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Allahabad High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 2598 (ALL)

Dharmendra Singh and others v. Sant Saran Gupta and another

2010-08-26

SHRI KANT TRIPATHI

body2010
Shri Kant Tripathi, J.;- Heard learned counsel for the applicants and the learned A.G.A. for the respondent no. 2 and perused the record. None is present for the respondent no. 1. 2. This is an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings of criminal complaint case no. 373/IX-1987 under sections 417/420 I.P.C., Sant Saran Gupta Vs. Dharmendra Singh and others pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate-Ist Class, Karvi, District Banda. 3. The learned counsel for the applicants submitted that according to the allegations made in the complaint no criminal charge is made out and the dispute is of civil nature. The respondent no. 1 had given the dealership on the basis of an agreement and if any breach of the agreement was committed, the same does not constitute the offences under sections 415, 417, 418, 420 and 120-B I.P.C. 4. It appears that the respondent no. 1, Sant Saran Gupta is the proprietor of Sant Agencies, Ganesh Bazar, Karvi. The applicant nos. 1 and 3 are the proprietor of the Hindustan Sales Corporation, Chandigarh and the applicant no. 2 is the Manager of the Hindustan Sales Corporation. An agreement between the applicants and the respondent no. 1 took place whereby the applicants agreed to appoint the respondent no. 1 as their dealer for supplying gas and the dealership continued for certain period and when the applicants stopped the supplies to the respondent no. 1, he contacted the applicants and any how get executed a fresh agreement and the dealership thereafter continued on the basis of the fresh agreement. But again, the applicants committed breach of the agreement and failed to supply despite taking security money of Rs. 10,000/-. In this way, the applicants committed forgery and cheated the respondent no. 1. 5. The learned counsel for the applicants submitted that according to the allegations made in the complaint, only a dispute of civil nature is made out, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable. If the applicants, in pursuance of the agreement, made supplies to the respondent no. 1 for certain period and later on stopped the supplies, the intention of the applicants cannot said to have been dishonest at the beginning of the contract. Therefore, the proceedings of the complaint case are liable to be quashed. 6. Section 415 IPC defines cheating, which reads: "415. 1 for certain period and later on stopped the supplies, the intention of the applicants cannot said to have been dishonest at the beginning of the contract. Therefore, the proceedings of the complaint case are liable to be quashed. 6. Section 415 IPC defines cheating, which reads: "415. Cheating.-Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'." 7. An offence of cheating, therefore, is not made out unless the following ingredients exist: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or to consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit. 8. In the case of V.Y. Jose and another (supra), the Apex Court has held that for the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise, no offence under section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out. In para 21 and 28 the Apex Court further observed: "21. There exists a distinction between pure contractual dispute of a civil nature and an offence of cheating. Although breach of contract per se would not come in the way of initiation of a criminal proceeding, there can not be any doubt whatsoever that in the absence of the averments made in the complaint petition where from the ingredients of an offence can be found out, the court should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ........... 28. ........... 28. A matter which essentially involves dispute of a civil nature should not be allowed to be the subject matter of a criminal offence, the latter being not a short cut of executing a decree which is non-existent. The superior courts, with a view to maintain purity in the administration of justice, should not allow abuse of the process of court. It has a duty in terms of section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to supervise the functioning of the trial courts." 9. A similar principle has been propounded in the case of S.V.L. Murthy vs. State represented by CBI, Hyderabad (2009) 6 SCC 77 . In that case the Apex Court has held that one of the ingredients of cheating, as defined in section 415 IPC, is existence of an intention to cheat at the time of making initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of contract. 10. A mere breach of promise does not constitute any criminal charge. There is nothing in the entire complaint to show that the intention of the applicants were dishonest from the very beginning. If they changed their attitude later on, the same cannot constitute the criminal charges levelled against them. 11. In my opinion, the dispute is of civil nature and as such the complaint can not proceed. 12. The application is allowed. Consequently, the summoning order as well as the proceedings of the aforesaid complaint case are quashed.