JUDGMENT : 1. These revisions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, are directed against the common judgment, dated 19-10-2009, made in C.M.A.Nos.78 and 92 of 2007 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, in setting aside the order passed by the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, dated 15-06-2007, made in I.A.No.556 of 2006 in O.S.No.454 of 2006, wherein the Receiver was appointed. 2. Petitioner herein is the plaintiff and the respondents herein are the defendants in the suit. 3. Brief facts, that are necessary for disposal of the present revisions may be stated as follows: The trust association of convention of Baptist Churches of the Northern Circars (hereinafter referred to as ‘Baptist Church’) filed the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their men from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the plaintiff association in any manner whatsoever including the alienation of the same and the defendants 14 to 27 from inducting third parties therein. Baptist Church is registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act. The Baptist Church acquired movable and immovable properties in East Godavari, West Godavari, Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam Districts and in some other places. The plaintiff association was formed in the year 1960. As per byelaws, the Governing Body of the plaintiff is authorized to sue and be sued on behalf of the plaintiff association. The Governing body consists of Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer and all other members of the plaintiff association. TDS Kumar is the duly elected Secretary of the Baptist Church. The Baptist Church is paying taxes to the municipal corporation, Visakhapanam. After annual convention was held at Visakhapatnam on 14-01-1995 under the supervision of the Advocate Commissioner, no other convention was validly held and no valid election of the office bearers of Baptist Church took place until January, 2004. Later valid convention of all the members of Baptist Church was held under the supervision of the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam and in that election, TDS Kumar was elected as Chairman, K.Deva Sahayam as Secretary and Gompana John Peter as its Secretary. Defendants 2, 3 and others were proclaiming that they are the lawful office bearers of the Baptist Church and making unauthorized and illegal alienation of the properties of the Baptist Church by way of sale agreements, lease, etc. Defendants 2, 3 and others were proclaiming that they are the lawful office bearers of the Baptist Church and making unauthorized and illegal alienation of the properties of the Baptist Church by way of sale agreements, lease, etc. These rival groups also started filing cases in almost every court in the north Coastal Andhra Pradesh with false pleadings. One such suit is O.S. No.3 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam, whereunder these unauthorized groups of people tried to legalize the unauthorized alienations made by them. But the said suit was dismissed after full trial. On appeal, the said dismissal of the suit was confirmed. In the suit filed by the plaintiff and another in O.S.No.98 of 1986 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, the sale transaction entered by one S.M.Kantha Raju was declared as not valid and binding on the plaintiff association. Therefore, S.M.Kantha Raju, Deniel Gandhi, defendants 2 and 3 and others have no right to claim office bearer ship of the Baptist Church or discharge any function as office bearers and as such, the transactions in the form of sale agreements, sale deed, memorandum of understanding etc., entered are illegal, void and unenforceable transactions as such they do not bind on the plaintiff in any manner. S.M.Kantha Raju, Deniel Gandhi, Marella Prasada Rao, P.Palus, in collusion with the defendants have created 22 sale deeds in respect of the suit schedule property during the year 1993 in a clandestine manner with an oblique motive of grabbing the suit property by ousting the plaintiff from possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It was held by the competent Court that the said persons have no right to deal with the properties of the Baptist Church and the alienations made by them. Therefore, the sale deeds obtained by the defendants from these unauthorized persons are invalid and unenforceable and do not bind the plaintiff in any manner. This Court ordered that on intimation given by the Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling, dated 28-02-1998, as an information as to the illegality of the 22 sale deeds wrongfully obtained and provided an opportunity to prefer an appeal against the said order, but no such appeal was preferred. This Court ordered that on intimation given by the Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling, dated 28-02-1998, as an information as to the illegality of the 22 sale deeds wrongfully obtained and provided an opportunity to prefer an appeal against the said order, but no such appeal was preferred. Defendants 2 ,9 and 10 for the last few days have been making hectic efforts by dispossessing the plaintiff there from in a high handed and illegal manner. The plaintiff association through validly elected office bearers, TDS Kumar and G.John Peter have been managing all the properties of the Baptist Church. The trust also filed suit in O.S.No.189 of 2001 against the defendants 14 to 27 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam for eviction of the persons in occupation in a part of the suit schedule property and obtained interim orders. The Baptist Church also filed O..No.38 of 004 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, in respect of the western portion building of the suit schedule property and obtained injunction in their favour. When challenged in the High Court, the said order was dismissed confirming the lower Court order. The so called vendor of the defendants 9 and 10, S.M.Kantha Raju, claiming to be the President of the plaintiff association, also filed I.A.889 of 2001 in O.S.772 of 1996, claiming interest in item 2 of the suit schedule property and prayed for impleadment of the plaintiff association represented by him as President, as a party to the suit. After hearing both sides, the learned Judge dismissed the application, vide order, dated 16-10-2003. The trust filed another suit in O.S.No.1263 of 2004 on the file this Court against defendants 9 and 10 besides 21 others in respect of the plaint schedule property excluding the built up portion in the occupation of the defendants 14 to 27 for permanent injunction restraining them from interfering n any manner whatsoever with the possession and enjoyment of the said property by the plaintiff. This Court after hearing both parties granted interim injunction pending disposal of the suit as per order in I.A.No.1580 of 2004, dated 06-05-2004. The said orders are in force. It is clear that the plaintiff through its legally elected office bearers, have right over the suit schedule property. This Court after hearing both parties granted interim