JUDGMENT 1. The appeal is directed against the judgement of Learned Single Judge dated 14.7.2009 passed in Special Civil Application No. 7043/2009. 2. The appellants were the original petitioners. In the petition, they had challenged an order dated 19.12.2008 passed by the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies by which the Board of Directors of Alavi Cooperative Bank Limited, Vadodara( the bank for short) were removed and an administrator was appointed for a period of one year in exercise of powers under Section 115A of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961( the Cooperative Societies Act for short). The petitioners had also challenged a subsequent communication dated 6.5.2009 from the Assistant General Manager of the RBI conveying to the petitioners that their request for restoration of the earlier Board of Directors of the bank has been examined but found not acceptable at present. 3. Facts in short are as as follows : 3.1 The appellants-original petitioners were elected as Directors of the bank in the year 2006 for a period of three years. Petitioner no.1 was elected as the Chairman of the bank and petitioner no.2 was elected as the Managing Director. 3.2 The RBI found that in the management of the bank, there were violations of guidelines in security transactions. A letter of displeasure was issued and the Bank was instructed to ensure strict compliance with RBI instructions. RBI upon inspection of the bank further found that certain transactions had been undertaken irregularly. A fine of Rs. 5 lakhs was therefore, levied upon the bank for violation RBI guidelines. Subsequently, also irregular transactions were detected. In the above background, RBI issued a communication dated 28.11.2008 to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies stating that : "5. In view of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of the bank as reflected above, Reserve Bank of India is of the view that the Board of Directors of the bank may be superseded and an Administrator be appointed for securing its proper management. In view of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of the bank as reflected above, Reserve Bank of India is of the view that the Board of Directors of the bank may be superseded and an Administrator be appointed for securing its proper management. Accordingly, we forward herewith a requisition UBD.No.CO.NSB-II/RSB-7/ 12.21.07/2)08-09 dated November 26, 2008, for supersession of the Board of Directors of the Alavi Co-operative Bank Ltd., Vadodara." Along with said communication, RBI also forwarded an order dated 26.11.2008 to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies which reads as follows : "Reserve Bank of India being satisfied that in the public interest and for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors and for securing the proper management of the bank, it is necessary to supersede the Board of Directors of Alavi Co-operative Bank Ltd., Vadodara and to have an Administrator appointed therefore, hereby requires the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Gujarat State to make an order for supersession of the Board of Directors of Alavi Co-operative Bank Ltd., Vadodara, and the appointment of an Administrator therefore initially for a period of one year from the date on which the official takes charge as an Administrator, in terms of the provisions of Section 115A(3) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961." 3.3 Pursuant to the said order dated 26.11.2008, Registrar of the Cooperative Societies issued impugned order dated 19.12.2008 superseding the Board of Directors and appointing an administrator to conduct the affairs of the bank for a period of one year. 3.4 Above-mentioned orders passed by the RBI as well as consequential orders passed by the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies came to be challenged by the petitioners before the Learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.342/2009. Petition was disposed of by order dated 19.1.2009. The petitioners withdrew the petition with a view to make representation to the RBI by way of post decisional hearing for revocation of the decision. 3.5 The petitioners made a detailed representation dated 22.1.2009 to RBI and requested that the order of supersession be recalled. They also prayed for personal hearing. RBI granted the request for personal hearing. After hearing the representatives of the petitioners however, RBI through its Assistant General Manager conveyed to the petitioners on 6.5.2009 that their request is not found acceptable. 3.5 The petitioners made a detailed representation dated 22.1.2009 to RBI and requested that the order of supersession be recalled. They also prayed for personal hearing. RBI granted the request for personal hearing. After hearing the representatives of the petitioners however, RBI through its Assistant General Manager conveyed to the petitioners on 6.5.2009 that their request is not found acceptable. 3.6 The petitioners therefore, approached High Court again by filing Special Civil Application No.7043/2009. Said petition came to be dismissed by the Learned Single Judge by impugned order dated 14.7.2009 observing inter-alia that the Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be loathe to interfere with such measure of controlling and regulating financial affairs of the bank. In view of post decisional hearing granted to the petitioners, Learned Single Judge found that there was no violation of principles of natural justice. This decision is in appeal before us in the present Letters Patent Appeal. 4. Before proceeding further, we may notice that during the pendency of the present proceedings, RBI passed a further order dated 11.12.2009 requiring the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to extend the term of appointment of the administrator for a period upto 19.12.2010 or till the election for the posts of Directors are held in the bank, whichever is earlier. 