JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. In this appeal, the Appellant has called in question the legality of the judgment and order dated 25.6.2002 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in S.T. (W. T/S) 183 of 1996 convicting the Appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. 2. The prosecution version in a nut shell is as follows: On 04.05.1995 at about 11/11-30 a.m. the informant Joynal Miah (P.W. 1) received an information that his niece Halema Khatun @ Akashi was killed by chopping at Madhuban Choumuhani. He then rushed to Madhuban Choumuhani and saw that Akashi, aged about 18 years, was lying dead on the western side of Sonamura-Melaghar road with multiple cut injuries on her face, back and other parts of the body. He also came to know from his sister Jaynennessa (P.W. 9), mother of deceased Akashi and niece Maleka Banu sister of deceased Akashi (P.W. 10) and wife of his nephew that on that day at about 10.30 a.m. one Dulal Chakraborty son of late Nani Gopal Chakraborty of his village came to the house of Akashi and requested her to go with him pulling her hand. Dulal also showed her some money. Thereafter, Akashi proceeded towards Madhuban Choumuhani following Dulal. They reached Madhuban Choumuhani at about 11.00 a.m. and it was strongly suspected by the informant that after their arrival at Madhuban Choumuhani, Dulal with some of his accomplices murdered Akashi by striking with sharp weapons. 3. It is also stated that before this incident, earlier on the first day of last Madhyamik examination at about 11.00 p.m., two young boys of Melaghar forcibly entered into the house of Akashi with ill motive. Later, one of them was apprehended by the inmates of the house and he was set free on request. 4. Thereafter, informant Joynal Miah lodged oral complaint to Sonamura P.S. which was recorded by Sri Manindra Debnath, Sub-Inspector of Police, (P.W. 25) the then time posted at Sonamura P.S. and the same was treated as FIR (Ext. PA-19). The said complaint was received on 4.5.1995 at 2.15 p.m. and Sonamura P.S. Case No. 40/95 was registered under Section 302 IPC. Investigation proceeded and the charge sheet came to be filed against the accused Promode Debnath for committing offence under Section 302 IPC. 5. PA-19). The said complaint was received on 4.5.1995 at 2.15 p.m. and Sonamura P.S. Case No. 40/95 was registered under Section 302 IPC. Investigation proceeded and the charge sheet came to be filed against the accused Promode Debnath for committing offence under Section 302 IPC. 5. It is to be noted here that Dulal Chakraborty whose name was recorded in the FIR as a suspected accused and who was interrogated by the police, and subsequently released from the police station as no evidence could be collected against him. 6. As the offence under Section 302 IPC is to be tried by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala for trial. Charge was framed against the accused Promode Debnath under Section 302 IPC to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. At the time of trial, the accused Appellant was not represented by any learned Counsel. Therefore, the learned Trial Court appointed a learned counsel as Amicus Curiae to defend the accused-Appellant. 8. The prosecution, in order to substantiate its case, examined as many as 25 witnesses including the official witnesses. 9. The accused Appellant declined to produce any witness in his defence. On completion of evidence of P.Ws. the statement of the accused Appellant was recorded under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure and he simply denied his involvement in the alleged incident. 10. On completion of the trial, upon appraisal of the entire evidence on record, the learned Additional Sessions Judge held the accused Appellant guilty of the charge and convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, as stated supra. 11. Being aggrieved, the accused Appellant preferred the instant appeal. 12. We have heard Mr. P.K. Pal learned Counsel for the accused-Appellant and Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor as assisted by Mr. R.C. Debnath for the State Respondents. 13. We have gone through the entire evidence on record. Before we deal with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, it would be profitable to introduce the prosecution witnesses, as examined, in support of their case, which are as follows: P.W. 1, Joynal Miah is the maternal uncle of the deceased Akashi and the person who lodged the FIR which is hearsay in nature. Before we deal with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, it would be profitable to introduce the prosecution witnesses, as examined, in support of their case, which are as follows: P.W. 1, Joynal Miah is the maternal uncle of the deceased Akashi and the person who lodged the FIR which is hearsay in nature. P.W. 2, Habij Miah in his statement said that he does not know who committed murder of Akashi. P.W. 3, Habil Miah is a rickshaw puller in whose presence inquest report over the dead body of Akashi was prepared. As such, he is the witness of the said inquest report. He did not say anything about the accused Appellant. P.W. 4, Kamajit Das is a daily labourer who is an eye witness, but he did not stand on his statement made before the police. He was declared hostile by the prosecution. Even after he was declared hostile, he said certain things which would help the prosecution case for corroboration of other evidences on record. P.W. 6, Hannan Miah is the elder brother of Akashi and by profession a driver of a Jeep who heard about the incident from Md. Abu Taher Miah @ Taher Miah (P.W. 13) and