Judgment This Original Petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal challenging the award passed on 5. 2007 and 26. 2007. 2. The petitioner is engaged in the business of marine works and carrying on works for the Madras Port Trust and other Ports. Pursuant to the tender by the first respondent, The Chennai Port Trust for works consisting of modification of iron ore berth suitable to handle general cargo vessel by providing front and south platforms with pile and decking arrangements and a part of the northern side platform with RC bored piles and decking arrangements and the remaining part of the northern side platforms with PCC blocks, the petitioner offered based on its own design and drawings. (a) After negotiation, the said works were granted to the petitioner and accordingly, an agreement was entered into on 14. 1996 for a sum of Rs. 1,69,78,325/- with a condition that the works should be completed within a period of 18 calendar months. Due to certain difficulties viz., ore dust, want of approach, want of space due to stacking of ore, delay in approval of mix design and obstruction for construction of superstructure in south platform apart from an accident due to a Chinese ship, the time was extended by 18 months. (b) Even after the extended period of time, the works continued up to 33. 2003 when the Port Trust foreclosed the works without completion of the northern platform. The prolongation of contract period beyond 28. 1998 to 33. 2003 when the contract was foreclosed was 55 months. While fixing the responsibility for the said period of delay, the Arbitral Tribunal found that neither party is responsible and therefore, fixed the period of delay as 18 months since it was essential to fix the period of delay due to the reason that the main claims of the petitioner are based on compensation for delay. (c) Apart from interest and cost of arbitration, the petitioner made six claims before the Arbitral Tribunal which are as follows: 1. Payment of final bill – Rs. 35,65,392/- 2. Compensation for loss due to infructuous overheads and profits due to breach of contract – Rs. 1,23,12,000/- 3. Compensation for extended use of machinery equipments – Rs. 1,47,51,570/- 4. Compensation for extended use of labour Rs. 15,83,000/- 5. Refund of bank guarantee commission Rs. Payment of final bill – Rs. 35,65,392/- 2. Compensation for loss due to infructuous overheads and profits due to breach of contract – Rs. 1,23,12,000/- 3. Compensation for extended use of machinery equipments – Rs. 1,47,51,570/- 4. Compensation for extended use of labour Rs. 15,83,000/- 5. Refund of bank guarantee commission Rs. 5,83,000/- 6. Increased cost of carrying out the work Rs. 56,30,134/-. (d) In respect of first claim, viz., settlement of final bill claimed at Rs. 35,65,392/-, the Tribunal on various heads of claim No.1, allowed the claim of Rs. 3,09,666/-in respect of type-E and type-D stones and an amount of Rs. 3,15,211/- towards excess amount recovered towards electricity charges, excess crane hire charges and security deposit to be refunded, while stating that an amount of Rs. 16,90,367/- is to be recovered towards income-tax, sales tax, cost of cement bags, cost of steel, LD balance and ental charges for office yard. (e) In respect of the total value of the works done viz., Rs. 1,48,00,963.79, the Tribunal arrived at a minus Rs. 10,65,490/- as against the claim of the value of works done by the petitioner to the extent of 1,58,30,216/-, after deducting the previous payment of Rs. 1,44,91,297.52 and the said amount of minus Rs. 10,65,490/- was subsequently revised by the award dated 26. 2007 as minus Rs. 12,04,271/-. 3. The claim Nos. 2 to 6 were made by the petitioner as compensation for damages consequent to the prolongation of the contract. 4. The claim No.2 relates to the compensation for loss due to infructuous overheads and profits due to breach of contract to an extent of Rs. 1,23,12,000/-and the said claim came to be rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal on the ground that no proof was furnished by the claimant to substantiate the claim. The Tribunal has taken note of the claim of the petitioner for Rs. 33,562 lakhs as compensation for the contract period and Rs. 89.56 lakhs for the period from 10. 1996 to 10. 2000 on the basis that the first respondent committed breach of contract by unreasonable delay. The Tribunal has taken note of the claim of the petitioner for Rs. 33,562 lakhs as compensation for the contract period and Rs. 89.56 lakhs for the period from 10. 1996 to 10. 2000 on the basis that the first respondent committed breach of contract by unreasonable delay. While it was the case of the first respondent that the petitioner committed breach of contract, the Tribunal, having held that since both the parties are not responsible for the delay, fixed 18 months as the period of delay and prolongation and taking note of the fact that the claimant worked out the overhead charges on percentage basis for the period from 1995-96 to 2002-2003, rejected the claim on the ground that no documentary proof was furnished. 5. Regarding claim No.3 which relates to compensation for extended use of machinery equipment to the tune of Rs. 1,47,51,750/-which was originally claimed as Rs. 1,74,00,800/-and subsequently restricted to the above said sum of Rs. 1,47,51,570/-, it was the case of the first respondent Port Trust that the cause for the delay in the work was due to the poor condition of machinery deployed by the claimant/petitioners on the basis of clause 14 of the contract that no idling charges for machinery is possible. In respect of the claim made by the petitioner for 41 machineries, the Tribunal, by stating that Clause 14 would not apply for the extended period and there is no bar to claim compensation for idling of plants, etc., identified only 4 machineries viz., coles crane, concrete mixer, pin vibrator and piling barge. Taking note of the berth occupancy rate at 67% and adopting 33% of the rate in respect four machineries, the Tribunal passed the award in that regard in favour of the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 9,58,647/-as against the above said claim of Rs. 1,47,51,740/-. 