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2010 DIGILAW 2567 (ALL)

RATAN SINGH YADAV v. STATE OF U. P.

2010-08-23

A.P.SAHI

body2010
JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—The petitioner, an Inspector of the U.P. Police Services, decorated with a President’s award, is before this Court questioning the wisdom of the State in having taken a decision to hold a de novo enquiry against the petitioner in relation to the charges framed on him, through four different charge-sheets, on the ground that once the petitioner stood exonerated under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, the State Government could not have initiated a de novo enquiry in the purported exercise of powers under Rule 25 (b) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1991 Rules”). 2. The background of the case is that the petitioner was posted as an Inspector at Kotwali Mugalsarai, District Chandauli. The petitioner in an incident that occurred on 28th November, 2006 arrested three persons found to be in possession of fire arms without having any valid license. One of the accused had a political connection as he happened to be the husband of the Block Pramukh of Behraini, District Chandauli and a close associate of the then local M.L.A. Sri Ram Kishun Yadav, who later on is alleged to have become a Member of Parliament. The aforesaid arrest led to the annoyance of the local M.L.A. who called upon the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi to forthwith suspend the petitioner and as a result whereof, the petitioner came to be suspended on 1st December, 2006. The grounds for suspension recited in the order were misbehaviour with the local M.L.A., Mugalsarai Sri Ram Kishun Yadav. Aggrieved the petitioner filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 66493 of 2006 and the suspension order dated 1st December, 2006 was stayed on 8.12.2006. The said writ petition was opposed by the said M.L.A. on its filing and immediately after passing of the interim order, on the very next day, the petitioner came to be transferred. This transfer order was also challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 68231 of 2006, in which an interim order was granted on 14.12.2006. 3. Inspite of the aforesaid interim orders, the compliance was not made. Consequently, a Contempt Application No. 68 of 2007 was filed. On the filing of the contempt application, the petitioner was given charge of Kotwali Mugalsarai and accordingly the contempt application was dismissed on 9.2.2007. 4. 3. Inspite of the aforesaid interim orders, the compliance was not made. Consequently, a Contempt Application No. 68 of 2007 was filed. On the filing of the contempt application, the petitioner was given charge of Kotwali Mugalsarai and accordingly the contempt application was dismissed on 9.2.2007. 4. The petitioner was again transferred on 20/21.2.2007 from District Chandauli to District Varanasi, which was again challenged by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10822 of 2007 but the same was dismissed. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed Special Appeal No. 374 of 2007, in which the Division Bench as an interim measure stayed the order of transfer calling upon the respondents to file their counter affidavit, vide order dated 30.4.2007. 5. The respondent-Officers arrayed therein, instead of filing a counter affidavit to the affidavit in the special appeal, proceeded to suspend the petitioner on 22nd June, 2007 for charges of negligence in duty. The said order was challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 28818 of 2007, which was disposed of on 2.11.2007 with a direction to the authorities to dispose of the matter and complete the enquiry within three months. Certain observations were made in relation to the trivial and flimsy nature of the charges in the said order. 6. The charge-sheets were served on the petitioner in relation to four charges separately numbered as Charge-sheet Nos. 38/07, 39/07, 40/07 and 41/07. The petitioner submitted his reply in November, 2007. The enquiry was conducted and the enquiry report was submitted on 26th February, 2008. The enquiry report runs into almost 35 pages of the paper book and the Enquiry Officer concluded that in view of the evidence brought on record none of the charges levelled against the petitioner can be sustained and, therefore, a recommendation was made for setting aside the charge-sheet. The Superintendent of Police, vide order dated 27th February, 2008, accepted the recommendation of the Enquiry Officer and cancelled the charge-sheets. This order was passed in the capacity of a disciplinary authority as provided for under the 1991 Rules. 7. The petitioner having awaited his reinstatement and appropriate posting, filed the present writ petition for a mandamus to reinstate him and grant all consequential benefits with a posting commensurate to his status as Inspector of Police. This order was passed in the capacity of a disciplinary authority as provided for under the 1991 Rules. 7. The petitioner having awaited his reinstatement and appropriate posting, filed the present writ petition for a mandamus to reinstate him and grant all consequential benefits with a posting commensurate to his status as Inspector of Police. The petition was presented on 13th March, 2008 and was taken up on 17th March, 2008, on which date learned Standing Counsel for the State made a request for taking up the matter on 24th March, 2008. 