injunction pending disposal of the suit as per order in I.A.No.1580 of 2004, dated 06-05-2004. The said orders are in force. It is clear that the plaintiff through its legally elected office bearers, have right over the suit schedule property. The defendants who are from places outside Visakhapatnam, who enjoy strong political, police clout coupled with money and muscle power, have been trying to trespass into the plaint schedule property by dispossessing the plaintiff there from. Defendants 1 to 13 are wooing the defendants 14 to 27 to handover the vacant possession of the property in their occupation by offering substantial amounts to them so that the defendants 1 to 13 can trespass into the part of the suit property and then high handedly occupy the remaining portion of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff learnt that defendants 1 to 13 brought the mafia gangs from Mumbai with the help of some film producers who are reportedly planning to take over the suit schedule property with the active connivance of the defendants 14 to 27, in an illegal and unauthorized manner. It is also learnt that defendants 1 to 8 and 14 to 27 have also been planning to damage the structures and also demolish some portion of the building in occupation of the defendants 14 to 27, in order to facilitate third parties like the above mentioned film producers to convert the suit property into a commercial space and thus gain wrongfully, causing wrongful loss to the plaintiff association. Though the physical possession of the built up area, namely the portion of the bungalow/watchman quarter bearing Door No.10-1-6 is with the defendants 14 to 27, the constructive possession of the same lies with the plaintiff. In fact, defendants 14 to 7 were only under permissive possession of the plaintiff and therefore, have an obligation not only to quit the same as and when the plaintiff wants but also to preserve the property without causing any damage. It is learnt that the defendants 14 to 27 are making hectic efforts to handover physical possession of the property in their occupation to the defendants 1 to 8, in order to facilitate them to handover the same to a film producer who reportedly entered into an agreement of the sale with defendants 1 to 8. It is learnt that the defendants 14 to 27 are making hectic efforts to handover physical possession of the property in their occupation to the defendants 1 to 8, in order to facilitate them to handover the same to a film producer who reportedly entered into an agreement of the sale with defendants 1 to 8. Further, defendants have been bringing unknown persons anti-social elements and also mafia gangs to the suit property and have been scrambling for possession of the suit property including the buildings therein. Even though there were interim injunctions in favour of the plaintiff association, on account of the illegal and high-handed acts, there is a scramble for possession of the suit property. That apart, there is a serious threat to the safety and security of the suit property at the hands of the defendants. The defendants 1 to 8 for the last few days, having been illegally raising the height of the boundary wall to serve as a cover their clandestine operations in the suit property, despite the strong protest by the plaintiff association. Under these circumstances, in order to effectively manage the suit schedule property and preserve the same from damaged or illegally alienated by the defendants 14 to 27 and interfered with by the defendants 1 to 13, it is just and proper for the Court to appoint an Advocate Receiver to take possession of the suit schedule property without disturbing the possession of the defendants 14 to 27 and supervise/manage the suit schedule property, prevent encroachments by third parties an alteration of physical features by the defendants and do all necessary things and act to safeguard the suit schedule property. 4. The 1st respondent filed counter denying the allegations in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. The allegations made in paras 3 and 4 of the petition in respect of the affairs of the society and right over the property are true. It is stated that the institution of suits are not binding on the first respondent as he is not a party to the said suits. The deponent of the affidavit and two others filed a petition to set aside the ex-parte order in I.A.2704 of 1996, but the same was dismissed on 29-01-1999 as such it is crystal clear that the deponent has no right to deal with the society and more particularly about the property. The deponent of the affidavit and two others filed a petition to set aside the ex-parte order in I.A.2704 of 1996, but the same was dismissed on 29-01-1999 as such it is crystal clear that the deponent has no right to deal with the society and more particularly about the property. But suppressing the same the deponent has been indulging vexatious litigation. In fact there is no whisper about the suit in the affidavit and the plaint. A reply notice was issued to the present counsel of the petitioner in reply to the advertisement published by him on behalf of deponent in which number of civil suits, which were filed by the deponent which were dismissed were detailed out. The deponent is not competent to represent the association, more particularly when the respondent is the Chairman of the said association and as such the suit is not maintainable that too a mere suit for injunction without seeking for declaration. As per the plaint schedule, the extent of the property is 6500 sq. yards. In the plaint or in the petition, the petitioner failed to explain as to how he could be in possession of such an extent of property when the maximum limit is only 1500 sq. meters as per the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act. On 26-02-1998 the Special Officer and competent authority, ULC, Visakhapatnam in a C.C. after conducting enquiry, declared the institution is a surplus land holder to an extent of 1,6500 sq. meters in TS No.75. The order is to the effect that the society has right over 1,500 sq. meters of land only and the rest of the surplus land belongs to the Government. The result of the order of the Court in appointing a Receiver directing him to take possession of the property resulted in grave miscarriage of justice since what was taken possession of by the Official Receiver is Government land. In pursuance of the said proceedings, a declaration under Section 10 (3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short ‘ULC Act’) was also published in A.P. Gazette. This respondent along with committee of office bearers filed applications and letters before the competent authority and issued notice explaining the true state of affairs. If at all the deponent is the Chairman of the Society, what steps had he taken to protect the property of the Society. This respondent along with committee of office bearers filed applications and letters before the competent authority and issued notice explaining the true state of affairs. If at all the deponent is the Chairman of the Society, what steps had he taken to protect the