JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. Writ Petition No. 3114 of 2010 was connected with Writ Petition No. 21442 of 2010. It is also on the same facts and is between the same parties. Sri Kunal Ravi Singh, Advocate in Writ Petition No. 21442 of 2010 on 16.8.2010 had adopted the arguments made in Writ Petition No. 3114 of 2010 by Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner therein, hence both the writ petitions are being decided together. 3. The petitioner has filed writ petition No. 3114 of 2010, Avinash Chandra Srivastava v. Smt. Kiran Srivastava, for quashing the judgment and order dated 8.1.2010 in Civil Revision No. 262 of 2007 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Allahabad as well as the judgment and decree dated 9.5.2007 in S.C.C. Suit No. 34 of 1999 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Allahabad. 4. By judgment and decree dated 9.5.2007,the Judge Small Causes Court decreed SCC Suit No. 34 of 1999 by directing the tenant petitioner to vacate and handover peaceful possession of the accommodation in question under his tenancy within a period of two months to the landlady. The Revisional Court in its judgment and order dated 8.1.2010 has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 9.5.2007 passed by the Judge Small Causes Court,Allahabad. 5. Writ petition No. 21442 of 2010, Avinash Chandra Srivastava v. Smt. Kiran Srivastava, has been filed for quashing the judgment and order dated 19.3.2010 in Rent Control Appeal No. 262 of 2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Allahabad whereby the appeal was dismissed by affirming the judgment and decree dated 21.5.2009 in P.A. Case No. 3 of 1999 passed by the Prescribed Authority/ Civil Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad. The aforesaid judgments and orders have been passed on the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent And Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) filed on behalf of the respondent on the ground of personal need. The relief prayed for in the application is only for part of the house and ejectment is only sought from part of the tenancy wherein the original tenancy was created for the entire house in favour of the petitioner. 6. Brief facts of the case are that Sri K.D. Misra, landlord let out house Nos. The relief prayed for in the application is only for part of the house and ejectment is only sought from part of the tenancy wherein the original tenancy was created for the entire house in favour of the petitioner. 6. Brief facts of the case are that Sri K.D. Misra, landlord let out house Nos. 603 and 501 Panna Lal Road, Colonelganj, Allahabad to Sri Avinash Chandra Srivastava. Smt. Kiran Srivastava is second wife of Sri Janhavi Kumar, who is the younger brother of the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that Sri Janhavi Kumar was financial weak, hence he permitted him to live with him in the house as a licensee since the year 1964. 7. The house in dispute was sold by the landlord Sri K.D. Misra in favour of Smt. Vijai Lakshami on 15.3.1965. She sold the house to Sri Nand Gopal Badhawan on 15.9.1983; that later on he died on 4.11.1992 leaving behind his widow, two sons including Ravi Bhushan Bhadhawan and six daughters. 8. The case set up by the petitioner in the Courts below was that after the death of his first wife his younger brother Janhavi Kumar married with Krian Pandey out side his caste which created rift between the petitioner and his brother who lodged an FIR against him alleging that petitioner had not only threatened him but had also blocked the passage for egress and ingress of his family to utilize the roof. The police after investigation submitted final report which was accepted by the Court. 9. The petitioner filed original suit No. 877 of 1993 on 31.7.1993 against Janhvi Kumar for ejectment as the licence had been terminated which is still pending. It is claimed by the petitioner that Janhavi Kumar then tried to induct outsiders in the premises in the portion occupied by the petitioner which compelled him to file original suit No. 1080 of 1993 against Janhavi Kumar. Temporary injunction was granted in the suit which has been affirmed up to the High Court. This suit is said to be still pending. Temporary injunction was granted in the suit which has been affirmed up to the High Court. This suit is said to be still pending. In the mean time, Smt. Kiran wife of Janhavi Kumar, respondent landlady purchased the house in dispute from Ravi Bhushan Badhawan on 4.11.1998 and gave a notice dated 13.1.1999 to the petitioner in her capacity of landlord and the owner of the house for vacating the part of the house under his tenancy within a period of six months. It was averred in the notice that whole of the house was required by her for her personal need. The respondent again sent another notice dated 29.1.1999 of ejectment of the petitioner from the portion occupied by him on the ground that he had sublet a portion and has made material changes by constructing a kitchen in the open space i.e. Aangan disfiguring the property and diminishing its utility and value. 