5. On the basis of above background, counsel for the parties have made detailed submissions before us. 6. Learned counsel Shri B.S. Patel for the appellants submitted that the orders passed by the RBI superseding the Board of Directors suffer from gross violation of principles of natural justice. Admittedly, no previous hearing was granted before passing such orders. He contended that post decisional hearing would not cure the initial defect. 6.1 He contended that financial condition of the bank all through out was sound. Supersession of elected members of the Committee should not be lightly resorted to. There was no material before the RBI to come to the conclusion that affairs of the bank were conducted in the manner prejudicial to the interest of the bank or its depositors. 6.2 He contended that even the representation of the petitioners was not properly considered by the RBI. Decision was taken by the authority other than the one who heard the petitioners. 6.2 He contended that even the representation of the petitioners was not properly considered by the RBI. Decision was taken by the authority other than the one who heard the petitioners. 6.3 In support of his contentions, he relied on the following decisions : 1) In case of Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Regd.) and another v. State of Karnataka and others reported in (1991)2 Supreme Court Cases 604, wherein the Apex Court found that though statute granted power to rescind a notification, recession of notification without hearing persons prejudicially affected thereby, would be in violation of principles of natural justice. 2) In case of Sahara India(Firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income tax, Central-I and another reported in (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 151, wherein the Apex Court finding that the order passed by the authorities would result into civil consequences against a citizen, held that same must be preceded by hearing. It was observed : "31. We are also unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the proposition canvassed by learned counsel for the Revenue that since a post-decisional hearing in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 142 is contemplated, the requirement of natural justice is fully met. Apart from the fact that ordinarily a post-decisional hearing is no substitute for pre-decisional hearing, even from the language of the said provision it is plain that the opportunity of being heard is only in respect of the material gathered on the basis of the audit report submitted under sub-section (2-A) and not on the validity of the original order directing the special audit. It is well settled that the principle audi alteram partem can be excluded only when a statute contemplates a post decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merit, which, as explained above, is not the case here." 3) In case of OLGA TELLIS and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others reported in (1985) 3 Supreme Court Cases 545, in which the Apex Court held that eviction of the persons from their dwelling houses would result in deprivation of livelihood which is included in Article 21 of the Constitution and if such deprivation of livelihood is not effected by a reasonable procedure established by law, the same would be violative of Article 21. 4) In case of Amreli District Co-operative Sale & Purchase Union Ltd. & ors. 4) In case of Amreli District Co-operative Sale & Purchase Union Ltd. & ors. v. State of Gujarat reported in 1984(2)GLR 1244, where the Bench had examined the vires of certain amended provisions in the Cooperative Societies Act. Division Bench of this Court while upholding Section 74-D of the Cooperative Societies Act and turning down the grounds of provision being violative of Article 14 as it does not provide for any hearing before appointing of custodian observed that : "We must read the obligation of hearing a society before an order is made under sec. 74D in the amended provision. The Registrar shall, before appointing a person or a committee of persons to be custodian of a society, given an opportunity of hearing to the society before any order is made. The challenge on the ground of Art.14 must, therefore, be rejected." 5) In case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another reported in AIR 1959 Supreme Court 308, wherein the Apex Court observed that if one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. 6) Referring to the case of Reserve Bank of India, Bombay v. Harisidh Co-operative Bank Ltd., Ahmedabad and others reported in AIR 1988 Gujarat 107, he submitted that Division Bench was examining the interim order passed by the single Judge granting interim stay of operation and implementation of order passed by the District Registrar for superseding the Board of Directors and appointing an administrator to take charge of the bank. It was in this background that the Bench while setting aside the order of the Learned Single Judge made certain prima facie observations with respect to requirement of hearing before passing such orders by the Registrar of the RBI. On the other hand, learned senior counsel Shri S.N. Soparkar appearing for RBI opposed the appeal. From the affidavits filed on behalf of the RBI, he pointed out that there were large scale irregularities in conducting the affairs of the bank. Previously such irregularities were noticed by the RBI. Directions were issued for taking corrective measures. Even thereafter, during inspection carried out by the RBI further irregularities came to light. After issuing show cause notice, penalty of Rs. 5 lakhs was recovered from the bank. Previously such irregularities were noticed by the RBI. Directions were issued for taking corrective measures. Even thereafter, during inspection carried out by the RBI further irregularities came to light. After issuing show cause notice, penalty of Rs. 5 lakhs was recovered from the bank. He contended that for preventing affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors and for securing proper management of the bank, it was necessary to appoint an administrator. He contended that section 115A of the Cooperative Societies Act requires no pre-decisional hearing before RBI passes any order under