JUDGMENT 1. Both these Letters Patent Appeals are filed by Union of India, by which, order passed by learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 dated 26.6.2008 and order passed in Civil Application No.11373 of 2008 in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 dated 26.9.2008 are under challenge. 2. Since both these appeals arise out of Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 and Civil Application No.11373 of 2008, Letters Patent Appeals are taken up together and learned counsel appearing for the parties have been heard accordingly. 3. It is the case of Union of India that the appellant herein was not joined as party respondent in the above mentioned Special Civil Application filed by respondent No.1-(Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd.) herein being petitioner of that writ petition challenging the notice issued by the Mamlatdar and Collector, District: Vadodara for recovery of dues of Union of India as arrears of land revenue. Though, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were enforcing the recovery as arrears of land revenue, since the order passed by the competent authority of Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers and Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals under Drug (Price Control) Order (for short 'DPCO') remained unpaid and no remedy was exhausted by the respondent No.1-ASE and the original petitioner. Inspite of the above fact, on 26.6.2008 upon a statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner following order came to be passed (Coram: Hon'ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari): “Notice returnable on 7.7.2008. Mr.Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate with Ms.Megha Jani, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that the petitioner will pay the outstanding amount as per the notice dated 6.5.2008, which amounts to approximately Rs.7,90,23,008/-, within a period of three months from today, and an Undertaking to that effect shall be filed in this Court, within a period of one week from today, subject to the right of the petitioner to challenge the order dated 31.7.2007 of the Government of India under the Drug (Price Control) Order. In the light of the above statement made by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, interim relief in terms of Paragraph-25(c) of the petition is granted till the next date of hearing. Direct Service of this order is permitted.” 3.1. In the light of the above statement made by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, interim relief in terms of Paragraph-25(c) of the petition is granted till the next date of hearing. Direct Service of this order is permitted.” 3.1. It appears that later on respondent No.1-ASE preferred Special Civil Application No.9066 of 2008 and 9067 of 2008 challenging demand notices dated 10th October 1995, 22nd February 2004, 26th May 2006, 22nd October 2005, 31st July 2007 and 26th January 2006 issued by the competent authority of the Appellant-Ministry. However, on 8.7.2008 learned Single Judge (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jayant Patel) heard both the above petitions, though admitted, refused interim relief by a speaking order. 4. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied by above order, two Letters Patent Appeal being 735 of 2008 with Special Civil Application No.8493 of 2008 and Letters Patent Appeal No.736 of 2008 with Civil Application No.8494 of 2008 were filed by the petitioner and respondent No.1-ASE herein, where ex-parte ad-interim relief was prayed and the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 24.7.2008 issued notice for final disposal and granted ad-interim relief on condition that appellants-Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. (ASE) of those appeals to deposit principal amount in both the cases. The orders dated 24.7.2008 passed by Hon'ble the Actg. Chief Justice and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.H.Waghela reads as under: “Notice for final disposal returnable on 8th September 2008. Till then, there shall be ad-interim stay of the demand of Rs.6,76,09,865/- pursuant to the communication dated 27.1.2006 at Annexure- A to the petition, on condition that the petitioner deposits the principal amount of Rs.2,05,35,575-04ps. with the respondent – authority by 31st August 2008. Direct service is permitted.” “Notice for final disposal returnable on 8th September 2008. Till then, there shall be ad-interim stay of the demand of Rs.84,13,143/- pursuant to the communications dated 25.2.1999 at Annexure-H, 26.5.2005 at Annexure-J and 22.10.2005 at Annexure-L to the petition, on condition that the petitioner deposits the principal amount of Rs.30,30,230/- with the respondent – authority by 31st August 2008. Direct service is permitted.” 5. It is to be noted that on the very say day i.e. on 24.7.2008 it was mentioned before learned Single Judge (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Direct service is permitted.” 