10. SCC Suit No. 34 of 1999, Smt. Kiran Srivastava v. Avinash Chandra Srivastava, was thereafter filed by the petitioner for ejectment from the part of the house occupied by him as tenant on the ground of personal need. Another application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was filed for release of the part of the house on the ground of personal need. This application was registered as P.A. Case No. 3 of 1999. SCC Suit No. 34 of 1999 was contested by the petitioner by filing written statement that Janhavi Kumar and his family were licensee and neither any material alteration was made nor damage was caused by him to the property. It was also stated in the written statement that there was no evidence as to how Sri Ravi Bhushan Bhadwan alone was entitled to sell the house in dispute and how respondent became the sole owner of the whole house in part of which her family lived. Respondent then filed an application for amendment of the plaint in SCC Suit No. 34 of 1999 by addition of paragraphs 11-A and 11-B supplying exact description of the portion of the accommodation from which ejectment was sought. The objection of the petitioner to the amendment application of plaint was allowed by the Court below vide order dated 19.1.2000. 11. Written statement was filed by the petitioner on 19.4.2001 in P.A. Case No. 3 of 1999 controverting the claim of the landlady. The objection of the petitioner to the amendment application of plaint was allowed by the Court below vide order dated 19.1.2000. 11. Written statement was filed by the petitioner on 19.4.2001 in P.A. Case No. 3 of 1999 controverting the claim of the landlady. The Judge Small Causes Court vide its order dated 9.5.2007 held that the petitioner had not sublet any part of the premises and no material alteration or damage was caused to the property by him. He, however, decreed the suit for ejectment on the ground that his written statement amounted to denial of title respondent and enhanced rent. According to the petitioner this order is without jurisdiction. No evidence was adduced how Ravi Bhushan Bhadhwan alone was entitled to sell 12. The Civil Judge (Senior Division)/Prescribed Authority, Allahabad vide order dated 21.7.2009 allowed the release application filed by the respondent on the ground of personal need and comparative hardship. 13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 21.7.2009, the petitioner filed Rent Control Appeal No. 262 of 2009 before the Additional District Judge, Allahabad which was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 8.1.2010 which has given rise to cause for filing this writ petition. 14. Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the suit ought to have been dismissed when the Court arrived at the finding that there was neither any material alteration made by the petitioner nor any portion wider his tenancy was sublet by him which were the only grounds on which his ejectment was sought by the respondent. It is argued that there is no denial of title in the written statement filed by the petitioner that paragraphs 1 to 6 of the written statement do not amount to denial of title of the landlord as it is merely putting the plaintiff to prove his title and paragraph 21 relates to the situation raised in the plaint by filing the suit for a portion of the tenancy only. It is submitted that relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to exist for the portion in suit under his occupation and that paragraph 24 of the written statement pertains to the rights of Sri Ravi Bhushan Badhawan to sell the house in dispute as he was only one of the 9 heirs on whom the share of the properties developed after death of their father late Nand Lal Badhawan. Hence he had no legal right to sell the whole house in dispute to the respondent on basis of an alleged ‘will’ referred in the sale-deed which neither saw the light of the day, nor was it filed or proved in the Courts below. It is stated in paragraph 29 of the written statement that the plaintiff was put to prove as to how she claimed the whole house and not merely share of her vendor Sri Ravi Bhusan Wadhawan which is a legal plea and it does not amount to denial of title of the landlord. 15. In support of this contention, learned senior Advocate Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary has relied upon the decisions rendered in Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. Kanti Devi, 1980 AWC 720 and Shagir Anwar v. Hashmat Husain, (sic) AWR 24, AIR 2002 SC 1264 , Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash and AIR 1971 (All)(FB) 112, Banarsi Lal v. Jata Shankar. 