Judgment : 1. The petitioner is one of the accused in S.C.No.15 of 2003 on the file of the Sessions Court for Exclusive Trial of Bomb Blast Cases, Poonamallee, Chennai. He stands charged for offences under Section 120(B) I.P.C., r/w Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Section 3 r/w 24(1)(B)(A) of the Arms Act of 1959. He was arrested on 29.05.1998 and then onwards, he has been in judicial custody. Similar bail applications moved on earlier occasions were all dismissed, considering the gravity of the offences said to have been committed by the petitioner and all the other attendant circumstances. Lastly, he filed Crl.O.P.No.6411 of 2010 for bail and the same was also dismissed on 08.04.2010. Now he has come up with this petition again seeking bail. 2. Mr.N.R.Elango, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that denial of bail to the petitioner would amount to violation of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as the petitioner has already served out pre conviction detention for about 12 years whereas, the maximum punishment awardable for the offences for which he has been charged is only 5 years rigorous imprisonment. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that on the previous occasion, when the matter was considered by this Court, it was made to appear before this Court as though the petitioner was facing prosecution for offence under Section 307 I.P.C., also for which the maximum awardable punishment is imprisonment for life. The learned Senior Counsel would now point out that though in the First Information Report, Section 307 I.P.C., had been invoked, the trial Court has framed charges only for offences under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act r/w Section 120(B) I.P.C., and Section 3 r/w Section 24(1)(B)(A) of the Arms Act. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that for the offence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substance Act, the maximum punishment awardable is 5 years and for the offence under Section 3 r/w Section 24(1)(B)(A) of the Arms Act, the maximum punishment awardable is only 3 years. Therefore, he would submit that it is unreasonable to detain the petitioner in prison until the conclusion of trial. 3. Therefore, he would submit that it is unreasonable to detain the petitioner in prison until the conclusion of trial. 3. The respondent has filed a detailed counter wherein, it is stated that the petitioner has got very bad antecedence inasmuch as there are other cases also pending against him. It is further stated that in one case, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 8 years. In yet another case of murder, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, however, the same was set aside on appeal by this Court. It is further stated that in the case on hand the trial is likely to be concluded very shortly, as the case now stands posted for the examination of the Investigating Officer. In these circumstances, he has prayed for dismissal of this petition. He would rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal (2004 Cri.L.J 4189) to substantiate his contention. 4. I have considered the rival submissions. 5. In the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Babu Singh v. State of U.P (1978 SCC (Cri) 133), in paragraph No.17: “17.The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, evenhanded and geared to the goals of community good and state necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.” 6. Considering the facts of the case, in the said judgment, in paragraph No.21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has proceeded to state as follows:- “21.Realism is a component of humanism which is the heart of the legal system. We come across cases where parties have already suffered 3, 4 and in one case (the other day it was unearthed) over 10 years in prison. These persons may perhaps be acquitted-difficult to guess. If they are, the injustice of innocence long in rigorous incarceration inflicted by the protraction of curial processes is an irrevocable injury. We come across cases where parties have already suffered 3, 4 and in one case (the other day it was unearthed) over 10 years in prison. These persons may perhaps be acquitted-difficult to guess. If they are, the injustice of innocence long in rigorous incarceration inflicted by the protraction of curial processes is an irrevocable injury. And, taking a pragmatic view, while life imprisonment may, in lay, last a whole life, in practice it hardly survives ten years, thanks to rules of remission. Thus, at the worst, the prisoner may have to serve some more years, and, at the best, law is vicariously guilty of dilatory deprivation of citizen’s liberty, a consummation vigilantly to be vetoed. So, a circumstance of some consequence, when considering a motion for bail, is the period in prison already spent and the prospect of the appeal being delayed for hearing, having regard to the suffocating crowd of dockets pressing before the few benches.” 7. In yet another case in Gokul Bhagaji Patil v. State of Maharashtra ( 2007 (2) SCC 475 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to grant bail in a serious case falling under the provisions of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 by observing as follows:- “14.We have considered the matter in the light of the inferences drawn by the High Court from the material on record and the role attributed to the appellant. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the purported acts of omission and commission on the part of the appellant may not per se bring his case within the ambit of Section 3(2) of MCOCA. Nevertheless, the aforementioned circumstances do tend to indicate that as a public servant he had failed to take lawful measures under MCOCA, attracting the provisions of Section 24 of MCOCA. Having reached this conclusion and bearing in mind the fact that the appellant has been in judicial custody for over three years, the maximum period of sentence contemplated under Section 24 of MCOCA, we are of the view that the appellant deserves to be released on bail.” 8. Having reached this conclusion and bearing in mind the fact that the appellant has been in judicial custody for over three years, the maximum period of sentence contemplated under Section 24 of MCOCA, we are of the view that the appellant deserves to be released on bail.” 8. In the path-breaking judgment in Hyssainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1979 SC 1377 ), in paragraph No.