JUDGMENT : K.A. Puj, J. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 26.04.2010 passed by the Executive Director of the respondent Corporation terminating the distributorship of the LPG of the petitioner after 11 years for the alleged bona fide omission committed in the application for the distributorship, submitted in 1998. 2. On 07.05.2010, this Court has passed an order recording the contents of the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent – Corporation. Time was granted to the petitioner to file rejoinder. Thereafter on 11.05.2010, draft amendment was moved by the petitioner seeking permission of this Court to amend the cause title by impleading the firm, namely, M/s. Meghani Indane through Partners Jayantibhai M. Patel and Rajesh M. Patel as petitioner No. 2 and also adding para 3-A after para 3 of the petition. The said amendment was granted by the Court. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent Corporation had issued a public notice inviting applications for Dealership/Distributorship of LPG in different areas of Ahmedabad on 09.10.1998 in Sandesh newspaper. In response to the above advertisement, the application was submitted by the petitioner from the defence category, being a widow of army personnel who was killed while discharging his duties in the year 1985. Along with this application, eligibility certificate issued by the Ministry of Defence was also submitted whereby it was certified that the petitioner being widow and dependent of late Shri Mehboob Shaikh was eligible for allotment of LPG Distributorship at Ahmedabad. The petitioner was selected for the LPG Distributorship for Naroda area. There was no other candidate when the Distributorship was given to the petitioner in the year 1999. For the purpose of development of the business, with the approval of the respondent Corporation, the petitioner was permitted to induct two partners in the business and fresh agreement was executed on 29.12.2002 in the name of partnership firm M/s. Meghani Indane. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has tried hard to develop the business and has worked with honesty, sincerity and dedication. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has tried hard to develop the business and has worked with honesty, sincerity and dedication. In the entire tenure of 11 years, there is not a single complaint against the petitioner as well as the firm with regard to any kind of irregularity or malpractice in distribution of LPG to the domestic and commercial consumers. The petitioner has produced on record the statement of growth and development of distributorship of LPG from the date of allotment and appointment of the Distributor i.e. 16.03.1999 upto 2010 to show growth in business. 5. Despite the above fact, the respondent Corporation issued a show-cause notice dated 25.01.2010 calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why the distributorship of LPG should not be terminated for the alleged breach of Clause 23 (c) (ii) and Clause 27 (i). The petitioner has filed writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 822 of 2010 challenging the legality and validity of the said show-cause notice. After hearing both the parties, the said petition was disposed of by this Court vide its order dated 15.02.2010 with appropriate directions. As per the direction of this Court, the petitioner submitted a reply to the show-cause notice, inter alia, explaining that there was no deliberate intention on the part of the petitioner to give any false information and that considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the alleged omission occurred. It was further requested in the said reply that considering the satisfactory service rendered, the distributorship ma not be terminated in the interest of justice. The respondent Corporation was not satisfied with the said reply and decided to terminate the Distributorship of the petitioner vide order dated 26.04.2010. 6. It is this order which is under challenge in the present petition. 7. Mr. N.K. Pahwa, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the husband of the petitioner died in the year 1985 while discharging his duties in the Indian Army. The petitioner was only 28 years old at the time of unfortunate death of her husband, with the responsibility of growing two minor children aged about 6 years and 2 years respectively. The petitioner was only 28 years old at the time of unfortunate death of her husband, with the responsibility of growing two minor children aged about 6 years and 2 years respectively. In those moments of distress, when the petitioner was receiving a monthly pension of Rs.500/-, it was practically not possible to maintain the family and, therefore, the petitioner had accepted a temporary employment as a substitute teacher at a monthly salary of Rs.375/- in 1986 in the K.G. School run by the Army in Ahmedabad. The appointment of the petitioner was on a contractual basis at a fixed salary for the period of one year only. The petitioner was continued in service on a contract for one year at the time when the petitioner had submitted the application to the respondent for Distributorship. He has, therefore, submitted that the respondent – Corporation has not considered that the petitioner was employed purely on temporary basis as substitute teacher on contractual basis for a period of one year. The bona fide omission to disclose the said fact ought to have been considered sympathetically in as much as the said omission was not deliberate to get the Distributorship. The petitioner was the only candidate from defence category and, therefore, even if the said fact was disclosed, she could have been given the distributorship as it is permissible under Clause 23 (c) (ii) of the agreement with the respondent – Corporation to give Distributorship despite such temporary occupation. He has, therefore, submitted that the respondent Corporation should not have taken such a drastic action of terminating the Distributorship and should have taken reasonable and sympathetic view. 8. