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2010 DIGILAW 256 (GAU)

Ram Lakhan Sharma v. Union of India

2010-04-12

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2010
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. By this writ petition the writ Petitioner, Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force, is assailing the order of the disciplinary authority being No. P. VIII-1/99-EC. II dated 19.3.2000 imposing penalty of removal from service w.e.f. 19.3.2000(AN) under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 (A) of CRPF Rules 1955, the order of the appellate authority (Dy. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Patna (Bihar) being No. P.VIII-RLS(II)/2004-EC-I dated 22.7.04 rejecting the appeal filed by the writ Petitioner against the said order of the disciplinary authority dated 19.3.2000 and also the order of the Inspector General of Police, Bihar Sector, CRPF, Patna-14 (Bihar) rejecting the revision petition filed by the present Petitioner against the said order of the disciplinary authority dated 19.3.2000 and the order of the appellate authority dated 22.7.04. 2. Heard Ms. P. Dhar, learned Counsel appearing for the writ Petitioner and also the learned Asstt. S. G. of India appearing for the Respondents. 3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND San unnecessary details, brief fact leading to the filing of the present writ petition are recapitulated. The writ Petitioner was appointed to the post of Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (for short CRPF) w.e.f. 10.4.91; since then he was said to have discharged his duty faithfully and honestly to the satisfaction of his superior officers. On 23.10.99 one Smt. Gita Rani Paul lodged an Ejahar at the Airport Police Station alleging that the Petitioner had committed rape on her on 23.10.99 at about 10 A.M. at Chinaihani under Airport Police Station. On receipt of the said Ejahar, a criminal case was registered against the writ Petitioner and the machinery of investigation had been put into motion. Finally the Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet against the writ Petitioner for the offence under Section 376 IPC. 4. Vide order No. F.V.III-1/99-C-II dated 23.10.99 issued by the Commandant. 11 Bn CRPF the Petitioner was placed under suspension w.e.f. 23.10.99 in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against him. Vide office order No. P.VIII-1/99-EC-II dated 4.12.1999 charge sheet was communicated to the Petitioner for initiating a disciplinary enquiry against him. 4. Vide order No. F.V.III-1/99-C-II dated 23.10.99 issued by the Commandant. 11 Bn CRPF the Petitioner was placed under suspension w.e.f. 23.10.99 in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against him. Vide office order No. P.VIII-1/99-EC-II dated 4.12.1999 charge sheet was communicated to the Petitioner for initiating a disciplinary enquiry against him. The charges against the present writ Petitioner are as follows: Charge-I That the Petitioner while functioning as Constable (GD) has committed an offence of disobedience of order/misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force under Section 11(1) CRPF Act, 1949 in that he remained absent from lines from 0900 hrs. to 0930 hrs. on 23.10.1999 from DIGP CRPF Agartala Office complex without proper permission of competent authority with consent of his Guard Commander. Charge-II That the Petitioner while functioning as Constable (GD) has committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force under Section11(1) CRPF Act 1949 in that he tried to do sexual intercourse with an woman with mutual consent by giving money which is an act of indiscipline/moral turpitude as a member of the force. 5. Vide office order No. P-VIII-1/99-EC-II dated 18.12.99 the Commandant, 11 Bn. CRPF (disciplinary authority) appointed Shri S.S. Bisht, Second-in-Command, 11 BN CRPF as Enquiry Officer to conduct the said disciplinary enquiry for the charge framed against the Petitioner. Undisputedly no Presenting Officer was appointed for the said disciplinary enquiry against the Petitioner. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 15.01.2000 vide letter No. P. VIII-1/99-II-EC-2 dated 7.2.2000 stating that the charges against the writ Petitioner were held proved. The disciplinary authority, basing on the said enquiry report by his order No. P. VIII-1/99, EC-n dated 19.3.2000, imposed penalty of removal from service w.e.f. 19.3.2000 (AN) under Section 11(1)of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 (A) of the CRPF Rule, 1955 upon the writ Petitioner. 6. The disciplinary authority, basing on the said enquiry report by his order No. P. VIII-1/99, EC-n dated 19.3.2000, imposed penalty of removal from service w.e.f. 19.3.2000 (AN) under Section 11(1)of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 (A) of the CRPF Rule, 1955 upon the writ Petitioner. 6. In the meanwhile, the Sessions Judge, West Tripura District, after full length sessions trial against the writ Petitioner vide his judgment and order dated 20.9.2001 in Sessions Trial No. 127 (W/T/A) of 2000, discharged the writ Petitioner from the charges levelled against him under Section 376 IPC for the said incident and that the said judgment and order of the Sessions Judge, West Tripura District dated 20.9.2001 passed in Sessions Trial No. 127 (W/T/A) of 2000 for acquitting the writ Petitioner from the charge under Section 376 IPC, had attained finality inasmuch as no appeal had been preferred against the said judgment and order. After the Petitioner had been acquitted from the said charge under Section 376 IPC vide the said judgment and order of the Sessions Judge, West Tripura District dated 20.9.2001, he challenged the order of the disciplinary authority dated 19.3.2000 for imposing penalty of dismissal from service to the Petitioner before the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad by filing writ petition, which had been disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad vide order dated 20.5.04 directing the writ Petitioner to file appeal under CRPF Rule, 1955 before the authority concerned within two weeks and the appellate authority was further directed to decide the same by a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law within a period of one month thereafter. 