JUDGMENT JITENDRA CHAUHAN, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 7.5.2001 (for short as ‘impugned judgment’) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul (for short as ‘trial Court’), vide which the accused-appellant Harpal Singh has been convicted for the commission of offence under Section 307 IPC and under Section 25 of the Indian Arms Act in FIR No.277 dated 4.11.99 registered at Police Station City Narnaul. 2. The facts of the present case in the prosecution story as set up before the trial Court are that the complainant/injured Sunil Kumar (PW9) was student of P.G. College, Narnaul. In the academic year 1999-2000 he was student of B.A. Part-II. On 4.11.99 at 12.00/12.30 noon he was present at the bus stand of Narnaul for returning to his village Nasibpur, when all the four accused came there. Harpal accused was holding a knife/gupti Ex.P1. Jaswant, Ramesh and Ajay accused caught hold of him and Harpal accused gave a knife blow in the left side of his waist. Dharminder (PW10) and Naresh who were present at bus stand were attracted to the spot. On seeing them the accused fled. Dharmender and Naresh removed him to Civil Hospital, Narnaul where he was examined medico-legally by Dr. S P Sharma (PW12). Doctor presented a ruka Ex.PM to ASI Chand Singh (PW7) who was already present in the hospital with regard to investigation of some other case. He moved an application Ex.PF before the doctor to seek his opinion regarding fitness of the injured to make a statement. Doctor declared him fit. His statement Ex.PG was recorded at 4.30 p.m. and on the basis of that statement, FIR Ex.PG/1 was drawn. 3. The injured was referred to Medical College and Hospital, Rohtak (MCH) for further management where he was operated upon the same day by Dr. Anil Sharma (PW3). As per operation findings, there were performation of size 1 X .5 cm each on anterolateral aspect of descending colon near the splenic flexure. 4. On 22.12.99 an application was presented before Dr. S.P. Sharma (PW12) to seek his opinion regarding nature of injury. The doctor vide his endst. Ex.PN declared the injury dangerous to life. Initially the FIR was drawn under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC. On the basis of the opinion of the doctor the offence was converted under Section 307 IPC.” 5. S.P. Sharma (PW12) to seek his opinion regarding nature of injury. The doctor vide his endst. Ex.PN declared the injury dangerous to life. Initially the FIR was drawn under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC. On the basis of the opinion of the doctor the offence was converted under Section 307 IPC.” 5. On the basis of the above allegations in the prosecution case, all the accused were arrested and after completion of investigation, the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented and accordingly charge was framed against the accused to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. In order to support its case, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses, namely, Niranjan Lal as PW1; Krishan Kumar as PW2; Dr. Anil Sharma of MCH, Rohtak, as PW3; C. Mahesh Kumar, Draughtsman, who prepared the site plan Ex.PB, as PW4; ASI Ram Niwas as PW5; ASI Chand Singh as PW7; Dr. Rajesh Verma as PW8; Sunil Kumar, injured, as PW9; Dharmender, eye-witness, as PW10; Chhaju Ram, Investigating Officer, as PW11 and Dr. S P Sharma, who medico-legally examined the injured, as PW12. 7. After the prosecution closed its evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by putting them all the incriminating material against them in prosecution case which they all denied and pleaded their false implication. 8. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence before it, acquitted Ajay Kumar and Jaswant and Ramesh Chand while observing that the prosecution has failed to bring home guilt against them. However, the present appellant was convicted under Section 307 IPC and Section 25 of Indian Arms Act vide judgment dated 7.5.2001.. 9. Aggrieved against the conviction, the accused-appellant-Harpal Singh has challenged the judgment of the learned trial Court by filing the present appeal before this Court. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the occurrence took place on 4.11.1999. Initially the FIR was registered under Section 324/34 of IPC. On 12.12.1999, Section 307 of IPC was added. The injured stood already discharged from the hospital on 15.11.1999. Thus, the huge delay in obtaining the opinion of the doctor creates considerable doubt on the genuineness of the prosecution version particularly when it has come in the statement of Dr. Anil Sharma, PW-3, Medical College and Hospital, Rohtak that the injured was operated upon on 4.11.1999 itself. 11. The injured stood already discharged from the hospital on 15.11.1999. Thus, the huge delay in obtaining the opinion of the doctor creates considerable doubt on the genuineness of the prosecution version particularly when it has come in the statement of Dr. Anil Sharma, PW-3, Medical College and Hospital, Rohtak that the injured was operated upon on 4.11.1999 itself. 11. It is further argued that from the evidence on record, it is apparent that the name of the appellant was added at a later stage. According to the injured/complainant, he left for Medical College Rohtak at about 1-1/30 p.m., whereas as per the statement of Investigating Officer, the statement of injured was recorded at 4.30 p.m. at Narnaul itself. 