Kamajit Das (P.W. 4) of their village. After hearing about the incident, he rushed to the Sonamura hospital and saw the deceased Akashi with several cut injuries on her face, back and other parts of the dead body of Akashi. He also stated that Akashi was married and at the relevant time, she was pregnant. P.W. 7, Gouranga Dutta is a driver by profession who got information regarding the incident of murder of Akashi from his brother Sudip Dutta (P.W. 12) who is an eye witness of the incident and was declared hostile as he shifted from statement recorded under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure. P.W. 8, Dulal Chakraborty is a daily labourer who was initially suspected as an accused and subsequently shown as a witness in the charge sheet. He stated that he did not go to the house of Akashi and on the date of occurrence he was working as a labourer in the house of Md. Asad Ali (P.W. 11), father of a judicial officer namely Abdul Rashid, who was holding the post of Civil Judge (Sr. Division). He stated that he did not go to the house of Akashi and on the date of occurrence he was working as a labourer in the house of Md. Asad Ali (P.W. 11), father of a judicial officer namely Abdul Rashid, who was holding the post of Civil Judge (Sr. Division). This witness also stated that he worked in the paddy field of P.W. 11 till 2/2-30 P.M. P.W. 9, Smt. Joyjanemesse is the mother of the deceased Akashi who stated that they gave marriage of Akashi in Bangladesh and her husband was living in Bangladesh and as her husband married another girl, Akashi left the house of her husband and came to them. She also stated, that Akashi was pregnant for about 7 months and on the date of incident at about 10 a.m., she was going to Melaghar hospital and was waiting at Madhuban Choumuhani to catch the bus. From Kamajit Das (P.W. 4) and one Samir she learnt that Akashi was murdered at Madhuban Choumuhani by the accused Appellant who is a resident of Madhuban. P.W. 10, Smt. Malaka Bhanu is the younger sister of Akashi who heard about the incident from her father (P.W. 5). P.W. 11, Md. Asad Ali who corroborated the statement of P.W. 8, Dulal Chakraborty that Dulal worked in his paddy land on the date of the incident from where in the afternoon the police called Dulal and brought him to the police station for interrogation. Later in the evening, Dulal was released from the police station. P.W. 12, Sudip Dutta is an eye witness and was declared hostile as he shifted from his statement recorded under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure. P.W. 13, Md. Abu Taher Miah @ Taher Miah is an eye witness and mainly relying whose evidence along with the aid of evidence of P.W. 4, P.W. 12, P.W. 15, and P.W. 24, Dr. Pijush Kanti Das, the Trial Court convicted the accused Appellant. P.W. 14, Ranjit Das is a sub-contractor and brother of P.W. 4, Kamajit Das who was also declared hostile. P.W. 15, Smti. Manika Debnath, niece of the accused Appellant was a student of Class-IV at that time and a seizure witness of one shirt and one lungi of the accused Appellant. This witness was also declared hostile. P.W. 16, Md. P.W. 14, Ranjit Das is a sub-contractor and brother of P.W. 4, Kamajit Das who was also declared hostile. P.W. 15, Smti. Manika Debnath, niece of the accused Appellant was a student of Class-IV at that time and a seizure witness of one shirt and one lungi of the accused Appellant. This witness was also declared hostile. P.W. 16, Md. Taher Miah is a seizure witness in presence of whom police seized lungi and shirt. P.W. 17, Md. Abul Hassein is a tender witness. P.W. 18, Hriday Debbarma is a constable who accompanied P.W. 25, the I.O. of the case in presence of whom I.O. prepared the inquest report and took the dead body of Akashi to the Sonamura hospital. P.W. 19, Subhash Ch. Saha is a judicial officer who recorded the statement of P.Ws. 4, 12, 13 and 15 under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. P.W. 20, Swapan Roy, a Sub-Inspector of Police, who recorded the oral statement of P.W. 1 and registered the police case No. 40 of 1995 under Section 302 IPC. P.W. 21, Kshitish Debnath who was the Officer in-charge of Sonamura P.S. at the relevant time and endorse the police case for investigation to P.W. 25, Manindra Debnath, S.I. P.W. 22, Smt. Rahima Begum, sister-in-law of the deceased Akashi. P.W. 23, Shri Khokan Majumder is the owner of a tong shop at Madhuban Choumuhani from whose shop Akashi purchased 'pan' (betel leaf) just before the incident. P.W. 24, Dr. Pijush Kanti Das proved the Post Mortem report prepared by Dr. Usha Raiyan Das, who was the Medical Officer of Sonamura Hospital the then time. P.W. 25, Manindra Debnath, S.I. who did the investigation of the case and filed charge sheet. 14. The learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence mainly relying upon the evidence of P.W. 5, Md. Joynal Abedin, father of the deceased and P.W. 13, Md. Abu Taher Miah, who is an independent eye witness, and also the post mortem report prepared by Dr. Usha Ranjan Das, since dead at the time of trial, which was approved by P.W. 24, and the seizure list, Exbt. Joynal Abedin, father of the deceased and P.W. 13, Md. Abu Taher Miah, who is an independent eye witness, and also the post mortem report prepared by Dr. Usha Ranjan Das, since dead at the time of trial, which was approved by P.W. 24, and the seizure list, Exbt. P.W. 9 as well as the evidence of P.W. 4, and P.W. 12, who are also eye witnesses and were declared hostile by the prosecution as those witnesses resiled from their earlier statement before the police even then some of their statements help the case of prosecution