JUDGMENT Shrivastava, J. -- 1. The order passed in this writ appeal shall govern the disposal of following connected writ appeals since common question has been involved in all these appeals : (1) Writ Appeal No.400/2009 (M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Mohammad Ismail and another). (2) Writ Appeal No.402/2009 (M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Pradyumn Pandey and another). (3) Writ Appeal No.403/2009 (M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Pradyumn Pandey). (4) Writ Appeal No.404/2009 (M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Dinesh Kumar Parashar). (5) Writ Appeal No.405/2009 (M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Dinesh Kumar Parashar and another). 2. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 26.8.2009 passed by the learned writ Court in Writ Petition No. 1829/09 (S), allowing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners by holding that the departmental enquiry has not been conducted according to law since it was conducted by a person not competent to hold the departmental enquiry, and further setting aside the order of dismissal of the writ petitioner from services by further directing the appellant Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter, referred to as the "Corporation") to pay arrears of salary to the writ petitioner, this appeal and the connected writ appeals have been filed by the Corporation under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005. 3. In brief, the case of the writ petitioner, as borne out from the impugned order as well as the record of the writ petition is that the writ petitioner initially filed a writ petition [Writ Petition No.314/09 (S)] challenging the validity of appointment of the enquiry officer. The learned writ Court vide order dated 23.1.2009 passed an interim order directing Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport who is arrayed as respondent No.2 in connected Writ Appeal No.400/09 not to take any coercive action against the writ petitioner. However, in spite of said interim order of the learned writ Court, writ petitioner has been removed from services. Hence, the writ petitioner in the subsequent Writ Petition No. 1829/09 (S) has challenged the order of dismissal from his service as well. 4. The writ petitioner was initially appointed as Traffic Superintendent in the Corporation in the year 1982. Later on, he was promoted as Deputy Manager in the year 2000 and he was given current charge of the post of Divisional Manager on 1.7.2006. 4. The writ petitioner was initially appointed as Traffic Superintendent in the Corporation in the year 1982. Later on, he was promoted as Deputy Manager in the year 2000 and he was given current charge of the post of Divisional Manager on 1.7.2006. Writ petitioner was posted as Divisional Manager of the Corporation at Gwalior. 5. A charge-sheet was issued to the writ petitioner vide memo dated 26.11.2008 by the Managing Director of the Corporation imposing seven charges against him. The writ petitioner vide Annexure P-5 filed in the writ Court, requested to supply certain documents for filing reply to the charge-sheet. Subsequently, vide letter dated 17.2.2008, Annexure P-6 in the writ Court, he filed his reply and refuted the charges. The Managing Director after considering the reply of the writ petitioner, vide Annexure P-1 in the writ Court dated 15.2.2008 appointed one Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport as enquiry officer as well as appointment of Mr. R.K. Jain, Divisional Manager, Headquarter of the Corporation, as presenting officer. It is not disputed that the enquiry officer Mr. Dilip Raj Dwivedi was serving on the post of Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport on deputation and has conducted the departmental enquiry against the writ petitioner. 6. Further the case of the writ petitioner is that vide letter dated 19.12.2008 he requested to change the enquiry officer on the ground that earlier Mr. Dilip Raj Dwivedi was posted as Professor in the Higher Education Department and his substantive post is of Professor in Higher Education Department and he is not an officer/employee of the Corporation. He is also not familiar with the rules and regulations, working system and administration of the Corporation, hence, he could not hold fair departmental enquiry. Legal competence to hold the departmental enquiry by the said enquiry officer was also raised on the ground that he is not eligible to be appointed as enquiry officer and his appointment as enquiry officer to hold enquiry against the writ petitioner runs de hors to the regulations namely Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees Conduct Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1975 (hereinafter, referred to as "Regulations"). But, the statutory competence of the enquiry officer raised by the writ petitioner was rejected vide order dated 9.1.2009. But, the statutory competence of the enquiry officer raised by the writ petitioner was rejected vide order dated 9.1.2009. Hence, Writ Petition No.314/09 (S) was filed before the learned writ Court which on 23.1.2009 passed the following interim order: "Keeping in view the order passed by the principal seat of this Court in the identical case challenging the same that an enquiry officer was appointed who was the Deputy Secretary working under the State of M.P., it is ordered that till the next date of hearing, the respondent No.2 shall not take any coercive action against the petitioner in the departmental enquiry in which the respondent No.2 is the enquiry officer. The petitioner shall also place English version of the regulations of 1975 on record. Issue notice to the respondents on payment of process fee within seven days failing which this petition shall stand dismissed without reference to the Court. List the matter on 2.3.2009." 