16. He then submits that the determination of tenancy under the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent And Eviction) Act, 1972 relates to determination of tenancy on the ground raised if forfeiture and not upon notice to quit and that Section 111 clause (g) Transfer of Property Act is specific in this regard. According to him, tenancy is determined only after notice in writing is given to the lessee of his intention to treat the lease as forfeited and the notice referred to in clause (g) of Section 111 Transfer of Property Act is this notice and not the notice to quit. It is stated that as no such notice was given and suit was already filed, hence tenancy must stand forfeited and that the averments in the written statement in the circumstances were only to be seen in the light that respondent only wanted but did not deny it. It is stated that as no such notice was given and suit was already filed, hence tenancy must stand forfeited and that the averments in the written statement in the circumstances were only to be seen in the light that respondent only wanted but did not deny it. It is stated that he paid the rent to the plaintiff as she demanded it on behalf of the owners which act does not amount to any attornment as in the circumstances it can only be for original tenancy and not for supposed half portion of the house in dispute in which Janhavi was living as licensee since 1964 for the reason that the owner of the premises is different than the person merely receiving rent on behalf of the owner. 17. The counsel for the petitioner then submits that damages for use and occupation cannot exceed the rent in case of leases governed by the act. He has relied upon the cases of Dwarka Prasad v. Central Talkies, AIR 1956 All 187 and Niaz Ahmad Khan v. Mahmood Rahimullah, in this regard. 18. He next submits that the tenancy is invidivisible and no suit lies for ejectment from a part of the premises. No novation was ever alleged or whispered even nor is there any such plaintiffs case. In this regard he has placed reliance upon the case of Habibunnisa Begum v. Dorai Chettiar, (2000) 1 SCC 74 and Miss S. Sanyal v. Gain Chand, AIR 1968 SC 438 . 19. The counsel for the petitioner argued that the plaintiff and her husband are licensees. He has relied upon the judgment rendered in Writ Petition No. 40101 of 1996, Janhvi Kumar v. District Judge, Allahabad, wherein the Court held even when a licensee has purchased a property from its owner he cannot eject his licensor till he hands over vacant possession to him. According to him, this plea goes to the root of the matter and has further placed reliance upon Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857 , in this regard. 20. According to him, this plea goes to the root of the matter and has further placed reliance upon Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh, AIR 1985 SC 857 , in this regard. 20. It is lastly urged that apart from widow of late Nand Kishore Badhawan, two sons and six daughters and that this will said to have been executed by late Sri Nand Lal Badhawan has not seen the light of the day as such the purchase of the property from one of the landlord alone who has only one ninth share in the property cannot give valid notice or file a suit for ejectment. 21. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the cases of Prayag v. Mone Singh, AIR 1914 All 160, Nandlal Girdharilal v. Gulamnabi, AIR 1973 Guj 131 and Abdul Hamid v. Bhuvaneshari Prasad, AIR 1953 Nag 18. 22. By means of supplementary affidavit dated 22.4.2010, Sri Manjari Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner brought on record the sale-deed said to have been executed on 3rd July, 1996 by Sri Ravi Bhushan Badhawan son of late Nand Gopal Badhawan, resident of 3, Darbhanga Castle Compound, Allahabad Vendor in favour of Smt. Kiran Srivastava wife of Sri Janhavi Kumar Srivastava alias Saras Kumar Viragi, resident of house Nos. 603 and 501 Colonelganj, Allahabad. 23. The relevant provisions of the sale-deed are thus : “Whereas Sri Nand Gopal Wadhawan the father of the Vendor Ist party purchased the aforesaid house Nos. 603 and 501 Colonelganj, Allahabad alongwith building and appurtenant land from himself earned money fully described at the end of this DEED from its previous owner Smt. Vijay Laximi wife of Sri Krishna Mohan Verma, vide registered sale-deed dated 9.9.1993 against a total sale consideration of Rs. 20,000/-. Whereas Sri Nand Gopal Wadhawan during his life time executed Will dated 14.8.1992 and thereby bequeathed the aforesaid house Nos. 603 and 501, Colonelganj Allahabad alongwith building and appurtenant land in favour of the Vendor Ist party. Sri Nand Gopal died on 4.11.1992 and after the death of Sri Nand Gopal Wadhawan the vendor Ist part became the exclusive owner in possession of the aforesaid house Nos. 603 and 501 Colonelganj Allahabad fully described at the end of this DEED. It is stated that late Nand Gopal Wadhawan owned in Colonelganj only one house i.e. the house in question. 603 and 501 Colonelganj Allahabad fully described at the end of this DEED. It is stated that late Nand Gopal Wadhawan owned in Colonelganj only one house i.e. the house in question. Whereas the Vendor Ist party is not getting proper return from the property in question as the same is occupied by old tenants and is also in dire need of money therefore, he has decided to sell the aforesaid property in question which has been fully described at the end of this DEED. Knowing the idea of the Vendor Ist party, the purchaser IInd party has offered a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three lacs) only as sale consideration for the aforesaid property in question which sum is quite reasonable and none else is ready to pay the same or more than the aforesaid amount and therefore the Vendor Ist party has decided to sell the aforesaid house Nos. 603 and 501 Colonelganj, Allahabad, alongwith building and appurtenant land, total area 113.24 sq. mtrs. measuring 39’x31.5.’ fully described at the end of this DEED in favour of the purchaser IInd party. NOW THIS DEED WITNESSES AS FOLLOWS : 1. In consideration of the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three lacs) paid by the purchaser IInd party to the Vendor Ist party vide A/C payee bankers cheque No. 483774/931 dated 1.7.1996 of Indian Overseas Bank, Allahabad in favour of the aforesaid vendor Sri Ravi Bhushan Wadhawan (the receipt of which the vendor Ist party do hereby acknowledge). The vendor Ist party as exclusive owner in possession hereby transfer to the purchaser IInd party by way of sale house Nos. 603 and 501 Colonelganj, Allahabad alongwith building and appurtenant land total area 113.24 sq. measuring 39’x31.5.’ fully described at the end of this DEED TO SOLD THE SAME TO THE PURCAHSER SECOND PARTY AS ABSOLUTE OWNER. 2. The vendor Ist party covenants with the purchaser 2nd party as follows: (i) That the said premises shall be quietly entered in and upon held land enjoyed by the purchaser IInd party without any interruption and disturbances by the vendor Ist party or any other person claiming through or under him and without any lawful disturbances and interruption by and other person. (ii) That the vendor Ist party have handed over the actual and proprietory possession of the vended property today to the purchaser 2nd party. (ii) That the vendor Ist party have handed over the actual and proprietory possession of the vended property today to the purchaser 2nd party. (iii) That all the rights, title and interest of the vendor Ist party stand transferred to the purchaser 2nd party. The purchaser 2nd party has become absolute owner of the vended property. She may get her name recorded in the relevant records at her own expenses. (iv) That the purchaser IInd party may use and enjoy the vended property in any manner she may like.” 24. He submits that by order dated 25.1.2010, the Court has directed the petitioner to deposit the entire decretal amount within 4 weeks and continue to deposit Rs. 3500/- per month as damages for use and occupation of the disputed accommodation. The original rent as claimed by the respondent is Rs. 55/- per month. The damages for use and occupation have been arbitrarily enhanced allegedly keeping in mind the situation of the house in a posh locality and the area occupied by the petitioner. 25. It is then submitted that the Apex Court held in the case of Niyas Ahmed Khan v. Mahmood Rahmat Ullah Khan, (2008) 7 SCC 530, that enhancement of rent as an interim measure in writ petitions by tenants, is not proper. Further under the law the mesne profits should be decreed on the basis of monthly rent. The enhancement of rent from Rs. 55/- per month to 3500/- is also arbitrary and unreasonable and without jurisdiction. The enhancement in the decree by the trial Court is unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive and in terrorem. It is without jurisdiction; that it will thus be noticed that it is the petitioner who accommodated his younger brother Janhvi Kumar and permitted to be in the house since 1964. The respondent after her marriage with Janhvi Kumar lives in this very house with her husband as a licensee of the petitioner. They have abused the goodness of the petitioner. There are no equities in their favour. In fact it is the petitioner who has been gravely wronged and his good nature abused. Petitioner’s only son is employed as a teacher in Madhya Pradesh. Petitioner’s only income is the monthly pension, which he draws since his retirement as a teacher. It is not possible for him to pay or deposit the alleged extravagant mesne profits. He is not in arrears. Petitioner’s only son is employed as a teacher in Madhya Pradesh. Petitioner’s only income is the monthly pension, which he draws since his retirement as a teacher. It is not possible for him to pay or deposit the alleged extravagant mesne profits. He is not in arrears. The conditions imposed by the interim order amounts to a denial of the right of the petitioner to approach the Court. 26. He also submits that as per Section 2(g) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act 1972, the provisions of the Act do not apply to buildings whose rent exceeds Rs. 2000/-. By enhancing the rent to Rs. 3500/- without looking at the circumstances, the Court failed to protect the interest of the tenant for which it was enacted. 27. He next submits that the certain facts were not before the Court at the time of passing of the interim order. The Court has proceeded to pass the interim order on the basis of factually incorrect statements made by the respondent. 