the admission made in the pleading by the defendants in its written statement, I have no scintilla of doubt that the plaintiffs are in possession of the disputed well and, if that would be the position, according to me, the plaintiffs are entitled for decree of inj unction which was rightly granted by the learned trial Court. ( 9. ( 9. ) The learned First Appellate Court did not give any specific finding whether the plaintiffs are in possession of the disputed well or not. But looking to the admission of the defendant made in its pleadings (para 1 of the written statement), that the plaintiffs are possessing the disputed well, it is proved that the plaintiffs are having possession on the disputed well. Decision of the Supreme Court in Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain (supra) is squarely applicable in the present case, wherein it has been categorically held that it is well settled principle of law that admission made by a party in his pleading of the defendant specifically admitting the possession of the plaintiffs on the disputed well is having higher evidentiary value and is having higher footing than that of oral evidence. I may also profitably place reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others, AIR 1974 SC 471 wherein at page 477 this proposition has been laid down. I would like to quote that portion of the decision of the Supreme Court laying down the aforesaid principle, which reads thus : "Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admission in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." Hence, according to me, the learned First Appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs for injunction. ( 10. ) I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant that the State of Madhya Pradesh is the owner of the suit well and, therefore, the suit has been rightly dismissed. ( 10. ) I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant that the State of Madhya Pradesh is the owner of the suit well and, therefore, the suit has been rightly dismissed. The Supreme Court in the case of M.Kallappa Setty v. M. V. Lakshminarayana Rao, AIR 1999 SC 2299 has categorically held that if the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property, he can on the basis of his possession resists interference from defendant who has no better title than himself and get injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing his possession. ( 11. ) Substantial question of law is, thus, answered that the learned First Appellate Court has erred in reversing the judgment and decree passed in favour of theplaintiffs by the learned trial Court particularly when admittedly the plaintiffs have been shown to be in possession of the disputed well. ( 12. ) Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. Impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is hereby set aside and the decree passed by the learned trial Court is hereby restored. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.