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that the respondent Corporation has not given any opportunity to rectify the alleged omission and mistake as required under clause 27 (a) of the Distributorship agreement. It states that if the Distributor shall commit a delay, breach or default of any of the terms, conditions, covenants and stipulations contained in the agreement and fail to remedy such breach within four days of the receipt of written notice from the corporation in that regard, the Corporation shall be at liberty at its entire discretion to terminate the agreement forthwith. He has further submitted that in the last 10 years, the respondent has not given any such notice and opportunity to the petitioner to remedy/rectify the alleged breach. He has further submitted that in the last 10 years, the respondent has not given any such notice and opportunity to the petitioner to remedy/rectify the alleged breach. If any such opportunity was given then the petitioner could have rectified such alleged breach. In absence of any valid reason, not to give such opportunity, the impugned termination order is arbitrary, unjust and hence, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 9. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that the reasons given by the respondent Corporation that the alleged omission and breach has caused prejudice to the good name of the respondent Corporation is baseless and unsustainable in as much as there is no such material to reach to such a conclusion. The good blotless services rendered by the firm has earned reputation to the respondent Corporation and the business of the Corporation has developed which can be judged from the figures of increased number of consumers as stated in the statement produced on record. The bona fide omission, the error or mistake by the petitioner before 11 years at the time of submitting application in the year 1999 cannot be said to be just and valid ground for the purpose of terminating the distributorship, especially when there is no complaint with regard to business against the petitioner. The business of the Corporation is developed and grown to the satisfaction of the respondent and, therefore, the alleged bona fide omission does not commensurate with the extreme punishment of terminating the Distributorship and the same being in violation of Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of India requires to be quashed and set aside. 10. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that new distributorship agreement in the name of the Firm is executed in the year 2002 by the respondent – Corporation and, therefore, the alleged omission and breach of the previous agreement of 1999 cannot be a ground to terminate the distributorship, after 11 years. Even on this ground, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that there is no allegation that because of the temporary employment as a substitute teacher of the petitioner, the business of the respondent Corporation has in any manner adversely affected. Even on this ground, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that there is no allegation that because of the temporary employment as a substitute teacher of the petitioner, the business of the respondent Corporation has in any manner adversely affected. The inspections have been carried out by the officials of the Corporation regularly and at no point of time, any such complaint is made against the petitioner as well as the Firm. The timing of the petitioner's temporary employment was from 08.00 a.m. to 13.00 p.m. and, therefore, the petitioner has personally attended to the business over and above the other two partners who are always attending to the business personally for the whole day. Thus, there is no justification for terminating the Distributorship of the petitioner. 11. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that the impugned order passed by the respondent Corporation on 15.02.2010 has not come into force as it was not implemented in view of the protection of 10 days granted by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 822 of 2010. 12. Mr. Pahwa has further submitted that the petitioner has made a statement before this Court that she shall discontinue her present temporary and part time engagement with the school with immediate effect and shall not accept any other engagement of any nature and will exclusively devote her services to the business of distributorship of the firm. He has also produced on record certified copy of the communication issued by the School dated 07.05.2010 stating that the Committee of the School management has decided not to renew the petitioner's contract for the post of teacher. He has, therefore, submitted that the ground on which the impugned termination order is based is no longer in existence and hence, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. 