5. It is to be noted that on the very say day i.e. on 24.7.2008 it was mentioned before learned Single Judge (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Akil Kureshi) that in view of the above orders passed in Letters Patent Appeals and some would have barrings on the interim order passed on 26.6.2008 and three post dated cheques were given to Special Recovery Officer, the following order dated 24.7.2008 came to be passed which reads as under: “Learned advocate Ms.Jani for the petitioner pointed out the order dated 26.6.2008 passed by the learned single Judge in the present petition and stated that the learned Judge had granted conditional stay in favour of the petitioner upon the petitioner depositing certain amounts with the authorities subject to the right of the petitioner to challenge the order dated 31.7.07 of the Government of India (from which the liability of the petitioner to pay the outstanding dues flows). She stated that today, a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.735 and 736 of 2008 has granted conditional stay against the order of the Government dated 31.7.07. She submitted that this would have bearing on the interim order passed on 26.6.08. She pointed out that the petitioner has given three post dated cheques to the Special Recovery Officer all dated 25.7.2008. The petitioner may bring all these facts on record including the order passed by the Division Bench. Since there is shortage of time, till it is done, the Special Recovery Officer is prevented from depositing the cheques for realization. Shri S.M.Padharia, Deputy Mamlatdar and Special Recovery Officer, who is present in Court shall carry out these directions. S.O. to 31st July 2008.” 6. Once again another Civil Application for amendment was moved being Civil Application No.8980 of 2008 after granting the amendment as prayed for and respondents were directed not to deposit the cheques for realization till further orders. However, request of the petitioner for shifting the attachment from the land in question was not accepted. 6.1. Meanwhile respondent No.1 herein (ASE) filed a Civil Application for seeking clarification of the order dated 26.6.2008 passed in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 and after hearing the parties learned Single Judge passed order dated 26.9.2008 and in the above Civil Application learned Single Judge (Coram: Hon'ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari) passed the following order. 6.1. Meanwhile respondent No.1 herein (ASE) filed a Civil Application for seeking clarification of the order dated 26.6.2008 passed in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 and after hearing the parties learned Single Judge passed order dated 26.9.2008 and in the above Civil Application learned Single Judge (Coram: Hon'ble Smt. Justice Abhilasha Kumari) passed the following order. “In the above background, as the Union of India is not a party-respondent in the application or the petition, the Court could not have heard the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India before passing the said orders. The order dated 26.6.2008 passed by this Court in the writ petition is an interim order and is subject to the final outcome of the petition. I agree with the submission made by the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India to the extent that the order dated 26.6.2008 is clear and unambiguous. The operative part of the order granting interim relief has been passed upon the statement being made by Mr.Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate, after arguments were addressed by the learned counsel for the respective parties. As the Union of India is/ was not a party-respondent, Mr.Harin P.Raval was neither present nor privy to the arguments advanced before the Court. The learned Senior Advocate made a statement to the effect that the petitioner shall pay the outstanding amount as per the notice dated 6.5.2008, and that an Undertaking to that effect shall be filed in this Court within a period of one week from the date of the order, subject to the right of the applicant-petitioner to challenge the order dated 31.7.2007 of the Government of India. As understood by this Court, the order mentioned in the statement could be challenged in any legally permissible manner, such as by filing a petition and/or making a prayer for interim relief. No other clarification of the order dated 26.6.2008 is necessary, other than this.(emphasis supplied) At this stage, Mr.Harin P.Raval, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, prays that this order may be stayed for some time. Since the order is only clarificatory in nature, I do not consider it necessary to accede to this request. The Civil Application is disposed of, in the above terms.” 7. Since the order is only clarificatory in nature, I do not consider it necessary to accede to this request. The Civil Application is disposed of, in the above terms.” 7. In view of the aforementioned facts, learned counsel for appellant-Union of India contended that challenge in the Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 was the notice for proclamation of sale of property belonging to respondent No.1 herein issued by Mamlatdar, Vadodara City under various provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code. By exercise of powers under provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code under Section 154, 155, 165 and 200 of the above Code, the authority was enforcing the recovery of dues of Union of India as arrears of land revenue and undertaking was to be filed by the petitioner-ASE as per statement made by learned counsel on his behalf. But for the statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Single Judge would not have granted interim relief in terms of para 25(c) of the said petition, by which, impugned notices for sale of immovable property and proclamation in this regard by respondent No.3 came to be stayed. It is submitted that having obtained the order on the basis of the statement made as reflected in the order dated 26.6.2008 in subsequent proceedings, being Special Civil Application Nos. 9066 of 2008 and 9067 of 2008 challenged the order of the authority under Drug Price Control Order where no relief was granted. However, the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeals with Civil Applications granted conditional ad-interim relief staying the demand, if the appellant deposited principal