6. Claim No. 4 made by the petitioner which relates to the compensation for extended use of labour to the extent of Rs. 15,83,000/- came to be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that there is no basis for such claim. 7. Claim No. 5 which relates to bank guarantee commission of Rs. 5.83 lakhs claimed by the petitioner for the period from October, 1996 to August, 2004, while admitting the claim for a period of 18 months beyond 28. 15,83,000/- came to be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that there is no basis for such claim. 7. Claim No. 5 which relates to bank guarantee commission of Rs. 5.83 lakhs claimed by the petitioner for the period from October, 1996 to August, 2004, while admitting the claim for a period of 18 months beyond 28. 1998 based on the ratio stated above, the arbitral award was passed for an amount of Rs. 1,14,742/- in favour of the petitioner as against the claim of Rs. 5.83 lakhs. 8. In respect of claim No. 6 relating to increased cost of carrying out of work to the extent of Rs. 56,30,134/-, the amount was claimed as the work was to be carried out beyond of claim No.6 relating to increased cost of carrying out of work to the extent of Rs. 56,30,134/-, the amount was claimed as the work was to be carried out beyond 28. 1998 which was opposed by the first respondent saying that as per the specific provision of the contract providing for escalation charges, the claim of increased cost is outside the purview of the contract. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the first respondent holding that the claim was in respect of the period beyond 28. 1998 for which no extension of time was granted by the first respondent. By applying the ratio of 18 months, for the period from 28. 1998 to 33. 2003 and taking note of the fact that in respect of damages caused by the Chinese ship 10% increased charges per year was adopted by the Port Trust, the Tribunal adopted 7% increased cost for the work carried out beyond 28. 1998 and awarded an amount of Rs. 3,67,016/-. 9. In respect of claim Nos.7 and 8 which relate to the interest and costs of arbitration, the Tribunal awarded only future interest at 12% and rejected the claim for costs of arbitration in view of the above said findings by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has ultimately passed the award in favour of the petitioner to an extent of Rs. 3,74,915/- to be paid by the first respondent with future interest from the date of award at the rate of 12% p.a. on the said amount. 10. By the subsequent award dated 26. 2007, passed in continuation of the award dated 5. The Tribunal has ultimately passed the award in favour of the petitioner to an extent of Rs. 3,74,915/- to be paid by the first respondent with future interest from the date of award at the rate of 12% p.a. on the said amount. 10. By the subsequent award dated 26. 2007, passed in continuation of the award dated 5. 2007 under claim No. 1 the amount originally awarded as Rs. (-) 10,65,490/- has been corrected as Rs. (-) 12,04,371/-. The Tribunal corrected the amount payable by the first respondent to the petitioner as Rs. 2,36,034/- as against the sum of Rs. 3,74,915/- with interest at 12% p.a. on the said amount of Rs./ 2,36,034/-. 11. The award on the above said various heads is challenged on various grounds including that the restriction to 18 months time as period of delay while the work was done for 55 months during extended period is unreasonable and arbitrary, that in respect of settlement of final bill claimed as claim No. 1, even though admittedly, there is no dispute regarding the value of work to the extent of Rs. 1, 48,00,963.79 in respect of which various amounts were paid to the extent of Rs. 1,44,91,297.52, the contention is that the Tribunal has not taken note of the materials. 12. Even though Mr. R. Murari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in this regard has taken strenuous efforts to contend that there is no rational basis for the Arbitrator to reduce the period of delay as 18 months while admittedly, there was an extended period of 55 months, a reference to the award in this regard shows that on considering various technical aspects as well as factual matters like, alternative design, damage due to Chinese ship, catwalk design, gantry, oil ship in another berth stopped the work at this berth to prevent fire hazard, raker pile, dumping of D and E stones and delay due to access problem to north platform, the Tribunal has held that neither the claimant nor the first respondent is responsible for the delay of 55 months and fixed 18 months as period of delay by calculating the same as follows: ‘55/3=18.33 months’ In my considered view, the same cannot be said to be detrimental to the claim of the petitioner apart from the fact that such technical findings given by the Tribunal do not require any interference. 13. 13. Therefore, it cannot be held that fixation of 18 months as delay period or prolonged period is arbitrary. In fact, the award deals with each one of the technical details. It is, consequent to such findings, the award in respect of the claim of the petitioner has been passed deducting the recoveries to be effected which are all genuine payments, and the award in respect of the said claim No.1 cannot be said to be either not valid or beyond the scope of arbitration. 