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “....We fail to see what moral or ethical justification could the State have to detain these unfortunate persons for such unreasonably long periods of time without trial. We feel a sense of relief that they should once again be able to breathe the air of freedom. But we find that there are still many more under trial prisoners who fall within this category of persons who have been in detention for periods longer than the maximum term without their trial having been commenced. Mrs.Hingorani has filed before me at the hearing of the writ petition on 16th April, 1979 a second chart giving the names and particulars of some of these under trial prisoners who have not yet got the benefit of the earlier order made by us. There are 59 under trial prisoners whose names and particulars are set out in this chart and we direct that they should be released forthwith as their continued detention is clearly illegal and in violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. There are also several other under trial prisoners who are accused of multiple offences and even if we were to proceed on the assumption that the State would be able to secure their conviction and maximum sentences would be imposed on them and such sentences would not be concurrent in accordance with the usual practice followed by the courts but would be consecutive, they have already suffered the aggregate imprisonment which could be inflicted on them, and there is no reason why they should be subjected to any further detention. It may be pointed out that ordinarily the sentences imposed on conviction for multiple offences are concurrent and if we proceed on that assumption which is more realistic, it would be found that there are many under trial prisoners who have already been in jail for periods exceeding the maximum term which could be imposed on them even if they were convicted of the multiple offences with which they are charged.......” 9. On the above factual findings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court issued a general direction to release all such under trial prisoners on bail who had been in detention for a period longer than the maximum term awardable for the offences. 10. It is common knowledge that Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the heart and soul of the supreme document. There can be no doubt that detaining a person as a under trial prisoner for a period more than the period of punishment which is awardable under the charges is surely violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. When such a serious infringement is noticed, the seriousness of the crime, the antecedence of the accused and all the other attendant circumstances, which normally weigh in the mind of the Court while considering the case of bail cannot sway the Court to perpetuate the violation. 11. Though the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been holding that speedy trial is part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not uncommon that the trials are protracted for unduly longer time. The case on hand is one such classic example. Even now, the State is not in a position to explain to this Court as to why the trial in this case could not be completed speedily. For the fault of the State to discharge its constitutional obligation to provide speedy trial, the under trial prisoner cannot be condemned. 12. It is of course true that the nature of offences for which the petitioner has been prosecuted and his antecedence would all go to indicate that in normal course, he does not deserve for bail. When the personal liberty of an individual vis a vis, the interest of the society at large are taken into consideration, the interest of the society always plays a dominant role in the jurisprudential approach in the bail context. When the personal liberty of an individual vis a vis, the interest of the society at large are taken into consideration, the interest of the society always plays a dominant role in the jurisprudential approach in the bail context. Though the right to life is the heart and soul of the Constitution, having regard to the larger public interest, the Courts do decline to grant bail for such unscrupulous elements. In this case, applying the said principles, the petitioner was denied bail for all these 12 years. But, it is unfortunate that the trail has not been completed even beyond 5 years for which period alone he can be imprisoned even if he is found guilty. Detaining him hereafter by declining bail would surely further offend Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that is the view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in all the judgments, I have referred to hereinabove. Therefore, considering all the aspects, I am of the view that the petitioner deserves bail at this stage on very stringent conditions so as to ensure his presence to face further proceedings of the trial. 13. In the result, this Court is inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail on the following conditions:- (i) The petitioner shall be released on bail on executing a bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the Sessions Court for Exclusive Trial of Bomb Blast Cases, Poonamallee, Chennai, out of the said sureties one should be a Government Servant. (ii) The petitioner shall remain at Poonamallee and shall report before the trial Court on every working day at 10.30 a.m. Further, he shall report before the respondent police daily at 6.00 p.m. (iii) The petitioner shall inform the respondent police about his place of stay in Poonamallee; (iv) He shall not participate in any meeting and he shall not give any provocative speech; (v) He shall co-operate for the disposal of the trial speedily. (vi) Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been in prison for a long time, the trial Court is directed to expediate the trial and to complete the same within a period of two months from today.