property of the Society. Actually, the respondents 14 to 27 who are inmates and who after recognizing the good services rendered by the office bearers of the society consisting of this respondent and others had vacated the property willfully and had also acknowledged the same in writing. This fact was suppressed by the petitioner. There are no merits in the petition. If at all the deponent is in possession of the land, he ought to have filed petition for temporary injunction, but filing a petition for appointment of Receiver shows that he is not having any possession over the said land. In respect of another property, which is known as Rockdale Bungalow, the deponent in collusion with two others created documents and passed over possession of the land to them and in that connection a legal notice was given. The deponent did not give any reply. Soon after the vacation of the inmates in the plaint schedule property, the respondent appointed Security Guards to the property because of the security guards the ulterior motive of the deponent to trespass into the property could not be successful. So, the deponent is using the court as medium of instrument who achieved his target of trespassing into the property by allowing the possession to be continued in the possession of the Advocate Commissioner. The future proceedings of the society by this respondent would be adversely affected. There are no grounds to justify the appointment of commissioner. The cost of the other property which was gifted to APCC by way of gift, since the donee had become non existent and the donee failed to achieve the object of the gift, the possession was taken over and civil suit in O.S.No.654 of 2004 was also instituted on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. The respondents and others are toiling hand to look after the property. In fact, after Receiver locked the property some of the henchmen of the deponent tried to wipe of the name of this respondent in the board that was fixed to the wall. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the petition. 5. The respondents and others are toiling hand to look after the property. In fact, after Receiver locked the property some of the henchmen of the deponent tried to wipe of the name of this respondent in the board that was fixed to the wall. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the petition. 5. Respondents 2 and 5 to 7 filed a memo adopting the counter filed by the 1st respondent. The 4th respondent filed separate counter supporting the claim of the petitioner and also sought appointment of Receiver to take possession of the suit schedule property and to manage the same till the rights are determined by the Court. 6. Respondents 9 and 10 filed counter denying all the material allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. According to them, the property originally belonged to Baptist Church an it was purchased by them and other 19 associated companies under 22 registered sale deeds in the year 1993 executed by S.M. Kantha Raju as President, P.Palus as Secretary of Baptist Church convention and one Prasada Rao as Secretary and C.John as Chairman of the Trust association. Since then, they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. They are the power of attorney holders of the remaining 19 companies The present chairman TDS Kumar who filed the suit and petition styling himself as Chairman of the Trust Association of Baptist Church filed O.S.464 of 2006 against them and others for permanent injunction and other reliefs. He also filed a petition in I.A.553 of 2006 for appointment of Receiver. When urgent notice was ordered the said petition was not pressed on 31-03-2006. The said suit was filed on 29-03-2006. As it was not pressed it was dismissed giving permission to the plaintiff to file a fresh petition and again the present petition for appointment of Receiver was filed and the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam appointed ex-parte Receiver on 01-04-2006. The said suit was filed on 29-03-2006. As it was not pressed it was dismissed giving permission to the plaintiff to file a fresh petition and again the present petition for appointment of Receiver was filed and the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam appointed ex-parte Receiver on 01-04-2006. The learned Senior Civil Judge heard and passed the order in the said application and the Court did not consider the very threat to the property for appointing Advocate Receiver in I.A.553 of 2006, but again on 01-04-2006 the learned Senior Civil Judge took a very same threat as consideration and consequently appointed Advocate Receiver even without evicting any person in possession or custody of the plaint schedule property straight away authorized the receiver to take possession of the plaint schedule property without disturbing the possession of defendants 14 to 27. It is not clear from whom the receiver has to take possession. The orders in MC No.6/94 confirmed by the Hon’ble High Court would clearly indicate that the plaint schedule property was in custody of Asst., Tahsildar (Urban), Visakhapatnam. Hence, the plaintiff filed the present petition under Order 41 Rule 1 (A) (c) (d) r/w Section 151 CPC by omitting sub clause (B) with a mala fide intention and suppressed the details of the very same property being in the custody of the Assistant Tahsildar (Urban) Visakhapatnam. In the year 1994 David Raju and Krupa Rao claiming to be a group of Baptist Church and independently filed a petition under Section 482 of C.P.C. in Criminal Petition No.2429 of 1994 on the file of the High Court to quash the orders of the attachment in MC No.6 of 1994 and ultimately the petition was dismissed. The Special Leave Petition preferred by the Chairman of the petitioner association was also dismissed. In pursuance of the orders of the Special Divisional Magistrate in M.C.No.6 of 1994 the possession was also delivered to the defendants 1 to 10 who also employed security guards. Aggrieved by the final orders in M.C.No. 6 of 1994 P.S.David Raj filed Crl.R.C.No.975 of 1997 and also Crl.M.P.No.4878 of 1997 for interim stay. D. Krupa Rao also filed Crl. R.P.No.1008 of 1997 against the order in M.C.No. 6 of 1994 and also filed a petition for interim stay in Crl. M.P.No.975 of 1997. Aggrieved by the final orders in M.C.No. 6 of 1994 P.S.David Raj filed Crl.R.C.No.975 of 1997 and also Crl.M.P.No.4878 of 1997 for interim stay. D. Krupa Rao also filed Crl. R.P.No.1008 of 1997 against the order in M.C.No. 6 of 1994 and also filed a petition for interim stay in Crl. M.P.No.975 of 1997. The Hon’ble High Court was pleased to direct the Commissioner of Police to inspect the premises and take steps and to maintain possession as on the date of orders of RDO, Visakhapatnam i.e., 08-10-1997 until further orders. The commissioner of police inspected the premises personally and directed the son of the 10th defendant and O.Sabestian, uncle of Dinakar Tyagaraj to vacate premises and the Commissioner of Police also prepared list. The Hon’ble High Court confirmed the possession of the defendants in respect of the said bungalow, which