JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shri Kant Tripathi, J.—Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and the learned AGA and also perused the record. 2. This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings of Complaint Case Nos. 2356 of 2003 (Vipin Kumar v. Yogendra) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, P.S. Kotwali, District Jaunpur pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 was not maintainable. It was further submitted that the respondent No. 2 on receiving the information that the cheque tendered by him to the Bank had been dishonoured for want of adequate fund in the account of respondent No. 2, sent the legal notice to the applicant on 26.11.2002 by registered post, which was properly served on the applicant but respondent No. 2 did not file any complaint within the statutory period. The respondent No. 2 served a second notice dated 1.5.2003 on the applicant by registered post and on the basis of that notice, he has filed the present complaint case. The learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that it was open to the respondent No. 2 to file a complaint on the basis of the first notice within the stipulated period but when he failed to file the same within the stipulated period after the service of the first notice, he had no authority to file the complaint by serving the second notice. 4. The learned AGA on the other hand submitted that the respondent No. 2, after service of the first notice on the applicant tendered the cheque in the Bank on 7.4.2003 and the Bank again informed him on 25.4.2003 that the amount was not payable for want of adequate fund, therefore, the second notice was valid. 5. The Apex Court has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhvan Sunil Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 514 and propounded the relevant principles of law in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment, which are being reproduced below: “6. 5. The Apex Court has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhvan Sunil Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 514 and propounded the relevant principles of law in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment, which are being reproduced below: “6. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action” means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act. (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. If we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term ‘cause of action’ certainly each of the above fact would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two Sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises-can arise - only once. 7. The combined reading of the above two Sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises-can arise - only once. 7. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action there are other formidable impediments which negates the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque there can be only one offence and Such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the provision of Section 138 That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file one. At a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again. 8. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept of successive causes of action is that it will make the period of limitation under clause (c) of Section 142 otiose, for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the drawer, can circumvent the above limitative clause by filing a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that the every part should have effect the above conclusion cannot be drawn, for, that will make the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory. 9. Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. 9. Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. Having given our anxious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonized with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right - and not cause of action - accrues in his favour. He may, therefor, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But, once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 he forfeits such right, for, in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires.” 6. Therefore, the cause of action to file the complaint arose on service of the first legal notice. When the respondent No. 2 failed to file the complaint within the stipulated period after service of the first notice then the right to file complaint stood extinguished on expiry of the limitation. The right to file complaint by serving the second notice did not accrue in favour of the respondent No. 2. It was no doubt open to the respondent No. 2 to place the cheque in the Bank for encashment even after service of the first notice but that does not mean that the respondent got another ground to serve any subsequent legal notice and file the complaint. In my opinion, the complaint in such a situation was not maintainable. 7. The petition is allowed and the proceedings of the Complaint Case Nos. In my opinion, the complaint in such a situation was not maintainable. 7. The petition is allowed and the proceedings of the Complaint Case Nos. 2356 of 2003 (Vipin Kumar v. Yogendra) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, P.S. Kotwali, District Jaunpur pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur are quashed. —————