7. Pursuant to the direction of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court dated 20.5.2004, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Dy. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Patna, Bihar, which was again dismissed vide order of the Dy. Inspector of Police, CRPF Patna, Bihar being No. P. VIII-RLS (II)/2004-EC-I dated 22.7.04. The Petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order of the appellate authority dated 22.7.04, preferred the revision petition before the Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Bihar Sector, Patna-14 (Bihar), which was again rejected vide office order No. R.XII-01 (RLS)/04-05. BS-EC-3 dated 2nd March, 2005. Inspector of Police, CRPF Patna, Bihar being No. P. VIII-RLS (II)/2004-EC-I dated 22.7.04. The Petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order of the appellate authority dated 22.7.04, preferred the revision petition before the Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Bihar Sector, Patna-14 (Bihar), which was again rejected vide office order No. R.XII-01 (RLS)/04-05. BS-EC-3 dated 2nd March, 2005. Being aggrieved by the said order of the disciplinary authority dated 19.3.2000 (order of the Commandant), the order of the appellate authority dated 22.7.04 and the order of the revisional authority (I.G.P.) dated 2.3.05 filed the present writ Petitioner for quashing those orders and also for a direction to the authorities to re-instate the Petitioner in the post held by him with all back wages. 8. The Respondents have filed affidavit-in-opposition wherein it is stated that all opportunities were afforded by the Enquiry Officer to the writ Petitioner to defend his case; the writ Petitioner pleaded guilty for the charges levelled against him and also that even acquittal in the criminal case does not entail automatic re-instatement. 9. This Court directed the learned Asstt. S.G. appearing for the Respondents to make available the proceedings of the disciplinary enquiry against the Petitioner. On perusal of the proceedings, it is crystal clear that no Presenting Officer was appointed in the said proceedings and the Enquiry Officer himself led the examination in-chief of the prosecution witness by putting questions. This fact is not disputed by the learned Asstt. S.G. appearing for the Respondents, but his only submission is that all opportunities were given to the writ Petitioner to put up his defense case and also the writ Petitioner had pleaded guilty for both the charges levelled against him. 10. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the Enquiry Officer acted himself as Prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary enquiry against the writ Petitioner. From this admitted fact, it may not be wrong to infer that there were no fair procedures in the disciplinary proceedings as a result of which principle of natural justice was undisputedly denied to the writ Petitioner. 11. From this admitted fact, it may not be wrong to infer that there were no fair procedures in the disciplinary proceedings as a result of which principle of natural justice was undisputedly denied to the writ Petitioner. 11. This Court (incidentally myself) in Mutum Shantikumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 2005 (1) GLT 413 held that though Rule 27 of CRPF Rules, 1955 is silent on appointment or non-appointment of Presenting Officer; it does not expressly exclude application of principle of natural justice and fair procedures; and the principles of natural justice have to be read into rules unless law expressly or by necessary implication excludes application of principles of natural justice, and further held that non-appointment of Presenting Officer amounts to violation of principle of natural justice and in that given case appointment of Presenting Officer is a must in the disciplinary proceedings against the CRPF Constable. Paras 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the GET in Mutum Shantikumar Singh case (supra) read as follows: 5. From the bare perusal of the Rule-27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955, it is clear that Rule-27 does not bar the competent authority from appointing a presenting officer in the disciplinary proceedings for holding the same in a fair manner in compliance with the requirement of the principle of natural justice, principle of which, are being discussed in the following paras, and Rule 27 is completely silent about the appointment or non-appointment of the presenting officer in the disciplinary proceedings. 6. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) had discussed the scope and object of natural justice and its applicability to administrative enquiry in A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 held that the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it, para 20 (of AIR) in A.K. Kraipak (supra) is quoted hereunder: 20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent year. In the past it was thought that it include just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alter am partum). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that it is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal 1 No. 990 of 1968, D/-15.7.1968=( AIR 1969 SC 198 the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. 