Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 2662 (PNJ)

Gurmeet Singh v. Walia Brothers

2010-09-16

MAHESH GROVER

body2010
Judgment Mahesh Grover, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against judgment dated 9.5.2009 passed by the Rent Controller, Hoshiarpur whereby the application of the petitioners filed under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short, the Act) for ejectment of the respondents from the demised premises was dismissed. 2. Petitioner -Gurmeet Singh and petitioner-Raghubir Singh are co-owners of the demised premises in equal shares. The positive pleaded case of the petitioners was that petitioner-Gurmeet Singh is a Non-Resident Indian (N.R.I.), who went abroad in 1991 and has since returned to India in December, 1999. It was averred that the petitioners also jointly own some other property at Government College Road, Hoshiarpur where petitioner no.2 is carrying on the business of shuttering and building material; that petitioner no. 1 also intends to start his business, but the property in possession of petitioner no.2 is insufficient for accommodating him; and that petitioner no. 1, thus, requires the demised premises for his own use and occupation as petitioner no.2 has no objection in that regard. Apart from these facts and the facts which were required to be pleaded as per the requirements of Section 13-B of the Act, it has been pleaded that matrimonial life of petitioner no.l has been disrupted as his wife had committed suicide on 14.12.1999 and his three children were residing with petitioner no.2 in Hoshiarpur which has farther precipitated the need of petitioner no.l to settle down in the country. It has further been pleaded that petitioner no. 1 is owner of the demised premises for the last five years and earlier, the same was owned by their father which devolved upon the petitioners being successors after his death. 3. Upon notice, the respondents appeared and filed their written statement as well as an application for leave to contest. They disputed the facts as pleaded by the petitioners; i.e., the status of petitioner no. 1 as N.R.I., his return to India, his personal necessity, as also his ownership of the demised premises. It was also pleaded that the petitioners are having four other shops to their credit which are sufficient to take care of the need of petitioner no.l and the personal necessity as expressed in the petition, therefore, did not arise at all. 4. The Kent Controller, after hearing the parties, granted leave to the respondents to defend. 5. It was also pleaded that the petitioners are having four other shops to their credit which are sufficient to take care of the need of petitioner no.l and the personal necessity as expressed in the petition, therefore, did not arise at all. 4. The Kent Controller, after hearing the parties, granted leave to the respondents to defend. 5. The parties went to trial and the Rent Controller framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the applicant No. 1 is Non-Resident lndian? OPA 2. Whether the applicant No. 1 has returned to India and requires the premises in question for his bona fide necessity? OPA 3. Whether the applicants have become owner of the premises in dispute for the period of 5 years before filing the present petition? OPA 4. Whether the applicants have not come to the Court with clean hands? OPR 5. Whether the petitioner is not maintainable? OPR 6. Relief. 6. By the impugned judgment, the Rent Controller rejected the application of the petitioners which has led to the filing of the instant revision petition. 7. Shri Sanjay Majithia, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended with reference to the judgment under challenge that the factum of petitioner no. 1 being an N.R.I, and his ownership of the demised premises for the last five years stood established and consequently, the only aspect which remained to be determined was whether he required the demised premises for his own personal use and occupation or not, which fact has erroneously been determined by the Rent Controller. Shri Majithia extensively referred to the evidence on record to say that petitioner no.l desperately required the demised premises for his own use as his wife committed suicide and he was burdened with liability of three children, who were residing in India. It was contended that the demised premises are needed so as to enable petitioner no. 1 to start his own business proposition and to settle down in the country. It was further contended that as per the observations of the Apex Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, JT 2005(12) SC 442 : 2005(2) RCR (Rent) 470, once a petitioner being an N.R.I. Expresses his bona fide need, the onus to dislodge such a plea shifts upon the tenant and that onus has not been discharged satisfactorily by the respondents in the instant case. He, thus, submitted that the impugned judgment is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. 8. In support of his submissions/ contentions, he placed reliance on the following judgment: 1. Narinder Singh v. Kripa Singh and others, (2006-3) 144 PLR 597; 2. Surinder Kumar Shori v. Shakuntala Devi, (2006-3)144 PLR 848 3. Satnam Channan v. Darshan Singh, 2006(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 614 (P&H); 4. Jasbir Kaur Sandhu @ Jasbero Kaur v. Bihari Lal Narang, (2006-2)143 PLR 672; 5. Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monhish Saini (supra). 