amount in both the above cases. However, it is submitted that the orders passed in Letters Patent Appeals by Division Bench on 24.7.2008 would not absolve the petitioner from filing an undertaking as assured to the learned Single Judge on 26.6.2008 in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008. However, it is submitted that the orders passed in Letters Patent Appeals by Division Bench on 24.7.2008 would not absolve the petitioner from filing an undertaking as assured to the learned Single Judge on 26.6.2008 in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008. It is further submitted that when proclamation of sale and notices were issued under Sections 165 and 200 of Bombay Land Revenue Code even granting conditional stay of recovery of dues of Union of India on the basis of filing an undertaking and to pay the amount within a period of three months, subject to challenge the base order of competent authority of Union of India dated 31.7.2008 is also illegal and recovery of dues of Union of India as arrears of revenue under Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 by Mamlatdar, Vadodara ought not to have been stayed only on mere assurance or on the basis of a statement made by learned counsel on behalf of petitioner and therefore, also impugned order is illegal. It is further contended that in the matter of recovery of revenue dues, when the orders of the authority of Union of India remained confirmed, grant of stay by learned Single Judge in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not warranted. 8. It is next contended that So far as, second order passed in Civil Application No.11373 of 2008 in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 on 26.9.2008 a clarifying order is concerned it is also uncalled for. It is also contended that the above clarificatory order is passed without considering the submissions made by learned counsel on behalf of Union of India and, therefore also it deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for Union of India has also voiced his grievances against the clarificatory order dated 26.9.2008 on the ground that there was no necessity to entertain Civil Application No.11373 of 2008 for seeking clarification on earlier order dated 26.6.2008 particularly when Coordinate Bench herein in main petition against the base order on 31st July, 2007 came to be rejected in Special Civil Application Nos. 9066 of 2008 and 9067 of 2008. Therefore, according to learned counsel for Union of India-appellant these appeals with orders dated 26.6.2008 and 26.9.2008 passed in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 deserve to be quashed and set aside. 9. 9066 of 2008 and 9067 of 2008. Therefore, according to learned counsel for Union of India-appellant these appeals with orders dated 26.6.2008 and 26.9.2008 passed in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 deserve to be quashed and set aside. 9. Shri Mihir Thakore, learned senior counsel with Ms. Megha Jani, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and original petitioner submitted that statement made on 26.6.2008 by learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner was not absolute and undertaking to pay the outstanding dues was to be filed subject to challenge the base order passed by the authority-Union of India under Drug Price Control Order dated 31.7.2007 and, therefore, upon challenge to the said order in Special Civil Application Nos.9066 of 2008 and 9067 of 2008, when interim relief was refused and when Letters Patent Appeals were preferred the Division Bench of this Court granted ad-interim relief on 24.7.2008 and, therefore, the respondent No.1 and the original petitioner was justified in not filing an undertaking. It is further submitted that the Company is trying to repay its debts to all its creditors and if any adverse order is passed at this stage, it will not be able to sustain additional financial disturbance and efforts of rehabilitating the Company would go in vain. The Company according to learned counsel for respondent No.1 has always acted bonafidely and never tried to avoid any payment of any statutory dues. Since the Company has deposited principal amount of liability under 'DPCO 1979' as directed by Division Bench in two appeals, prayer of appellant's to quash and set aside impugned orders dated 26.6.2008 and 26.9.2008 in Special Civil Application 8580 of 2008 deserves to be rejected. 10. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of record of the case, we are of the opinion that by granting interim relief vide order dated 26.6.2008, learned Judge had virtually allowed writ petition, even though none of the circumstances for consideration for grant of interim relief did ever exist. 10. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of record of the case, we are of the opinion that by granting interim relief vide order dated 26.6.2008, learned Judge had virtually allowed writ petition, even though none of the circumstances for consideration for grant of interim relief did ever exist. The petitioner who had not paid outstanding dues as per order passed by competent authority of Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers and Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals was facing recovery of dues of Union of India which remained unpaid and, therefore, certificates were issued by the competent authority of Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers and Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals to recover such dues as arrears of land revenue and pursuant to that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 issued notices under Section 154 and 200 of Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. The above step taken by the revenue authorities under land revenue code was a last measure by which dues of Union of India could be recovered and realized. The amount as per impugned notice was Rs. 7,96,25,008/-. The above dues were ordered not to be recovered by granting interim relief in terms of para 25 (c) which reads as under: “That pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay proclamation and notice for sale of immovable property issued by Respondent No.3 dated 27.5.2008 ( at Annexure a to this petition) and letter dated 13.6.2008 issued by Respondent No.3 (at Annexure B to this petition) and be pleased to direct Respondent No. 2 and 3 herein not to hold any sale on 30.6.2008 of the property of this petitioner as proclaimed.” 