13. Mr. M.R. Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation has submitted that the petitioner has not disclosed correct facts in this petition. The averments made in the petition not only being untrue but are made only to gain undue sympathy from this Court. In the application dated 09.11.1998 made by the petitioner, in Clause 9, the petitioner was required to file an affidavit containing statement of income, which would include information relating to income from all sources such as salary, property etc. The averments made in the petition not only being untrue but are made only to gain undue sympathy from this Court. In the application dated 09.11.1998 made by the petitioner, in Clause 9, the petitioner was required to file an affidavit containing statement of income, which would include information relating to income from all sources such as salary, property etc. In Clause 13, the petitioner had stated "I shall present in showroom for full time". Based on the said application, the respondent Corporation issued a letter dated 16.03.1999 intending to offer distributorship for the petitioner. In Clause 7, it has been stated that, if already employed, the petitioner will have to submit acceptance of resignation letter from her employer prior to the issuance of appointment letter by the Corporation. Based on the application dated 07.10.2002 made by the petitioner, an agreement dated 29.12.2002 was executed permitting the petitioner to add partners of the firm. Even as per relevant Clauses of the agreement, all the partners were required to take active part in the management and running of the distributorship and they had also agreed not to take any other employment or to engage in any business other than the operation of the distributorship. 14. Mr. Bhatt has further submitted that upon inquiry, certain new facts have come to the notice of the respondent – Corporation. The inquiry reveals that the petitioner No. 1, the original allottee and major shareholder (51%) of the LPG Distributorship has been in the employment in a school w.e.f. 07.01.1986 till date and has been drawing salary of Rs.8,000/- p.m. Under agreement dated 24.04.2003, it transpires that the petitioner No. 1 has sold/relinquished her interests in the distributorship to other two partners without the permission of the respondent Corporation. The petitioner No. 1 has obtained DGR Certificate on false declaration about her employment/source of income. She had hidden the facts about her employment from the beginning i.e. from application stage. The petitioner No. 1 has obtained DGR Certificate on false declaration about her employment/source of income. She had hidden the facts about her employment from the beginning i.e. from application stage. Shri Jayantibhai M. Patel and Shri Rajesh M. Patel (inducted as Partners w.e.f. 29.12.2002) along with their family members have been associated with the petitioner No. 1 and the firm from the application stage i.e. since 1998, even though in the undertaking dated 06.11.1998, she assured not to induct Shri Mohanbhai as a partner, but she allowed his son Shri Jayantibhai and his nephew Shri Rajesh to be inducted as partners in the distributorship of M/s. Meghani Indane. The School timing has been from 08.00 to 13.00 hrs. and hence, it could be concluded that she has not been attending to the distributorship during this time schedule. She has, therefore, violated the terms and conditions of the letter of intent distributorship agreement dated 30.09.1999 and 29.12.2002. The violations detected on the part of all the partners including the petitioner No. 1 are of serious nature and call for termination of Distributorship agreement. 15. On the basis of the above inquiry, Mr. Bhatt has submitted that the petitioner has admitted that she has been gainfully employed. It has also come on record that the petitioner had sold/relinquished her interest in the distributorship and the filing of the petition is only to gain undue sympathy from this Court. Even as per clause 37 of the agreement, dispute, if any, arising out of the agreement is required to be adjudicated through the process of arbitration. Even in this view of the matter, the Court should not entertain the petition. 16. Mr. Bhatt has placed further affidavit on record dated 12.05.2010. Along with this affidavit, fact finding inquiry report was placed on record. In that report, the name of the complainant was left out with the permission of the Court, so as to maintain confidentiality. The Report reveals that the Committee was constituted on 25.08.2009 to investigate in respect of the complaint filed against the LPG Distributorship given to the petitioners. The major allegations by the complainant are that the Distributorship was allotted under defence category to the petitioner No. 1, but she is still serving in defence school and not attending to the Agency. The Report reveals that the Committee was constituted on 25.08.2009 to investigate in respect of the complaint filed against the LPG Distributorship given to the petitioners. The major allegations by the complainant are that the Distributorship was allotted under defence category to the