14. In respect of other claim Nos. 2 to 6, as it is stated that they are all relating to compensation for the delay on various heads, it is the contention of Mr. R. Murari, learned counsel for the petitioner that in respect of claim No. 2 relating to infructuous overheads and profits due to breach of contract committed by the first respondent, when the Tribunal has accepted that the claimant worked out the overhead charges based on year wise site expenses for the period from 1995-96 to 2002-2003, thee is no rational for the Tribunal to totally reject the claim on the ground of want of proof. (a) It is his submission that when the Tribunal found that the petitioner furnished year wise site expenses and proportionate head office overhead expenses for the said period. If it was not satisfied, it should have directed the petitioner to produce proof. According to his, having failed to perform the said function, it should be presumed that the Tribunal has conducted. It is his contention that the function of the Tribunal is more inquisitorial in the form of conducting enquiry to find out the fact and the failure to perform such function is to be construed as a misconduct. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in K.P. Poulose v. State of Kerala AIR 1975 SC 1259 : (1975) 2 SCC 236 to substantiate the above said contention. 15. On the other hand, Mr. R. Karthikeyan, learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that if the Arbitrator grants award only on the basis of claim statement equating it as a proof without looking for the real proof, it would be a legal misconduct. He would submit that was the rationale of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ferro Concrete Construction Private Ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 1 . He would submit that was the rationale of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ferro Concrete Construction Private Ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 1 . 16. In K.P. Poulose v. State of Kerala (supra) after referring to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which sets out the grounds for setting aside an award in the following words: “30. Grounds for setting aside award.- An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely- (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.” and while dealing with the legal misconduct, the Supreme Court held that if the Arbitrator arrives at an inconsistent conclusion on his own findings, by ignoring the material documents, the same should be construed as a misconduct. While holding so, it is no doubt true that by referring to two documents therein viz., Exhibits P-1 and P-16, which were not produced by the department, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal should have taken steps to direct the parties to produce the said documents for the purpose of a just decision. It was, in that context, the following observation relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner came to be passed. “4. We have been taken through all the relevant documents by the learned counsel for both sides and we ae satisfied that Exhibit P-11 and Exhibit P-16 are material documents to arrive at a just and fair decision to resolve the controversy between the Department and the contractor. In the background of the controversy in this case even if the Department did not produce these documents before the arbitrator it was incumbent upon him to get hold of all the relevant documents including Exhibits P-11 and P-16 for the purpose of a just decision Exhibit P-11 dated 9. 1966, is a communication from the Superintending Engineer to the Chief Engineer with regard to the objections raised by audit in connection with the construction of the reservoirs. The following extract will explain the position then taken by the Department. 1966, is a communication from the Superintending Engineer to the Chief Engineer with regard to the objections raised by audit in connection with the construction of the reservoirs. The following extract will explain the position then taken by the Department. “The contention of the Accountant-General that jetting was resorted to by the contractor to facilitate the driving of the piles is not correct. Had it not been for jetting, it would not have been possible for the piles to reach the required depth of 30’, passing through sandy strata and we would have been constrained to stop with a smaller depth viz. upto the point of refusal for penetration of the pile by hammering. It was, therefore, in the interest of the work that jetting was insisted upon by the Department for pile driving. The contractor had to resort to jetting under instructions from the Department. The Accountant-General has stated that the department is not bound to pay extra for adopting the method of jetting for pile driving. This does not appeal correct since the method of jetting was adopted in the interest of the department in view of the sandy stratum obtaining at the site as against the indication given by the department that the soil is clayey upto a depth of nearly 200 ft. No doubt, the contractor was asked to ascertain the nature of the soil; but this does not imply that he was to conduct exploratory borings to conform the classification given by the department in the tender within the short span of time available for submitting tenders.” Earlier also on 27. 