7. The principal seat of this Court at Jabalpur in identical matters wherein appointment of the enquiry officer was made pivot, also passed an interim order that the enquiry officer Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport shall not take any coercive action. Despite the said order of the learned writ Court, the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and found the charges to be proved against the writ petitioner, and on the report of the enquiry officer, the Managing Director vide order dated 8.4.2009 passed order of dismissal from service against the writ petitioner and in this manner, it made a cause to the writ petitioner to file another Writ Petition No. 1829/09 (S). The learned writ Court by the impugned order has allowed the writ petitions of all the writ petitioners by a common impugned order. 8. In this manner, this writ appeal and the connected writ appeals have been filed by the Corporation. 9. The contention of Shri S.S. Bansal, learned counsel for the appellant is that under the Regulations, the term "authority" has not been defined, although, the term "competent authority" has been defined in sub-clause (1)(b) of clause 4 which pertains to definitions under the Regulations. 9. The contention of Shri S.S. Bansal, learned counsel for the appellant is that under the Regulations, the term "authority" has not been defined, although, the term "competent authority" has been defined in sub-clause (1)(b) of clause 4 which pertains to definitions under the Regulations. According to the learned counsel, if clause which speaks about the procedure for imposing major penalties and particularly sub-clause (e)(iii) of clause 36 is taken into consideration in proper perspective, it is in the domain of the competent authority who can impose penalties under Regulation 32, to hold the departmental enquiry itself, in regard to the article of charges or he may appoint an inquiry authority for holding enquiry into the said charges, and therefore, if the Managing Director has appointed Mr. Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport as enquiry officer, his action cannot be said to be de hors to the Regulations and therefore, Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport was a competent enquiry officer to hold the departmental enquiry against the writ petitioner. 10. Further it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that no prejudice has been shown by the writ petitioner, and indeed, there is no prejudice caused to him. Even if for the sake of argument, it is held that the departmental enquiry was conducted by an incompetent person, because punishment order was required to be passed by the Managing Director and not by the enquiry officer, therefore, the learned writ Court erred in holding that Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport, was not competent to hold enquiry. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on three decisions of the Supreme Court; they are South Indian Cashew Factories Workers' Union v. Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Limited and others [ (2006)5 SCC 201 ], Pankajesh v. Tulsi Gramin Bank and another [ (1997)7 SCC 68 ], and Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices and others v. G. Mohan Nair [ AIR 1999 SC 2113 ]. 11. Further, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that since charges were found to be proved against the writ petitioner, the Managing Director vide order dated 8.4.2009 which is impugned in the writ petition, rightly passed the order of dismissal by exercising the powers conferred upon him under clause 32(ix) of the Regulations. 12. 11. Further, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that since charges were found to be proved against the writ petitioner, the Managing Director vide order dated 8.4.2009 which is impugned in the writ petition, rightly passed the order of dismissal by exercising the powers conferred upon him under clause 32(ix) of the Regulations. 12. On the other hand, Shri Vivek Jain, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner argued in support of the impugned order and submitted that the Corporation is a statutory body and has been constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (for brevity, the Act of 1950). Under section 45 of the said Act, the Corporation which is constituted under the Act of 1950 has been given powers to make regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government and by issuing notification in the official gazette with a further rider that the regulations shall not be inconsistent with the Act and Rules made thereunder. By inviting our attention to section 12(2) of the Act of 1950, it has been contended by the learned counsel that the Managing Director has been empowered to delegate his powers as envisaged under sub-section (1) to section 12 of the Act of 1950 to any officer of the Corporation and such officer to whom such powers and duties are delegated thereafter may exercise and perform such powers and duties under the control and supervision of the Managing Director. Hence, it has been contended by the learned counsel that the Managing Director can delegate his powers to an employee of the Corporation only. Learned counsel has also invited our attention to clauses 4(b), 34(1) and 36(b) of the Regulations and has contended that looking to the spirit of the powers delegated to the Managing Director of the Corporation and sub-delegation, only an employee of the Corporation can hold the departmental enquiry, and since admittedly the enquiry officer Mr. Dilip Raj Dwivedi, is not an employee of the Corporation and is basically from the Higher Education Department and was on deputation on the post of Deputy Secretary in the Transport Department, he was not competent to hold the departmental enquiry. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Malik v. National Film Development Corporation Limited and others [ (2004)13 SCC 427 ]. 13. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Malik v. National Film Development Corporation Limited and others [ (2004)13 SCC 427 ]. 