8. The twist in the case intervened during this period before the case could be taken up when the State Government issued a fax message on 21st March, 2008 calling upon the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi to submit his report/recommendation in relation to the enquiry and the disciplinary proceedings of the petitioner. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, vide his letter dated 23rd March, 2008, sent the entire information to the State Government including the order passed by the Superintendent of Police exonerating the petitioner. On receipt of this letter of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, the State Government passed a order dated 24th March, 2008 in exercise of the powers under Rule 25 (b) of the 1991 Rules to hold a de novo enquiry against the petitioner. 9. This order of the State Government was brought to the notice of the Court on the date fixed and on 25th March, 2008 the petitioner prayed for an amendment in the writ petition for challenging the said order. The amendment application was moved and was allowed which questions the correctness of the said order as well. 10. As a consequence of the said order, a new Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi on 10th April, 2008 whereafter the matter is pending in this writ petition. 11. The petitioner through another amendment has also prayed for quashing the original order of suspension dated 22.6.2007, which aspect need not be gone into as the petitioner has been reinstated and is functioning. This was done pursuant to the order dated 12.11.2008 passed in this writ petition staying the order of suspension dated 22.6.2007 with a direction to reinstate the petitioner. 12. This was done pursuant to the order dated 12.11.2008 passed in this writ petition staying the order of suspension dated 22.6.2007 with a direction to reinstate the petitioner. 12. The said order was not being complied with, as a result whereof, the petitioner filed Contempt Application No. 1244 of 2009 in which a detailed order was passed on 4.9.2009 and keeping in view the compliance status, the hearing of the said contempt application has been deferred till final decision of this petition, vide order dated 24.5.2010. The posting and the placement of the petitioner commensurate to his status as Inspector of Police is subject matter of consideration before the Contempt Court about which facts have been indicated in the order dated 4.9.2009, which are not relevant to decide the present controversy at this stage. 13. Sri Kripa Shanker Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, narrating the mala fides of the respondents and the action taken against the petitioner, submits that the procedure as prescribed under the 1991 Rules has been thrown overboard and the petitioner has been victimized on account of his having put resistance to the action taken by the authorities, and the State Government has proceeded to take action which was absolutely unwarranted and without any of the ingredients available so as to invoke the powers under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules. He submits that the order dated 24th March, 2008 has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice without giving any notice or opportunity to the petitioner causing serious prejudice to him and, therefore, the order should be quashed on this ground alone. He further submits that the entire evidence on record as collected by the Enquiry Officer clearly demonstrates that the charges were framed against the petitioner that were frivolous and too trivial to stage a departmental enquiry. He submits that the petitioner was sought to be punished on the basis of frivolous complaints as he had earned the annoyance of a local political leader as also his superior officers, who were acting on the dictates of their political masters. He submits that the witnesses examined during the regular enquiry have all deposed without any indication of negligence on duty on the part of the petitioner. The Superintendent of Police has rightly quashed the charge-sheet and there remains nothing to be re-enquired warranting a de novo enquiry against the petitioner. He submits that the witnesses examined during the regular enquiry have all deposed without any indication of negligence on duty on the part of the petitioner. The Superintendent of Police has rightly quashed the charge-sheet and there remains nothing to be re-enquired warranting a de novo enquiry against the petitioner. It is urged that the words used in Rule 25 (b) of the 1991 Rules are “further enquiry” and not a “de novo enquiry”. 14. The contention is that the order dated 24th March, 2008 recites that the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer and its acceptance by the Superintendent of Police does not require a re-enquiry, inasmuch as, if the finding is contrary to the evidence on record, then the same evidence could have been looked into for passing of a fresh order, as it is not the case of the respondents that the evidence collected is insufficient or there is some more material available so as to warrant a further enquiry or collection of further evidence. On the strength of the said submissions it is urged that Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules was not attracted at all and in the absence of any recital in the order dated 24th March, 2008 about the nature of the material, which is contrary to the evidence, there was no occasion to pass an order for de novo enquiry. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is not known as to what is contrary to the evidence on record and, therefore, the discretion under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules could not have been exercised in the manner in which it has been done by the State Government. 15. Sri Singh, further submits that the letter dated 23rd March, 2008 of the Deputy Inspector General of Police also does not indicate anything to the contrary so as to warrant action under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules and it is evident that the State Government itself sent a fax message on 21st March, 2008 to some how the other re-open the matter without therebeing any fresh material in that regard. 16. 16. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of M/s D.N. Roy and S.K. Bannerjee and others v. State of Bihar and others, (1970) 3 SCC 119 , to contend that while exercising suo moto powers by the State Government under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules, it was incumbent on the State Government to have provided an opportunity of hearing prior to the passing of the order, and this having not been done the same is vitiated. He further relies on the decision in the case of Makeshwar Nath Srivastava v. The State of Bihar and others, AIR 1971 SC 1106 , contending that since no appeal was filed by the petitioner, there was no occasion for the State Government to have exercised the powers under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules. 17. Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri A.K. Mehrotra, Advocate for the State has come up with a submission that the order dated 24th March, 2008 does not cause any prejudice to the petitioner, which is only for holding a de novo enquiry and in the absence of any such prejudice, there was no occasion to have given the petitioner any opportunity of hearing prior to the passing of the order dated 24th March, 2008. He submits that the Enquiry Officer while submitting his report on 26.2.2008 has analysed the evidence inserting his own views thereby converting the qualitative flavour of the evidence in a manner so as to suit the purpose of the petitioner. He submits that the evidence, which is on record was sufficient to indict the petitioner but it has been presented by the Enquiry Officer in such a converse manner that the entire enquiry report appears to be tailored. It is further submitted that the Superintendent of Police without recording any reason and without applying his mind and discretion in an appropriate manner, has in a cryptic way accepted the report and cancelled the charge-sheet. 18. This, in the submission of the State Government was an improper exercise of power against the weight of evidence on record, by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the Disciplinary Authority and hence the State Government keeping in view the entire facts of the case rightly proceeded to exercise suo moto powers for holding a de novo enquiry under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules. 19. 19. Sri Satish Chaturvedi further submits that in view of the law laid down in the case of R.R. Verma and others v. Union of India and others, (1980) 3 SCC 402 , the principle relating to the exercise of such powers where no prejudice can be demonstrated, the order should not be interfered with as the nature of the powers exercised under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules is administrative and not quasi-judicial in nature. He has invited the attention of the Court to the statement made by Manish Tiwari, the first informant in the F.I.R., which forms one of the charges against the petitioner that the petitioner had wrongly registered the F.I.R. under Section 382 of the Indian Penal Code whereas the incident was clearly covered by Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. He submits that the petitioner deliberately acted in a way prejudicial to the prosecution and against the evidence collected during enquiry. He submits that the language employed in Rule 25 (b) of the 1991 Rules leaves no room for doubt that the words “further enquiry” would also include a de novo enquiry and hence the order cannot be faulted with. He submits that the evidence collected during the preliminary enquiry and the regular enquiry was in variation, which demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer proceeded in a biased way and, therefore, a de novo enquiry is necessary. He submits that this material was available with the State Government while passing the order dated 24.3.2008. 20. Sri Chaturvedi inviting the attention of the Court to the rules contends, that the order of the Superintendent of Police does not amount to taking a decision for terminating the holding of any fresh enquiry against the petitioner. He submits that the order of the Superintendent of Police is a mere order of cancelling the charge-sheet but it does not amount to withdrawing the decision to hold a disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner. Even otherwise, the facts as they stand on record substantiate the order dated 24th March, 2008 and in this view of the matter, in the event this Court interferes with the order dated 24th March, 2008, the same would amount to restoring an equally illegal order passed by the Superintendent of Police. He, therefore, submits that the Court should refuse to exercise discretion and allow the enquiry to proceed. 