1966, as per Exhibit P-1`6 the Executive Engineer had written to the Chief Engineer wherefrom para 4 is revealing: “Even though while inviting tenders for the work there was a condition that the tenderer should examine the soil condition it was not expected of them to do soil testing in detail within the period available to them to tender for the work. A clear indication regarding the nature of the strata that is likely to be met with was also furnished at the time of inviting tenders. After complete soil investigation the strata was found to be different from that furnished by the department and so in my opinion technical specification has changed. A clear indication regarding the nature of the strata that is likely to be met with was also furnished at the time of inviting tenders. After complete soil investigation the strata was found to be different from that furnished by the department and so in my opinion technical specification has changed. In the circumstances jetting done by the contractor can be considered as an extra item.” However, as stated above, the Hon’ble Apex Court ultimately held a follows: “6. Under Section 30(a) of the Arbitration. Act an award can be set aside when an arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings. Misconduct under Section 30(a) has not a connotation of moral lapse. It comprises legal misconduct which is complete if the arbitrator on the face of the award arrives at an inconsistent conclusion even on his own finding or arrives at a decision by ignoring very material documents which throw abundant light on the controversy to help a just and fair decision. It is in this sense that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings in this case. We have, therefore, no hesitation it setting aside such an award. In the result the judgment of the High Court is wet aside and that of the Sub ordinate Judge is restored. The award of the arbitrator thus stands quashed. The arbitrator will complete the proceedings after considering all the relevant documents including Exhibit P-11 and Exhibit P-16 after giving opportunity to the parties. The appeal is allowed with costs.” 17. At the outset, it has to be held that the context under which the said observation came to be made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was a deliberate suppression in producing two material documents by the agency and the absence of care exercised by the Arbitrators. It was, in such circumstances, the legal misconduct came to be attributed to the Arbitrators. On the facts of the present case, in respect of claim No.2, the Arbitral Tribunal has stated that except the year-wise site expenses stated by the petitioner, no document has been produced to substantiate the same and the finding of the Tribunal cannot be said to be either inconsistent or misconduct on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal in this regard. 18. 18. As correctly submitted by the learned counsel for the first respondent, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ferro Concrete Construction Private Ltd. (supra) while construing the term, ‘legal misconduct’ and also in the context of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, held that even though the quantum of evidence to be appreciated is within the realm of Arbitrator, if an award is passed without evidence at all and merely based on the statement, such award would be invalid and beyond the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: “55. While the quantum of evidence required to accept a claim maybe a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide, if there was no evidence at all and if the arbitrator makes an award of the amount claimed in the claim statement, merely on the basis of the claim statement without anything more, it has to be held that the award on that account would be invalid. Suffice it to say that the entire award under this head is wholly illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and wholly unsustainable.” 19. The Supreme Court in the said judgment, while referring to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, has categorically held that while deciding the validity of an award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitrator to reappreciate the evidence. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has with approval reiterated its earlier finding regarding the scope of the Court to interfere with the award by quoting paragraph11 of the judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd., (1994) 6 SCC 485 which is as follows: “21. This Court explained the principle relating to interference with awards under the 1940 Act in State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. (supra) thus: 31. …Similarly, an award rendered by an arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Ltd., (1994) 6 SCC 485 which is as follows: “21. This Court explained the principle relating to interference with awards under the 1940 Act in State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. (supra) thus: 31. …Similarly, an award rendered by an arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the arbitrator is a judge by choice of the parties, and more often than not, a person with little or no legal background, the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration byway of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award” in the Arbitration Act. Over the decades, judicial decisions have indicated the parameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the Courts have disfavoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and fact on the score of misappreciation and misreading of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to preserve the award as far as possible. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the Courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of “legal misconduct” of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is necessary, however, to put a note of caution that in the anxiety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the Court should not reappraise the evidences intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out that the conclusion drawn from some facts, by the arbitrator is, according to the understanding of the Court, erroneous. Such exercise of power which can be exercised by an appellate Court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is alien to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award under the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible. Similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In ultimate analysis, it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous finding easily demonstrable from the materials on record and application of principle of law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous.” 20. In yet another case, the Supreme Court held that while a claim in respect of loss of profit was made before the Arbitral Tribunal, the essential condition on the part of the claimant in that regard was that he should establish a situation that if he had received the amount due under the contract, he would have utilized and earned better profit, and such plea must be raised and established. That was in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. V. L.K. Ahuja (2004) 5 SCC 109 . The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: “24. That was in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. V. L.K. Ahuja (2004) 5 SCC 109 . The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: “24. Here when claim for escalation of wage bills and price for materials compensation has been paid and compensation for delay in the payment of the amount payable under the contract or for other extra works is to be paid with interest thereon, it is rather difficult for us to accept the proposition that in addition 15% of the total profit should be computed under the heading “Loss or Profit”. It is not unusual for the contractors to claim loss of profit arising out of diminution in turnover on account of delay in the mater of completion of the work. What he should establish in such a situation is that had he received the amount due under the contract, he could have utilized the same for some other business in which he could have earned profit. Unless such a plea is raised and established, claim, for loss of profits could not have been granted. In this case, no such material is available on record. In the absence of any evidence, the arbitrator could not have awarded the same. This aspect was very well settled in Sunley (B) & Co. Ltd. V. Cunard White Star Ltd. by the Court of Appeal in England. Therefore, we have no hesitation in deleting a sum of Rs. 6,00,000 awarded to the claimant.” 21. While dealing with an award under Section 30(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the said conduct attributed to the Arbitrator for the purpose of arriving at a fair and just decision by insisting the parties to produce, the material documents, must be due to the reason that under the Act, 1940 there was no obligation on the part of the claimant and the other party to make a statement of claim or a statement of defence with necessary evidence. However, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the claimant shall file a statement of claim and the respondent has to state his defence and during the course of hearing before the Arbitrator, the parties shall produce their evidence as it is seen in various provisions of the Act, 1996, especially Section 23 which is as follows: “23. However, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the claimant shall file a statement of claim and the respondent has to state his defence and during the course of hearing before the Arbitrator, the parties shall produce their evidence as it is seen in various provisions of the Act, 1996, especially Section 23 which is as follows: “23. Statement of claim and defence.- (1) Within the period of time agreed upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral Tribunal, the claimant shall state the facts supporting his claim, the points at issue and the relief or remedy sought, and the respondent shall state his defence in respect of these particulars, unless the parties have otherwise agreed as to the required elements of those statements. (2) The parties may submit with their statements all documents they consider to be relevant or may add a reference to the documents or other evidence they will submit. (3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, either party may amend or supplement his claim or defence during the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless the arbitral Tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow the amendment or supplement having regard to the delay in making it.” In that regard, it is not as if the petitioner is in disadvantageous position in proving such loss of profit since the same can be done by production of balance sheet and profit and loss of account of the petitioner, which have not been produced by the petitioner, on the facts of the case. 22. Likewise, in respect of claim No.3 relating to compensation for extended use of machinery equipment which was restricted to Rs. 1,47,51,750/- for 41 machineries, the Arbitral Tribunal has taken four machineries as eligible for granting compensation. With reference to clause 14 of the contract, the Tribunal held that as per the said clause, there is no prohibition in making claim for the period beyond the extended time and identified four machineries on facts and granted the award for Rs. 9,58,647/-. The said finding is purely based on appreciation of factual evidence and by applying the categorical ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as stated above, this Court cannot sit in appeal and reappreciate the evidence. Therefore, it cannot be said that the finding of the Tribunal in respect of claim No.3 is invalid. 