is plaint schedule property. John Peter having knowledge of this order filed O.S.163 of 2004 against these defendants and other 20 companies on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam for permanent injunction and obtained interim orders. TDS Kumar having had unsuccessful battle ought to have approached for recovery of the same and concealing all those facts, he filed the present suit. The suit is not maintainable since for the very self same reliefs O.S. 1263 of 2004 was already instituted wherein, the interim injunction already granted was made absolute. Petitioners 1 to 8 in W.P.No.25078 of 2001 submitted their application to the Special Officer and Competent Authority, ULC, Visakhapatnam to regularize the extent of sites in their favour covered by their sale deeds. TDS Kumar has no authority to represent the plaintiff and in fact S.M. Kantha Raju is the president of Baptist Church during the year 1992-93. The suit filed by D.Krupa Rao representing Baptist Church in O.S.137 of 1982 on the file of the Sub-Court, Visakhapatnam against S.M.Kantha Raju and others for permanent injunction and for other relies was dismissed. TDS Kumar and John Peter are the defendants 5 and 8 in O.S.57of 1985 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam and the same was decreed. TDS Kumar and John Peter are the defendants 5 and 8 in O.S.57of 1985 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam and the same was decreed. The suit filed by D.Krupa Rao, representing Baptist Church in O.S.127 of 1982 as Secretary in O.S. 137 of 1982 and O.S.356 of 1987 and also O.S.114 of 1985 on the file of the I Additional Senior Judge, Visakhapatnam, against S.M. Kantha Raju and others were also dismissed. Thus the plaintiff association has no locus-standi at all and therefore, they sought for dismissal of the petition. 7. The 14th respondent filed counter denying the averments in the affidavit filed in support of the petition and stated that he had vacated the property and handed over the same to D.Samuel, the Chairman of the petitioner society and he is unnecessarily added as party to the proceedings. 8. Respondents 15 to 26 filed their counters on the same and similar lines as that of the counter filed by the 14th respondent. 9. No oral evidence was adduced on either side, except marking Exs.A1 to A14 on behalf of the petitioner-plaintiff and Exs.B1 to B15 on behalf of the 1st respondent-1st defendant. 10. The trial Court by order, dated 15-06-2007, appointed Receiver to manage the suit schedule property. Challenging the said order of the trial Court, the 1st respondent herein filed CMA 78 of 2007, whereas respondents 9 and 10 filed CMA 92 of 2007. The 1st appellate Court after considering the material on record, set aside the order of appointment of Receiver and consequently I.A. filed by the Baptist Church was dismissed. Hence, these revisions. 11. Now the point for determination is whether the findings of the 1st appellate Court are perverse or there is error of law apparent on the face of the record. 12. Hence, these revisions. 11. Now the point for determination is whether the findings of the 1st appellate Court are perverse or there is error of law apparent on the face of the record. 12. Mr.D.Prakash Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner herein (plaintiff) contended that S.M.Kantha Raju and others who executed a sale deeds in favour of some of the defendants are not duly elected office bearers of the Baptist Church and therefore, the defendants who purchased the suit schedule property through various sale deeds are not valid in law, that the suit filed by S.M.Kantha Raju and some others on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam to legalize the unauthorized alienations was dismissed, that on appeal the trial Court judgment was confirmed, that the petitioner and others filed suit in O.S.No.98 of 2006 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada whereunder the sale transactions entered by S.M.Kantha Raju and others were declared as not valid, that the trial Court after considering the material on record, appointed Receiver, by order, dated 15-06-2007, but the said order was set aside by the appellate Court on 19-10-2009 after hearing both the parties, but in revision before this Court, the impugned order was stayed, and for all these years even till today, the Receiver is managing the affairs of Baptist Church, that as the defendants are trying to damage the property by removing the structures in the schedule property, it is absolutely necessary to continue the Receiver, that the findings recorded by the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings are not based upon any material on record, that if the Receiver is not appointed to manage the properties of the Baptist Church, there would be scramble for possession and several persons were making their claim over the suit schedule property, that by producing Exs.A1 to A14, the plaintiff made out a case, that it was just and convenient to appoint a Receiver, that the subsequent validation of the sale deeds by the Government when the Baptist Church allegedly surrendered the property has no validity in view of the fact that S.M.Kantha Raju and others have no right or authority to sell the property in question to some of the defendants, that no loss or injustice would be caused to the defendants if the Receiver is managing the properties till the disposal of the suit and therefore, the trial Court was rightly justified in appointing Receiver and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned order and confirm the order of the trial Court. 13. On the other hand, Mr. D.V.Seetha Rama Murthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents (defendants) contended that defendants 9 and 10 purchased the property under registered sale deeds, that there is a presumption of law that if the document is registered, prima facie it gives a right, that S.M.Kantha Raju and others who executed sale deeds are not made as parties and that sale deeds cannot be tested behind the back of the executants, that the Criminal Court in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. categorically held that defendants 9 and 10 were in possession of the property, that Baptist Church surrendered the surplus land including the suit schedule property to the Government and thereafter, the Government validated the sale deeds executed in favour of the defendants 9, 10 and others that the sale deeds executed by S.M.Kantha Raju and others in favour of the defendants 9,10 and others are not under challenge before any other Court, that as the plaintiff failed to establish just and convenient reason, the 1st appellate Court rightly set aside the order of the trial Court, that there is no scramble for possession in view of the fact that defendants are in possession of the property, and that after elaborate consideration of material on record, the 1st appellate Court is right in setting aside the appointment of Receiver and hence, he prays to dismiss the revisions. 14. The suit is filed for perpetual injunction. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and see that they do what their duty require and that they do in a legal manner. Findings of fact of an inferior Court can be set aside when there is no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court has come to or in other wards it is a finding which was perverse in law. Interference is required in case of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law or grave injustice. Interference is required in case of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law or grave injustice. It is not to be exercised to correct error of fact or law unless such error is error of law apparent on the face of the record; it cannot be exercised irregularity or illegality of procedure unless such error effects the jurisdiction or involves a breach of principles of natural justice. 15. Grant or refusal of injunction is guided by three well established principles viz., 1) If the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, 2) If the balance of convenience is in his favour i.e., it would be greater inconvenience to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the defendant would be put to if the temporary injunction is granted and 3) If the plaintiff suffers irreparable injury. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision NAWAB MIR BARKAT ALI KHAN V NAWAB ZALFIQUAR JAH B AHADUR AND OTHERS ( AIR 1975 AP 187 ), with regard to grant of temporary injunction, wherein it was held thus: “It is well settled that the grant or refusal of a temporary injunction is covered by three well established principles viz., (1) whether the petitioners have made out a prima facie case (2) whether the balance of convenience is in their favour i.e., whether it would cause greater inconvenience to them if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which is opposite party or persons claiming through the opposite party would be put to if the temporary injunction is granted and (3) whether the petitioners would suffer irreparable injury. With the first condition as sine quo non, at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioners conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle the petitioners to obtain a temporary injunction in their favour.” 16. With the first condition as sine quo non, at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioners conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle the petitioners to obtain a temporary injunction in their favour.” 16. It is also pertinent to refer to a decision reported in KASHI MATH SAMSTHAN AND ANOTHER V SHRIMA SUDHINDRA THIRTHA SWAMY AND ANOTHER ( (2010) 1 SCC 689 ), wherein it was held thus: “It is well settled that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party who seeks for grant of such injunction has to prove that he has made out a prima facie case to go for trial, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted. But it is equally well settled that when a party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, question of considering the balance of convenience or irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned would not be material at al, that is to say, if that party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to the court to grant injunction in his favour even if, he has made out a case of balance of convenience being in his favour and would suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction order is granted. Therefore, keeping this principle in mind, let us now see whether the appellant has been able to prove prima facie case to get an order of injunction during the pendency of the two appeals in the High Court.” In view of the above decisions, even for grant of temporary injunction, the plaintiff has to make out a prima facie case. If it is not established, then question of granting temporary injunction does not arise, even if the plaintiff establishes balance of convenience and he would suffer irreparable injury if injunction is not granted. The present application was filed by the plaintiff in the trial Court for appointment of Receiver on the ground that in spite of granting injunction on earlier occasion, the plaintiff is unable to protect its possession and if the Receiver is not appointed, there would be scramble for possession and that the defendants would cause structural damages to the building and change the physical features of the property. Therefore, appointment of Receiver is imperative so as to safe-guard the suit schedule property till the disposal of the suit. 17. There cannot be any dispute that a receiver can be appointed even in a suit for injunction provided the Court comes to the opinion that it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver by showing a good title to the property, a special equity in his favour and the property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wasted i.e., to preserve the status quo ante during litigation. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in RAVI LAKSHMAIAH V NAGAMUTHU LAKSHMI ( AIR 1971 AP 380 ), wherein it was held thus: “Further under Order 40, Rule 1 C. P. C. the court has the power to appoint a receiver where it appears to the court to be just and convenient. The said order does not require that there should be an application for the appointment of a receiver. Even without such an application if the facts and circumstances are brought to the notice of the court justifying the appointment of a receiver it may do so suo motu even without an application by way of the parties for that purpose.” 18. Order XL Rule 1 CPC reads thus: Appointment of Receivers: (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order- a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after the decree; b) Remove any person from the possession or custody of the property; c) Commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver and d) Confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. (2) Nothing in this rule shall authorize the court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove. 19. The word ‘just and convenient’ has been construed, as meaning that it is practicable and the interest of justice requires it. (2) Nothing in this rule shall authorize the court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove. 19. The word ‘just and convenient’ has been construed, as meaning that it is practicable and the interest of justice requires it. In ascertaining what is a just or convenient, regard should be had to what is just according to settled legal principles as well as to what is convenient. The word ‘Just’ can be said to be right in accordance with law and justice. 