9. On the other hand, Shri Amar Vivek, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the impugned judgment was justified as the petitioners had failed to prove all the ingredients that are required to be proved under Section 13-B of the Act. The main plank of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents is that petitioner no. 1, who claimed himself to be an N.R.I., did not offer himself for cross-examination at the time of trial and, hence, his evidence could not be looked at for the purpose of arriving at any conclusion. It was contended that after tendering his affidavit, petitioner no. 1 did not come present for cross-examination despite several opportunities which precluded the respondents from putting substantial and incriminating material to him which could have proved that his need was not bona fide. It was further contended that whether petitioner no. 1 intended to settle down in the country or not, could have been established only if the respondents were granted opportunity to cross examine him. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there is sufficient material on record to show that the petitioners were in possession of four shops which were lying vacant and from where it could be inferred that the need of petitioner no. I was not bona fide. It was next submitted that even though, the statement of petitioner no.2 has been recorded and he has been cross-examined, yet, his testimony could not be a substitute of the statement of petitioner no. 1, who was required to plead and prove all the particulars of Section 13-B of the Act, such as being an N.R.I., his plea of bona fide need and his ownership of the demised premises for the last five years. Learned counsel for the respondents, thus, contended that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity and prayed that the petition be dismissed. Learned counsel for the respondents, thus, contended that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He also submitted that the respondents have no objection if the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Rent Controller for decision afresh, provided petitioner no.l offers himself for cross-examination. 10. In support of his contentions/ submissions, he placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao, 1999(3) S.C.C 573; 2. Iswar Bhai C.Patel v. Harihar Behera, 1999(3) S.C.C. 457; 3. Rattan Dev v. Pasam Devi, 2002(7) S.C.C. 441; 4. Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd., (2005-2)140 PLR 1 (SC); 5. Satnam Channan v. Darshan Singh, 2006(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 614 (P&H); 6. Basant Kumar v. Romesh Kumar Deora, (2008-4)152 PLR 313; 7. Hardev Singh v. Surjit Kaur, (2008-3)152 PLR 477; 8. Manohar Lal v, Smt.Pushpawati Jain, 1993 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 592 (Delhi). 11. I have considered the rival contentions/ submissions and have gone through the whole record of the case. 12. If the impugned judgment is to be seen, then there are categoric findings recorded by the Rent Controller that petitioner no. 1 is an N.R.I., who was owner of the demised premises for the last five years. Examined independently also, there is enough material to show that petitioner no. 1 is indeed, an N.R.I, and is owner of the demised premises for the last five years. No material worth the name has been shown by the respondents to this Court from where a contrary inference could be derived. So much as the question of ownership was not even agitated by the learned counsel for the respondents before the Rent Controller. It is, thus, evident that because of the conclusive nature of these unquestioned findings, these two aspects of the matter necessarily have to be affirmed in favour of the petitioners. 13. This leaves the Court with two aspects of the matter which have been vehemently agitated before me - (i) that the need of petitioner no. 1 is not bona fide and (ii) that petitioner no. 1 not having offered himself for cross-examination, his evidence could not be looked into as he being N.R.I., was personally required to testify on these aspects and not having done so, he invited a fatal conclusion for his case. 14. 1 is not bona fide and (ii) that petitioner no. 1 not having offered himself for cross-examination, his evidence could not be looked into as he being N.R.I., was personally required to testify on these aspects and not having done so, he invited a fatal conclusion for his case. 14. Before examining the bona fide need, this Court would delve upon the question that in the absence of petitioner no.1 offering himself for cross-examination, his testimony would be ignored to result in fatality to the case of the petitioners. The counsel for the respondents, who has raised this plea, has tried to derive sustenance for his plea on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao (supra) wherein, while referring to a number of judgments of various High Courts, it was observed that "where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct." 15. In Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v Indusind Bank Ltd (supra), which deals with a case where a power of attorney was examined on behalf of the actual litigant, their Lordships of the Apex Court laid down in paragraph 8 of the judgment, as under:- "8.............. Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, empowers the holder of power of attorney to act on behalf of the principal. In our view, the word acts employed in Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of acts done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term acts would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words,if the power of attorney holder has rendered some acts in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined." 16. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined." 16. A learned single Judge of this Court in Basant Kumar v. Romesh Kumar Deora (supra), which was a case relating to proceedings initiated under Section 13-B of the Act, relied upon the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, as also/two judgments of Rajasthan High Court in Shambhu Dutt Shastri v. State of Rajasthan, 1986 2 WLL 713 and Ram Parshad v. Hari Narain, AIR 1998 Rajasthan 185, observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment as under- "8. it is observed by the Rent Controller, an attorney is competent to give evidence on behalf of the principal. This view cannot be approved in view of the legal position as noticed above. An attorney can given such evidence only on those aspects which are in his personal knowledge. Whether the NRI wishes to return to India and start his business would more appropriately be in the personal knowledge of the principal NRI and whatever information the attorney would have, would be a derivative one as told to him by the NRI-respondent.........." 17. I am in agreement with the proposition of law laid down in the afore-quoted judgments from where it is evident that ordinarily the testimony of power of attorney holder in substitution to that of the actual litigant may not be sufficient and non-examination of the latter and his not being cross-examined by the other side, may lead to an adverse inference against his case, but, in my view, at the same time, the Court before deducing such inference, is not precluded from searching for other material that may. be available on record to justify such inference and if attending material and evidence belies it, then mere non-examination of a litigant or absence of his cross-examination, would not be fatal to his case. 18. Now, I come to the facts of the instant case. As noticed above, the application for eviction of the respondents was initiated by the petitioners, who invoked the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act as petitioner no. 1 is an N.R.I, and petitioner no.2, his brother, is a co-owner of the demised premises. 18. Now, I come to the facts of the instant case. As noticed above, the application for eviction of the respondents was initiated by the petitioners, who invoked the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act as petitioner no. 1 is an N.R.I, and petitioner no.2, his brother, is a co-owner of the demised premises. There is, no doubt, about the fact that a co-owner can also initiate proceedings on behalf of the other co-owner and in the absence of any objection from such co-owner, who has not chosen to controvert them, the same would stand validated by him as well. But, in the instant case, both the co-owners had chosen to come to the Court seeking eviction of the respondents and one of them being N.R.I., had rightly invoked the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act for ouster of the tenants from the demised premises. Admittedly, petitioner no. 1, who is N.R.I., stepped into witness box and was examined in chief, but could not be cross-examined. Petitioner no.2, who is co-owner, was examined in his own right and subjected to intensive cross-examination. He was not the agent nor the power attorney holder of petitioner no. 1, but as mentioned above, he was examined in his own right as a co-owner. Legally he could not have invoked the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act and thus, his being a coowner of not, the fact of the matter is that he was merely an appendage of the main proceedings initiated by petitioner no.l. His testimony, however, cannot be ignored to the detriment of petitioner no. 1 whose cross examination was not conducted, for the reason that he was intricately involved in the affairs of his co-owner in so far as the share of the demised property is concerned and also in so far as the personal affairs of petitioner no. 1 are concerned which is evident from the detailed account which he has given. Moreover, petitioner no. 1 is real brother of petitioner no.2. The testimony of petitioner no. 2 establishes beyond doubt the fact that petitioner no. 1 are concerned which is evident from the detailed account which he has given. Moreover, petitioner no. 1 is real brother of petitioner no.2. The testimony of petitioner no. 2 establishes beyond doubt the fact that petitioner no. 1 is an N.R.I., that he was owner of the demised premises for the last five years and that he required the tenanted premises for his own use and occupation in order to settle down in India as he had lost his wife and his children were residing in at Hoshiarpur in the same house with petitioner no.2. The respondents, who were acutely on notice regarding the controversy in- cluding the non-appearance of petitioner no. 1 to offer himself for cross-examination, cross-examined petitioner no.2 at length on all me vital aspects. 19. Besides, the intimate and intricate involvement of petitioner no.2 with the affairs of the joint properties including the demised premises proved a deep insight of the needs and requirements, as also the knowledge of the factual matrix of the eviction application and the requirement of petitioner no.l. His testimony, therefore, cannot be discarded and has to be accepted and held to be worth credence to be evaluated and which, on evaluation, is found to be inspiring enough. 