12. Learned counsel has further argued that a perusal of the DDR would reveal that neither the names of co-accused Ajay and Jaswant nor the place of occurrence was mentioned. Furthermore, the names of eyewitnesses and the time of the alleged occurrence has also not been given in the DDR. The weapon of offence has been mentioned as `knife' instead of `gupti'. He has also submitted that alleged recovery is stated to be affected from an open space, which makes the recovery highly doubtful. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has argued that case of the prosecution is proved beyond reasonable doubt as the appellant had caused incised wound on the person of the injured, which was declared dangerous to life as per Exhibit PN, therefore, he has prayed that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the learned trial Court be maintained. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 15. The injured/complainant Sunil (PW9) has made a categoric statement that he was given knife blow on the left side of waist by the appellant. Dharmender, PW10 (eye-witness) has corroborated the statement of injured. Dr. S.P.Sharma, PW12, who medico-legally examined the injured, has given description of the injury caused by the appellant, as such, the factum of the injury inflicted by the appellant stands corroborated. It has further come in the testimony of PW-12 that as per Exhibit PN, the injury was declared as dangerous to life. This witness, after examining the weapon of offence, gave opinion to the effect that the said injury could be caused by the said weapon. It has further come in the testimony of PW-12 that as per Exhibit PN, the injury was declared as dangerous to life. This witness, after examining the weapon of offence, gave opinion to the effect that the said injury could be caused by the said weapon. Thus, there is complete consistency between the ocular version and the medical evidence. 16. So far as the delay is concerned, it is made out from the record that the appellant was medico-legally examined on 4.11.1999 itself and after receiving the radiological report, the injury was declared dangerous to life by Dr. S.P.Sharma, PW12 vide Exhibit PN, on 12.12.1999. Therefore, there is no delay in the instant case. The report, Exhibit PN, is based on the radiological report, which was prepared on 6.2.2001. The radiological report was received at a little belated stage, but does not affect the authenticity of the document. The injured was admitted in the hospital on the same day. He made a categoric statement that knife injury was given by the appellant as there was some altercation between them 2-3 days prior to the occurrence when they were taking tuition. Thus, there was a motive available with the appellant to cause injuries on the person of the complainant. The seat of injury and the weapon used in the commission of offence fully establish the intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the injured. From the evidence, it is sufficiently established that the appellant had intention and knowledge of causing death, therefore, the nature of injury is not material. However, it is important to note that in the instant case, the injury was declared dangerous to life. 17. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru and another, 2005 (3) RCR (Crl.) 749 has observed as under:- “12. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” 18. In State of M.P. v. Kashiram & others, 2009 (1) RCR (Crl.) 956, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- 13. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 (2) RCR (Crl.) 427. 14. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia, 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. 19. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil & others, 1983 AIR (SC) has observed as under:- “10. 19. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil & others, 1983 AIR (SC) has observed as under:- “10. The High Court, in our opinion, was not correct in acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 307, I.P.C. merely because the injuries inflicted on the victims were in the nature of a simple hurt. Therefore, that part of the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 11 of the offence under Section 307, I.P.C. cannot be sustained and must be set aside. They have, however, already served out sentence of imprisonment for two years for the offence under Sections 147 and 148, I.P.C. in pursuance of the order of the High Court. When the State filed an appeal against them they were arrested again and had to remain in jail for three months before they could be released on bail. Thus, they have already served a sentence of two years, three months. In the circumstances, the ends of justice would be met if the sentence is limited to the period already undergone.” 20. Admittedly, the appellant was student at the time of occurrence. However, this fact itself is not a sufficient mitigating factor to taking a lenient view in such matters. In the cases where serious injuries are administered on trivial altercations would bring disastrous impact on society and such a view would also not serve the public interest. Thus, the case of prosecution is fully established beyond reasonable doubt from the statement(s) of the injured witness, eye witness and on the basis of medical evidence. 21. For the reasons mentioned above, the present appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment dated 7.5.2001 passed by the learned trial Court is maintained. The appellant is stated to be on bail. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled and he be taken into custody forthwith to serve remainder of his sentence. Appeal dismissed.