Judgment 1. An order under Section 45-A of the Employee’s State insurance Act (hereinafter called as Act) was passed by the First Respondent against Kiran Fashions Pvt Ltd., to pay ESI contribution for the period between April 1992 to March 1995. A sum of Rs.87,59,386/- is due from the said Company. The Petitioner was formally a Director of the Company known as “Kiran Fashions (P) Ltd.” of which her husband was yet another director. The Petitioner’s husband was one of the Directors of another Company, known as “Kiran Creations Pvt Ltd.” and 45-A order was passed against the said Company also for the period between April 1991 to March 1993. A total sum of Rs.7,03.486/- is due from the said Company. The above said orders made under Section 45-A of the Act have become final and the same were not challenged by the respective Company. Subsequently, Recovery Certificates have also been issued in order to recover the said amount. For the purpose of recovering the said amount, which is due under the Recovery Certificates, the Second Respondent has now issued the impugned orders of attachment of immovable properties by his proceedings TN/RECY/ESIC-CP-16/51-52520-18 dated 08.02.2000 impugned in W.P. 4776/2001 and proceedings No.TN/Recy/ESI-CP-16/51:52522 dated 212. 2003 impugned in W.P.26160 of 2005, there by, attaching her land, superstructure on the area bearing Door No.20, Anderson Street, Chennai-6 challenging the said orders of attachment, the Petitioner is before this Court with the present Writ Petitions. 2. According to the Petitioner, she was formerly one of the Directors of the said company, viz., Kiran Fashions Ltd., but she resigned on 22.04.1981 itself. This property, which is under attachment was originally owned by one Mr. MohanSingh T. Lulla, the father-in-law of the Petitioner; by his last Will and testament dated 7. 1981, the said Mohan Singh T. Lulla bequeathed the said property into two equal shares; one to his son Sanjaykumar M. Lulla and other to the Petitioner. Subsequently, Sanjaykumar M. Lulla executed a release deed dated 212. 1995 by means of registered release deed. Thus, the Petitioner has become the absolute owner of the property. The will was also probated by this Court in O.P. 578 of 2000. 3. Subsequently, Sanjaykumar M. Lulla executed a release deed dated 212. 1995 by means of registered release deed. Thus, the Petitioner has become the absolute owner of the property. The will was also probated by this Court in O.P. 578 of 2000. 3. In this Writ Petition, the only point urged by the learned Senior Counsel Appearing for the Petitioner is that for the dues from the Company, the property of the Directors, both past and present cannot be attached at all. To substantiate this contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.C. Agarwala v. Payment of Wages Inspector, M.P., and others, 2006 AIR SCW 146, wherein, the Supreme Court had to consider the liability of the Directors of the Company under the Payment of Wages Act as amended by Madhya Pradesh Act of 1964 and the Factories Act of 1948. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that on a plain reading of the language of the governing statute, it cannot be held that the Directors beat any personal liability. Same view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Indore v. Kailashchandra and others, 1989 LAB.I.C. 760, wherein, in paragraph 16 of the judgment, the Division Bench has held as follows: “If the contributions have not been paid even by the occupier, the same can be recovered from the assets of the Company and not from the personal assets of the Director or Managing Director or the occupier by making them personally liable and their personal property cannot be attached or sold for realisation of contributions except any property of the Company in the hands of the Director or Managing Director or occupier, it certainly can be attached and the amount can be realised from the same.” 4. In yet another judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Chandigarh v. Gurdiah Singh and others, 1991 (1) LLJ 425 in paragraph 3 has held as follows: “Learned Counsel for the Appellant relied upon two decisions as precedents. In the case of the Bombay High Court in Suresh Tulsidas Kalichand v. Collector of Bombay, 1980 (2) LLJ 81, the Court found liability by relying upon clause (ii) of the definition without first ascertaining whether the mater was covered by clause (i). In the case of the Bombay High Court in Suresh Tulsidas Kalichand v. Collector of Bombay, 1980 (2) LLJ 81, the Court found liability by relying upon clause (ii) of the definition without first ascertaining whether the mater was covered by clause (i). Now on our finding in the instant case that clause (i) Applied, we do not have to go to clause (iii) where the liability is of the person who is responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. The other decision on which reliance has been placed is in the case of B.M. Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 Cal. 290 . That was a case where a learned Single Judge proceeded on the footing that the Directors were owners of the company. We called upon the learned Counsel for the Appellant to substantiate the proposition that Directors in the absence of anything more would have to be treated as owners of the Company and he has candidly accepted the position that in the absence of facts and proof of actual position. Directors cannot be treated ipso facto as owners. Thus no support is available from the precedents. We are of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the liability was of the Company and in the event of there being an occupier, he was liable to meet the demand.” 5. Applying the above, I have to necessarily hold that the impugned Recovery Certificates are liable to be quashed. 6. But the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents would vehemently oppose this Writ Petition. According to her, the Writ Petition is not maintainable since there is an alternative remedy available before the E.S.I. Court under the provisions of the Act. 7. In my considered opinion, the said contention cannot be countenanced for the following reasons: It is true that there is an alternative remedy available for the Petitioner to work out under the Act itself. At this juncture, it has to be mentioned that the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wide to have judicial review of any order, though there is an alternate remedy available for the party concerned. However, while exercising such power, the Courts have evolved certain self-imposed restrictions, so as to decline to entertain the Writ Petitions, when there are alternate remedies available for the parties. However, while exercising such power, the Courts have evolved certain self-imposed restrictions, so as to decline to entertain the Writ Petitions, when there are alternate remedies available for the parties. But the said self-imposed restriction is not absolute so as to Apply the same universally in all the cases. It is also settled law that in appropriate cases, wherein, any such special circumstances such total lack of jurisdiction/barred by limitation, etc., this Court will not hesitate to exercise its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Applying this settled principles to the facts of the case, if the facts are analysed, it is crystal clear that the impugned order of attachment is totally without it is crystal clear that the impugned order of attachment is totally without jurisdiction as the property belonging to the Director cannot be attached for the dues of the Company. It is on this ground, I hold that this Writ Petition is maintainable. 8. Apart from that, this Writ Petition was admitted in the year 2005. At this length of time, on the ground of availability of alternate remedy, if this Writ Petition is dismissed and to drive the Petitioner to work out her remedy before the competent authority, it will not be in the interest of justice. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, 1970 (2) SCC 355 . Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable is only to be rejected. 9. The learned Counsel for the Respondents would further submit that by ingenious method, the Petitioner has made an attempt to evade the claim of the Corporation by creating property in the name of the Petitioner, to make it Appear as though the property has nothing to do with the Company. However, the said argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents has no substance in it. If it is the definite case of the Respondents that the property has been purchased by siphoning out the amount belonging to the Company or that the transaction under which the property comes to the hands of the Petitioner is sham and nominal, certainly, these disputed questions have to be resolved by the ESI Court. If it is the definite case of the Respondents that the property has been purchased by siphoning out the amount belonging to the Company or that the transaction under which the property comes to the hands of the Petitioner is sham and nominal, certainly, these disputed questions have to be resolved by the ESI Court. But, in the case on hand, the undisputed facts which I have narrated above, would go to show that the property was originally owned by the father-in-law of the Petitioner, from whom, she got 1/2 share of the same under the registered Will, which was also probated by this Court in the year 2000 itself i.e., long prior to the period when the amounts in question had fallen due. Similarly, 1/2 share in the same property was acquired by her husband under the Will, which later on, he transferred in the name of the Petitioner. Thus, there is nothing even to suggest that the property has got any semblance of connection with the Company. Therefore, the attachment of the said property is wholly without jurisdiction. 10. In the result, the Wirt Petitions are allowed and the impugned order of attachments are set aside, however, liberty is given to the Respondents to proceed against the properties of the Company in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, connected W.P.M.P. No.28612 of 2005 is closed.