Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [for short, the Act] by the injured-claimant, who totally failed in his claim petition in MVC No. 336 of 2003, on the file of Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Srirangapatna, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Act for the purpose of claiming compensation towards serious injuries that he had suffered due to an accident that occurred on 16-12-2002 involving a motor vehicle bearing registration No.KA-01-A-6386, a bus owned by second respondent, driven by the first respondent at the time of the accident and insured with the third respondent-insurance company. 2. The claim, which was no less than for a sum of Rs.26.72 lakh, perhaps advised and quantified by the advocate for the claimant before the tribunal, was on the premise that the injury caused to the appellant-claimant due to the accident had left him in posttraumatic spastic/quadriplegia [all the four limbs becoming useless] and virtually leaving the injured in a vegetable like condition and is bed-laid for the rest of his life, cannot live without the aid or assistance of a constant attendant-24/7 and 365 days. 3. It is such a claim petition, which, nevertheless failed before the tribunal, notwithstanding the petitioner having deposed before the tribunal supporting his claim by narrating his experience as to the after-effects of the accident and the injury and with the driver of the vehicle having pleaded guilty of the act of negligence before the criminal court, wherein he had been prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 IPC and there being no contest on the part of the owner of the vehicle and in the claim petition, both the driver and the owner of the vehicle having remained ex parte, it was left to the insurance company to defend the claim petition and we notice that the insurance company had not left any stone unturned in very intelligently defending the claim petition. 4. 4. The appellant-claimant, as though suffering one disaster was not sufficient on him, got the second shock of his life, when his claim petition was dismissed, by which time he was only in bed and had lost his livelihood and had himself become totally dependent on others and was in constant need of attention not only of sympathetic tolerant members of his family but also of medical personnel, as his condition was so pathetic, doctor’s attendance, if not every day atleast on alternative days was inevitable, and with such complications staring before him and with a ray of hope of expectation and faith in the legal system has come up in appeal before this court, as in terms of Section 173 of the Act, while the legislature has provided a remedy off appeal to a person like the appellant herein, as court is constituted the body to hear appeals in terms of the very statutory provisions and that is how we are hearing this appeal. 5. It is said that law is an ass, but the value and significance of a mule, can be realized and appreciate in a country like ours only by his master-washer man/laundry man/dobhi and not by any one else, as the mule a burden the beast very faithfully and dutifully carries the burden without any murmur or complaint and diligently carries it to its destination! But laws gets derailed midway many a times! 6. It matters little for the mule as to what burden it carries. An ass cannot definitely appreciate or distinguish as to whether it is carrying a very valuable load on its back or even an useless load on its back. It makes little difference for the ass! 7. If the law is worked in all its majestic technicalities, legalities, that will exactly be the result and that is perhaps why the law is compared to an ass. If we viewed this appeal technically or from a very legalistic angle, perhaps, the only outcome can be to dismiss this appeal. 8. It makes little difference for the ass! 7. If the law is worked in all its majestic technicalities, legalities, that will exactly be the result and that is perhaps why the law is compared to an ass. If we viewed this appeal technically or from a very legalistic angle, perhaps, the only outcome can be to dismiss this appeal. 8. Being a little taken aback at the result and shedding at the though of the poor helpless coolie, who is crippled for his life due to the accident and the resultant injury, who is left high and dry, without any solace or succour and with not much assistance forthcoming from the Bar, particularly the learned counsel for the appellant, we have been forced to look into the records, become a little innovative and to find ways and means to render justice, as we were of the view that the dismissal of the appeal without a proper examination will not only result in grave injustice to the appellant-claimant, resulting in miscarriage of justice, but also will shatter the faith and confidence of the common man, in our legal and judicial system, who has in spite of all disasters that are taking place, nevertheless, reposes confidence in our system and keeps approaching courts for relief and succour in the hope of getting justice and at any rate the dismissal of this appeal will only aggravate the misery of a poor hapless victim of a motor accident and we remain inhuman in the process. 9. 