Sub-section(3) thereof. In any case, in the present matter, the appellants had approached this Court earlier by filing Special Civil Application No. 342/2009 challenging orders passed by the RBI. Said petition was withdrawn with a liberty to make representation by way of post decisional hearing for revocation of the decision. Having thus agreed to and having availed of such an opportunity, it would not be open for the appellants to contend that orders are bad for want of pre-decisional hearing. He contended that in any case facts of the case are gross. In any case, the tenure of three years for which the appellants were elected is over. Term of the administrator is to continue till fresh elections are held. 7.1 In support of his contentions, he relied on the following decisions : 1) In case of Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v. Reserve Bank of India and others reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1371, to highlight the nature of powers exercised by RBI. 2) In case of Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager(PJ), Indian Oil Corprn. Ltd., Haldia and others reported in (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 764, wherein the Apex Court while upholding an order of dismissal without hearing on the ground that the same was justified in exigency of the situation observed that : "44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten forbidden fruit. [See R.v. University of Cambridge. But we are also aware that principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straight-jacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated ; "To do a great right after all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong". [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (Bhopal Gas Disaster); SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than precedential." 3) In case of Liberty Oil Mills and others v. Union of India and others reported in (1984) 3 Supreme Court Cases 465, to contend that in situations requiring urgent steps, pre-decisional hearing would not be feasible. 4. In case of Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1480, wherein the Apex Court considering the requirement of hearing before passing an order against any person, referring to the decision in case of OLGA TELLIS and others(supra), observed as under : "109 ...The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule or prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partam rule at the pre-decisional stage. If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected the administrative decision after post-decisional hearing was good." 5) In case of Anilbhai M. Patel and others v. Suryapur Bank Agent D.B.H. Samiti and others reported in (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 83, wherein the Apex Court was examining the challenge to the supersession of the Committee of the Cooperative Society. The Apex Court found that during pendency of the litigation, term of members of the Committee had already expired. The Court permitted the administrator to continue to hold the office but provided that the administrator must get election of the Committee members held as expeditiously as possible. 6) In case of Reserve Bank of India v. M. Hanumaiah & ors. reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 994, wherein the Apex Court held that Registrar is not required to give a hearing to the bank before passing an order of supersession of the Managing Committee when such supersession is based on request from RBI. 8. Before examining the rival submissions, relevant statutory provisions need to be noted at this stage. 9. To regulate the issue of bank notes and for the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate currency and credit system of the Country to its advantage, it was found expedient to constitute a Reserve Bank of India. RBI was thus constituted under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. 10. To consolidate and amend the law relating to banking, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 was enacted. From the statement of objects and reasons for enacting the Banking Regulation Act, it can be seen that the Banking Regulation Act was enacted inter-alia to bring within the scope of the legislation all institutions which receive deposits, to prohibit non banking companies from accepting deposits, for prohibition of trading with a view to eliminating non-banking risks, for prohibition of minimum capital standards, etc. 10.1 Section 35 of the Banking Regulation Act pertains to inspection of any banking company. Sub-section(1) of Section 35 in particular, empowers the RBI to cause inspection to be made of any banking company and its books and accounts. 10.1 Section 35 of the Banking Regulation Act pertains to inspection of any banking company. Sub-section(1) of Section 35 in particular, empowers the RBI to cause inspection to be made of any banking company and its books and accounts. Sub-section(4) of Section 35 empowers the Central Government under certain circumstances, upon consideration of the report that the affairs of the banking company are being conducted to the detriment of the interests of its depositors, after giving such opportunity to the banking company to make a representation, order prohibiting the bank from receiving fresh deposits . Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act pertains to power of the Reserve Bank to give directions. Section 35A reads as follows : "35A. Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions :-(1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that - (a) in the public interest;or (aa) in the interest of banking policy;or (b) to prevent the affairs of the any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the banking company; or (c) to secure the proper management of any banking company generally, it is necessary to issue directions to banking companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it may, from time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and the banking companies or the banking company, as the case may be, shall be bound to comply with such directions. (2) The Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or on its own motion, modify or cancel any direction issued under sub-section(1), and in so modifying or cancelling any direction may impose such conditions as it thinks fit, subject to which the modification or cancellation shall have effect.]" 