for corroboration of the evidence of other witnesses. It would be proper for this Court to discuss the relevant part of the evidence of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses, which we do hereunder: P.W. 4, Kamajit Das and P.W. 12, Sudip Dutta in their deposition before the Court supported the fact that they were working with P.W. 13, in connection with fitting of water pipe line at the Madhuban Choumuhani on the date of occurrence and at arrival of deceased Akashi at 10.30 a.m. at Madhuban Choumuhani and her chewing a pan purchasing from the shop of P.W. 23. P.W. 4 also deposed that Akshi offered him a pan. Both, P.W. 4 and P.W. 12, have also corroborated the fact as stated by P.W. 13 that Akashi was sitting on Agartala-Sonamura Road beneath a flower tree and the distance between the place where Akashi sat and the place where they were working was about 8/9 cubits and then suddenly P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 heard a cry, 'Maa go'. They have deposed that on hearing cry 'Maa go' they went there and saw the dead body of Akashi with bleeding injuries which appeared to have been inflicted by Dao, but thereafter both P.W. 4 and P.W. 2 became hostile and they did not implicate the accused-Appellant Pramod with murder and for this the prosecution side declared them hostile. The said statement of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 recorded by P.W. 25, investigating authority under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure has been marked as Exhibit P 4 and Exhibit P 7 respectively. 15. In their cross they have stated that there was bamboo fencing between the place where they were working and where Akashi was sitting and so they could not see Akashi and could not see what happened there. 16. 15. In their cross they have stated that there was bamboo fencing between the place where they were working and where Akashi was sitting and so they could not see Akashi and could not see what happened there. 16. The said fact was not believed by the learned Trial Court as they did not state the same while they gave statement before the learned SDJM, P.W. 19 within 3/4 days of the incident during investigation while their statement was recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. Rather the P.W. 19 in his deposition specifically stated that P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 gave their statements which he recorded on oath under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure and on identification. The Statement of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 under Section 164(5) Code of Criminal Procedure has been identified by P.W. 19 and marked as Exhibit P A3-2 and Exhibit P6-1 respectively. From the recorded statements, it appears that P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 stated before the Magistrate, P.W. 19 during investigation that on 04.05.1995 at about 10.45 a.m. while they were working at Madhuban Choumuhani in connection with fitting of pipe line for water they saw the deceased Akashi chewing a pan and waiting beneath a flower tree in the left side of the Agartala-Sonamura Road at Madhuban Choumuhani. P.W. 12 in his statement, marked Exhibit P61, also stated that at about 11.00 a.m. he heard a cry and saw the accused Pramod Debnath was striking her with a 'cheni dao'. P.W. 4 has stated in his statement, marked Exhibit PA-3-2 that at about 10.45 a.m. he heard a cry, 'Maa go' and saw Akashi was lying dead with bleeding injuries on her person and Pramod Debnath looking towards them with a 'cheni dao'. It is to be mentioned here that P.W. 4 while deposing before the Court has stated that he told the learned SDJM about the incident, and the learned Magistrate, recorded his statement under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure and on his identification his signature in the recorded statement under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure is marked at Exhibit P-A-3/1. 17. P.W. 13, Md. 17. P.W. 13, Md. Abu Taher Miah who is an independent eye witness, in his deposition before the Court and cross examination therein stated that about 5/6 years ago, Thursday at about 7.30 a.m. he together with P.W. 4, Kamaj it Das and P.W. 12, Sudip Dutta were working at Madhuban Choumuhani as labourers in connection with fitting of water pipe lines under Babul Mia, who was a contractor for the said work, and Sri Ranjit Das, P.W. 14, brother of the P.W. 4 was a subcontractor. He also stated that they started their work at 7.30 a.m. at Madhuban Choumuhani and at about 10.30 a.m. deceased went to Madhuban Choumuhani and she was chewing 'pan' (betel leaf) purchasing it from a tong shop and was sitting under a flower tree near Madhuban Choumuhani in the western side of Melaghar Sonamura Road which runs from South to North and the Madhuban road is also known as the College road which touches the Melaghar-Sonamura road. The distance between the place where Akashi was sitting and the place where he together with P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 were working, was 5/6 cubits, and the place where Akashi sat, was visible from their place. There was no barrier between the place where Akashi sat and the place where they were working. At about 11.00 a.m. he heard a cry of Akashi, 'Maa go' (Oh mother, a cry in distress) and he looked at the place where Akashi was sitting and saw that accused-Appellant Pramode was striking her with a Cheni Dao. He together with P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 saw that accused Pramode was inflicting dao blow upon Akashi. He saw cheni dao in his hand and there was blood in the said cheni