21. He, therefore, submits that the Court should refuse to exercise discretion and allow the enquiry to proceed. 21. Sri Kripa Shanker Singh, in rejoinder, proceeded to substantiate the plea with regard to violation of principles of natural justice on a comparative reading of Rule 23 of the 1991 Rules, which makes a provision for exercising of powers by the State Government on a revision petition filed by the aggrieved person or even exercise of suo moto powers therein and he contends that the State Government is obliged to give an opportunity of hearing prior to any such orders being passed. Sri Singh submits that the same principles would apply to any action taken by the State Government under Rule 25 and hence the order dated 24th March, 2008 is vitiated. 22. Sri Singh further submits that if the State Government chose to take suo moto action then the same amounts to usurping the power of the controlling authority namely the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the disciplinary authority who could have proceeded with the matter after disagreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer. He submits that this having not been done, the State Government was at least obliged to give reasons on the basis of some cogent material evidence to indicate as to why it chose to differ with the views of the Enquiry Officer and the Superintendent of Police. He submits that the reason that there was evidence to the contrary and, therefore, the conclusion drawn by the authorities was wrong is based on no evidence nor any such recital has been made in the order and, therefore, the said flimsy reason is perverse and is abuse of the exercise of discretion under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules. 23. Replying to the said submission Sri Chaturvedi for the State submits that the manner in which opportunity has to be provided is clearly spelled out in the statute namely the 2nd proviso to Rule 23 and simultaneously the proviso contained in Rule 25. Exigencies, in which such an opportunity has to be given, are indicated. Where any adverse or prejudicial order indicating enhancement of punishment is to be passed only then opportunity is contemplated and not otherwise. Exigencies, in which such an opportunity has to be given, are indicated. Where any adverse or prejudicial order indicating enhancement of punishment is to be passed only then opportunity is contemplated and not otherwise. He submits that the reasons and the evidence are available on record and merely because there is no recital in the order dated 24th March 2008, the same would not vitiate the action of the State Government. 24. In essence he submits that a fresh de novo proceedings are genuinely warranted in this case in view of the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer and by the Disciplinary Authority, which according to him is contrary to law. 25. Before proceeding to dwell into the issues raised, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant rules of the 1991 Rules in relation to the proceedings that can be invoked for disciplinary action. 26. The 1991 Rules defines an appointing authority to mean the authority empowered to make appointment to the post which a police officer for the time being holds. The Rules are applicable to all police officers of the subordinate ranks not below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The punishment major or minor both are provided in Rule 4 and by virtue of Rule 5, it has been provided that the procedure for award of punishment in relation to major punishments shall be dealt with under Rule 14 (1) whereas in relation to minor penalties the procedure has to be dealt with in Rule 14 (2). However, in addition to the aforesaid major and minor penalties there are lesser punishments provided for in sub-rule 2 and in sub-rule 3 of Rule 4 for which the procedure to be followed is provided in Rule 15. 27. The power to punish is conferred on the Government or any officer of the police department not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police in relation to the punishments enumerated in Rule 4. There is an exception under sub-rule 2 of Rule 7 where the Superintendent of Police can award some of the punishments as referred to in sub-rule 1 of Rule 4. However, the Superintendent of Police has been given powers to award any of the punishment on police officers below the rank of Sub-Inspector. 28. The punishment of dismissal and removal and its procedure has been provided for in Rule 8. 29. However, the Superintendent of Police has been given powers to award any of the punishment on police officers below the rank of Sub-Inspector. 28. The punishment of dismissal and removal and its procedure has been provided for in Rule 8. 29. Under Rule 20 an appeal shall lie against the orders of punishment as referred to therein and after an appeal is rejected, a revision can be preferred under Rule 23. The power of revision can also be exercised suo moto by the revising authority. This power can, however, be exercised after giving the person effected a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. 30. Rule 23 which is relevant for the purpose of the arguments advanced before this Court is quoted below : “23. Revision.