20. Five requirements ordinarily have to be followed in a case where a receiver can be appointed to manage the property pending disposal of the suit. Those requirements are set out in the decision reported in K.MANGAMMA V K.BRAHMA REDDY (1989 (1) Law Summary 30), which are thus: “ 1. The appointment of Receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the court; 2) The Court should not appoint a Receiver except upon proof of the plaintiff that prima facie he has a very excellent change of succeeding in the suit; 3) Not only the plaintiff show a cause of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but he must show some emergency of danger or loss demanding immediate action and of his own right he must be reasonable clear and fee from doubt. The element of danger is an important consideration; 4) A order appointing a Receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of a ‘defacto possession since that might cause irreparable wrong. It would be different where the property is shown to be ‘in modio’ that is to ay in the enjoyment of no one; and 5) The court on the application made for the appointment of a Receiver looks to the conduct of the party who makes the application and will usually refuse to interfere unless his conduct has been free from blame. These well recognized principles are generally be considered and applied to the fact of a particular case.” 21. Similarly those five requirements have also been highlighted in a decision reported in STATE BANK OF INDIA V JAYSHREE CERAMICS PVT. LTD., (AIR 1987 Calcutta 194). 22. These well recognized principles are generally be considered and applied to the fact of a particular case.” 21. Similarly those five requirements have also been highlighted in a decision reported in STATE BANK OF INDIA V JAYSHREE CERAMICS PVT. LTD., (AIR 1987 Calcutta 194). 22. While exercising the judicial discretion in appointing the receiver, the whole of the circumstances of the case has to be taken into consideration. Unless a receiver is appointed the property is in dissipating or an irreparable mischief would be caused. Bearing the above principles in mind, it has to be seen whether the trial Court is justified in appointing a receiver to manage the suit schedule property pending disposal of the suit and whether the 1st appellate Court is right in setting aside the order of appointment of receiver by the trial Court. 23. With regard to prima facie title, the appointment of Receiver is discretion of the Court, which has to be exercised judiciously and on settled legal principles. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in MUNIAMMAL V P.M.RANGANATHA NAYAGAR (AIR 1955 Madras 571), wherein it was held thus: “The principles which should guide Indian Courts in the appointment of a receiver are three in number. First of all, a plaintiff applying for the appointment of a Receiver must show 'prima facie' that he has a strong case and good title to the property or a special equity in his favour and that the property in the hands of the defendent is in danger of being wasted; --'muhammad Qasim Ravather v. Nagaraja Moopanar', AIR 1928 Mad 813 at p. 814 (Z13). It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that he has a fair question to raise as to the extent of the right alleged as in the case of a temporary injunction, but he must go further and make out that he has a good 'prima facie' title requiring Court's protection and safeguarding pending litigation and which must be made out on the facts of that particular case. 'guruswami Pandiyan v. S. K. P. Chinnathambirar', AIR 1919 Mad 157 at p. 158 (Z14 ). Secondly, where the property is in media that is to say, in the possession of no one, a Receiver can readily be appointed. 'guruswami Pandiyan v. S. K. P. Chinnathambirar', AIR 1919 Mad 157 at p. 158 (Z14 ). Secondly, where the property is in media that is to say, in the possession of no one, a Receiver can readily be appointed. But where any one is in possession under a legal claim strong and compelling reasons are necessary for interfering with such possession : -- 'sivaji Raja Sahib v. Aiswariyanaudaji Sahib', AIR 1915 Mad 926 at p. 929 (Z15); AIR 1924 Mad 482 at p. 483 (Z12 ). Thus the 'bona fide' purchaser of the property -- 'bona fides have to be presumed unless and until the contrary can be inferred -- in dispute should not be disturbed by the appointment of a Receiver unless there is some substantial and compelling ground for such interference. Where there is 110 apprehension of waste or danger a Receiver will not be appointed merely on the ground that the applicant apprehends difficulty in obtaining possession 'of properly in the event of success or in realising mesne profits or the opposite party is poor or a woman. Specific acts capable of being tested should be alleged 21 Mad IJ 821 (Z11); AIR 1915 Mad 926 (Z15). Voilently stated vague allegations constitute no substitute for vacuum of facts. Thirdly, an application for the appointment of a Receiver should always be made promptly and delay in making it is a circumstance unfavourable to such an appointment. But of course the matter should he considered judicially in all its aspects before being disposed of as there may be legitimate reasons for preferring an application after delay: -- Pattiuharakettu v. Mauavedan', AIR 1936 Mad 966 (Z1g). If all these conditions are satisfied, and it is found just and convenient to appoint a Receiver, the Court can exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant 24. An extent of 11000 sq. metres known as Hill Crest Bungalow situated in Siripurm junction, Visakhapatnam covered by T.S.No.75, Waltair Ward, Block No.9 admittedly belonging to the Baptist Church. The said property was purchased by some of the defendants and others under 22 registered sale deeds in the year 1993, which were executed by S.M.Kantha Raju as President, P.Palas as Secretary, Marella Prasad Rao as Secretary/Attorney and Pallapati John as Chairman of the trust association. Therefore, originally the suit schedule property belongs to Baptist Church. The said property was purchased by some of the defendants and others under 22 registered sale deeds in the year 1993, which were executed by S.M.Kantha Raju as President, P.Palas as Secretary, Marella Prasad Rao as Secretary/Attorney and Pallapati John as Chairman of the trust association. Therefore, originally the suit schedule property belongs to Baptist Church. It is the case of the plaintiff that annual convention of the Baptist Church was held at Visakhapatnam on 14-01-1985 under the supervision of Advocate Commissioner and no other valid convention was held and no valid election of office bearers took place until January, 2004. Therefore, S.M.Kantha Raju, Daniel Gandhi, M.Prakash Raju and P.Palas have no right at all to execute 22 sale deeds in favour of defendants 9 and 10 and others. It is not in dispute that S.M.Kantha Raju and others filed O.S.No.3 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam for reliefs inter alia to declare that the plaintiff’s body of Baptist Church is the present functioning body of the Baptist Church; that all other parallel bodies of Baptist Church are illegal and without sanction of the constitution of the Baptist Church; and that all the alienations made by these defendants from the year 1979 till this date, are null and void by setting aside the sale deeds and other deeds executed by them and also to reimburse the plaintiffs organization the amounts received by the defendants by sale and transfer of properties of Baptist Church; and that the alienations and sale transactions made by the trust association of the plaintiff in favour of the group of companies