28. Some of the relevant facts are : (a) The petitioner is a 79 year old retired teacher, who lives on his monthly pension. Such a huge enhancement of rent amounts to punishment for no fault of his and no reason in law and would be a fetter on his right to take legal proceedings in the circumstances of the case. The enhancement is unreasonable and virtually forces the petitioner out of the house. (b) The disputed house is located in Colonelganj area, which is a very old area of Allahabad. The house in dispute is itself more than 80 years old, which has an open drain in front and a small brick lane in the back. The area in which the house is situated is not a posh area but very congested and dirty. (c) The total area of the house of close to 113.24 sq. meters including the appurtenances. Out of this, approximately half of the area is in use and occupation of the respondent. The open roof is also in possession of the respondent. The area of the house is small if one takes into consideration that more than half of the house in dispute is in use and occupation of the respondent. 29. Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that respondent/ landlady purchased the house Nos. The open roof is also in possession of the respondent. The area of the house is small if one takes into consideration that more than half of the house in dispute is in use and occupation of the respondent. 29. Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that respondent/ landlady purchased the house Nos. 603 and 501, Colonelganj, Allahabad, from it’s erstwhile owner Sri Ravi Bhusan Vadhawan through a registered sale-deed dated 3-7-1996; that petitioner is the tenant of the house Nos. 603 and 501, Colonelganj, Allahabad having in his occupation 4 rooms on the ground floor, one Court yard, one varandah, one latrine and one bathroom and one kitchen, stair case for going to the first floor, one room on the first floor, one balkani on the first floor, one tin shed room on the first floor and an open roof top on second floor; that in the sale-deed it is mentioned that the said house was bequeathed in favour of Ravi Bhushan Vadhawan by his father Sri Nand Gopal Vadhawan vide a will dated 14-8-1992; and that after the purchase of the said house by the respondent landlady, petitioner started making payment of rent Rs. 55/- p.m. to her. There is an admission in this regard in examination-in-chief of petitioner in suit Nos. 34 and 99. 30. 55/- p.m. to her. There is an admission in this regard in examination-in-chief of petitioner in suit Nos. 34 and 99. 30. He also submits that by making payment of rent to the respondent, the petitioner has attorned (legally acknowledged) respondent as her landlady; that the word ‘title’ as has been defined under the U.P Rent Control Act as per Section 3(j) ‘landlord’ in relation to a building means a person to whom it’s rent is payable; that after payment of rent for few months the petitioner stopped making payment of the rent and made some material alterations in the house and therefore, respondent requested the petitioner to vacant the house and handover the possession thereof to her, but petitioner did not pay any heed to her request; that compelled under the circumstances respondent-landlady to serve a notice under Section 106 of Transfer Property Act dated 29-1-1999 upon the petitioner which was served upon him on 23-2-1999; that after determining the tenancy, respondent-landlady filed a suit for eviction against the petitioner under Section 20(a) and (c) of U.P Rent Control Act; that in the said suit No. 34 of 1999 filed by the respondent-landlady petitioner-tenant filed his written statement in which he denied the title of the landlady in paragraphs 1,6,21,24 and 29 ; that when the petitioner denied the title of the respondent-landlady she moved an amendment application to amend the plaint which was allowed. Against the said order allowing the amendment application, the petitioner did not prefer any appeal, revision or writ before any Court of law and that order attained finality; that the fact of payment of rent by the petitioner to the respondent is not only proved from his own statement on oath but also from the money order coupons filed in the suit per list 13C and again proves the fact that the petitioner has acknowledged the respondent as his landlady and, therefore, he did not have any legal right to deny the title of the respondent, after that. 31. 31. He next submits that the learned Court below has decided issue No. 4 regarding denial of title and has rightly held that the petitioner has illegally denied the landlord’s title and therefore as per Section 20(2)(f) of U.P Rent Control Act the petitioner-tenant was liable to be evicted; that while deciding issue No. 4 the leaned Court below has very rightly held that from the perusal of the sale-deed and the money order coupons it is evident that the petitioner has acknowledged respondent as his landlady and he has also not mentioned any other person as having title as his landlord and therefore the plaintiff- respondent suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title on 9- 5- 2007; and that the revisional Court has confirmed the findings given by the trail Court in it’s order dated 8-1-2010. 