—(1) An officer whose appeal has been rejected by any authority subordinate to the Government is entitled to submit an application for revision to the authority next in the rank above by which this appeal has been rejected within the period of three months from the date of rejection of appeal. On such an application the powers of revision may be exercised only when, in consequent of flagrant irregularity, there appears to have been material injustice or miscarriage of justice : Provided that the revising authority may on its own motion call for and examine the records of any order passed in appeal against which no revision has been preferred under this rule for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit : Provided further that no order under the first proviso shall be made except after giving the person effect a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) The procedure prescribed for appeal applies also to application for revision. An application for revision of an order rejecting an appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the original order as well as the order of appellate authority.” 31. The power to enhance a punishment has been given to the appellate authority and the revising authority under Rule 24. 32. Thereafter, powers have been conferred on the State Government under Rule 25, which is to the following effect : “25. The power to enhance a punishment has been given to the appellate authority and the revising authority under Rule 24. 32. Thereafter, powers have been conferred on the State Government under Rule 25, which is to the following effect : “25. Powers of Government.—Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, the Government may, on its own motion or otherwise, call for an examine the records of any case decided by an authority subordinate to it in the exercise of any power conferred on such authority by these rules, and against which no appeal has been preferred under these rules and- (a) confirm, modify or revise the order passed by such authority; or (b) direct that a further inquiry be held in the case; or (c) reduce or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; or (d) make such other order in the case as it may deem fit : Provided that where it is proposed to enhance the penalty imposed by any such order the Police Officer concerned shall be given an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed enhancement.” 33. The State Government under the said rule is required to give an opportunity of showing cause in the event it proposes to enhance the punishment in exercise of such powers. 34. The submissions which have been raised in the present writ petition related to the grant of opportunity to an officer other than a contingency of enhancement of punishment. 35. In the instant case, the State Government has ordered a de novo enquiry and, therefore, the issue raised is as to whether such an opportunity is necessary to be given to the employee before passing of an order under Clause (b) of the said Rules. It is admitted between the parties that no opportunity was given to the petitioner prior to the passing of the impugned order dated 24.3.2008. It is in the light of the aforesaid facts that the answer has to be given on the submissions raised. 36. This issue as to whether an administrative authority proceeding to exercise suo moto powers is obliged to give an opportunity of hearing to a person effected by such an order has been reflected in the decision of D.N. Roy (supra) in paragraph 7, as follows : “7. It is true that the order in question also refers to “all other powers enabling in this behalf”. It is true that the order in question also refers to “all other powers enabling in this behalf”. But in its return to the writ petition the Central Government did not plead that the impugned order was passed in exercise of its suo moto powers. We agree that if the exercise of a power can be traced to an existing power even though that power was not purported to have been exercised, under certain circumstances, the exercise of the power can be upheld on the strength of an undisclosed but undoubted power. But in this case the difficulty is that at no stage the Central Government intimated to the appellant that it was exercised its suo moto power. At all stages it purported to act under Rules 54 and 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. If the Central Government wanted to exercise its suo moto power it should have intimated that fact as well as the grounds on which it proposed to exercise that power to the appellant and given him an opportunity to show-cause against the exercise of suo moto power as well as against the grounds on which it wanted to exercise its power. Quite clearly the Central Government had not given him that opportunity. The High Court thought that as the Central Government had not only intimated to the appellant the grounds mentioned in the application made by the 5th respondent but also the comments of the State Government, the appellant had adequate opportunity to put forward his case. This conclusion in our judgment is untenable. At no stage the appellant was informed that the Central Government proposed to exercise its suo moto power and asked him to show-cause against the exercise of such a power. Failure of the Central Government to do so, in our opinion, vitiates the impugned order.” 