9. We have though better of that, we have tried to humanize the legal aspects and the law and at any rate taking cue from the object of the legislation, particularly the provisions of Chapter-XI of the Act, providing for succour and relief to third party victims in an accident involving a motor vehicle while being used on a road and the legislature having realized that the succour and relief to a victim may not be a reality, if the owners of the vehicles causing accidents alone are to be looked up for compensation, having ensured that the insurance of the vehicle against the claims by third parties is made compulsory by law and thereby ensure that the risk of the owner of the vehicle is covered by the insurance company and if such is the avowed object and purpose of the Chapter-XI, Section 147 read with Section 166 of the Act, then, it is necessary for us to examine the facts of the present case and the appeal in this background and keeping view that the avowed object of the legislation was only to ensure that the relief, solace and succour was provided to a victim like the appellant herein. 10. Coming back to the case on hand and to the facts of the Case, learned judge of the tribunal, in the light of the history of the accident and the injury, as placed before the tribunal through the pleading on behalf of the appellant-claimant and the contest on behalf of the insurance company, framed the following issues: (1) Whether the petitioner proves that the accident arose on 16.12.2002 at 06.30 A.M., at Gummanahalli Bus Stand, due to the use of vehicle Bus bearing No.KA-01/A-6386 and caused injuries to the petitioner? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, how much amount and from whom? (3) What order or award? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, how much amount and from whom? (3) What order or award? In the wake of such issues, parties having gone on trial and on behalf of the claimant while the claimant himself had deposed as PW1, a close relative [brother-in-law] [sala] of the claimant, having deposed as PW2, and the doctor, who had treated the injured-claimant, having deposed as PW3, and as many as 19 documents having been marked as ExP1 to 19 as documentary evidence, amongst which, the learned judge of the tribunal has chosen to bestow special attention to ExP6wound certificate issued by K R Hospital at Mysore, where the injured claimant had received initial treatment, and choosing to lay emphasis and belief on the evidence of PW2, which, according to the learned judge of the tribunal, is quite contrary to the case pleaded by the claimant dismissed the claim petition. It is under these circumstances, the present appeal. 11. We have heard Sri R D Renukaradhya, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri A M Venkatesh, learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company, while the other two respondents-driver and the owner of the vehicle-being represented by not less than four advocates namely M/s S N Bhat, B C Venkatesh, Shivakumar S and Vijay Narayan, nut none of them chose to appear and assist the court. We have to rest content with assistance we have received from Sri A M Venkatesh, advocate for third respondent-insurance company, though incidentally we had the additional benefit of appearance of Sri Raju, advocate, for a brief period while during the absence of Sri A M Venkatesh. 12. We have to rest content with assistance we have received from Sri A M Venkatesh, advocate for third respondent-insurance company, though incidentally we had the additional benefit of appearance of Sri Raju, advocate, for a brief period while during the absence of Sri A M Venkatesh. 12. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, submission of Sri R D Renukaradhya, learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned judge of the tribunal committed an error in law in rejecting the claim petition even when the claimant’s case as per the plea had been made good by supporting evidence of the claimant himself and the facts that the negligence of the driver of the bus was not a disputed aspect, particularly with the drive having pleaded guilty before the criminal court of his negligent act, which was brought on record in terms of document at ExP18, which is a copy of the extract of the order sheet maintained in CC No.336 of 2003, which indicates that the accused therein, who happens to be first respondent in the claim petition and in this appeal, driver of the vehicle, had pleaded guilty of the accusation made against him and was convicted under Section 255(2) of CrPC for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 IPC read with Section 134(A) and (B) of the M V Act, and had been imposed a total fine of Rs.750/-, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days, and submits that the learned judge of the tribunal should not have placed undue reliance on ExP6, which is the wound certificate issued by K R Hospital, Mysore, which had recorded the incident in terms of the version of PW2 before the doctor, as it was PW2 who had taken the injured to the hospital as the injured was not in a position to speak or narrate the incident, being unconscious. Learned counsel would also bring to our notice ExP17, case sheet in respect of the injured-claimant maintained in the K R Hospital, which vividly brings out the pathetic condition of the injured immediately after the accident and the fact that while he was unconscious and on regaining conscious realized that he was not in control of all his four limbs which had declared independence and would not respond to his needs and requirements. 13. 13. Submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the accident being not in dispute, the negligence on the part of the driver of the bus also being not in dispute, the injury that the claimant sustained in relation to use of vehicle, the only claim before the tribunal and before the insurance company was from the claimant-appellant and no one else and when such being the situation, the insurance company should not have wriggled out of its liability to make good the damages payable to the claimant due to the injury and the consequences of having issued a policy covering risk of second respondent owner of the vehicle and in respect of the vehicle causing accident and in such a situation, the tribunal should have only allowed the claim petition and to proceed to quantify the damage for compensation payable and therefore the appeal should be allowed, judgment passed by the tribunal set aside and the claim petition allowed in terms of the claim. 14. 14. Per contra, Sri A M Venkatesh, learned counsel for the third respondent-insurance company would very vehemently urge that if the claimant does not support his claim petition with cogent and convincing evidence, there is no way the tribunal allowing such a claim petition; that the tribunal is fully justified in dismissing the claim petition; that the claimant, leave alone supporting his version by cogent evidence, on the other hand had let in evidence, which is quite contrary to the case made out in the claim petition; that his own witness PW2 had deposed at variance with the version in the petition and such variance in fact is found even before the presentation of the claim petition, inasmuch as in the history recorded by the doctor at the time of admitting the injured to hospital, even at that point of time, which was the earliest point in time immediately after the accident, the version of PW2 was only to the effect that the claimant sustained injury due to fall of a flower sack on his head and if so, the version in the claim petition to the effect that while the claimant bad boarded the bus and due to sudden application of brake and due to the consequential jerk, the claimant fell down and sustained injury having not been supported, but on the other hand, the evidence of PW2 being at variance, there was no way for the tribunal to allow the claim petition and particularly with the ExP6 also indicting same version of the flower sack falling on the claimant, and the variation coming after 15 days when the complaint was lodged giving a different version, which is only reiterated in the claim petition, the learned judge of the tribunal is fully justified in rejecting the case of claimant and going be the version of PW2 for dismissal of the claim petition. 15. It is also the submission by Sri Venkatesh, learned counsel for the insurance company that even if this court should find some justification for sustaining the claim, with the learned judge of the tribunal having not quantified the compensation which the claimant was entitled to, the matter has to be inevitably remanded to the tribunal for such purpose. 16. 15. It is also the submission by Sri Venkatesh, learned counsel for the insurance company that even if this court should find some justification for sustaining the claim, with the learned judge of the tribunal having not quantified the compensation which the claimant was entitled to, the matter has to be inevitably remanded to the tribunal for such purpose. 16. We have perused the judgment under appeal, looked into the records and considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company. 17. The main question that arises for our examination in this appeal is as to whether the tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim petition based on the evidence of PW2 Jayashankar and the contents of ExP6-wound certificate-or if the tribunal was required to look into the evidence beyond these two and ascertaining thereafter the answer to issue No.1 and if so, as to what consequence will follow thereafter. 18. We have very carefully looked into the record. The record very vividly discloses the very serious injury that the claimant suffered on the fateful day on 16-12-2002, which has left him a cripple for his life. The claimant was aged 43 years of age, able bodied person and according to his evidence, he was earning his livelihood working as coolie and was also owning a bullock cart used for transporting foodgrains and fruits and vegetable and eking out his livelihood in such a manner and his income from all such activities was claimed to be Rs.8,000/-per month. If such is the version made out in the claim petition, the evidence which is in the form of an affidavit as of now in view of the amendment to the relevant provision of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 inevitably as our experience tells us, is only a version as prepared by the advocate for the claimant and sworn to by the claimant as his affidavit and is nothing but a reproduction of the averments in the claim petition! 19. 19. The legislature in its eagerness to reduce the length of litigation appears to have lost sight of the basic legal principles, basic reverence to truth and honesty and the very salient aspect of trial judge being enabled to observe the demeanour of a witness and thereby to evaluate the evidence as to what part of the evidence of a witness is acceptable and what part is not worthy of acceptance etc. 20. With such an advantage to the trial judge which was otherwise available in our legal system having been lost after the amendment to Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC, there is no more guarantee that the witness deposing before the court in chief examination feels compelled to speak truth, but any version prepared by the lawyer to suit and support the pleading is passed off as evidence, which is treated as evidence of the witness in examination-in-chief! 