32. He also submits that another important fact which needs to be mentioned is that petitioner’s only son has purchased his own house in Kalindipuram, Allahabad which is lying vacant as the petitioner’s son Vibhash Chandra is Lecturer in Gandhi Gramodhaya University Chitrakoot, M.P and is settled over there and the said house is lying vacant and which is sufficient accommodation for the petitioner to live in. The sale-deed dated 16-2-1995 and assessment khasra has been annexed herein as Annexure No. 4 to the counter-affidavit. 33. He further submits that after the purchase of the house vide the registered sale-deed respondent-landlady became the owner of the property and the fact of payment of rent thereafter by the petitioner to the landlady at the rate of Rs. 55/- p.m for few months amounts to ‘attornment’ (acknowledgment of the title of the landlady). It is settled law that a person may be a landlord even if the proprietary title to the accommodation does not vest in him. The word ‘title’ in Sec. 3 (j) refers to the title of the landlord on the basis of which he can claim to eject the tenant and cannot be taken to refer only to the proprietary right in the accommodation which may be entirely immaterial so far as the right of ejectment is concerned. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the case of Hushmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmad and others, AIR 1958 All 847 . 34. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the case of Hushmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmad and others, AIR 1958 All 847 . 34. He further submits that the argument of the petitioner that Ravi Bhushan Vadhawan was one of the children of Nand Gopal Vadhawan, was not having any right to sell the house in question to the respondent-landlady, as there were other co-sharers of the said house, is illegal and untenable as in the sale-deed itself there is a mention of WILL dated 14-8-1992 executed by Sri Nand Gopal Vadhawan bequeathing the aforesaid house Nos. 603 and 501, Colonelganj, Allahabad and the said WILL was never challenged by the petitioner in the proceeding of the suit before the Court below, therefore, the denial of the right to execute the sale-deed by Ravi Bhushan Vadhawan in favour of respondent-landlady is baseless, illegal and untenable; and that after the purchase of the said house respondent-landlady stepped into the house the shoes of it’s erstwhile owner and the fact of payment of rent by the petitioner to her,as is evident from the money order coupons filed per list 13C in the suit, amounts to adornment. After attorning respondent as his landlady petitioner cannot deny her title as it is barred by Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act estoppel against the tenant. In support of the aforesaid submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in Mohd. Ilyas and another v. Mohd. Adil and others, AIR 1994 Del 212 . 35. He next submits that tenant during the beginning of the tenancy or subsequently is estopped from denying his landlord’s title after acknowledging landlord title by attornment or any other conduct. He has placed reliance upon the judgments in Anar Devi (Smt.) Nathu Ram, (1994) 4 SCC 250 , Atyam Veerraju and others v. Pechetti Venkanna and others, AIR 1966 SC 629 and Joginder Singh and another v. Smt. Jogindero and others, JT 1996(1) SC 467. 36. He has placed reliance upon the judgments in Anar Devi (Smt.) Nathu Ram, (1994) 4 SCC 250 , Atyam Veerraju and others v. Pechetti Venkanna and others, AIR 1966 SC 629 and Joginder Singh and another v. Smt. Jogindero and others, JT 1996(1) SC 467. 36. He also submits that the argument of the petitioner that the husband of the landlady had been held to be licensee of a portion of the said house in a different suit has in fact got no meaning once the entire house has been purchased by respondent-landlady; that the argument of the petitioner that a fresh notice as per Section111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act was required to be given before filing a suit on the ground of denial of title is absolutely illegal and untenable because before filing of the suit landlady-respondent served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer Property Act and thereafter filed the said suit, by that time petitioner did not deny the title of the landlady and only in his written statement for the first time he denied the title, therefore, there is no provision of law which provides a notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer Property Act after filing the suit; and that the argument of the petitioner that the suit was filed only with respect to a portion of the house but tenancy was of the entire house is also illegal and untenable as after the purchase of the said house there was a novation of the contract of tenancy between petitioner-tenant and respondent- landlady and therefore, the suit for eviction was filed only for the portion in which the petitioner was in occupation and the said fact is also supported from his own admission in his statement that he is a tenant of only portion of the house. 37. It is lastly submitted that in the light of concurrent findings given by both the Courts below and the fact that the petitioner’s son has purchased the house at Kalindipuam, Allahabad which is sufficient accommodation for the petitioner to live in, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed out rightly. 