13. Replying to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant about causing of prejudice to the writ petitioner in respect to holding of departmental enquiry by the enquiry officer is concerned, it has been argued that the writ petitioner submitted an application to the Managing Director of the Corporation on 19.12.2008 which was filed as Annexure P-8 before the learned writ Court, in which specifically it has been mentioned that the enquiry officer is an employee of the Higher Education Department and was holding the substantive post of Professor and as such he is not acquainted with the working system of the establishment of the Corporation as well as its rules, therefore, a request was made to change the enquiry officer which was turned down by the Managing Director vide his order dated 9.1.2009. 14. The contention of the learned counsel is that looking to the charges which were framed against the writ petitioner, unless and until person who is well acquainted with the working system of the Corporation is appointed as an enquiry officer, he cannot hold fair enquiry, even if, he is not prejudiced against the writ petitioner, because reasons are to be assigned by the enquiry officer holding the charges to be proved or not proved, therefore, a person who is totally stranger to the working system of the Corporation cannot discharge the duty of enquiry officer in respect to findings about proving of the charges and how they are found to be proved. 15. It has also been put forth by the learned counsel that because later on, the departmental enquiry was conducted against the writ petitioner in his absence, therefore, he was unable to submit his case properly, and further, the order of dismissal has been passed de hors to interim order passed by this Court and therefore, the order of dismissal is bad in law. Hence, it has been prayed that these writ appeals being devoid of any substance, be dismissed. 16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that this appeal and the connected writ appeals deserves to be dismissed. 17. Hence, it has been prayed that these writ appeals being devoid of any substance, be dismissed. 16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that this appeal and the connected writ appeals deserves to be dismissed. 17. We shall advert ourselves to the competence of the enquiry officer to hold departmental enquiry. The Corporation is a statutory body and has been constituted under section 3 of the Act of 1950, and hence, the Corporation is a creature of the statute. Various functions of the Corporation are to be carried out within the purview of the Act of 1950. Section 12 of the Act of 1950 speaks about the power to appoint committees and delegate functions. Under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act of 1950, the Managing Director is having competence to delegate powers and duties to any officer of the Corporation and such officer to whom such powers and duties are delegated shall exercise and perform such powers and duties under the control and supervision of the Managing Director. For better understanding, we think it apposite to quote section 12 of the Act of 1950 which reads thus: "12. Power to appoint committees and delegate junctions. -- (1) A Board may, from time to time, by resolution passed at a meeting -- (a) appoint committees (consisting of Directors) for performing such function as may be specified in the resolution; (b) delegate to any such committee or to the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in the resolution, such of its powers and duties as it may think fit; (c) authorise the Managing Director or any other officer of the Corporation, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in the resolution to exercise such powers and perform such duties as may deem necessary for the efficient day to day administration of its business. (2) The Chairman, Vice-Chairman or Managing Director may delegate any of his powers and duties including powers and duties delegated to him under sub-section (1) to any officer of the Corporation, and the officer to whom such powers and duties are delegated, shall exercise and perform such powers and duties under the control and supervision of the Managing Director. (2) The Chairman, Vice-Chairman or Managing Director may delegate any of his powers and duties including powers and duties delegated to him under sub-section (1) to any officer of the Corporation, and the officer to whom such powers and duties are delegated, shall exercise and perform such powers and duties under the control and supervision of the Managing Director. (Emphasis supplied) On bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is luminously clear as like a noon day that the Managing Director can delegate his powers and duties to any officer of the Corporation who shall perform such powers and duties under the control and supervision of the Managing Director. 18. The Regulations are framed by the Corporation under section 45 of the Act of 1950. Under this section, there is a specific bar to make any regulation which shall be consistent with the Act of 1950 and the rules framed under the said Act. Thus, under section 45 of the Act of 1950 itself, there is a clear bar to frame any regulation which is inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made under the said Act. Admittedly, the enquiry officer who has been appointed by the Managing Director is not an officer of the Corporation, since he holds the substantive post of Professor in the Higher Education Department and when he was appointed as an enquiry officer, he was serving as Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport on deputation. As the statute does not permit the Managing Director to delegate his powers to any other officer except the officers of the Corporation, according to us, the appointment of enquiry officer, who is admittedly not an officer of the Corporation, runs de hors to sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act of 1950. 