Judgment :- Balakrishnan Nair, J. The writ petitioner is the appellant. It is a Scheduled Bank. It filed the Writ Petition, challenging Ext.P1 order of the Labour Court, Ernakulam. 2. The brief facts of the case are the following : The respondents 2 to 8 were Head Clerks working under the appellant Bank in different branches. From the day they were appointed to that post, they were discharging the functions of Special Assistants also. So, they claimed that they were entitled to get special allowance, for discharging the functions of the Special Assistants. When their claim in that regard was not accepted by the appellant Bank, they moved the Labour Court, Ernakulam, under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, by filing claim petition Nos.24 and 25 of 1993, 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 of 1994. Those claim petitions were heard together by the Labour Court and Ext.P1 common order was passed by it, directing payment of special allowance to them. The relevant portion of Ext.P1 reads as follows :- "In the result, all the claim petitions are allowed. The opposite party is directed to pay Rs.36,075.88 (Rupees thirty six thousand seventy five and paise eighty eight only) to the petitioner in C.P.24/93(C), Rs.31,982.72 (Rupees Thirty one thousand nine hundred eighty two and paise seventy two only) to the petitioner in C.P.No.35/93(C), Rs.44,326.44 (Rupees Forty four thousand three hundred twenty six and paise forty four only) to the petitioner in C.P.1/94(C), Rs.32,268.28 (Rupees Thirty two thousand two hundred sixty eight and paise twenty eight only) to the petitioner in C.P.2/94(C), Rs.37,228/- (Rupees Thirty seven thousand two hundred and twenty eight only) to the petitioner in C.P.5/94(C), Rs.30,373.12 (Rupees Thirty thousand three hundred and seventy three and paise twelve only) to the petitioner in C.P.6/94(C) and Rs.30,373.12 (Rupees thirty thousand three hundred seventy three and paise twelve only) to the petitioner in C.P.No.7/94(C). The amounts shall carry 12% interest, if not paid within two months from this date." The appellant challenged Ext.P1, by filing the Writ Petition. The main contention canvassed before the learned Single Judge was that the claims of the workers were belated and stale. It was submitted that the special allowance payable between 1983 and 1994 was claimed, by filing petitions in 1993 and 1994. Since the claims were stale,according to the Bank, the same should not have been allowed. The main contention canvassed before the learned Single Judge was that the claims of the workers were belated and stale. It was submitted that the special allowance payable between 1983 and 1994 was claimed, by filing petitions in 1993 and 1994. Since the claims were stale,according to the Bank, the same should not have been allowed. We notice that the said contention was unsuccessfully raised before the Labour Court also, but the Labour Court took the view that the workmen concerned were pursuing their claim by filing representations from time to time and therefore, there is no delay from their part, in raising the claim. Before the learned Single Judge also, it was contended that the claims were barred by limitation. But, the learned Single Judge overruled the contention. Limited relief was granted, by relieving the Bank from paying interest, but directed the Bank to make the payment within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. In case, the amount was not paid within the said time limit, the amount will have to be paid with interest at the rate directed by the Labour Court. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, this Writ Appeal is preferred. 3. We heard the learned senior counsel Sri.Pathrose Mathai, for the appellant and Smt.Lakshmi B.Shenoy, for the workmen. The learned senior counsel submitted that the Labour Court is also a Court and therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings before it. Going by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, a claim, which is made beyond three years, is barred by limitation and the same should not have been allowed by the Labour Court. 4. The Labour Court is not a court for the purpose of Limitation Act. This point is squarely covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 209). In paragraph 3 of the said judgment, it was held as follows : "3. In our view Article 137 only contemplates applications to Courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a court. In paragraph 3 of the said judgment, it was held as follows : "3. In our view Article 137 only contemplates applications to Courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a court. Further Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is "when the court is closed". Again under Section 5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963." In view of the above authoritative pronouncement, the contention of the learned senior counsel, cannot be accepted. 5. In the result, the Writ Appeal fails and it is, accordingly, dismissed.