headed by H.V. Jayaraj and J.M.Tyagaraju of Vijayawada are valid and binding on the defendants and that they have no right to interfere with the peaceful possession of the bona fide purchasers. Basing on the evidence available on record, the learned Judge held that by October, 1993, the plaintiff body therein has no right to deal with the sale of the trust property, but however, declaration of the sale transactions covered by Exs.A15 to A17 cannot be granted in view of the fact that properties are situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Exs.A15 to A17 sale deeds deal with the properties in Visakhapatnam. Therefore, the suit was dismissed. On appeal in A.S.No.48 of 2000 before the District Judge, Srikakulam, the said dismissal of the suit was confirmed. Exs.A15 to A17 sale deeds deal with the properties in Visakhapatnam. Therefore, the suit was dismissed. On appeal in A.S.No.48 of 2000 before the District Judge, Srikakulam, the said dismissal of the suit was confirmed. The said judgment was marked as Ex.A4. A categorical finding has been recorded to the effect that plaintiffs body (S.M.Kantha Raju, Daniel Gandhi, P.Palus, M.Prasada Rao, Matha David Raja Mohan Rao and P.John) have no right to deal with the sale of the trust property by the date of execution of sale deeds, however, the sale deeds that were executed in favour of some of the defendants herein, no finding as to its validity or correctness or otherwise was given on the point of jurisdiction. 25. Similarly, under Ex.A5, the plaintiff filed suit that the sale deed executed by defendant No.6 therein in favour of defendants 8 to 37 are not true, valid and correct. In O.S.No.98 of 1986 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, the sale transactions entered by M.Prasad Rao as attorney of trust and others were declared as not valid and binding on the plaintiff. Similarly, in I.A.No.1580 of 2004 in O.S.No.1263 of 2004 on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, Baptist Church represented by its Secretary G.John Peter and Church represented by K.Deva Sahayam were obtained temporary injunction in respect of Hillcrest Bungalow appurtenant site 6500 sq. yards bearing No.10-1-6 and 10-1-7 in T.S.No.75 against some of the defendants herein. The interim injunction granted by the 1st Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam on 15-10-2004 was made absolute on 06-05-2005. 26. It is the case of the defendants that some of the defendants and others purchased the suit schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 04-05-1993 and thereafter, the Baptist Church surrendered the excess land including the suit schedule property to the Government. Thereafter, the Government issued a declaration under Section 10 (3) of the ULC Act vesting the said property absolutely with the State Government under Ex.B2 proceedings. The Government issued G.O. allotting excess of land to some of the defendants as allottees paid the amount prescribed under G.O.Ms.No.455, which is marked as Ex.B14. Thereafter, the Government issued a declaration under Section 10 (3) of the ULC Act vesting the said property absolutely with the State Government under Ex.B2 proceedings. The Government issued G.O. allotting excess of land to some of the defendants as allottees paid the amount prescribed under G.O.Ms.No.455, which is marked as Ex.B14. Therefore, as seen from the record, it is clear that the surplus land which was surrendered by Baptist Church to the Government including land covered by 22 sale deeds was considered by the Government and regularization of total extent purchased by 18 companies under 22 sale deeds were regularized as the said companies paid the amounts prescribed. It is not in dispute that Urban (Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 is repealed by Repeal Act 1989. Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Repeal Act, 1989 reads thus: “ 3 (1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect- (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or the competent authority. (b) The validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken there under, not withstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary; (c) Any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20. (2) Where- (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government. 27. It is contended by the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff that ULC Act has been repealed, but the Government has not paid any amount to the Baptist Church. Therefore, the regularization in favour of some of the defendants is not valid in view of the fact that they are not saved. 27. It is contended by the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff that ULC Act has been repealed, but the Government has not paid any amount to the Baptist Church. Therefore, the regularization in favour of some of the defendants is not valid in view of the fact that they are not saved. It is not in dispute that the State Government issued Gazette notification under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act, but there is no evidence at this stage to show that the compensation for surrendering surplus land to the Government was paid. These aspects cannot be looked into at this stage to know whether the regularization in favour of some of the defendants by the Government is correct or not or the Government actions will come under the purview of Repeal Act as they are required to be decided after adducing necessary evidence in the suit itself. 28. The fact remains from the date of passing an ex parte order appointing Receiver, till today, the Receiver is managing the properties. The case of the Baptist Church is that though the Church is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, the Church is unable to safeguard and manage the property because of the illegal high handed and intimidating acts of the defendants. As seen from the allegations in the plaint, defendants 1 to 8 in the suit are wrongfully claiming that they have right to manage the property of the Baptist Church and secondly the purchasers defendants 9 and 10 along with defendants 24 to 27 proclaiming that they would disturb the possession of the plaintiff association and trying to alienate the properties or to create third party interest in the property. 29. It is one of the contentions of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that some of the defendants would handover the possession of the suit schedule property to a influential film producer and in these circumstances, it is difficult for the plaintiff association to safeguard and manage the suit schedule property and therefore, continuation of receiver is imperative till final verdict that may be given by the Court. The specific case of the plaintiff is that S.M.Kantha Raju, Daniel Gandhi, D2 and D3 and others have no right of whatsoever to claim office bearer ship of Baptist Church or to alienate the properties of the Church or to discharge any functions as office bearers as no valid election of office bearers of the Baptist Church took place till 2004. Thereafter under the supervision of an Advocate commissioner appointed by the IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam as per orders in I.A.No.24 of 2004 in O.P.No.13 of 2004, elections were conducted whereunder TDS Kumar was elected as Chairman and K.Devasahayam was elected as Secretary of plaintiff association, but the same is seriously disputed by the 1st respondent stating that TDS Kumar is not all the Chairman of the Baptist Church. 