38. From perusal of the record it is apparent that only son of the petitioner has purchased his own house in Kalindipuram, Allahabad which is lying vacant. 38. From perusal of the record it is apparent that only son of the petitioner has purchased his own house in Kalindipuram, Allahabad which is lying vacant. His son is working at Satna, Madhya Pradesh and therefore, in view of the explanation to second proviso of Section 21 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the petitioner cannot exercise his rights as tenant in the said house. It may also be noted that there is a long drawn litigation between the two brothers. They are not even at talking terms with each other for more than last 15 years. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of facts in favour of the landlord and against the tenant. Since one of family members of the tenant petitioner had acquired a house in vacant conditions as far back as in 1995 the petitioner cannot claim that damages of Rs. 3500/- per month is excessive on the ground that it cannot exceed the rent for the reason that he is precluded to claim right of a tenant after acquiring of the house by his son. He therefore, has to pay damages of the house as a person outside the purview of the Act who is not a tenant as fixed by the Court. 39. Looking into the facts that the petitioner has also not complied with the order of this Court dated 25.1.2010 by which he has been directed to pay damages at the rate of 3500/- per month since July, 2010, he is not entitled to any sympathetic consideration by the Court. The cases cited by the petitioner in this regard are therefore not applicable. 40. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent should vacate the house and then enter as landlord is nothing but a wishful thinking as the husband of the respondent Smt. Kiran Srivastava appears to be paying Rs. 30/- per month to the petitioner out of the total rent of Rs. 55/- per month before the house in dispute was purchased by his wife. It may be noticed here that none of the heirs of late Sri Nand Lal Badhawan have claimed any share in the house in dispute bequeath by him to his son Ravi Bhusan Badhawan does not appear to have been challenged by any of his brothers and sisters or even the mother. It may be noticed here that none of the heirs of late Sri Nand Lal Badhawan have claimed any share in the house in dispute bequeath by him to his son Ravi Bhusan Badhawan does not appear to have been challenged by any of his brothers and sisters or even the mother. Hence Sri Ravi Bhusan Badhawan had full right to sell this property to the respondent. In any case it cannot be questioned by a tenant. He admits that house was purchased by Nand Lal Wadhawan father of Ravi Bhusan Wadhawan claiming share of other family members on the property in dispute in arguments after will having been filed by the petitioner in the writ petition itself amounts to denial of title of Ravi Bhusan Wadhawan who transferred the same to Smt. Kiran Srivastava by sale-deed dated 3.7.1996 who had stepped into his shoes as landlord hence reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is misplaced and they do not apply to the peculiar facts and circumstances in these writ petitions. The tenancy is not indisputable as the relationship between the parties has undergone change and the husband of the respondent who has become landlord after its purchase on 3.7.1996. When a tenant purchases a property in which he is living as a licensee no longer remains as such as soon as he purchases it. However, in the instant case, the respondent claims that her husband had been paying Rs. 30/- out of the total rent of Rs. 5/- per month, hence the claim of the petitioner that his brother was a licensee is lightly doubtful and has not been proved in the Courts below who have returned findings against the petitioner. 41. As stated earlier, the rulings cited by the petitioner are in their own peculiar facts and circumstances and are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case as such are of no help to the case of the petitioner. 42. At this stage Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel for the petitioner on 19.8.2010 has submitted that his client, the petitioner has expressed his desire to vacate the accommodation in dispute but prays for some time to shift in the house. 43. 42. At this stage Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel for the petitioner on 19.8.2010 has submitted that his client, the petitioner has expressed his desire to vacate the accommodation in dispute but prays for some time to shift in the house. 43. The office was directed to put up these writ petitions on 23.8.2010 as prayed by the counsel for the petitioner to enable him to file an application before Court in furtherance of desire of the petitioner to vacate the accommodation in dispute by him. Application has been filed on behalf of the petitioner praying time for vacating the accommodation in dispute. In the circumstances, the petitions are dismissed without any further observation on merits and case laws. No order as to costs. —————