10.2 Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act pertains to application of the Act to Co-operative Banks. Said section was added in the Banking Regulation Act in the year 1965 and makes the Banking Regulation Act applicable to the Co-operative banks subject to certain modifications. By virtue of clause(x) of Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act is made applicable to the Co-operative Banks also. To consolidate and amend the law relating to the Co-operative Societies Act in the State of Gujarat, Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 was enacted. By virtue of clause(x) of Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act is made applicable to the Co-operative Banks also. To consolidate and amend the law relating to the Co-operative Societies Act in the State of Gujarat, Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 was enacted. 11.1 Section 81 of the Co-operative Societies Act pertains to supersession of the Committee of a society. Sub-section(1) of Section 81 in particular, provides for removal of the Committee and appointing of administrator if it is found that the Committee persistently makes default, or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws, or does anything which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members. 11.2 Section 107 of the Co-operative Societies Act pertains to winding up of the society. Sub-section (1) of Section 107, in particular, empowers the Registrar to make an interim order directing the society to be wound up if after an inquiry held under Section 86 or an inspection held under Section 87 of the Co-operative Societies Act or on the report of the auditor of the society, he is of the opinion that society ought to be wound up. Under sub-section(2) of Section 107, after passing such an interim order of winding up, Registrar is required to communicate a copy thereof to the society calling upon it to submit its explanation to the Registrar within prescribed time. Under sub-section(3) of Section 107, the Registrar, after giving an opportunity to the society of being heard, has to make a final order, either vacating or confirming the interim order. 11.3 Section 109 of the Co-operative Societies Act provides for an appeal against order of winding up passed under Section 107 of the Co-operative Societies Act. 11.4 Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act, around which entire controversy has been centered is applicable to insured Co-operative banks and pertains to order of winding up, reconstruction, supersession of committee, etc. Section 115A reads as follows : "115A. Order for winding up, reconstruction, supersession of committee, etc. 11.4 Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act, around which entire controversy has been centered is applicable to insured Co-operative banks and pertains to order of winding up, reconstruction, supersession of committee, etc. Section 115A reads as follows : "115A. Order for winding up, reconstruction, supersession of committee, etc. of insured co-operative bank not to be made without sanction or requisition of Reserve Bank of India : Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in the case of an insured co-operative bank (1) an order for winding up or an order sanctioning a scheme of compromise or arrangement or of amalgamation or reconstruction (including division or reorganization) of the bank may be made only with the previous sanction in writing of the Reserve Bank of India; (2) an order for the winding up of the bank shall be made by the Registrar if so required by the Reserve Bank of India in the circumstances referred to in section 13D of the Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 1961 (Act 47 of the 1961) (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder, the Registrar shall ensure the implementation of regulatory prescription given by the Reserve Bank of India including supersession and winding up of the State Co-operative Bank and the Central Co-operative Bank and shall appoint the liquidator within a period of one month of being so advised by the Reserve Bank of India. (3) If so required by the Reserve Bank of India in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the bank, an order shall be made by the Registrar for supersession of the committee and the appointment of an administrator in place thereof for such period or periods, not exceeding five years in the aggregate, as may from time to time be specified by the Reserve Bank of India, and the administrator so appointed shall, after the expiry of his term of office, continue in office until the day immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the new committee of such bank; (4) an order for winding up of the bank or an order sanctioning a scheme of compromise or arrangement or of amalgamation or reconstruction (including division or reorganization) or an order for the supersession of the committee of the bank and and the appointment of an administrator in place thereof made with the previous sanction in writing or on the requisition of the Reserve Bank of India shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any matter in any court; and (5) the liquidator or such bank or the transferee bank, as the case may be, shall be under an obligation to pay the Deposit Insurance Corporation established under the Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 1961(47 of 1961), in the circumstances, to the extend and in the manner referred to in section 21 of the said Act. Before seeking to interpret the statutory provisions, few factual aspects need to be reiterated :" 12.1 As already noted, in the present case, order requiring the Registrar to supersede the Board of Directors of the bank was passed on 26.11.2008. In a communication of the same date appended to such an