Rakesh Tiwari, J. - Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and pe­rused the record. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 1.5.1999 passed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Agra by means of this writ petition. By the order impugned, the shop has been released and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 3.8.1996 dismissing the release application of the landlord has been set aside. 3. The brief facts are that the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 filed release appli­cation under section 21 (1)(a) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called as Act No. 13 of 1972) for release of the shop in dispute No. 39/21 situated in mohalla Alamchand Loha Mandi, Agra. 4. The application was contested by the respondent on the ground that there are four shops in the building out of which two shops have been allotted to Mohan Swaroop Bansal and one to Daya Shankar. It is also stated in the written statement that there is a passage which can be used as shop on the ground floor. 5. The ground taken by the petitioner for the purpose of comparative hardship was that in his family, there has been addition as Manoj Bansal has got married and they are residing with minor son and daughter on the ground floor of the house where Manoj Bansal is also carrying on his business of sani­tary pipe fitting hence the space is insufficient for his business and residence of the family and that the shop of the petitioner was required for the purpose of chamber of Chaman Lal Bansal who is a practicing lawyer in the civil side. 6. It appears from record that the petitioner is also owner of house No. 32/205 Gujar Topkhana, Lohamandi, Agra, where he has shifted his business but is illegally retaining possession of the shop in dispute for extraneous con­sideration. From perusal of the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, it ap­pears that he has recorded a finding that the need of the landlord was not bonafide and comparative hardship was more to the tenant. 7. The aforesaid finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority has been set aside by the Appellate Court in appeal No. 370 of 1996 holding that need of the landlord was bonafide and that the comparative hardship was also in his favour. 7. The aforesaid finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority has been set aside by the Appellate Court in appeal No. 370 of 1996 holding that need of the landlord was bonafide and that the comparative hardship was also in his favour. As regards tenant is concerned the Appellate Court has held that he can be compensated. 8. From perusal of the record, it also appears that the tenant was in pos­session of the shop for about 40 years and he has shifted his business to his own house as stated above. It has also come on record that in his family, his two sons are engaged in their own independent business. The petitioner has also since died during the pendency of the writ petition and his legal heirs have been substituted. 9. One of the grounds for contesting the release application was that since the tenant was carrying on his business in the shop for about 40 years and had built up goodwill hence if he is directed to shirt his own shop, his business would suffer. Now the tenant is no more in this world. As stated earlier, his sons are also established in their own independent business and daughters have already been married. In the circumstances that his sons have acquired inde­pendent business, the Appellate Court has rightly came to a conclusion that the bonfire need of the landlord cannot be challenged now on ground of hardship. The suggestion that the chamber could have been opened by Chaman Lal Bansal for his practice of law in the small piece where previously there was a frarau latrine of 4 x 4 is ridiculous. Office/Chamber of an advocate could not be opened in such? small place. 10. In view of the changed circumstances and for all the reasons stated above, as well as taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is no more, whose sons are carrying on their independent business, elsewhere and the ten­ant had also acquired his own house wherein he would have shifted the busi­ness, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Appellate Court is up­held. No order is passed as to costs. Petition Allowed.