11. Thus, it was only a statement of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and there was no security or protection of dues of Government sought to be recovered by way of arrears of land revenue. None of celebrated principles for granting relief according to us was satisfied, namely prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Therefore, according to us by passing the above order at the time of issuance of notice to respondents learned Single Judge has virtually accepted the main relief of the petitioner and allowing the petition. 12. Therefore, according to us by passing the above order at the time of issuance of notice to respondents learned Single Judge has virtually accepted the main relief of the petitioner and allowing the petition. 12. It is trite that in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court has time and again sounded a note of caution to High Courts in a case of granting interim relief practically giving principal relief sought in petition for mere reason that prima facie case has been made out and particularly in a case where matters of public revenue are concerned and interim relief is prayed for in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the action of authorities of the Government the Apex Court in the case of Assistance Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors. [AIR 1985 SC page 330]. relying on earlier decisions of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [ AIR 1983 SC 603 ], Union of India v. Oswal Woolen Mills Ltd. [ AIR 1984 SC 1264 ] etc. in para 5 held as under: “We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim order which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other relevant considerations. Regarding the practice of some clever litigants of resorting to filing writ petitions in far away courts having doubtful jurisdiction, we had this to observe” ....Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The writ petitioners however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port. An inevitable result of the filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest. An inevitable result of the filing of writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in the State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi. But we do feel disturbed that such writ petitions are often deliberately filed in distant High Courts as part of a manoeuvre in a legal battle, so as to render it difficult for the officials at Delhi to move applicants to vacate stay where it becomes necessary to file such applications.” In Union of India v. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. (supra), Chandrachud, CJ. A.P.Sen, R.N.Misra JJ, allowed an appeal against an interim order making the following observations: “After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties, we are of the opinion that the interim order passed by the High Court on Nov. 29, 1983 is not warranted since it virtually grants to the respondents a substantial part of the relief claimed by them in their writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside the said order.” We have come across cases where the collection of public revenue has been seriously jeopardized and budgets of Governments and Local Authorities affirmatively prejudiced to the point of precariousness consequent upon interim orders made by courts. In fact, instances have come to our knowledge where Governments have been forced to explore further sources for raising revenue, sources which they would rather well leave alone in the public interest, because of the stays granted by courts. We have come across cases where an entire Service is left in a stay of flutter and unrest because of interim orders passed by courts, leaving the work they are supposed to do in a state of suspended animation. We have come across cases where buses and lorries are being run under orders of court though they were either denied permits or their permits had been cancelled or suspended by Trnsport Authorities. We have come across cases where liquor shops are being run under interim orders of court. We have come across cases where buses and lorries are being run under orders of court though they were either denied permits or their permits had been cancelled or suspended by Trnsport Authorities. We have come across cases where liquor shops are being run under interim orders of court. We have come across cases where the collection of monthly rentals payable by Excise Contractors has been stayed with the result that at the end of the year the contracter has paid nothing but made his profits from the shop and walked out. We have come across cases where dealers in food grains and essential commodities have been allowed to take back the stocks seized from them as if to permit them to continue to indulge in the very practices which were to be prevented by the seizure. We have come across cases where land reform and important welfare legislations have been stayed by courts. Incalculable harm has