petitioner No. 1, but she is still serving in defence school and not attending to the Agency. She has sold out the agency to Shri Rajesh M. Patel and the Agency is being run by him. Along with the said complaint, the complainant has submitted certain documents in support of his allegations. The documents are (1) Power of Attorney executed by the petitioner in favour of Shri Rajesh M. Patel on 30.03.1999 (2) Guarantee agreement to give Agency to Shri Jayantibhai M. Patel executed on 16.02.1999, Agreement for assignment of her rights to carry out LPG Gas Agency executed by the petitioner in favour of Shri Ramesh M. Patel dated 30.03.1999, (4) Agreement executed by Shri Jayantibhai M. Patel on 24.04.2003 for purchase of agency from the petitioner. During the course of investigation, another complaint on similar ground was received on 30.09.2009. The Committee members were advised to investigate on this complaint also being of similar nature. The Committee members have perused the documents submitted by the complainants, collected required documents from Ahmedabad, invited both the complainants for meeting and substantiating the complaint, discussed and examined issues with all the partners of M/s. Meghani Indane and meeting held with the concerned Bank and School. The conclusions recorded by the Committee are reflected in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Corporation. 17. Based on its conclusions, the Committee recommended that the petitioner No. 1 being permanently employed elsewhere till date has grabbed the LPG distributorship M/s. Meghani Indane by fraudulent methods and has been violating the conditions of the letter of intent and distributorship agreement since its inception. Also the involvement of other partners along with their family members are beyond doubt as other partners have tried to take over the control of the distributorship as per their mutual agreement dated 26.04.2003 without the permission of the Corporation. Thus, the beneficiaries in running the distributorship M/s. Meghani Indane by such fraudulent way for over a decade are none other than the petitioner No. 1 and family members of Shri Mohan Patel i.e. Shri Jayantibhai M. Patel (son) and Shri Rajesh M. Patel (nephew). Thus, the beneficiaries in running the distributorship M/s. Meghani Indane by such fraudulent way for over a decade are none other than the petitioner No. 1 and family members of Shri Mohan Patel i.e. Shri Jayantibhai M. Patel (son) and Shri Rajesh M. Patel (nephew). In view of these findings, observations and conclusion and to protect the interest/image of the Corporation from deterioration on account of such fraudulent acts, the Committee recommended suspension of Distributorship of M/s. Meghani Indane, Ahmedabad with immediate effect and immediate issuance of show-cause notice for termination of the distributorship. 18. Based on the above report and inquiry, Mr. Bhatt has submitted that the show-cause notice was issued and after considering the explanation, termination order was passed by the Corporation. He has, therefore, submitted that this Court should not take into judicial review the decision taken by the respondent Corporation. In support of his submissions, he relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.R. Chowdhury v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, AIR 2004 SC 2770 wherein it is observed that a combined reading of the offer of appointment and the aforementioned reply of the M/s. Denis Chem Lab Limited clearly shows that the appellant was an employee on the relevant date. Mere use of word trainee cannot be taken to say that he was not an employee particularly so when his services were confirmed later. In the application filed by the appellant for securing dealership, as against column No. 8(c) whether he was temporarily employed, he has filled as 'No'. In column No. 9, as against the present occupation, he has shown as 'Nil'. These statements made by the appellant in column No. 8(c) and column No. 9 amount to suppression of material fact. This apart, nothing prevented the appellant from mentioning in column No. 9 of the application as against the status of employment at least as a trainee. But on the other hand, in column 9 he has shown the status of occupation as 'Nil'. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the status of occupation as shown was bona fide cannot be accepted. In view of para 10 of the affidavit filed by him coupled with the para 56 of the Memorandum, the Corporation was well within its right to terminate the dealership of the appellant. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the status of occupation as shown was bona fide cannot be accepted. In view of para 10 of the affidavit filed by him coupled with the para 56 of the Memorandum, the Corporation was well within its right to terminate the dealership of the appellant. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Corporation passed the order of termination of the dealership of the appellant mechanically and without application of mind. After referring to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan Yadav [ (2003) 3 SCC 437 ] while dealing with the effect of suppression of material information took a view that the purpose of seeking information cannot be defeated which has bearing on the selection. Added to this, if only the appellant had given correct information about status of his occupation as on the relevant date as rightly held by the learned single Judge which view was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, possibly the position would have been different. At any rate, the appellant is bound by his own affidavit and the Memorandum of Agreement. 