dao. He further deposed that he gave statement before the learned SDJM, Sonamura P.W. 19 during investigation and he told in his statement what he saw and heard, and the learned Magistrate also recorded the same in his statement judicially and thereafter he put his left thumb impression on the recorded statement. In his cross examination, he has categorically stated that he had no blood relation with the deceased Akashi. The statement of him recorded by the P.W. 19 Judicial Magistrate under Section 164(5) Code of Criminal Procedure was marked Exhibit P 15. The defence also failed to shaken the evidence of P.W. 13 while cross examining him. 18. In his cross examination, he has categorically stated that he had no blood relation with the deceased Akashi. The statement of him recorded by the P.W. 19 Judicial Magistrate under Section 164(5) Code of Criminal Procedure was marked Exhibit P 15. The defence also failed to shaken the evidence of P.W. 13 while cross examining him. 18. P.W. 24, Dr. Pijush Kanti Das in his deposition stated that he knew the handwriting and signature of deceased Dr. Usha Ranjan Das, the Medical Officer of Sonamura Rural Hospital at the relevant time who conducted the autopsy on the dead body of deceased Akashi on 04.05.1995 and prepared the autopsy report which was submitted in connection with GD No. 136 dated 04.05.1995, as both of them worked together in the said hospital and on identification by him the autopsy report furnished by Dr. Usha Ranjan Das has been marked as Exhibit P 19 and his signature is marked as Exhibit P 19/1 and as per the said post mortem report, the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased Akashi are as follows: (i) There were deep cut injury on the dead body over lateral side of right eye extending up to the temporal region measuring 3"X'1/2"X1/3" and cutting plica at the right ear; (ii) Deep cut injury on the maxilar area of left side infra orbital area measuring 1 1/2" X 1/2" X 1/2" including alaenasal on leftside; (iii) In the abdomen right side deep cut injury involving mandible right ramus 2"X'1/2"X'1/2"; (iv) In the left arm above elbow humerus completely cut into two pieces; deep cut injury measuring 6"X 2 1/2" X 2 1/2"; (v) In the right palm there is deep cut injury 6 1/2"X3 1/2"X 1/2"; (vi) In the right shoulder joint deep cut injury exposing humerus; and scapula over back side 8" X 3" X 2 1/2"; (vii) Deep cut injury over right shoulder joint 2"X2" X 1/2". In the aforesaid Post Mortem report (exhibit P 19) it is specifically mentioned that there is a deep cut injury over the right side of the face over the infra orbital region 2" X 1/2"X 1/2" and above noted multiple deep cut injury all over the face, right shoulder both sides at the back involving vertebrae column. Uterus contains 24-28 weeks of female foetus in dead condition. Uterus contains 24-28 weeks of female foetus in dead condition. According to the doctor, who caused the autopsy (Exhibit P 19), the cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory failure by hypovolumic shock due to the sudden haemorrhage due to multiple deep cut injuries caused on the body and facial region. 19. The learned Trial Court, on going through the evidence of P.W. 4, P.W. 12 and P.W. 13 came to the conclusion that deceased Akashi on the date of occurrence went to I Madhuban Choumvihani at about 10.30 a.m. and she was chewing a pan by purchasing from a tong shop of Khokan at Madhuban Choumuhani and was waiting under a flower tree on the western side of Melaghar-Sonamura road/Agartala-Sonamura Road at Madhuban Choumuhani for a vehicle and all the aforesaid witnesses heard a cry 'Maa go' at about 11.00 a.m. and while P.W. 13 saw the incident of the accused striking the deceased with a cheni dao, P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 became hostile and did not corroborate the aforesaid fact. He also stated that P.W. 13, who is an independent witness and is dependable and his evidence can safely be believed and the statement of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12, in their cross that there was a bamboo fencing between the place where they were working and the place where Akashi was sitting under the lower tree in the western side of Melaghar-Sonamura road, is not believable as they did not state all these facts while giving statement before the learned SDJM, P.W. 19. The learned Trial Court also considered the autopsy report (exhibit P 19) prepared by Dr. Usha Ranjan Das, since dead, wherein the injuries caused to the deceased were mentioned as well as the seized articles, the Trial Court convicted the accused-Appellant and sentenced him as stated supra. 20. Mr. Pal, learned Counsel for the Appellant in support of the appeal would contend, inter alia, the prosecution story started with FIR wherein the name of P.W. 8, Dulid Chakraborty has been mentioned as an assailant, but subsequently shifted the story of Dulal to the accused Appellant Pramode as an assailant due to the statement of P.W. 9, Smt. Joyjanemesse, mother of the deceased Akashi as she learnt from P.W. 4, Kamajit and one Samir that her daughter Akashi was murdered by the accused Appellant. He also canvassed that as P.W. 4 did not corroborate the statement of P.W. 9, the Trial Court should not have believed the said story involving the accused Appellant Pramode in the alleged murder P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 though examined as eye witnesses by the prosecution, but did not support the case of the prosecution, rather contradicted the case of the prosecution by way of their evidence. And if the Trial Court believed the evidence of these two witnesses, then the Trial Court should have disbelieved the evidence of P.W. 13 who is allegedly to be an eye witness, he further contended. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has also pointed out that it is not clear from the prosecution case as to why the accused Appellant killed Akashi and from where he came to the place of occurrence and as such, the motive and intention behind killing Akashi by the accused Appellant is totally missing in the prosecution case. The learned Counsel again contended that as P.W. 13 stated in his statement, inter alia, that at about 11 a.m. they heard a cry of Akashi 'ma go' and he looked to the place where Akashi was sitting and saw that the accused Appellant Pramode was striking Akashi with a Cheni dao and then he, P.W. 4, and P.W. 12 stood up and saw the accused Appellant Pramode was inflicting dao blow on her body of Akashi and also saw blood in the said dao and the accused Appellant Pramode ran towards northern side with that cheni dao in his hand and they ran towards their house. He also stated regarding the incident to his father Abdul Rahaman and on going through the said evidence, it can be easily said that the evidence of P.W. 13 is wholly unnatural and untrustworthy being conduct of the said witness is contrary to the normal human conduct. A man normally witnessing such an incident would not leave the place of occurrence but what this witness did, in the instant case, he was a silent spectator and did not even make any attempt to save the life of the deceased from the hands of the accused Appellant, was just opposite to human conduct he contended. More so in view of the statement of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12, the statement of P.W. 13 should be disbelieved. More so in view of the statement of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12, the statement of P.W. 13 should be disbelieved. They stated in their cross-examination that the place where they were working and the place where Akashi was sitting was obstructed by bamboo fencing. Therefore, they could not see Akashi and they could not say what happened there. If these two witnesses (P.W. 4 and P.W. 12) could not see what happened with Akashi, how the P.W. 13 could see from the same place the alleged incident of murder of Akashi by the accused Appellant. Therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to believe the evidence of P.W. 13 as his statement is wholly contradicted by P.W 4 and P.W.12. 21. He further stated when according to the prosecution, these three witnesses are the only eye witnesses, it would not be proper on the part of this Court to believe one witness and disbelieve other two witnesses and when there are two sets of prosecution witnesses contradicting each other, the Court should disbelieve the whole story of prosecution. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harehand Singh and Anr v. State of Haryana : AIR 1974 SC 344 . 22. The learned Counsel for the accused Appellant further contended that the learned Trial Court ought have applied the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) as one portion of prosecution story in the FIR is false then other part of the story can not be true and also a part of the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12, but in the instant case, the learned Trial Court failed to consider the said maxim and took residuary part in the FIR and the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 for the purpose of corroboration of evidence of P.W. 13, which is contrary to law. Evidence of hostile witness can not be treated as prosecution version for convicting an accused, he contended. In support of his aforesaid submission he placed reliance on Keshoram Bora v. State of Assam AIR 1978 SC 1096 . 23. Mr. Evidence of hostile witness can not be treated as prosecution version for convicting an accused, he contended. In support of his aforesaid submission he placed reliance on Keshoram Bora v. State of Assam AIR 1978 SC 1096 . 23. Mr. Pal has drawn our attention to the hand sketched map including indexes, Exhibit 21 series and contended that though there were so many shops and huts on both sides of the Sonamura-Melaghar Road near by the place of occurrence but none of the shopkeepers or inhabitants of those huts were produced or examined by the prosecution and such non-examination of the shopkeepers or inhabitants of those huts creates a doubt regarding the prosecution story. 24. He again contended that the Court should not have relied upon the statement of P.W. 5, father of the deceased, inter alia, that the accused entered into his house at night by excavating a hole in the bhitti of his house and was caught red-handed by him and was handed over to the police. Over this issue there was enmity between him and the accused, as he did not make such a statement under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure recorded by the police. The Trial Court should have considered the said statement as an approved version and the Court should not, relying on such approved version, try to find out the motive on the part of the accused Appellant to commit the alleged crime. In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove the motive on the part of the Appellant to commit the alleged crime, the accused Appellant has to be considered innocent and is liable to be acquitted. He also contended that though the story of enmity between the P.W. 5, father of the deceased and the accused Appellant is a developed story, and even if the same is believed, then also it cannot be presumed that for the said enmity the accused Appellant caused the murder of Akashi, daughter of P.W. 5. As enmity cuts both ways, according to him, it cannot be ruled out that for such alleged enmity the accused Appellant has been falsely implicated in this case to save the real accused Dulal with whom the story of FIR started. 