21. There is no better teacher than experience and it is high time for the legislature to rethink as to the present provision of Rule 4 of Order XVIII, which reads as under: 4. Recording of evidence (1) In every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit and copies thereof shall be supplied to the opposite party by the party who calls him for evidence. Provided that where documents are filed and the parties rely upon the documents, the proof and admissibility of such documents which are filed along with affidavit shall be subject to the orders of the Courts. (2) The evidence (cross-examination and re-examination) of the witness in attendance, whose evidence (examination-in-chief) by affidavit has been furnished to the Court, shall be taken either by the Court or by the Commissioner appointed by it: Provided that the Court may, while appointing a commission under this sub-rule, consider taking into account such relevant factors as it thinks fit: (3) The Court or the Commissioner, as the case may be, shall record evidence either in writing or mechanically in the presence of the Judge or of the Commissioner, as the case may be, and where such evidence is recorded by the Commissioner he shall return such evidence together with his report in writing signed by him to the Court appointing him and the evidence taken under it shall form part of the record of the suit. (4) The Commissioner may record such remarks as it thinks material respecting the demeanour of any witness while under examination. Provided that any objection raised during the recording of evidence before the Commissioner shall be recorded by him and decided by the Court at the stage of arguments. (5) The report of the Commissioner shall be submitted to the Court appointing the commission within sixty days from the date of issue of the commission unless the Court for reasons to be recorded in writing extends the time. (6) The High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be shall prepare a panel of Commissioners to record the evidence under this rule. (7) The Court may by general or special order fix the amount to be paid as remuneration for the services of the Commissioner. (8) The provisions of rules 16, 16A, 17 and 18 of Order XXVI, in so far as they are applicable, shall apply to the issue, execution and return of such commissions under this rule. Which enables a witness to provide his deposition through an affidavit, which is not a productive experience either for finding truth or for ascertaining the credibility or trustworthiness of a witness.With the legislative provision having elicited approval of the Apex Court, while is foolproof legally speaking, it is nevertheless, in the domain of the legislature to take corrective steps if the experience warrants such correction. We leave it to the legislature with a fond hope that the observations herein would be taken note of and the legislature debates over the matter and takes corrective measure, if found necessary. 22. To continue with the narration of the case, we find that the version of the claimant that he suffered injuries while trying to board the bus and in the process of having boarded the bus, fell down because of the sudden movement of the vehicle, attributable to the careless and negligent manner of driving by the driver of the bus. The only defence perhaps the drive could have was that there was no negligence on his part. But the driver having pleaded guilty before the criminal court, even this defence is preempted. 23. The only defence perhaps the drive could have was that there was no negligence on his part. But the driver having pleaded guilty before the criminal court, even this defence is preempted. 23. At this stage, we should also deal with the argument of Sri Venkatesh, learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company that the manner in which the claimant had tried to board the bus and fell down, is indicative of contributory negligence on his part also and to that extent, it has to be assessed and the liability on the part of the owner and the insurer should be scaled down. 24. We notice that there is no such a possibility in the present case, as the driver himself has pleaded guilty and any defence on the part of the driver, owner and the insurance company is preempted, and there is no way of bringing back that defence through the backdoor and therefore the argument on such lines in the appeal before the high court on behalf of the insurance company, when such was never the case or stand of the insurance company either in its pleadings or even when the claimant was in the witness box, cannot be entertained. 25. The only reason why the learned judge of the tribunal has chosen to discard the case of the claimant in the petition and the supporting unimpeached evidence of the claimant in the witness box is due to the non-supporting evidence of PW2, brother-in-law of the claimant, who perhaps was only under the impression that he was helping the claimant by his chivalrous act of having taken the claimant to the hospital and having given the version before the doctor as to the manner of accident taking place and in the wake of such material placed, has inevitably conceded t this position when confronted with ExP6 during the course of cross-examination by the learned counsel for the insurance company, when PW2 was in the witness box. 26. We have looked into the record and we find that the deposition of PW2 very clearly indicates that he was not an eye witness to the accident, which resulted in the injury to the claimant. 