20. In Baldev Singh Bajwa Versus Monhish Saini (supra), while addressing the issue of personal necessity of an N.R.I. Landlord, who comes to the Court and invokes the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act, it has been observed by the Apex Court in paragraphs 19, 20, 21,22, and 23 of the judgment as under:- "19. From the aforesaid decisions the requirement of the landlord of the suit accommodation is to be established as genuine need and not a pretext to get the accommodation vacated. The provisions of Sections 18-A(4) and (5) concede to the tenants right to defend the proceedings initiated under Section 13-B showing that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona fide. The legislative intent for setting up of a special procedure for NRI landlords is obvious from the legislative intent which has been deliberately designed making distinction between the ordinary landlords and special category of landlords. The legislative intent for setting up of a special procedure for NRI landlords is obvious from the legislative intent which has been deliberately designed making distinction between the ordinary landlords and special category of landlords. The Controllers power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 13-B is restricted by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. It is needless to say that in the summary proceedings the tenants right to contest the application would be restricted to the parameters of Section 13-B of the Act. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying on any other fact which does not fall within the parameters of Section 13-B. The tenants defence is restricted and cannot go beyond the scope of the provisions of the Act applicable to the NRI landlord. Under Section 13-B the landlord is entitled for eviction if he requires the suit accommodation for his or her use or the use of the dependent, (who) ordinarily lives with him or her. The requirement would necessarily to be genuine or bona fide requirement and it cannot be said that although the requirement is not genuine or bona fide, he would be entitled to the ejectment of the tenant nor it can be said that in no circumstances the tenant will not be (will be ?) allowed to prove that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona fide. A tenants right to defend the claim of the landlord under Section 13-B for ejectment would arise if the tenant could be able to show that the landlord in the proceedings is not NRI landlord; that he is not the owner thereof or that his ownership is not for the required period of five years before the institution of proceedings and that the landlords requirement is not bona fide. 20. The legislative intent of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of the tenant filed by the NRI landlord is reflected from the summary procedure prescribed under Section 18-A of the Act of 1949 which requires the Controller to take up the matter on day-to-day basis till the conclusion of the hearing of an application. 20. The legislative intent of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of the tenant filed by the NRI landlord is reflected from the summary procedure prescribed under Section 18-A of the Act of 1949 which requires the Controller to take up the matter on day-to-day basis till the conclusion of the hearing of an application. The Legislature wants the decision of the Controller to be final and does not provide any appeal or second appeal against the order of eviction, it is only the High Court which can exercise the power of consideration of the case, whether the decision of the Controller is in accordance with law. Section 13-B gives right of ejectment to special category of landlord who is NRI (Non Resident Indian); and owner of the premises for five years before action is commenced. Such a landlord is permitted to file an application for ejectment only once during his life time. Sub-section (3) of Section 13-B imposes a restriction that he shall not transfer through sale or any other means or lease out the ejected premises before the expiry of the period of five years from the date of taking possession of the said building. Not only that, if there is a breach of any of the conditions of sub-section (3) of Section 13-B, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession of the said building. Under subsection (2-B) of Section 19 the landlord has to take possession and keep it for a continuous period of three months and he is prohibited from letting out the whole or any part of such building to any other person except the evicted tenant and any contravention thereof, he shall be liable for punishment of imprisonment to the term which can be extended upto six months. These restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine. Landlord, after the decree for possession, is bound to possess the accommodation. Landlord is prohibited from transferring it or letting it out for a period of five years. Virtually conditions and restrictions imposed on the NRI landlord makes it improbable for any NRI landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of a tenant unless his need is bona fide. Landlord, after the decree for possession, is bound to possess the accommodation. Landlord is prohibited from transferring it or letting it out for a period of five years. Virtually conditions and restrictions imposed on the NRI landlord makes it improbable for any NRI landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of a tenant unless his need is bona fide. No unscrupulous landlord probably, under this section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him