order, reasons for such a decision have been recorded. It is recorded that several irregularities were noticed in conducting the affairs of the bank. It was recorded that in view of unsatisfactory state of affairs of the bank, RBI was of the view that the Board of Directors may be superseded and an administrator be appointed. It is recorded that several irregularities were noticed in conducting the affairs of the bank. It was recorded that in view of unsatisfactory state of affairs of the bank, RBI was of the view that the Board of Directors may be superseded and an administrator be appointed. Based on this communication, Registrar Co-operative Society passed order dated 19.12.2008 superseding the Board of Directions and administrator to take charge of the affairs of the bank. These orders were challenged before the Court on various grounds including the ground that no hearing was granted before passing such orders. Learned Single Judge however, permitted the petition to be withdrawn for making representation to the RBI by way of post decisional hearing. Representation thereupon was made by the petitioners to RBI which representation also came to be rejected. 12.2 Before passing the above-mentioned orders, RBI had brought to the notice of the bank several irregularities. In fact, at one stage after issuing show cause notice, penal order imposing fine of Rs. 5 lakhs was passed. Fine was actually paid by the bank. 12.3 In the affidavit dated 28.4.2010 filed by Shri Hemant, son of Yeshwant Joshi, Assistant General Manager of RBI, major irregularities noticed in conducting the affairs of the bank have been stated as under : "(i) the bank had not prepared any panel of brokers. (ii) All these securities transactions were undertaken with Samay Trade Link either as seller or purchaser as a counter party. (iii) the Registrar for the SLR securities was also not maintained properly. No checking of the investments was being done by any officer of the bank. The investment decision was being taken by the Chairman or Managing Director and one officer. One clerk was doing the work of both front office and the back office however he is not signing any voucher. (iv) The security transactions were not subjected to concurrent audit. (v) The bank had not used any scientific method to decide the rate of securities or verified rates with any authority while purchase or sale of such securities. (vi) Although concurrent audit has been introduced, securities transactions were not subjected to concurrent audit. (vii) The board of directors had not carried out a half yearly review of securities transactions. The bank did not forward the review note on securities transactions to the Regional office by 15th November/15th May, as required under Circular BPD(PCB). (vi) Although concurrent audit has been introduced, securities transactions were not subjected to concurrent audit. (vii) The board of directors had not carried out a half yearly review of securities transactions. The bank did not forward the review note on securities transactions to the Regional office by 15th November/15th May, as required under Circular BPD(PCB). No.37/12.05.01/2004-05 dated February 26, 2005. (viii) Shri Chaviwala, General manger was associated with back office business/entering/posting of deals transactions and was also operating the bank's CSGL account with HDFC Bank. During the inspection, it was revealed that Alavi Bank had not followed any sound system of credit appraisal and that it did not take into account important aspects such as financial position of the borrower, purpose of loan, business prospects, turnover, income generating capacity, liquidity etc. and that the Alavi bank also did not obtain credit opinion on the borrower. The inspection further revealed that the loans and advances were made to the relatives of the directors in total disregard to the guidelines issued by the RBI in this regard." 12.4 We may also recall that the petitioners who were the members of the Board of Directors of the bank were elected in the year 2006 for a period of three years. Their term thus came to an end in the year 2009. Last order extending the term of administrator passed by RBI on 11.12.2009 clearly provides that administrator shall hold the office till fresh elections of Board of Directors are held. 13.To ensure that management of the bank is taken over by the elected body, we are of the view that Registrar of the Cooperative Society should hold elections as early as possible. We propose to issue such directions. 14. In view of the factual background noticed above, we are of the view that Learned Single Judge committed no error in dismissing the petition. In facts of the case, it cannot be stated that the principles of natural justice were violated. Order of RBI was preceded by series of actions in form of bringing certain defects to the notice of the bank and also of passing penal order after issuing show cause notice. It cannot be stated that the bank and its Directors were not aware about several irregularities noticed by the RBI. Order of RBI was preceded by series of actions in form of bringing certain defects to the notice of the bank and also of passing penal order after issuing show cause notice. It cannot be stated that the bank and its Directors were not aware about several irregularities noticed by the RBI. This coupled with the fact that the appellants earlier approached this Court and agreed to accept post decisional hearing would convince us not to entertain the challenge of the bank any further. In any case, we find that the term of the office of Directors having come to an end, question of their re-induction would not arise. Further we propose to direct the Registrar to hold the elections as early as possible. 