19. Mr. Bhatt further relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Deepa Ganpatbhai Parmar v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited and another rendered in Special Civil Application No. 3537 of 2010 dated 21.04.2010 wherein after referring the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Mandal (Supra), the Court held that if the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. In the case of Jagdish Mandal (Supra), the Apex Court held that when the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. The Court further held that before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, the Court should pose to itself the following questions :- I. Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; Or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the Court can say : the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached; II. Whether the public interest is affected. 20. Mr. Bhatt has, therefore, submitted that if the petitioner's case is examined on the above touchstone, it cannot be said that the respondent Corporation has taken this decision with any mala fide or to favour someone. There is no arbitrariness and after giving an adequate opportunity, decision is taken. He has, therefore, submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed with cost. 21. Having heard the learned Counsels appearing for the parties and having considered their rival submissions in light of the agreements, documentary evidence and decided case law on the subject, the Court is of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief from the Court and the impugned order passed by the respondent Corporation does not call for any interference of this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The distributorship of LPG was awarded to the petitioner No. 1 under Special Category I.e. defence category. The appointment of the petitioner No. 1 as distributor of LPG was purely on sympathetic ground as she has lost her husband in 1985 while serving to the nation. The distributorship of LPG was awarded to the petitioner No. 1 under Special Category I.e. defence category. The appointment of the petitioner No. 1 as distributor of LPG was purely on sympathetic ground as she has lost her husband in 1985 while serving to the nation. What was considered by the respondent Corporation was the fact disclosed by the petitioner in her application dated 09.11.1998. Though Clause 9 of the application requires the petitioner No. 1 to disclose information relating to income from all sources, including salary, she has not disclosed that she was working as substitute teacher on temporary basis in Army school. This appointment continued even after the distributorship was awarded to the petitioner No. 1 and till the petition is filed and heard by this Court. Clause 13 requires the petitioner to devote full time to the business. However, due to other assignment of substitute teacher and working hours being 08.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m., she could not devote full time. Clause 7 expects from the petitioner to tender her resignation after the appointment as Distributor. But she had not done so. All these things can not be said to be bona fide omissions. This would amount to suppression of material facts, which dis entitled her to claim Distributorship and even after awarding of such Distributorship, it cannot be continued. Whatever might be the compelling circumstances of the petitioner No. 1 to work as substitute teacher on temporary basis, non-disclosure of these facts in the application is unpardonable. 22. The inquiry further reveals that non-disclosure of above facts was not bona fide omission. It was perhaps a pre-planned strategy. The appointment of petitioner No. 1 as distributor was made on 16.03.1999. In or around this period, Power of Attorney was executed by the petitioner No. 1 in favour of Shri Rajesh M. Patel on 30.03.1999. Guarantee agreement to give agency to Shri Jayantibhai M. Patel was executed on 16.02.1999. Agreement for assignment of petitioner No. 1's rights to carry out LPG Gas Agency was executed by the petitioner in favour of Shri Rajesh M. Patel on 30.03.1999. Even after induction of two partners and constitution of firm M/s. Meghani Indane on or around 29.12.2002, an agreement was executed by the petitioner No. 1 relinquishing or selling her interests in the Distributorship in favour of other partners. Even after induction of two partners and constitution of firm M/s. Meghani Indane on or around 29.12.2002, an agreement was executed by the petitioner No. 1 relinquishing or selling her interests in the Distributorship in favour of other partners. All these facts may not be forming part of show-cause notice or the impugned order. However, to substantiate its decision, if the respondent Corporation has placed these informations before the Court for its perusal, the Court cannot turn its eyes and grants the relief in favour of the petitioners. 