26. We have looked into the record and we find that the deposition of PW2 very clearly indicates that he was not an eye witness to the accident, which resulted in the injury to the claimant. It is the say of PW2 that he had helped the claimant to board the bus and had left the place and moved away for about a furlong from the vehicle and at that time he received information from one Kumar that his brother-in-law has suffered injury due to the accident and immediately rushed back to his help. If such is the version of PW2, it is very obvious that he was not an eye witness to the accident and whatever he has deposed is nothing but a hearsay evidence, which is only to be rejected as worthless in terms of the Indian Evidence Act. 27. Unfortunately, it is such a version of PW2, which found place in the first instance in ExP6 i.e. the version as given by PW2 before the doctor about the cause for the injury and as admitted about his version given before the doctor, during the course of cross-examination! 28. The very version of PW2 was based on his hearsay evidence, in the sense, that he had not seen the accident taking place, but had been informed so by one Kumar, who, perhaps, saw the accident and who realized that his [PW2] brother-in-law had sustained injury in the accident and therefore informed PW2. 29. Therefore, PW2’s version of the manner in which the claimant got injured is not a piece of evidence that merits acceptance as quality evidence and at any rate to exclude the unimpeached evidence of the claimant himself and the supporting circumstances and the fact that the driver has pleaded guilty of negligence on his part before the criminal court. 30. Learned judge of the tribunal appears to have been in a great hurry to close the claim petition by conveniently placing reliance on the undependable, unworthy evidence of PW2, which, in law, also should not have been accepted, as the evidence amounted to hearsay evidence and not a narration of the witness’s own experience. PW2 being not an eye witness to the accident, not much credence could be given to his evidence. 31. Mr. PW2 being not an eye witness to the accident, not much credence could be given to his evidence. 31. Mr. Venkatesh, learned counsel for the insurance company has very emphatically urged and is insistent upon us not to accept the version in the complaint and in the claim petition by drawing our attention to the considerable delay in lodging the complaint, as it appears, there was an interval of 15 days between the date of accident and the date of lodging of complaint, as the complaint was lodged on 2-1-2003 while the accident took place on 16-12-2002. 32. Note dated: 21.12.2002, made by the duty Doctor in the case sheet maintained by K R Hospital, Mysore, which is marked as ExP17 reads as under: “To The Resident Medical Officer, K R Hospital, Mysore, Sir, This patient admitted with quadriplegia at the time of accident, some patient’s attendants gave h/o self fall, now patient given the history of road traffic accident. Kindly do the case into an MLC-medico legal case-and do the needful. Thanking you, Yours Sincerely, Sd/-.” Thereafter the resident medical officer has issued a direction to treat the case as a medico-legal case instead of non-medico-legal case and accordingly the case was registered as medico-legal case and corresponding entries were made in the MLC register and a report was forwarded to the jurisdictional police who, in turn, took up follow-up action by visiting the hospital and recording statement of the claimant, who by that time, had become conscious and was in a position to give his version of the accident, which recording was done on 2-1-2003, based on which police registered the case in Cr.No.1/2003 against the driver of the bus for offences punishable under sections 279 & 337 of IPC and Section 134(A) & (B) of Motor Vehicle Act. 33. We cannot help but observe that the version given by PW2 at the time of admitting the injured claimant to hospital was inevitably to ensure that the patient gets immediate medical attention. 33. We cannot help but observe that the version given by PW2 at the time of admitting the injured claimant to hospital was inevitably to ensure that the patient gets immediate medical attention. The Courts can take Judicial notice of the development in a government hospital if a patient is brought with the history of an accident or medico-legal case, which inevitably requires to go through law and procedural wrangles and in the meanwhile the patient is left unattended to, until all the formalities in that regard are complied with, and during which time, the condition of the patient can worsen lead to further complications and even resulting in totally and it is inevitably a tendency of any concerned person of the patient to ensure that the patient first receives proper medical attention. 34. In fact, it is only the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of PARAMANDA KATARA vs UNION OF INDIA [ (1989) 4 SCC 286 ], which has remedied this situation to some extent by ensuring that all medico-legal cases not necessarily be taken to a government hospital and all medical practitioners, whether in private or government hospital, should immediately attend the patients without waiting for other formalities to be fulfilled, which perhaps saved many a lives and has helped many injured persons from encountering more serious consequences. 