7. The Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 81 had discussed the applicability of principles of natural justice in the departmental enquiry and held that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7 (2). (Punjab National Bank Officer Employee's (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 though it is silent on this aspect Para-19 (of SCC) in Punjab National Bank and Ors. (supra) is quoted hereunder: 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7 (2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reason for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 8. The Apex Court in State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees' Association v. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in (2001) 1 SCC 610 took the similar view that "the requirements of natural justice will be read into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication." Paras-27 and 28 (of SCC) in State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees 'Assn. (supra) are quoted hereunder: 27. Houseless Harijan Employees' Association v. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in (2001) 1 SCC 610 took the similar view that "the requirements of natural justice will be read into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication." Paras-27 and 28 (of SCC) in State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees 'Assn. (supra) are quoted hereunder: 27. This Court has consistently held that the requirements of natural justice will be read into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. 28. In the case of Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha this Court said (SCC p. 461 para 8): It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intent to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by the necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the provision concerned the principles of natural justice. 9. The Apex Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors., reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 held that the object of the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. Doctrine of natural justice is incapable of exact definition. However, it is synonymous with fairness. Compliance or non-compliance therewith has to be examined on the totality of the facts and circumstances in each case. In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court held that there is violation of the principles of natural justice in the departmental enquiry because of non-appointment of the presenting officer. The relevant portion of para-22 in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra) is quoted hereunder: 22. The sixty-five page report has been sent to the Managing Director of the Nigam against the Petitioner recording therein that the charges against him stand proved what is the basis? Was the enquiry officer justified in coming to such a conclusion on the basis of the charge-sheet only? The sixty-five page report has been sent to the Managing Director of the Nigam against the Petitioner recording therein that the charges against him stand proved what is the basis? Was the enquiry officer justified in coming to such a conclusion on the basis of the charge-sheet only? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative, if the records have been considered, the immediate necessity would be to consider as to who is the person who has produced the same and the next issue could be as regards the nature of the records unfortunately there is not a whisper in the rather longish report in that regard. Where is the presenting officer? Where is the notice fixing the date of hearing? Where is the list of witnesses? What has happened to the defence witnesses? All these questions arise but unfortunately no answer is to be found in the rather longish report. But if one does not have it can it be termed to be in consonance with the concept of justice or the same tantamounts to a total miscarriage of justice. 12. This Court in Baharul Islam (CT) v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2001 (1) GLT 621 held that in a disciplinary proceeding against a CRPF constable wherein the Enquiry Officer himself examined the witnesses and exhibited documents, is a proceeding proceeded in clear violation of the principle of natural justice and fair procedure. Paras 3 and 4 of the GLT in Baharul Islam's case (supra) reads as follows: 3. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the disciplinary authority did not appoint any presenting officer nor informed the Petitioner that he is entitled to engage defence assistance on his choice and that he has every right to defend his case but on the other hand the enquiry was conducted in one sided and as such, the impugned order dated 20.2.95 and 25.4.95 passed by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are liable to be set aside and quashed. Learned Counsel for the Respondents on the other hand submitted that Rule 27 of the CRPF Rule 1995 does not visualize appointing of defence assistance nor of presenting officer and that the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer and affirmed by the Respondent No. 2 was strictly of the provision of the CRPF rules as aforesaid. 4. Learned Counsel for the Respondents on the other hand submitted that Rule 27 of the CRPF Rule 1995 does not visualize appointing of defence assistance nor of presenting officer and that the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer and affirmed by the Respondent No. 2 was strictly of the provision of the CRPF rules as aforesaid. 