15. In view of the above facts, we would have closed the appeal without further addo. However, counsel for the appellants pointed out that the question of nature of powers exercised by RBI under Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act arises in number of cases and it is necessary to decide whether before passing any order under Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act, RBI is required to give any hearing to the bank and its Directors or not. We therefore, proceed to decide this issue also. 16. From the statutory provisions noticed here-in-above, it appears that on a co-operative bank, the RBI exercises certain powers both under the Banking Regulation Act as well as under the Co-operative Societies Act. In view of Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, a co-operative bank is amenable to certain supervisory controls of RBI. 16.1 Under Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, the RBI has powers to give directions, if it is satisfied that in the public interest or in the interest of the banking policy or to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the banking company or to secure proper management of any banking company, it is necessary to issue directions generally or in a particular case and the concerned co-operative bank is bound to comply with such directions. Under Sub-section(2) of Section 35A, it is open for the RBI either on representation made to it or on its own motion, to modify or cancel any direction under Sub-section(1). Under Sub-section(2) of Section 35A, it is open for the RBI either on representation made to it or on its own motion, to modify or cancel any direction under Sub-section(1). Powers under Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act as is apparent are very wide. Before passing any order under Sub-section(1) of Section 35A, the statute does not specifically provide for any pre-decisional hearing. Sub-section(2) of Section 35A however, permits post decisional hearing. We do not wish to examine the scope of the powers of RBI under Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act nor do we intend to comment on the nature of hearing required to be given under the said Section. These provisions are noticed only for the purpose of comparison to the relevant statutory provisions under the Co-operative Societies Act. 16.2 Under the Co-operative Societies Act, a Co-operative bank is once again subjected to dual supervision. As a Co-operative society, it is under the supervision and direct control of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. It is therefore, that under Section 81 of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar is empowered to supersede a Committee of such a bank or under Section 86 is empowered to carry out any inquiry into its constitution, working and financial conditions or to carry out inspection of its books of accounts. Under Section 107 of the Co-operative Societies Act , the Registrar is empowered to wind up a co-operative bank under certain circumstances. 16.3 Under Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act, an insured co-operative bank is subjected to certain supervisory controls of RBI acting through the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. As per sub-section(1) of Section 115A, an order for winding up or an order sanctioning a scheme of compromise or arrangement or of amalgamation or reconstruction of a bank can be made only with the previous sanction in writing of the RBI. As per sub-section(2) of Section 115A, an order for winding up of the bank shall be made by the Registrar if so required by the RBI in the circumstances referred to in section 13D of the Deposit Insurance Corporation Act. As per sub-section(2) of Section 115A, an order for winding up of the bank shall be made by the Registrar if so required by the RBI in the circumstances referred to in section 13D of the Deposit Insurance Corporation Act. Under sub-section(3) of Section 115A, the Registrar has to pass an order for supersession of the Committee of the bank and appoint an administrator in place thereof if RBI so requires in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the bank. Such appointment of the administrator however, may be extended from time to time as may be specified by RBI. However, such period in aggregate shall not exceed five years. Sub-section(4) of Section 115A provides that an order for winding up of the bank or an order sanctioning a scheme of compromise or arrangement or of amalgamation or reconstruction or an order for the supersession of the committee of the bank and and the appointment of an administrator in place thereof made with the previous sanction in writing or on the requisition of the Reserve Bank of India shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any matter in any court. It can thus be seen that under Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act, RBI enjoys wide powers with respect to insured co-operative banks. RBI can require the Registrar to wind up a bank in situations referred to in Section 13D of the Deposit Insurance Corporation Act. RBI can also in public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the bank, require the Registrar to supersede the Committee of the bank and appoint an administrator in place thereof upto a maximum period of five years. Such orders are treated as final and are not be liable to be called in question in any court. 17. It is not possible to hold that such orders passed by RBI requiring winding up of the bank or supersession of the Committee of the bank, would not result into adverse civil consequences. In one case the bank is being wound up. Such winding up is final and binding. 