37. The argument in this case on behalf of the State is that the legislature or the rule making authority made a provision for grant of opportunity only in a limited sense where the State Government was proceeding to pass an order enhancing the punishment. Accordingly, the argument raised is that Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules does not make any provision for grant of opportunity prior to the passing of any and every order. Accordingly, the argument raised is that Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules does not make any provision for grant of opportunity prior to the passing of any and every order. It is also argued on behalf of the State that passing of an order for de novo enquiry does not prejudice the cause of the petitioner in any way and hence no opportunity is required. 38. Analysing the aforesaid submissions, in the instant case, the petitioner was practically exonerated of the charges as the charge-sheet itself was quashed on the recommendation of the Enquiry Officer. Once such an order is passed then the proceedings against the petitioner in relation to the said charges terminate, inasmuch as, the Superintendent of Police has not ordered any further enquiry. Not only this, the Deputy Inspector General of Police has merely made a communication dated 23.3.2008 to the State Government on its asking on 21st March, 2008. Neither the Superintendent of Police nor the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who have been conferred with the powers under Rule 7 of the 1991 Rules have chosen to disagree with the report of the Enquiry Officer and to further punish the petitioner. This situation, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the petitioner was not sought to be punished and the charges against him were dropped. 39. Accordingly, the petitioner had every right to know the basis for ordering a re-enquiry as a status of a reinstated employee had accrued in his favour absolving him of the charges. If this situation was sought to be upturned by the State Government then in the opinion of the Court, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the powers that were being exercised by the State Government under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules for ordering a de novo enquiry. 40. The view expressed by the Apex Court in the case of D.N. Roy (supra) has been followed in the case of Shahabad Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Secretary to Government of Haryana Corporation, (2006) 12 SCC 404 and further in the case of Hidayatkhan Bismillakhan Pathan v. Vaijnath and others, (2009) 7 SCC 506 . 41. 40. The view expressed by the Apex Court in the case of D.N. Roy (supra) has been followed in the case of Shahabad Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Secretary to Government of Haryana Corporation, (2006) 12 SCC 404 and further in the case of Hidayatkhan Bismillakhan Pathan v. Vaijnath and others, (2009) 7 SCC 506 . 41. The power exercised by the State Government subjecting the petitioner to a de novo enquiry in respect of the same charges, where the charge-sheet has already been quashed would, therefore, prejudice the cause of the petitioner as he stood absolved of the same charges. Subjecting him to a fresh enquiry would, therefore, require the twin conditions of reasons existing on record to hold a de novo enquiry by invoking the powers of Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules and also giving him an opportunity prior to the passing of such an order, if prejudice has been caused. Had there been no decision by the authority, then the power could not have been invoked under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules and even otherwise holding of a mere enquiry cannot by itself amount to prejudice. In view of this, the petitioner ought to have been heard or given an opportunity prior to the decision taken by the Government to hold a de novo enquiry. 42. The next question is as to whether in fact there was any material available to substantiate the reason given in the impugned order dated 24.3.2008 to hold a de novo enquiry. The recital contained in the order dated 24.3.2008 is to the effect that the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority have proceeded to render their opinion without appreciating the facts on record and contrary to the weight of evidence on record. It has also been indicated that without a proper examination of the material and without exercising discretion in accordance with law both the authorities have committed an error in quashing the charge-sheet and hence de novo enquiry was necessary. 43. The said order does not indicate as to what was that evidence on which a contrary view has been taken by the authorities so as to vitiate the action and form an opinion otherwise. No specific evidence, instance or material has been discussed by the State Government and, therefore, the reason given is in the shape of a conclusion. 43. The said order does not indicate as to what was that evidence on which a contrary view has been taken by the authorities so as to vitiate the action and form an opinion otherwise. No specific evidence, instance or material has been discussed by the State Government and, therefore, the reason given is in the shape of a conclusion. In the opinion of the Court, every conclusion should be supported by cogent reasons that may support the order and the decision making process. The order dated 24th March, 2008 makes general comments without specifying the exact reason for having taken a different view. The Enquiry Officer in his 35 pages report has rendered his analysis. If the same was contrary to the evidence on record, the same could have been spelled out in the order dated 24th March, 2008. If the State Government was proceeding to take a different view in the matter namely disagreeing with the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority then reasons for the same ought to have been specified and the same cannot be substituted by general comments. 