by which practically he is deprived of his right in the property not only as a lessor but also as the owner of the property. There is a restriction imposed even on the transfer of the property by sale or any other manner. The restriction imposed on the landlord by all probability points to the genuine requirement of the landlord, In our view, there are inbuilt protections in the relevant provisions, for the tenants that whenever the landlord would approach the Court he would approach when his need is genuine and bona fide. It is, of course, subject to tenants right to rebut it but with strong and cogent evidence. In our view, (in) the proceeding taken up under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords for the ejectment of the tenant, the Court shall presume that landlords need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide. But this would not dis-entitle the tenant from proving that in fact and in law the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. A heavy burden would lie on the tenant to prove that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the tenant will be called upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlords favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine. 21. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlords favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine. 21. We cannot subscribe to the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/ landlords,that if the inquiry in the allegation of landlords need regarding the bona fide and genuineness is permitted, the legislative intent of immediate delivery of possession of the accommodation owned by them would be defeated. Time and again this Court has laid down that legislative intent has to be ascertained according to plain language used in the enactment and basic rule of statutory construction should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of a legislation and not which leads to anomalies, injustice or absurdities. To refer some, they are K.P. Verghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and another, 1981 (4) SCC 173; Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Nasik and others, 1984(2) SCC 50; Ravulu Subba Rao and others v. Commnr. Of Income-tax, Madras, AIR 1956 SC 604. 22. The golden rule of construction is that when the words of legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them. The basic principle on which this rule is based since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislatures, as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. The legislative intent of the enactment may be gathered from several sources which is, from the statute itself, from the preamble to the statute, from the statement of objects and reasons, from the legislative debates, reports of committees and commissions which preceded the legislation and finally from all legitimate and admissible sources from where they may be allowed. Record may be had from legislative history and latest legislation also. But the primary rule of construction would be to ascertain the plain language used in the enactment which advances the purpose and object of the legislation. Record may be had from legislative history and latest legislation also. But the primary rule of construction would be to ascertain the plain language used in the enactment which advances the purpose and object of the legislation. No doubt the legislative intent in enacting Section 13-B, is to provide for immediate possession of the accommodation owned by the NRI but it cannot be assumed that the legislature wants the NRI landlord/ owner, to get the possession of the accommodation from the tenant even if he does not require it and the need pleaded is proved to be a mere pretext to get the accommodation vacated. Had that not been the intention of the legislatures, the phrase required by the NRI landlord would not have been used in Section 13-B. The classified landlords are given the benefit of summary trial under Section 18-A of the Act. The summary trial is in two parts. Sub-section (4) provides that after the service of summons the tenant has no right to contest the prayer for eviction from the residential building, or schedule building and/ or non-residential building as the case may be unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 13-B to contest the matter, If the tenant defaults to appear in pursuance of summons or when he does not get leave to contest, the Controller shall presume the statements made by the NRI in his petition have been admitted by the tenant and pass an order of eviction. This eventually is contemplated when a tenant does not appear in pursuance of the summon issued and served or where the leave to contest has not been granted by the Controller. The second facet of the section comes into operation when the leave to contest is granted by the Controller. Sub-section (6) of Section 18-A provides that the Controller has to commence the hearing of the petition not later than one month from the date on which the leave was granted to the tenant to contest and he has to hear the application from day-today till the hearing is concluded and the application is decided. It is further provided that the procedure which shall be followed in deciding the application would be as is being practiced by Court of Small Causes. It is further provided that the procedure which shall be followed in deciding the application would be as is being practiced by Court of Small Causes. No appeal or second appeal is provided. From