17. It is not possible to hold that such orders passed by RBI requiring winding up of the bank or supersession of the Committee of the bank, would not result into adverse civil consequences. In one case the bank is being wound up. Such winding up is final and binding. In another case, elected Committee of the Co-operative Society is being superseded and is replaced by an administrator. Such supersession and replacement can extend upto a period of five years. These actions would certainly result into adverse consequences against the bank and its elected body. 18. It is held in number of decisions of this Court as well as the Apex Court that when action of authority - administrative or quasi judicial result into adverse civil consequences against a person or a body unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication excludes the principles of natural justice, hearing must be given before passing such orders. In case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 851, the Apex Court observed as follows : "75. Fair hearing is thus a postulate of decision-making cancelling a poll, although fair abridgement of that process is permissible. It can be fair without the rules of evidence or forms of trial. It cannot be fair if apprising the affected and appraising the representations is absent. The philosophy behind natural justice is, in one sense, participatory justice in the process of democratic rule of law." 76. We have been told that wherever the Parliament has intended a hearing it has said so in the Act and the rules and inferentially where it has not specificated it is otiose. There is no such sequitur. The silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication. Art. 324 vests a wide power and where some direct consequence on candidates emanates from its exercise, we must read this functional obligation. 19. It cannot be denied that order of winding up or supersession of the Committee of the bank would result into adverse consequences. Order of winding up in fact would be permanent in nature and thereafter only the actual process of winding up would remain. 19. It cannot be denied that order of winding up or supersession of the Committee of the bank would result into adverse consequences. Order of winding up in fact would be permanent in nature and thereafter only the actual process of winding up would remain. Though order of supersession of the Committee and appointment of an administrator would be for a limited period, such period or periods can be extended upto a maximum of five years in aggregate. Such order also therefore, would have lasting effect on the functioning of the bank as well as on the members of the Committee. Both these orders are treated as final and cannot be called in question in any matter in any Court. 20. Reason for clothing RBI with such powers are not far to seek. RBI has to ensure that all banks including the Co-operative banks function within the statutory parameters. It has to ensure that affairs of the bank are not being conducted in any manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors and that the bank is properly managed. It is therefore, necessary that RBI would have corresponding powers. Such powers include supersession of the Committee and appointment of an administrator. 20.1 Simultaneously, we must remember that the Co-operative societies enjoys a certain autonomy in their internal functioning. They elect their representatives to the Committee as per their bye-laws or in some cases as per the provisions contained in the Co-operative Societies Act. Such autonomy of-course would not mean that the Co-operative Societies and Co-operative banks in particular, can mismanage their affairs and carry on business in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors 21. While legislature thus empowers RBI to supersede even an elected committee of the Co-operative bank and appoint an administrator in place thereof, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that even the bare minimum principles of natural justice are excluded. There is no express provision excluding the requirement of hearing. We are unable to read any such intent in the provisions noted above. In fact in the statutory provisions there are clear indications that natural justice should be followed. There is no express provision excluding the requirement of hearing. We are unable to read any such intent in the provisions noted above. In fact in the statutory provisions there are clear indications that natural justice should be followed. In particular, we find that under sub-section(3) of Section 115A, RBI can require the Registrar to supersede the committee of the bank and appoint an administrator in place thereof if in the larger public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the bank, it is so necessary. Therefore, before requiring the Registrar to supersede the committee and appoint an administrator, RBI must be satisfied that in public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing proper management of the bank, it is so required. Ordinarily, such satisfaction can be arrived at only after giving an opportunity of being heard to the concerned persons. In case of Reserve Bank of India v. M. Hanumaiah & ors.(supra), the Apex Court was considering the requirement of hearing by the Registrar before superseding a Managing Committee of the Co-operative Bank under the requisition of RBI. It was in this context the Apex Court held that no such hearing would be necessary. The question that whether RBI can require supersession of the elected committee of the Co-operative bank without hearing was neither at issue nor decided in the said decision. It was in this context in para. 18 of the decision, the Apex court observed that the question may arise whether the principles of natural justice are completely excluded from the process or it may be that against the requisition, the affected bank may move the Reserve Bank itself and try to show that it had wrongly arrived at the decision for its supersession. The Court refrained from going to the said question as it did not arise in the said case. The above decision therefore has no direct application in facts of the present case. 22. Inevitable conclusion therefore would be that principles of natural justice and requirement of hearing are part and parcel of the scheme of the provisions contained in Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act. The above decision therefore has no direct application in facts of the present case. 22. Inevitable conclusion therefore would be that principles of natural justice and requirement of hearing are part and parcel of the scheme of the provisions contained in Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act. Principles of natural justice would clearly require that hearing be given to the person likely to be affected by the ultimate decision that the authority may take. However, it is stated repeatedly that principles