44. Apart from this, had the petitioner been given an opportunity, he could have satisfied the State Government that there was no material to demonstrate that a contrary view was possible on the evidence as collected. As a matter of fact, the State Government has the power to decide such matters by invoking the powers under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules in which Clause (a) empowers the State Government to confirm, modify or revise any order passed by the authority. The powers in Rule 25 are wide enough but can be invoked only in a matter where a case is decided by any authority. To this extent, the power is slightly different from the power under Rule 23 of the 1991 Rules where the State Government can revise orders passed by the appellate authority. It is to be noted that in the revisional powers under Rule 23 where the revising authority exercises suo moto powers, it is obliged to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the effected person. The Court is conscious of the fact that whereever the legislature has thought fit, it has made provisions for giving of an opportunity. It is to be noted that in the revisional powers under Rule 23 where the revising authority exercises suo moto powers, it is obliged to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the effected person. The Court is conscious of the fact that whereever the legislature has thought fit, it has made provisions for giving of an opportunity. At the same time, the State Government while proceeding to take action under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules is also obliged to grant an opportunity where it proposes to upset a proceeding, which has been concluded. Rules of natural justice are not contained in a strait jacket formula. Reference be had to 2008 (12) JT 371 paragraphs 30 to 41. 45. In the instant case as noted above, the charge-sheet had been quashed by the Superintendent of Police and there remained nothing further to proceed against the petitioner. A finality was, therefore, attached to the proceeding in favour of the petitioner, which was sought to be re-opened by the State Government through a de novo enquiry on the ground that the evidence had not been properly appreciated either by the Enquiry Officer or by the Superintendent of Police. The least the State Government was expected in such circumstances was to apply the principles of fair play and ought to have sought for an explanation from the petitioner as to why a de novo enquiry be not ordered. The prejudice to the petitioner arises on account of the facts as narrated and undisputed that the Superintendent of Police had passed an order concluding the proceedings and simultaneously the State Government was reopening the issue by virtually disagreeing with the aforesaid action. The State Government has exercised its power in a couched manner which in my opinion amounts to revising the order of the Superintendent of Police. Resultantly the decision of the State Government is also referable to the powers conferred on it to revise an order under Clause (a) of Rule 25. The petitioner therefore had a right of audience at that stage. 46. The impugned order dated 24th March, 2008 also does not indicate any shortage or deficiency of any evidence in order to conduct the enquiry. In the absence of any such finding, it is not understood as to why a de novo enquiry has been ordered. The petitioner therefore had a right of audience at that stage. 46. The impugned order dated 24th March, 2008 also does not indicate any shortage or deficiency of any evidence in order to conduct the enquiry. In the absence of any such finding, it is not understood as to why a de novo enquiry has been ordered. The entire evidence was already collected and therebeing no indication in the order of any material wanting a de novo enquiry does not appear to have been warranted. Nonetheless, the State Government has the power to order an enquiry but the facts of the present case, where an order of the disciplinary authority had already intervened in favour of the petitioner, the State Government was obliged to provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before proceeding to pass an order to hold a de novo enquiry. The exercise of suo moto powers under Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules, therefore, ought to have proceeded with a notice to the petitioner, which has not been ultimately done in the instant case and, therefore, the order dated 24th March, 2008 is unsustainable. 47. Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General with the aid of the preliminary enquiry and the variation in the statements of the witnesses in the main enquiry has contended that the material did exist as the Enquiry Officer has deliberately twisted the evidence in order to obliterate the effect of the evidence against the petitioner. 