the aforesaid, it is absolutely apparent that even when leave would be given to the tenant to contest, legislatures have taken care of expeditious disposal of the petition for ejectment filed by the NRI landlord. Trial of the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlord in the procedure prescribed would not take much time and thus we cannot accept the argument that the phrase required used by the legislature in Section 13-B would not mean bona fide or genuine requirement and the section has to be construed as and when the allegation is made by the landlord of his need, it is to be taken as gospel truth and the tenants right to defend on that count is completely extinguished and given a go-bye. We do not think High Court is right in holding that mere prayer of the NRI landlord that tenanted premises is required by him or his dependent living with him entails decree of eviction on the mere allegation of requirement and no leave to contest can be given in respect of cases which are covered by various provision restricting the right of the landlord to deal with the premises taken possession of by him in pursuance of the decree for eviction passed by the Controller under Section 13-B of the Act of 1949. We hold that allegations made by the NRI landlord of his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide unless rebutted by the tenant by placement of cogent and material facts and evidence in support thereof at the stage of leave to contest before the Controller. We feel any other interpretation would completely whittle down and deny the tenants right to show and prove that landlord does not in fact, or in law require suit premises. 23. It is further contended that for according relief under Section 13-B of the Act of 1949, it must be proved by the NRI landlord that he has permanently returned to India or that his intentions are to permanently return to India. 23. It is further contended that for according relief under Section 13-B of the Act of 1949, it must be proved by the NRI landlord that he has permanently returned to India or that his intentions are to permanently return to India. The intention to permanently settle down in India should be read into words return used in Section 13-B. The specific category of NRI landlord has been created by the Legislature with the intention to provide relief to them who are intending to settle down in India or take up business in India only. Learned counsel appearing for the landlords have submitted that from the very definition of the NRI in Section 2(dd) of the Act, it is not necessary for the NRI landlord to permanently return to India either for the purpose of his residence of for non-residential purpose." 21. From the afore-quoted judgment, as also from the reading of the various of the Act, particularly Sections 13-B and 18-A, it is crystal clear that a special provision of law has been enacted to help out the N.R.I, landlords and the plea of personal necessity as raised by such a landlord is not to be viewed with suspicion and in the eventuality of leave to defend being granted in favour of a tenant, the onus to dislodge such a plea rests heavily on the tenant, who can off-set the same by bringing sufficient material on record. 22. In the case in hand, the entire thrust of the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents was that the petitioners were in possession of other shops as well in the vicinity out of which four shops were lying vacant and consequently, the need of petitioner no. 1 could not be said to be genuine. To substantiate his contention, he placed reliance on photographs Exhibits R1 to R4. 23. On examination of this plea, I find that material evidence in this regard is manifestly absent. The photographs Exhibits R1 to R4 do not advance the case of the respondent. The same were not put to petitioner no.2, who was cross-examined at length and because of this lapse, it cannot be said with certainty that these photographs pertain to the shops which were owned and possessed by the petitioners. The photographs Exhibits R1 to R4 do not advance the case of the respondent. The same were not put to petitioner no.2, who was cross-examined at length and because of this lapse, it cannot be said with certainty that these photographs pertain to the shops which were owned and possessed by the petitioners. Even if it were to be accepted that other shops were available to the petitioners, yet, the respondents being tenant, they could not dictate terms to the landlord to assert that he may occupy other premises rather than the one which are occupied by them and which are sought to be vacated. Besides, the provisions of Section 13-B of the Act, even though liberally tilting towards the landlord, provide an inherent safeguard to prevent their abuse and in the eventuality of the landlord getting the tenanted premises vacated in pursuance thereto and not occupying the same for the intended purpose for a period of three moths following eviction, the tenant has a right to repossess the same. 24. As a sequel to above discussion, it is held that the Rent Controller, in the instant case, has grossly erred in declining the prayer of the petitioners by dismissing their application under Section 13-B of the Act on the grounds which were not germane to the controversy. 25. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is accepted, the impugned judgment is set aside, the eviction application is allowed and the respondents are directed to forthwith hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises to the petitioners.