of natural justice cannot be put in straitjacket. Particularly, considering the nature of duties and responsibilities exercised by the RBI to ensure proper functioning and management of the Co-operative bank and corresponding powers enjoyed under Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act, as also considering the complex nature of situations which may arise while exercising such powers, all of which are not possible to be foreseen, the exact nature of requirement of hearing in each individual case must depend on individual facts. Therefore, even while holding that RBI would have to follow the principles of natural justice while issuing directions under Section 115A(2) and (3) of the Co-operative Societies Act, we are conscious that there may be certain emergencies which would brook no delay where it would be necessary for RBI to act promptly and issue urgent orders to prevent serious damage to the bank, its depositors or to the larger public interest . In such circumstances, it would neither be possible nor necessary to give a pre-decisional hearing before passing any such urgent direction or order. However, such powers are to be exercised with due caution and only in appropriate cases as observed in case of OLGA TELLIS and others(supra). Even in such cases, requirement of post decisional hearing cannot be done away. In case of Liberty Oil Mills and others v. Union of India and others(supra), it was observed that : ...It may be that the opportunity to be heard may not be pre-decisional; it may necessarily have to be predecisional where the danger to be averted or the act to be prevented is imminent or where the action to be taken can brook no delay. If an area is devastated by flood, one cannot wait to issue show-cause notices for requisitioning vehicles to evacuate population. If an area is devastated by flood, one cannot wait to issue show-cause notices for requisitioning vehicles to evacuate population. If there is an out-break of an epidemic, we presume one does not have to issue show cause notices to requisition beds in hospitals, public or private. In such situations, it may be enough to issue post decisional notices providing for an opportunity. It may not even be necessary in some situations to issue such notices but it would be sufficient but obligatory to consider any representation that may be made by the aggrieved person and that would satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness and natural justice. There can be no tape-measure of the extent of natural justice. It may and indeed it must vary from statute to statute, situation to situation and case to case. Again, it is necessary to say that pre-decisional natural justice is not usually contemplated when the decisions taken are of an interim nature pending investigation or enquiry. Ad-interim orders may always be made ex-parte and such orders may themselves provide for an opportunity to the aggrieved party to be heard at a later stage. Even if the interim orders do not make provision for such an opportunity, an aggrieved party has, nevertheless, always the right to make appropriate representation seeking a review of the order and asking the authority to rescind or modify the order. The principles of natural justice would be satisfied if the aggrieved party is given an opportunity at the request. There is no violation of a principle of natural justice if an ex-parte ad-interim order is made unless of course, the statute itself provides for a hearing before the order is made as in clause 8A. Natural justice will be violated if the authority refuses to consider the request of the aggrieved party for an opportunity to make his representation against the ex-parte ad-interim orders. 23. We are therefore of the view that barring some emergent situations, where any delay is likely to cause serious prejudice to the bank or its depositors or to the larger public interest, principles of natural justice must be followed before any order or direction can be issued by RBI under Section 115A (2) and (3) of the Co-operative Societies Act. We are therefore of the view that barring some emergent situations, where any delay is likely to cause serious prejudice to the bank or its depositors or to the larger public interest, principles of natural justice must be followed before any order or direction can be issued by RBI under Section 115A (2) and (3) of the Co-operative Societies Act. Even in a case where due to reasons stated above, it is not possible to give a pre-decisional hearing, requirement of post decisional hearing cannot be done away with. 24. In the result, appeal is disposed of with following observations and directions : (i) We hold that the principles of natural justice are inbuilt in Sub-section(2) and (3) of Section 115A of the Co-operative Societies Act. (ii) Ordinarily, before RBI issues any order or directions under the said provisions, it must be preceded by hearing to the persons likely to be affected by such decision. (iii) In case of urgency, where any delay is likely to adversely affect public interest or cause serious prejudice to the interests of the depositors or to the bank, RBI would have the power to issue appropriate directions. In such a case also, however by way of post decisional hearing, RBI must consider the representation if any made by the persons affected by the said decision and dispose of such representation by recording reasons howsoever brief. It is however, clarified that it is not possible to lay down any rigid outline of requirements of hearing and the same must depend on facts of each case. (iv) So far as present appeal is concerned, as already noted earlier, we neither find that impugned orders passed by the RBI suffer from breach of principles of natural justice nor do we find that Learned Single Judge committed any error in the impugned judgement. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies is however directed to hold the elections of the Managing Committee of the appellant bank expeditiously and in any case not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 25. Appeal and Civil Application stands disposed of accordingly.