4. I have perused the writ petition as well as the documents and affidavit filed by the Respondents. It is settled law that even if the rules does not provide for appointment of presenting officer giving of opportunity to defence and proper information to the Petitioner to defend himself and to appoint the defence assistance of his choice. The disciplinary authority should at least afford opportunity to the Petitioner to defend himself in a proper manner keeping in view the fundamental principle of natural justice. In (1994) 5 SCC 267 a law laid down (text missing) Apex Court regarding principle of natural justice is applicable to the instant case. In Dr. Rash Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar in said case the Apex Court has also down principle of natural justice which as follows: So also in Dr. Rajyamalla Buzarbarua v. The Assam Administrative Tribunal and Ors. 1983 LAB 1.C. 1839 this Court held as follows: ... It appears that the Enquiry Officer himself questioned the delinquent officer before he inspected the documents he wanted to inspect. On the day of enquiry also it was the Enquiry Officer alone who put all the questions to the Petitioner. The delinquent officer was not asked as to whether he liked to examine witnesses in defence. No witnesses having been examined there was no question of the delinquent officer being given any opportunity to cross-examine. When an oral hearing is given in a disciplinary proceeding the authorities must be careful to give the delinquent officer opportunity to comment on any adverse statement. In an oral hearing the Tribunal must (a) consider all relevant evidence which a party wishes to submit; (b) inform every party of all the evidence to be taken on account. Whether derived from any party or independent; (c) allow witnesses to be questioned; (d) allow comment on the evidence and documents on the whole case was observed in R v. Dy. Industrial Commr. Ex parte Moore (1965) 1 B 456. Whether derived from any party or independent; (c) allow witnesses to be questioned; (d) allow comment on the evidence and documents on the whole case was observed in R v. Dy. Industrial Commr. Ex parte Moore (1965) 1 B 456. The right to call and examine witnesses is, therefore, as a general rule, of the procedure required by natural justice. This may also be said to be the requirement of reasonable opportunity envisaged in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and spelled out in Rule 9 of the Rules. Rule 5 (5) of Rule 9 envisages the presenting officer to present the case of the disciplinary authority and government servant to present the case of the delinquent officer. The Inquiring Authority shall consider such documentary evidence and such oral evidence as may be relevant material and the Government servant to be entitled to cross-examine witnesses examined in support of the charges and in support of the charges shall be entitled to cross-examine the Government servant and the witnesses examined in his defence. If the Inquiring Authority declines to examine any witness or to admit any document in evidence on the ground that his evidence or such document is not relevant or material, it shall record its reasons in writing. The Inquiring Authority is also to prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore; and the Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge as required by Sub-rule (9). On perusal of the records of the inquiry it appears that these rules were not at all followed in case of the Petitioner. There was, therefore, palpable violation of the Rules. This also tentamounted to the violation of the principles of natural justice there having been no evidence, oral or documentary, produced at the enquiry and the delinquent officer having not been given any opportunity to explain.... So also in Inspector General of Police, Bhubaneswar and Anr. v. Sukanta Kumar Nayak of Orissa 1993 LAB I.C. 521 High Court held as follows: ... The next question is whether providing of opportunity to have a defence assistant is a part of natural justice. It is well settled that the requirements of natural justice cannot be put in a strait jacket. v. Sukanta Kumar Nayak of Orissa 1993 LAB I.C. 521 High Court held as follows: ... The next question is whether providing of opportunity to have a defence assistant is a part of natural justice. It is well settled that the requirements of natural justice cannot be put in a strait jacket. They vary from case to case and circumstances to circumstances. They may also vary from person to person. All that has to be seen in this regard its that a delinquent is provided with a reasonable opportunity of defending himself. It is well known that every man does not have the ability to defend himself. He cannot bring out a point in his favour or the weakness in the other side. He may be tongue tied or nervous confused or wanting in intelligence. He cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses. If justice is to be done, he ought to have the help of someone to speak for him. This is how Lord Denning, M.R. thought in Pett v. Groyhound Racing Association (1968) 2 WLR 1471. It would be appropriate to refer in this connection to C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1972 SC 2178 (1972 Lab IC 1049) where the Court observed in paragraph 16 that the rule laid down in Pett's case had not commended itself to that Court. But then, a different note was struck in paragraph 12 of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 109 (1983 Lab IC 419). It may be stated that in Pett's case or, for that matter, in the two aforesaid case of the Apex Court, the question for consideration was regarding representation of the delinquent in the domestic enquiry by a counsel, whereas we are not considering in the present case such a question. Even so, we may point out that in Dilip Kumar, after referring to the case of C.L. Subramaniam (supra). It was stated in paragraph 12 that-- We have reached a stage in our onward march to fairplay in action that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner, the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated.... 13. 13. One golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Apex Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 24 held that: while it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law Courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most-accepted methodology of a government action. 