23. 9,58,647/-. The said finding is purely based on appreciation of factual evidence and by applying the categorical ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as stated above, this Court cannot sit in appeal and reappreciate the evidence. Therefore, it cannot be said that the finding of the Tribunal in respect of claim No.3 is invalid. 23. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of claim No.4 relating to compensation for extended use of labour is that the Arbitral Tribunal has rejected the claim of Rs. 15.83 lakhs claimed by the petitioner on the ground that thee is no basis for the said claim. 24. The above said contention is based on Section 31(3) of the Act, 1996 which contemplates a duty on the Arbitral Tribunal to state the reason for its finding in this regard. Section 31(3) of the Act, 1996 states as follows: “31. Form and contents of arbitral award.- (1) and (2) xxx (2) The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless- (a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or (b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under Section 30.” 25. To appreciate the said contention, it is relevant to refer to the claim and reasoning made by the petitioner in respect of claim No. 4. The claim statement made by the petitioner in respect of claim No.4 is as follows: “Claim No.4 Compensation for Extended Use of Labour Assuming 20% of value of work as labour component of work done, normal provision for labour expenditure=0.2x158.3=31.66 lakhs The claimant has spent much higher amounts than claimed towards additional labour but restricts the claim to 50% of the above = Rs. 15.83 lakhs.” 26. On a bare reading of the claim, it is clear that, on the face of it, it is based on assumption and that has only prompted the Tribunal to observe that the claim has not made on any basis. Even for the assumption of 20% work of labour component, which is stated to be a normal provision of expenditure, the petitioner has not produced any material and in such situation, when the petitioner restricted its claim to the extent of 50% of such assumption, it is not known as to what other reason the Arbitral Tribunal can grant, in this regard. In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the award is not valid on any of the grounds contemplated under Section 34 of the Act. 27. In respect of claim No. 5 relating to refund of bank guarantee commission, the petitioner has not raised any issue against the award. Learned counsel for the petitioner would fairly submit that it is on appreciation of factual aspects, the Tribunal restricted the claim for a period of 18 months. Therefore, the award in that regard to the extent of Rs. 1,14,742/- cannot be said to be invalid. 28. Regarding the last claim dealt with in the award, viz, claim No. 6 relating to increased cost of carrying out of work, as stated above, the claimant claimed a sum of Rs. 56,30,134/- while the Tribunal granted a sum of Rs. 3,67,016/-. A reference to the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal shows that the finding has been given not only on the basis of evidence but also as a consequence to the original decision of restricting the extended period upto 18 months beyond 28. 1998 and hence, there is no scope for reappreciation of evidence. However, the Tribunal, while observing that the Port Trust itself has calculated the damages by adopting 10% increased charges per year relating to a Chinese ship, has chosen to adopt 7% increased cost beyond 28. 1998 in respect of the petitioner’s claim which is insisted by the learned counsel for the petitioner to be arbitrary and without reasoning. 29. Even though the said argument is attractive, the same is without substance. The Arbitral Tribunal consisting of experts in its wisdom, appreciated the entire facts and evidence and exercised its discretion regarding percentage of increased cost and in that regard the Tribunal is not certainly bound by any stand taken by the Port Trust on an earlier occasion on different factual scenario. Certainly, it is the discretion of the Tribunal to fix such percentage and it is not for this Court to interfere in that regard. Even assuming otherwise, that itself is not enough to show that portion of the award as disastrous. 30. Certainly, it is the discretion of the Tribunal to fix such percentage and it is not for this Court to interfere in that regard. Even assuming otherwise, that itself is not enough to show that portion of the award as disastrous. 30. On an overall analysis of the entire aspects as stated above, even assuming that there are some discrepancies on the part of the Tribunal in exercising its discretion regarding the claim No.6 by granting 7% increased cost, by applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Company Ltd. (supra) that there should be a balance between the permissible limit of errors of law and facts, I find that there is no patent error on the face of the ward, as demonstrated from the materials on record. In such view of the mater, this petition stands dismissed and the Arbitral award stands confirm ed. No costs. Petition dismissed.