19. The power of sub-delegation to any other officer has been delegated to the Managing Director under section 12(2) of the Act of 1950 and the Managing Director enjoys only those delegated powers and further he can sub-delegate only those powers which are conferred to him by the statute and the Managing Director cannot sub-delegate his powers in contravention to section 12(2) of the Act of 1950. In this context, we may also place reliance on Maxims "Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet", which would mean that no one can give that which he has not. 20. In this context, we may also place reliance on Maxims "Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet", which would mean that no one can give that which he has not. 20. In clear terms and very simple words having no other interpretation, it is envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act of 1950 that the Managing Director can delegate his powers and duties including powers and duties delegated to him under sub-section (1) to any officer of the Corporation, and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that except the officer of the Corporation, any such power can be delegated to any other officer. It is well settled law that when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. In this context, it would be fruitful to place reliance on some decision of the Supreme Court; they are Nelson Motis v. Union of India [ AIR 1992 SC 1981 ], Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 2001 SC 1980 ], State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh [ AIR 2005 SC 294 ], and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta [ AIR 2005 SC 648 ], so also the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition 2010, page 50. 21. Even the Regulations which are framed by the Corporation under section 45 of the Act of 1950 do not permit the Managing Director to appoint any person who is not an officer of the Corporation to hold departmental enquiry. In the definition clause of the Regulations, in clause 4(1)(b) the term "competent authority" has been defined which would mean the authority competent under the Regulations to impose on an employee any of the penalties specified in regulation 32. Clause 32 pertains to minor and major penalties and sub-clause (ix) is in respect of dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Corporation. Clause 34 highlights about the competence of authority to impose penalty and sub-clause (2) of clause 34 bars to impose any penalty specified in clause (v) to (ix) of regulation 32 by any authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Clause 34 highlights about the competence of authority to impose penalty and sub-clause (2) of clause 34 bars to impose any penalty specified in clause (v) to (ix) of regulation 32 by any authority subordinate to the appointing authority. At the relevant time, the writ petitioner was an officer and was serving on the post of Divisional Manager and the appointing authority is the Managing Director. Clause 36 speaks about the procedure for imposing major penalties and according to sub-clause (a) no order imposing any of the major penalties specified in regulation 32 could be made except after an enquiry is held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this regulation and regulation 37. Under sub-clause (b) of clause 36, whenever the competent authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct against an employee, it may itself inquire, or appoint under this regulation an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Under sub-clause (e) (i) on receipt of the written statement of defence the competent authority may itself inquire into such of the articles of charge, as are not admitted or, if it considers necessary so to do, appoint under sub-regulation (b) an inquiring authority to hold an enquiry. For ready reference, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant sub-clauses of clause 36 which read thus: "36. Procedure for imposing major penalties. -- (a) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in regulation 32 shall be made except after an enquiry is held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this regulation and regulation 37. (b) Whenever, the competent authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct against an employee, it may itself inquire, or appoint under this regulation an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. (b) Whenever, the competent authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct against an employee, it may itself inquire, or appoint under this regulation an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Explanation: xxxx xxxx (c) xxxx xxxx (d) xxxx xxxx (e) (i) On receipt of the written statement of defence the competent authority may itself inquire into such of the articles of charge, as are not admitted or, if it considers necessary so to do, appoint under sub-regulation (b), an inquiring authority for the purposes; where all the articles of charges have been admitted by the employees, shall record its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner laid down in regulation 37. (ii) If no written statement is submitted by the employee the competent authority may itself inquire into the articles of charge or may, if it considers it necessary to do so, appoint under sub-regulation (b) an inquiring authority for the purpose. (iii) Where the competent authority itself inquires into any articles of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order appoint an employee, to be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge." On bare perusal of sub-clause (b) of clause 36, it is clear that either the competent authority may itself inquire or appoint under this regulation an authority to inquire into the truth of the charges. 22. We are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that because the term "authority" has not been defined under the Regulations, it can even be a third person or stranger, and therefore, Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport cannot be said to be an incompetent person to hold departmental enquiry. According to us, because the term "authority" mentioned in the aforesaid Regulations is required to be read in context with section 12(2) of the Act of 1950 as well as statutory mandate given in section 45 of the Act of 1950 which we have discussed herein above in detail, therefore, since the enquiry officer was not an officer of the Corporation, he was not having any competence to hold any departmental enquiry. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Malik (supra), placed reliance by the learned counsel for the respondent is applicable in the present case. 23. So far as prejudice part to the writ petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that an application was submitted by the writ petitioner to the Managing Director in which specifically it has been mentioned that because the enquiry officer is totally stranger to the set up, functions, duties and working procedure of the Corporation, looking to the factual inquiry which is to be conducted on the basis of charges, according to us, unless and until person who is well acquainted with the working system of the Corporation is appointed as an enquiry officer, he cannot hold fair enquiry, even if, he is not prejudiced against the writ petitioner, and because reasons are to be assigned by the enquiry officer holding the charges to be proved or not proved, therefore, a person who is totally stranger to the working system of the Corporation cannot discharge the duty of enquiry officer in respect to findings about proving of the charges and how they are found to be proved. Therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner, in any manner, was not prejudiced, if the departmental enquiry was held by Dilip Raj. Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport. 24. Three decisions of the Supreme Court placed reliance upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable on facts and further in all those decisions, after enquiry was conducted and order of punishment was passed, objection in respect to competence of the enquiry officer was raised. But in the present case, at the threshold of the departmental enquiry, competence of the enquiry officer has been challenged and it was requested by the writ petitioner to Managing Director to change the enquiry officer assigning reasons that he is totally a stranger and is not acquainted with the set up, functions and the business of the Corporation. The prayer of the writ petitioner was not accepted as a result of which the writ petitioner filed Writ Petition No.314/09 in which interim orders were passed by the learned writ Court. 25. The prayer of the writ petitioner was not accepted as a result of which the writ petitioner filed Writ Petition No.314/09 in which interim orders were passed by the learned writ Court. 25. We also do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that under Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 it is not necessary that enquiry officer should be a Government servant; he may even be a stranger and because the Regulations are more or less akin to the aforesaid CCA Rules of 1966, therefore, Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport was competent to hold departmental enquiry even though he is not an officer of the Corporation. The answer is simple, as we have already held therein above that the Corporation is a creature of the statute and has been constituted under section 3 of the Act of 1950. Delegation of the powers of the Managing Director of the Corporation is strictly in terms of section 12(2) of the Act of 1950 and there is no other provision of delegation of powers to any other person, except an officer of the Corporation. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is having no merit. 26. Hence, according to us, the learned writ Court did not commit any error in holding that the departmental enquiry conducted by Shri Dilip Raj Dwivedi, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport runs de hors to the spirit of the Act of 1950 as well as the Regulations framed under section 45 of the said Act. Indeed, holding of departmental enquiry against the writ petitioner is also prejudicial to him. 27. Now coming to the next point whether the learned writ Court was justified in setting aside the order of dismissal. We have minutely gone through the reasonings assigned by the learned writ Court and we are •of the view that the learned writ Court has rightly set aside the order of dismissal for the reasons assigned in the impugned order and we are not reiterating those reasons in this judgment. We may, however, add that the order of dismissal was mala fide for another reason that on account of passing interim order, no coercive action which according to us would also include the order of dismissal, was required to be taken. We may, however, add that the order of dismissal was mala fide for another reason that on account of passing interim order, no coercive action which according to us would also include the order of dismissal, was required to be taken. We are not, at all, impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the interim direction was issued against the enquiry officer and not against the Managing Director, and because the order of dismissal has been passed by the Managing Director, therefore, the said interim order would not bind him. The argument so advanced, at the first blush appears to be quite attractive, however, on deeper scrutiny it was found to be devoid of any substance for the simple reason that according to the Regulations, the Managing Director of the Corporation directed the enquiry officer to hold inquiry on his behalf, which would mean, looking to the spirit of the Regulations and various provisions of the Act of 1950 which we have mentioned herein above, that for all practical purposes, the departmental enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer on behalf of the Managing Director, and therefore, the interim order dated 23.1.2009 in Writ Petition No.314/09 (S) which this Court passed was also applicable against the Managing Director not to take any coercive step against the writ petitioner and the order of dismissal from service is mala fide. 28. Since, the order of dismissal is mala fide, according to us, the learned writ Court also did not commit any error by passing the direction to the Corporation to pay arrears of salary apart from passing the order setting aside dismissal order. 29. For the reasons stated herein above, we do not find any merit in this writ appeal as well as in the connected writ appeals. The same are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.