25. Per contra, to support the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence and to resist the contention of Mr. 25. Per contra, to support the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence and to resist the contention of Mr. Pal, learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Sarkar, learned PP would contend that the maxim 'felsus in uno felsus in omnibus' has no application in our country and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars as the said maxim has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. Rather the said maxim is merely a rule of caution. In the instant case, though the prosecution story started with the fact of involvement of Dulal, P.W. 8 but the said story is hearsay and the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 cannot be discarded as a whole being they were declared hostile but their unshaken evidence when corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 13, an independent witness, the same can be believed and accepted for the purpose of corroboration of the evidence of P.W. 13 and relying on such evidence which supports the prosecution case an order of conviction can be passed, which was exactly done by the learned trial Court in the instant case. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Jakki @ Selvaraj and Anr. v. State reported in AIR 2007 SCW 1327 . He further contended that failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the motive of the crime, ipso facto, would not entitle the accused to get an order of acquittal, if the direct ocular evidence corroborated the medical evidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable and also finds corroboration fi-om the other witnesses, even if hostile, and a finding of guilt can safely be recorded. In the instant case, from the conjoint reading of the evidences of P.W. 5 and P.W. 13 a reasonable man can easily come to the conclusion that the motive for commission of murder of deceased Akashi is the enmity between the family of the deceased and the accused Appellant as the P.W. 5 filed a case against the deceased three years before the alleged incident. He further submitted that finding out the motive for committing a criminal act is generally difficult in view of Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh 2003 Cri LJ 3070 particularly paragraph 18 of the said report wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia, where the ocular evidence is found to be trust worthy and reliable and finds corroboration from the medical evidence, a finding of guilt can safely be recorded even if the motive for the commission of the crime has not been proved. He also placed reliance on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh (1999) 4 SCC 370 , wherein it was held: No doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every criminal act was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no offence was committed if the prosecution failed to prove the precise motive of the accused to commit it, as it is almost an impossibility for the prosecution to unreveal the full dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the person whom he offended. According to him, in every crime motive may not be available and for such non-availability of motive the accused would not be entitled to be acquitted even when from other evidences guilt is established. In support of his aforementioned contention he placed reliance on Nathuni Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (1998) 9 SCC 238 . 26. It has been stated by us earlier that we have independently scrutinised the oral and documentary evidences appearing on record. The death of deceased Akashi is undisputedly homicidal in nature from the autopsy report as it is stated therein, the multiple deep cut injuries could have been the cause of death. There is no doubt that the prosecution story in the FIR was started suspecting P.W. 8 as the offender of the crime but the FIR itself is not the entire case of the prosecution rather on the basis of the said story in the FIR, the prosecution case gets in motion and the investigating authority upon investigation filed the charge sheet on the basis of the evidence against the actual offender who committed the alleged crime of murder. Mere mentioning the name of a person like P.W. 8 is not enough to involve him in the alleged crime unless in support of his involvement, evidence is available. Mere mentioning the name of a person like P.W. 8 is not enough to involve him in the alleged crime unless in support of his involvement, evidence is available. In the instant case, P.W. 1 lodged the FIR on the basis of information. Hence, the FIR itself was hear say. Except P.W. 1, no other witness of the prosecution connected P.W. 8 with the alleged crime of murder. When P.W. 13, who is an independent witness, was working nearby the place at a distance of about 8/9 cubits from the place where deceased Akashi was sitting and heard a cry 'Maa go' and saw Appellant Pramod inflicting Dao injuries to the deceased Akashi and P.W. 4 and P.W. 12, who are eye witnesses, though hostile, stated the fact that Akashi was sitting on Agartala Sonamura road beneath a flower tree and the distance between the place where Akashi sat and the place where there were working was about 8/9 cubits and suddenly they heard a cry' Maa go' and went there and saw the dead body of Akashi with bleeding injuries which appeared to have been inflicted by dao none of these witnesses disclosed the name of P.W. 8 as an assailant and even the inmates of deceased Akashi, like her father, mother, brother and sister (P.W. 5, P.W. 9, P.W. 6 and P.W. 10 respectively) did not support the hear say evidence of P.W. 1 regarding the involvement of P.W. 8. Therefore, the investigating authority rightly filed the charge sheet against the accused-Appellant and learned Trial Court also on committal of the case framed charge under Section 302 against the accused Appellant. 