48. The question as to whether the evidence had been twisted was a issue which does cause prejudice to the petitioner. The petitioner upon an opportunity could have explained that the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer and that the presentation of the report was in accordance with the evidence collected and not contrary to the same. The State Government, therefore, committed an error by just recording its conclusions without affording an opportunity to the petitioner, which vitiates the order impugned. The State Government instead could have called upon for an exercise if circumstances so warranted. The debate sought to be raised by the State of the nature of the power exercised under Rule 25 being purely administrative need not detain the Court, as now the settled trend of law is that the line of distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative functions is very thin and hence no further deliberation is desirable. 49. The debate sought to be raised by the State of the nature of the power exercised under Rule 25 being purely administrative need not detain the Court, as now the settled trend of law is that the line of distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative functions is very thin and hence no further deliberation is desirable. 49. Having so held, there is yet another argument which has to be considered namely that the order of the Superintendent of Police dated 27th February, 2008 quashing the charge-sheet is equally erroneous as the issue that arises is as to whether in such a situation the Court should interfere with the order dated 24th March, 2008, which would in effect restore the order of the Superintendent of Police dated 27th February, 2008. 50. I have carefully perused the order dated 27.2.2008 and the Superintendent of Police in a one line cryptic order has accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer. The order, if read plainly, reflects that the records were seen by the Superintendent of Police but the opinion making process of the Superintendent of Police is not reflected and he simply concludes that in view of the report of the Enquiry Officer the charge-sheet was being quashed. The Superintendent of Police was required to exercise his independent view with recording of reasons, may be in brief, but not so brief so as to reflect no reason at all. The Superintendent of Police was proceeding to quash the charge-sheet which in a way obliterated the entire disciplinary proceedings. This termination of the proceedings by quashing of the charge-sheet should, therefore, be proceeded by recording of reasons in brief for accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer so that the decision making process may reflect an appropriate application of mind and of exercise of discretion vested in the disciplinary authority. 51. In my opinion, the order of the Superintendent of Police does not conform to the aforesaid principles and is therefore equally erroneous. 52. The orders of the State Government and the Superintendent of Police suffer from malice in law. (See para 9 of (2004) 4 SCC Pg. 666). In view of the aforesaid conclusions drawn, both the orders dated 27.2.2008 and 24.3.2008 are unsustainable in law. This Court has ample powers to mould the relief in order to do justice between the parties. The orders of the State Government and the Superintendent of Police suffer from malice in law. (See para 9 of (2004) 4 SCC Pg. 666). In view of the aforesaid conclusions drawn, both the orders dated 27.2.2008 and 24.3.2008 are unsustainable in law. This Court has ample powers to mould the relief in order to do justice between the parties. In view of the findings as arrived at, it is necessary in the interest of justice to set aside the order dated 27.2.2008 as well. 53. Accordingly, the orders dated 27.2.2008 passed by the Superintendent of Police and the order dated 24.3.2008 passed by the State Government are quashed. 54. Quashing of the order of the Superintendent of Police will however not automatically revive the disciplinary proceedings, so long as the Superintendent of Police does not pass an order recording his reasons for either accepting the enquiry report or disagreeing with the same. In the event, the Superintendent of Police chooses to disagree with the enquiry report then in that event, the petitioner will again be entitled for an opportunity before any orders are passed by him. In the event, the Superintendent of Police agrees with the enquiry report then he shall record his reasons in brief and forward the same to the controlling authority namely the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with Rule 7 of the 1991 Rules. 55. After, the proceedings if concluded in favour of the petitioner, the State Government if it finds it necessary to proceed in the matter by exercise of its suo moto powers, then in that event the State Government can exercise its powers in the light of the observations made hereinabove and subject to the restrictions contained in Rule 25 of the 1991 Rules. 56. The petitioner has already been reinstated in service and, therefore, his status as such shall not be disturbed, inasmuch as, the quashing of the order dated 27.2.2008 will not revive the suspension order dated 20.6.2007 at this stage. Passing of this order shall not be in any way be an impediment to the State Government or authorities in relation to the transfer and posting of the petitioner in the administrative exigencies of the State. 57. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed subject to the observations made hereinabove. No order as to costs. —————