JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—This is plaintiff’s second appeal. Krishna Murari (since deceased) son of Harihar Prasad instituted the O.S. No. 368 of 1984 against Lakshmi Narain, the State of U.P. through Collector, Deoria, Tehsildar Salempur and Prabhari Adhikari, Industries Department for permanent injunction in respect of a open piece of land described in the plaint on the please inter alia that he is the owner in possession of a house having entrance towards North. There is a road towards north of the house and the disputed land described in the plaint lies towards the other side of road is a vacant piece of land. It is in his occupation and he is using the same by keeping Khoota, Naad, Charahi etc. Also there is a Neem tree. The property in dispute is his ancestral property. There was a rumour in the village that the defendant No. 1 who has no concern with the said piece of land has mortgaged it with other respondents as a security for loan and the Industries Department is going to auction sale it on 23.2.1984. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant No. 1 on the pleas inter alia that he has purchased the said property from Harihar Prasad by means of a registered sale-deed dated 9.1.1961 and is in occupation since then. The said piece of land was mortgaged with the Industries Department as a security for the loan amount advanced to him. 3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as many as eight issues were framed by the trial Court. However, the issue No. 1 as to whether the plaintiff who is owner in possession of the property in dispute is the only surviving issue in the present appeal. The said issue alongwith other issue was decided on 6th of July, 1987 by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed. The said decree was subject matter of appeal before the Court below at the instance of Lakshmi Narain, defendant No. 1, which has been allowed by the First Appellate Court on 11th of July, 1997. 4. The above appeal was admitted on the following two substantial questions of law as framed in the memo of appeal : 1.Whether in the case of sale-deed contents thereof can be proved by production of a certified copy of sale-deed? 4. The above appeal was admitted on the following two substantial questions of law as framed in the memo of appeal : 1.Whether in the case of sale-deed contents thereof can be proved by production of a certified copy of sale-deed? 2.Whether where an allegation had been made that the original sale-deed has been deposited with Industries Department to which the Pairokar of the Industries Department replied that no such sale-deed was ever deposited by the defendant No. 1 nor was there any such sale-deed available in the Industries Department, can such a sale-deed held to be proved when no other evidence had been let in by the defendant No. 1. 5. Sri G.D. Misra, learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant argued both the above questions of law simultaneously and submits that admittedly, the original sale-deed has not been produced by the defendant No. 1 in evidence. Defendant No. 1 came out with the case that the said sale-deed was deposited with the Industries Department as a security for the purposes of taking advance from it. The Pairokar of the Industries Department was examined as a witness who deposed that no such sale-deed was deposited by the defendant No. 1. The contention is that the defendant No. 1 has failed to account for the absence of original sale-deed, could not have been permitted to file the certified copy of the sale-deed i.e. secondary evidence in the suit. The vendor of the alleged sale-deed is Harihar Prasad according to the own showing of the defendant No. 1 who is the father of plaintiff and as such, plaintiff’s ownership with regard to the land in dispute is established. In addition, there is oral testimony to establish the plaintiff’s title over the disputed land and as such, the Court below was not right in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. It has wrongly placed reliance upon the secondary evidence i.e. the certified copy of the sale-deed which is not admissible in evidence. In reply, the learned counsel for the defendant respondent No. 1 submits that in view of Sections 65(f) read with Section 79 of the Evidence Act, a certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence, irrespective of the fact that absence of original deed has not been explained. In reply, the learned counsel for the defendant respondent No. 1 submits that in view of Sections 65(f) read with Section 79 of the Evidence Act, a certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence, irrespective of the fact that absence of original deed has not been explained. It was submitted that in view of Section 74(2) of the Evidence Act, certified copy of a registered sale-deed is admissible in evidence. 6. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Before proceeding further, it may be noticed that except making a bald statement that the certified copy of sale-deed is not admissible in evidence, the learned counsel could not refer any material to substantiate the said argument. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has placed reliance upon the following decisions which support his contention : 7. Kiran Singh v. Balbir Singh, 1993 AWC 138, is an authority for the proposition that certified copy of a registered sale-deed is admissible in evidence, no explanation is required as to why the original sale-deed was not produced. It has taken note of Section 65 (f) of Evidence Act which provides that secondary evidence relating to documents may be given when the original is a document of which certified copy is permitted by this Court, or by any other law in force in (India) to be given in evidence. Section 74 of the said Act defines the public document. Its sub-section (2) provides that public records kept in any state of private documents is also a public document. The record of the sale-deed registered before the Registrar is itself a public record where in the record of the private documents is kept by the State and the State authority. Section 77 says that certified copies of the public documents may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.. Section 77 says that certified copies of the public documents may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.. Ultimately, it concluded as follows : “Thus considered the certified copy issued by the Office of Registrar, of the private documents, from Public record of private documents kept therein in which is kept and maintained by the Sub Registrar’s Office is a secondary piece of evidence and in view of the provisions of Section 65 (e) and (f) of the Act the same is admissible in evidence in order to prove the contents of documents under Section 65 sub clauses (e) and (f) thereof. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the learned lower appellate Court committed substantial error of law in holding that the certified copy of the sale-deed dated 3-4-1978 was inadmissible in evidence as the defendants have not said a single word explaining the reason why original was not produced. There was no need to explain the circumstances in which original was not produced because it is covered by Section 65 (e) and (f) and there is no such requirement. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) stand independently of each other. Section 65 of the Act explains the circumstances. In any case the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) the secondary evidence can be produced. It is not necessary that if a case is covered by clauses (e) and (f) the person who wants to produce the secondary evidence should explain about ‘the original while filing the certified copy of the public document, or of a document of which certified is permitted under this Act i.e. in case covered by clauses (e) (f) then nothing further is required to be explained.” 8. Then Marwari Kumhar and others v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri and another, 2001 (1) ARC 141, was relied upon wherein it has been held : “Thus it is to seen that under sub-clause (c) of Section 65, where the original has been lost or destroyed, then secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. Sub-clause (c) is independent of sub-clause (f). Secondary evidence can be led, even of a public document, if the conditions as laid down under sub-clause (c) are fulfilled. Sub-clause (c) is independent of sub-clause (f). Secondary evidence can be led, even of a public document, if the conditions as laid down under sub-clause (c) are fulfilled. Thus, if the original of the public document has been lost or destroyed then the secondary evidence can be given even of a public document. This is the law as has been laid down by this Court in Mst. Bibi Aisha and others v. The Bihar Subai Sunni Majlis Avaqaf and others, AIR 1969 SC 253 . In this case a suit had been filed for setting aside a registered mokarrari lease deed and for restoration of possession of properties. The suit had been filed on behalf of a Waqf. The Original Waqf Deed was lost and an ordinary copy of the Waqf Deed was produced in evidence. The question was whether an ordinary copy was admissible in evidence and whether or not secondary evidence could be led of a public document. The Court held that under Section 65, clauses (a) and (c) secondary evidence was admissible. It is held that a case may fall both under clauses (a) or (c) and (f) in which case secondary evidence would be admissible. It was held that clauses (a) and (c) were independent of clause (f) and even an ordinary copy would, therefore, be admissible. As stated above the case that the original was no longer available in Court records and the certified copy was lost has not been disbelieved. Thus the ordinary copy of the earlier judgment was admissible in evidence and had been correctly marked as an exhibit by the trial Court.” 9. Lastly, Ved Prakash Rastogi v. Nagar Palika Badaun, 2007 (4) AWC 3980 , a decision of this Court, was relied upon which supports the contention of learned counsel for the defendant respondent No. 1. It was also a case of sale-deed where original sale-deed was not filed but the certified copy thereof was filed in evidence. It was stated that the registered sale-deed has been misplaced. In this fact situation, in view of Section 65 (f) read with Section 79 of the Evidence Act it was held that the certified copy is admissible in evidence. 10. It was stated that the registered sale-deed has been misplaced. In this fact situation, in view of Section 65 (f) read with Section 79 of the Evidence Act it was held that the certified copy is admissible in evidence. 10. The Apex Court in the year 1963 in Ramappa v. Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , has held that certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence without being proved by calling an attesting witness. The aforesaid ratio has been reiterated recently in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh, JT 2001 (6) SC 8, para 5 of the judgment is reproduced below : “Counsel for the State was right when he submitted that the High Court erred in rejecting Exhibits R/2 and R/3 as inadmissible only on the ground that the parties to the documents had not been examined by the State. It is not the law that a certified copy of a registered agreement for sale is inadmissible in evidence unless the parties to the document are examined to prove it. That would be contrary to what Sections 77 read with Sections 74(2) and 76 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and more specifically Section 51A of the Act provides. As far as the provisions of the Evidence Act are concerned, a certified copy of the registered sale-deed is admissible in evidence and does not need to be proved by calling a witness. (See Ramappa v. Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , 1637). 11. After close of the hearing and before the judgment could be delivered, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted following three decisions for consideration : Smt. J. Yashoda v. Smt. K. Shobha Rani, 2007 (103) RD 191, is an authority for the proposition that photostat copies of documents are not admissible in evidence as it is not possible to compare them with the originals. The said decision does not advance the case of appellant and was rendered in a different factual matrix. Then, reliance was placed on Mst. Sardaran and others and others v. Sunderlal Baldeo Prasad and others, AIR 1968 Alld. 363, wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held that the plaintiff who relied upon a sale-deed of the year 1986 cannot tender the certified copies to prove the contents of the sale-deed as he has failed to prove the loss of original. Sardaran and others and others v. Sunderlal Baldeo Prasad and others, AIR 1968 Alld. 363, wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held that the plaintiff who relied upon a sale-deed of the year 1986 cannot tender the certified copies to prove the contents of the sale-deed as he has failed to prove the loss of original. A close reading of the facts of the above case would show that the controversy raised therein was with regard to Sub-section (2) of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act as added by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1954. In the aforestated judgment, the attention of the Court was not invited towards the Section 65 (f) of the Evidence Act nor Section 74 thereof was under consideration. The said decision rests on a different footing. In any view of the matter, the said decision has to be read subject to the subsequent decision of the Apex Court referred to herein above. Lastly, a reference was made to Rosammal Issetheen Ammal Fernandez (Dead) by L.Rs. and others v. Joosa Mariyan Fernandez and others, 2002 (93) RD 508. Herein also the controversy was with regard Section 68 proviso in respect of a gift deed. It has no application to the controversy on hand and therefore, the appellant cannnot derive any benefit from it. 12. The First Appellate Court has further found that the boundaries of the sale-deed tally with the property in disputed. It has noticed that a witness namely Triyugi Narain from the Sub Registrar Office was called and examined as AW 1 who has proved registration of the sale-deed and has stated that the sale-deed still continues to be registered in the Sub Registrar Office and it has not yet been cancelled. As against this, the plaintiff except producing oral evidence could not lead any satisfactory evidence in support of his plea that he is owner in possession of the property in dispute. In face of registered sale-deed executed by the plaintiff’s father in favour of defendant No. 1, the plaintiff’s evidence have got no value. Significantly, it may be noted that the plaintiff has given some evidence that the house was let out to the department of consolidation but the house of the plaintiff is not a subject matter of the suit and the said evidence is not of any consequence so far as the land in dispute is concerned. Significantly, it may be noted that the plaintiff has given some evidence that the house was let out to the department of consolidation but the house of the plaintiff is not a subject matter of the suit and the said evidence is not of any consequence so far as the land in dispute is concerned. The Appellate Court has committed no error in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 13. Even the trial Court under issue No. 2 has accepted the case of the defendant No. 1 that he took a loan by mortgaging the house in question with the Industries Department. The documents were filed and marked as Annexure A-2 and A-3. 14. Viewed as above, the substantial question of law as framed in the memo of appeal, reproduced above, are decided by holding that the registered sale-deed is admissible as secondary evidence in view of Sections 65(f), 74 (2) and 79 of the Evidence Act. 15. In view of the above discussions, I find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed. But no order as to costs. —————