27. In Harchand Singh (supra) the Apex Court discussed, when the prosecution leads two sets of witnesses in support of its case and one set contradicts the other, then it would be difficult to convict the accused but in the instant case the prosecutor leads only one set of witness in support of its case and therefore the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court has no application. 28. Now let us examine the contention of Mr. Paul regarding missing of motive and intention for committing the crime. According to us, motive is not sine qua non for establishment of the prosecution case when some other evidence like direct ocular evidence is available. The Apex Court in Podda Narayana and Ors. 28. Now let us examine the contention of Mr. Paul regarding missing of motive and intention for committing the crime. According to us, motive is not sine qua non for establishment of the prosecution case when some other evidence like direct ocular evidence is available. The Apex Court in Podda Narayana and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 1252 held that where the positive evidence against the accused is clear, cogent and reliable, the question of motive has no importance. In Thaman Kumar (supra) as relied upon by Mr Sarkar, the Apex Court taking note of the decision in Jeet Singh (supra) held that where the ocular evidence is found to be trustworthy and reliable and finds corroboration for the medical evidence, a finding of guilt can safely be recorded even if the motive for commission of the crime has not be proved. The Apex Court also took note of Nathuni Yadav (supra) wherein it was held that motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for the prosecution as one can not normally see into the mind of another. Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act and such impelling cause need not necessarily be proportionately grave to do grave crimes. If was further held that many a murders have been committed without any known or prominent motive and it is quite possible that the aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the absence of any evidence on the point of motive cannot have any such impact so as to discard the other reliable evidence available on record which unerringly establishes the guilt of the accused. 29. In Meharban and Ors. v. State of MP (1996) 10 SCC 615 their Lordships, while dealing with the submission of the learned Counsel of that case relating to failure of the prosecution to bring on record any motive for the assaults, noted that: Motive lies locked in the heart of a man and so, it becomes difficult to know the same. Failure to bring on record any evidence regarding motive does not, however, weaken the prosecution case, though existence of the same may strengthen the same. Failure to bring on record any evidence regarding motive does not, however, weaken the prosecution case, though existence of the same may strengthen the same. In the instant case, as it appears from the record, particularly, evidence of P.W. 5, inter alia, that a case was filed by him against the accused Appellant three years prior to the alleged incident, for entering into his house at night by excavating hole in the bhiti of his house while the accused was caught red handed and handed over to the police and the police initiated a case against him, it cannot be ruled out that the accused Appellant committed the murder of Akashi due to the enmity developed for such incident. Hence, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Pal that the prosecution case has to be dis-believed for mere absence of motive for committing the alleged crime. 30. The contention of Mr. Pal, inter alia, non-examination of the shop-keepers or inhabitants near the place of occurrence creates a doubt regarding the prosecution case cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Amar Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1973 SC 2221 wherein the Apex Court noted: Non-examination of dis-interested neighbours residing near the place of occurrence is not a ground for dis-believing the eye witnesses, even though they are related to or interested in the complainant when there is no evidence to show that the persons other than the eye witnesses saw the occurrence. In Raj Narain Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in AIR 2010 SCW 521, the Apex Court taking note of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, in its wisdom noted, that no particular number of wisdom is required for proof of any fact as it is trite law that it is hot the number of witnesses but the quality of evidence which is required to be taken note of by the Courts for ascertaining the truth of the allegations made against the accused. In the instant case also it is evident from the record that except P.W. 13 no other person saw the accused Appellant at the time of inflicting dao injuries to the deceased Akashi. Therefore; mere non-examination of shop keepers and the inhabitants of the nearby place would not brush aside the evidence of independent eye witness P.W. 13. 