23. The subsequent induction of two partners and execution of new agreement in favour of the partnership firm, M/s. Meghani Indane cannot save this distributorship as it is tainted since its inception. All partners are involved in commission of this fraud. The remaining two partners could not have got this distributorship but for making use of the petitioner No. 1 in acquiring the distributorship under the defence category. When acquisition of distributorship is based on fraud, suppression of material facts and misstatements, all other issues even if they have some bearing under normal circumstances, pale into insignificance. 24. The distributorship agreement contains certain provisions which justify the respondent Corporation's action of termination of such agreement. Clause 23 (a) casts an obligation on the distributor to undertake faithfully and promptly to carry out, observe and perform all directions and orders or Rules made from time to time by the Corporation or its representatives for the proper carrying on of the distributorship of the Corporation. The petitioners have failed to discharge this obligation. Clause 23 (c) (ii) states that except with the previous written consent of the Corporation, the distributor himself (if he is an individual or the partners themselves (if the distributor is a partnership firm) ....... shall not (without prior permission in writing of the Corporation) take up any other employment or engage in any other business apart from the operation of the distributorship. Despite this covenant, the petitioner No. 1 continued with temporary appointment of substitute teacher for more than 10 years. Clause 27 (1) empowers the respondent Corporation to terminate the agreement forthwith if any information given by the Distributor in his application for appointment as a distributor shall be found to be untrue or incorrect in any material particular. Despite this covenant, the petitioner No. 1 continued with temporary appointment of substitute teacher for more than 10 years. Clause 27 (1) empowers the respondent Corporation to terminate the agreement forthwith if any information given by the Distributor in his application for appointment as a distributor shall be found to be untrue or incorrect in any material particular. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner No. 1 has given untrue or incorrect information in her application with regard to her employment as substitute teacher in Army School. The Apex Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan Yadav (Supra) considered the effect of suppression of material information and held that the purpose of seeking information cannot be defeated which has bearing on the selection. If the petitioner No. 1 had given correct information about status of her appointment as substitute teacher on the relevant date, the position would have been different. In any case, the petitioner No. 1 is bound by her affidavit-cum-undertaking and the Memorandum of Agreement. 25. Though the Executive Director, Gujarat State has given detailed reasons in his order of termination dated 26.04.2010, it is not obligatory for him to give such reasons in view of Clause 27 (n) of the Agreement which dispenses with such reasons if the Distributor shall either himself or by his servants or agents commit any act which is prejudicial to the interest of good name of the Corporation. By acquiring the distributorship under defence category and thereafter transferring it to General category by inducting other two partners with or without consideration, would certainly cause prejudice to the interest of good name of the Corporation. Non-granting of an opportunity to remedy breach committed by the petitioners as envisaged under Clause 27 (a) would not strengthen the case of the petitioners as the said Clause can not be pressed into service in the present case. A delay, breach or default envisaged in this clause is totally different from the one committed by the petitioners. Even otherwise, the show-cause notice was issued on 25.01.2010 pointing out the breach committed by the petitioner No. 1 and admittedly the petitioner 's employment as substitute teacher has come to an end on 07th May 2010, meaning thereby, she failed to remedy the breach within four days of the receipt of a written notice from the respondent – Corporation. Even otherwise, the show-cause notice was issued on 25.01.2010 pointing out the breach committed by the petitioner No. 1 and admittedly the petitioner 's employment as substitute teacher has come to an end on 07th May 2010, meaning thereby, she failed to remedy the breach within four days of the receipt of a written notice from the respondent – Corporation. Moreover, it is settled law that if the decision relating to award or cancellation of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, Courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assignment or prejudice to a tenderer or Contractor, is made out. The Court's only concern is to decide as to whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the Court takes the view that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached at such decision. 26. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and without being impressed by any so-called sympathy, the Court does not find any substance or merits in any of the submissions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Notice discharged without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.