been done by such interim orders. All this is not to say that interim orders may never be made against public authorities. There are of course cases which demand that interim orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about to be perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and given appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizon's faith in the impartiality of public administration, a Court may well be justified in granting interim relief against public authority. But since the law presumes that public authorities function properly and bona fide with due regard to the public interest a court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative, burdensome inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that the parties have come to the Court alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of the public interest. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of the public interest. There are many such factors worthy of consideration. We often wonder why in the case (of) indirect taxation where the burden has already been passed on to the consumer, any interim relief should at all be given to the manufacturer, dealer and the like.” After considering relevant facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court in the penultimate part held as under: “Even assuming that the company had established a prima facie case, about which we do not express any opinion, we do not think that it was sufficient justification for granting the interim orders as was done by the High Court. There was no question of any balance of convenience being in favour of the respondent-Company. The balance of convenience was certainly in favour of the Government of India. Governments are not run on mere Bank Guarantees. We notice that very often some courts act as if furnishing a Bank Guarantee would meet the ends of justice. No governmental business or for that matter no business of any kind can be run on mere Bank Guarantees. Liquid cash is necessary for the running of a Government as indeed any other enterprise. We consider that where matters of public revenue are concerned, it is of utmost importance to realise that interim orders ought not to be granted merely because a prima facie case has been shown. More is required. The balance of convenience must be clearly in favour of the making of an interim order and there should not be the slightest indication of a likelihood of prejudice to the public interest. We are very sorry to remark that these considerations have not been borne in mind by the High Court and interim order of this magnitude had been granted for the mere asking. The appeal is allowed with costs.” 13. Therefore, it is clear that even on condition of furnishing bank guarantee, surety or undertaking, grant of interim relief, stay in recovery of revenue dues, ordinarily, is not permitted. The appeal is allowed with costs.” 13. Therefore, it is clear that even on condition of furnishing bank guarantee, surety or undertaking, grant of interim relief, stay in recovery of revenue dues, ordinarily, is not permitted. No extraordinary circumstances did exist in this case for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner. 14. We find that against the impugned order and notice of auction under Section 203 of Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, appeal is available and, therefore, also the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to have been exercised. As per Section 178, application can be filed to set aside sale and under any circumstances as per provisions under Section 203 appeal shall lie from any order passed by a revenue officer to his superior. Besides impugned notice issued by respondent No.3 under Section 154, 165 and 200 of Bombay Land Revenue Code were towards outstanding dues of Government of India under DPCO and the petitioner was duty bound to join Union of India as party respondent inasmuch as acceptance of any of the prayer of the petitioner as prayed in para 25 of the writ petition certainly would have affected order and certificate of the recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue would have made efforts of the authorities unsuccessful. Thus, the impugned order dated 26.6.2008 is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court in the above decision and well settled principles of grant of interim relief and without proper parties being joined by the petitioner is illegal and accordingly deserves to be set aside. 15. On the same premises and reasons, the clarificatory order dated 26.9.2008 being consequential order also deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. Since proceedings arising out of subsequent writ petitions in the form of Letters Patent Appeals are pending before this Court, we refrain from making further observations with regard to subsequent orders passed in Letters Patent Appeals preferred against the orders passed by learned Single Judge in common order dated 8.7.2009 in Special Civil Applications No. 9066 and 9067 of 2008 and we set aside the impugned orders dated 26.6.2008 passed in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008 and order dated 26.9.2008 passed in Civil Application No.11373 of 2008 in Special Civil Application No.8580 of 2008. 17. 17. Both the appeals and Civil Applications are allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute. No costs. At this stage, Mr.Mihir Thakore, Senior Advocate appearing with Ms.Megha Jani, learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.1 requested to extend the interim relief granted earlier for another period of 8 weeks. In the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons aforesaid, we are not inclined to grant such interim relief.