31. In the instant case also it is evident from the record that except P.W. 13 no other person saw the accused Appellant at the time of inflicting dao injuries to the deceased Akashi. Therefore; mere non-examination of shop keepers and the inhabitants of the nearby place would not brush aside the evidence of independent eye witness P.W. 13. 31. It is settled by this time that the maxim 'felsus in uno felsus in omnibus' has no application in our country and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars as in our country codified rules of evidence exist, as rightly contended by Mr. Sarkar. The Apex Court, after taking note of Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 366 observed in Jakki @ Selvaraj (supra). In essence the prayer is to apply the principle of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate the grain from the chaff where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be discarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence. 32. In the case of Sukha and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1956 SC 513 , the Apex Court held, that when one part of witness's evidence is disbelieved. 32. In the case of Sukha and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1956 SC 513 , the Apex Court held, that when one part of witness's evidence is disbelieved. Judges of fact have the right to act on the rest of his testimony. In the instant case also the learned Trial Court rightly believed one part of the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 for the purpose of corroboration of the evidence of independent eye witness P.W. 13, whose testimony could not be shaken in any manner by the defence, by way of cross examining him. 33. Though in the case of Keshoram Bora (supra), the Apex Court held that once the prosecution witness is declared hostile his version can not be treated as a version of the prosecution itself but subsequently the Apex Court diluted the law laid down in Keshoram Bora (supra) in the case of Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1991 SC 1853 wherein the Apex Court noted that merely because the prosecution chose to treat its witness as hostile and cross examined him, evidence of such hostile witness cannot be rejected in toto and to treat the same as effaced or washed off the record altogether but can be accepted to the extent of the version which is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny. In the instant case, the learned Trial Court has found a part of the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 to be dependable in view of the evidence of P.W. 23, the Tong Shop owner and P.W. 13, the Trial Court rightly accepted the residuary portion of the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 12 for the purpose of corroboration. According to us, the Trial Court did not commit any wrong as the P.W. 13 clearly stated that he saw the accused Appellant inflicting dao injuries/blows to the deceased Akashi and the said evidence of P.W. 13 is also corroborated by the medical evidence. More so, keeping in view the number of injuries inflicted on the deceased as also the nature thereof and furthermore the opinion of the Doctor who caused file autopsy, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Appellant had the intention to kill the deceased Akashi and the learned Trial Court very rightly believed P.W. 13 and P.W. 5 while appreciating the prosecution evidence. 34. 34. By this time, it is settled that uncorroborated testimony of solitary witness cannot be brushed aside provided such evidence is found to be wholly true and reliable. In the instant case, according to us, P.W. 13, who is a solitary independent, truthful and reliable witness and on the basis of the evidence of such a witness as corroborated by the medical evidence, an order of conviction can be passed. Our aforesaid view are supported by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Vahula Bhushan @ Vehuna Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1989 SC 236 wherein it was held that, there cannot be any rule of law that no conviction can be based on the evidence of a solitary witness and if his evidence is straight forward, cogent and also corroborated by Medical evidence, is sufficient to sustain the conviction. On perusal of the decision of the Apex Court in Kathi Ramku Aligbhai v. State of Gujarat AIR 1993 SC 2472 this Court is of considered opinion that when the evidence of a witness of prosecution is cogent consistent, supported by other witnesses, corroborated by medical evidence and there is no indication regarding false implication, evidence of such witness should not be thrown out for minor discrepancies. 35. As the Trial Court has seen the witnesses and has heard their evidences closely and has come to the conclusion that witness are credible, particularly P.W. 13 and the circumstances stated by him, so far inflicting of Dao injuries by the accused Appellant to the deceased, justify the views taken by the Trial Court. As appellate Court, it is our duty to see and scrutinize the evidence on the basis of which the learned Trial Court arrived at the conclusion that the Appellant is guilty of committing murder of the deceased Akashi. Accordingly, we have given a fresh look to the evidences and we find nothing wrong with the judgment of the learned Trial Court and according to us, it is not necessary to interfere with the said judgment and order. 36. For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to accept the submission, inter alia, the accused Appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the learned counsel for the Appellant. We, thus, find no merit and substance in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.