35. We can reasonably infer this obviously should have been one such case, as the brother-in-law of the claimant would have inevitably given a version to indicate that it was a non-medico-legal case, and whether it is so or not, he being himself not an eye witness to the accident, his version is really of no consequence for the purpose of examination of the claim petition in the wake of his version and therefore we hold that the learned judge of the tribunal should not have given undue importance to such evidence of PW2. 36. In fact, the claimant himself at the earliest point of opportunity had indicated the accident being due to a road traffic accident involving a vehicle, as recorded in the case sheet on 21-12-2002, by which time, he had regained his consciousness and was in a position to speak. 36. In fact, the claimant himself at the earliest point of opportunity had indicated the accident being due to a road traffic accident involving a vehicle, as recorded in the case sheet on 21-12-2002, by which time, he had regained his consciousness and was in a position to speak. This being the only version of the claimant and there being no conflicting versions by the claimant, this version should definitely be accepted and not discarded because of the discordant version of PW2, who is not even an eyewitness to the accident. 37. While the claim petition deserves to the allowed, the only question that remains is about the quantification of the compensation. 38. Though Sri A M Venkatesh, learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company would urge for remanding the matter for such purpose, as the learned judge of the tribunal has not quantified the compensation, we are of the view that it is wholly an unnecessary exercise, particularly when the quantification of compensation depends on the definite known facts which are available from the records and therefore we proceed to quantify the compensation which the claimant is entitled to. 39. The claimant was an inpatient for not less than 65 days and even thereafter has remained quadriplegic for the rest of his life. He is now totally dependent on others and is in need of a constant attendant round the clock for the rest of his life. He has also lost his entire earning and future loss of earning will be at 100%. While the claimant having put forth his income at Rs.8,000/- per month in the claim petition and having struck to this version in his evidence and that evidence though not impeached in cross-examination, with no other supporting material forthcoming, we are not very confident to accept this itself to be his monthly income, but would take his income to be around Rs.3,000/- per month, which will be quite reasonable, as any able-bodied person should be able to earn this kind of income and with the claimant being 40 years of age at the time of accident, was quite experienced in his life would have seen ways and means of earning a better livelihood than a minimum earning of an able-bodies person, as it is always the mind which has the ability to enhance the earning over and above the physical capacity. Experience is a natural contributor in this direction and we have to give weightage to the age of the injured, though age in turn may reduce the rest of his life period, in terms of the multiplier. Hence, we compute the loss of future earning at Rs.5,04,000/- (Rs.3,000 x 12 x 14). 40. Under the head of general damages, we award a sum of Rs.50,000/-towards pain and suffering, Rs.50,000/- towards loss of amenities. Under the head of special damages, we award a sum of Rs.10,000/- to meet the medical expenditure incurred by the injured-claimant. Apart from this, as the claimant is required further medical attention, we award a sum of Rs.40,000/- towards this head and another sum of Rs.20,000/- towards nourishment during treatment period. As the claimant is in need of an attendant throughout his life, we award a sum of Rs.50,000/-towards attendance charge. Thus, the claimant-appellant is entitled to a total compensation of Rs.7,24,000/-. 41. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment under appeal is set aside. The claim petition is allowed in part, awarding a total compensation of Rs.7,24,000/- [Rupees Seven lakh twenty-four thousand only] with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of claim petition till realization. Out of the award amount, we direct that a sum of Rs.7.00 lakh Rupees seven lakh] shall be kept in a fixed deposit in any nationalized bank to be retained like during the life time of the claimant-appellant with liberty to withdraw periodical interest monthly. The balance amount of Rs.24,000/- with accrued interest on the entire compensation amount shall be paid to the claimant. The 3rd respondent-insurance company to deposit the compensation amount with interest within eight weeks from today. 42. While we leave it to the parties to bear their costs, we cannot avoid but observe the gross negligent manner in which the counsel for the claimant-appellant had conducted the case before the tribunal, which contributed to the dismissal of the claim petition itself, which perhaps would have become final, which is a very disturbing state of affair, but having necessitated us to look into the records in a little more detail than is usual and finding to our pleasant surprise and satisfaction the record being loaded in favour of the claimant and not against the claimant. 43. Appeal Allowed. 44. 43. Appeal Allowed. 44. Registrar general of this court directed to forward copies of this judgment to: 1) Chairman, Central Law Commission, Delhi. 2) Chair Person, Karnataka State Law Commission, Bangalore. 3) Secretaries concerned of the Central Government and the State Government for information and follow up action.