14. The Apex Court in Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 held that the principles of natural justice will have to be read into Regulation. The Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 does not require an opportunity of being heard being given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiring authority once the enquiring authority had given hearing to them. The Apex Court further held that even the regulation does not require to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent, the opportunity should be given in compliance with the principles of natural justice to the delinquent officer when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the enquiring officer. Paras 7 and 19 of the SCC read as follows: 7. Paras 7 and 19 of the SCC read as follows: 7. The only contention urged by Shri V.R. Reddy, learned Senior counsel for the Appellant, was that the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 (for short "the Regulations") did not require an opportunity of being heard being given to the delinquent officers when the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the enquiring authority once the enquiring authority had given a hearing to them. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel that the requirement of giving such a hearing could not be read into the said Regulations and no prejudice could be said to have been caused to the Respondents inasmuch as the enquiring authority had given full opportunity to them. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 15. The Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 held that departmental proceeding is quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a qusi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties even if the delinquent pleaded guilty or/he made the confession that he committed the charges levelled against him. Paras 15, 16 and 17 of the SCC in Roop Singh Negi's case (supra) read as follows: 15. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties even if the delinquent pleaded guilty or/he made the confession that he committed the charges levelled against him. Paras 15, 16 and 17 of the SCC in Roop Singh Negi's case (supra) read as follows: 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the Appellant before the police. According to the Appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The Appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. 16. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel it was held: (AIR pp. 369-70, paras 22-23). 22....... The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the Appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the Respondent. 23. That takes us to the merits of the Respondent's contention that the conclusion of the Appellant that the third charge framed against the Respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. 23. That takes us to the merits of the Respondent's contention that the conclusion of the Appellant that the third charge framed against the Respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the Appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the Appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the Respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the Respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the Respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the Respondent's grievance is well founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the Appellant's order dismissing the Respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence. 17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 492 para 17). 17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. 17. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 492 para 17). 17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded there from. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken in its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. 16. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the disciplinary proceedings against the present writ Petitioner is vitiated because of the vice mentioned above, i.e. non-appointment of Presenting Officer and complete violation of principles of natural justice as well as principle of fair procedure in a quasi-judicial proceeding. Therefore, this Court has no alternative except to interfere with the impugned orders dated 19.3.2000, 22.7.04 and 2.03.2005. Accordingly the impugned orders are set aside. 17. Now the question arises is -- from what stage of the disciplinary proceedings, if at all necessary, is to be initiated? The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that departmental enquiry should be started from the stage where illegality had been crept in. In the instant case illegality started from the stage of non-appointment of the Presenting Officer. Accordingly, the departmental enquiry, if at all necessary to be initiated afresh against the writ Petitioner, should be started from the stage of appointment of the Presenting Officer. 18. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the writ Petitioner to his service within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order. Accordingly, the departmental enquiry, if at all necessary to be initiated afresh against the writ Petitioner, should be started from the stage of appointment of the Presenting Officer. 18. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the writ Petitioner to his service within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order. If the departmental proceeding is required to be started afresh, the Petitioner shall be placed under suspension and during the period of suspension, subsistence allowance should be paid to the Petitioner. It is left to the wisdom of the authority to decide arrear pay and allowances of the writ Petitioner. 19. This writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Petition allowed