30. On the other hand, it is the case of the 1st respondent that a Special Officer and competent authority under ULC, Visakhapatnam after making enquiry has declared the plaintiff church as the surplus land holder to an extent of 1.6500 sq. meters in T.S.No.75 after allowing 1500 sq. meters towards the retainable ceiling limit. Therefore, plaintiff association has got right to an extent of 1500 sq. meters of land only and the rest of the surplus land vested with the Government. Whereas defendants 9 and 10 who are the purchasers of the property stated that an extent of 11000 sq. meters known as Hillcrest bungalow with the building standing thereon was purchased by the defendants as Directors of M/s Janet Property Developers Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Thyagaraj Constructions Pvt. Ltd., respectively and other 19 associated companies under 22 registered sale deeds having duly registered during 1993 executed by S.M.Kantha Raju as President, D3 as Secretary and D2 as Secretary/Attorney and Pallapati John as Chairman of the trust association. Defendant No.9 is the power of attorney holder of remaining 19 companies. At the first instance, plaintiff filed I.A.553 of 2006 under Order XL Rule 1 CPC to appoint a receiver. The learned Judge after perusing the record, ordered urgent notice. But no batta has been paid. The said petition was dismissed as not pressed with a liberty to file a fresh petition. Interlocutory application was advanced to 31-03-2006 from 07-04-2006 and the petition was dismissed. On 31-03-2006 another application was filed. Upon hearing the counsel for the petitioner, the matter was posted for orders on 01-04-2006. But no batta has been paid. The said petition was dismissed as not pressed with a liberty to file a fresh petition. Interlocutory application was advanced to 31-03-2006 from 07-04-2006 and the petition was dismissed. On 31-03-2006 another application was filed. Upon hearing the counsel for the petitioner, the matter was posted for orders on 01-04-2006. On 01-04-2006 an ex parte receiver was appointed to manage the schedule property. When the learned Judge was of the opinion that there was no urgency to pass an order on 29-03-2006, but within three days thereafter an ex parte receiver was appointed. In between these two dates, absolutely there were no changed circumstances pleaded in the petition. Though the ex parte order shows that the defendants 14 to 27 were said to be in possession of the property, subsequently defendants 14 to 27 filed affidavits stating that they vacated the suit schedule property and handed over physical possession to the 1st defendant. Neither of the parties filed the byelaws of the plaintiff association. Byelaws of plaintiff association is very important document which would reveal about the persons competent to sale of properties of Church. But this aspect can be decided in the suit after the evidence is let in. Though it is alleged in the plaint that copy of byelaws are filed, but they are not marked. Admittedly, the plaintiff association has come into existence and was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 with specific objects. Similarly no document is filed to show that which body is the duly elected body during the year 1993 in which year the 22 sale deeds came into existence. This aspect of the case can only be decided after evidence is let in by the both parties. 31. On the report filed by the Circle Inspector, Law and Order, Visakhapatnam City, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, appointed Assistant Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam as Receiver to take possession of the property as there is every likelihood of breach of peace and disturbance to public tranquility in the locality. Thereupon, one Krupa Rao filed Criminal Petition No.2429 of 1994 before this Court. On the report filed by the Circle Inspector, Law and Order, Visakhapatnam City, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, appointed Assistant Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam as Receiver to take possession of the property as there is every likelihood of breach of peace and disturbance to public tranquility in the locality. Thereupon, one Krupa Rao filed Criminal Petition No.2429 of 1994 before this Court. This Court while dismissing the petition directed the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Visakhapatnam to continue the existing receiver for a period of four months from the date of that order, in case his decision is going to be that one of the parties was in possession of the property as on the relevant date. The learned Judge of this Court has not doubted the finding of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Visakhapatnam that there was a likelihood of breach of peace and disturbance to public tranquility in the locality. The S.L.P. filed against that order before the Supreme Court of India was dismissed as the petitioner TDS Kumar was not evincing any interest. Thereafter, the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed final order on 08-10-1997 holding that H.Ratnakar Tyagaraj group and Hillcrest bungalow residents impleaded at a later stage are found to be in possession of he schedule property earlier to the date of preliminary order and they are directed to enjoy the possession without causing breach of peace. Challenging the same, a revision was filed before this Court in CRP Nos.975 and 1008 of 1997. This Court after consideration of the entire material on record dismissed the revisions holding that it was not expedient to interfere with the finding of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate as to the possession over the subject of dispute as on the date of the preliminary order in view of the fact that the finality can be attained only by the judgment of the competent civil Court. No doubt, a finding has been recorded by the competent Criminal Court with regard to possession that H.Ratnakar Tyagaraj group was in possession of part of the property whereas Hillcrest bungalow residents were in possession of the remaining property. Therefore, the other groups restrained from interfering with the possession of the respondents 6 and 8 in M.C.No.6 of 1994 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. Therefore, the other groups restrained from interfering with the possession of the respondents 6 and 8 in M.C.No.6 of 1994 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Visakhapatnam. Respondents 9 and 10 claiming the property by virtue of 22 registered sale deed said to have been executed by S.M.Kantha Raju and others in the year 1993. 32. The prime question is who are the legally elected office bearers of the plaintiff association for the year 1992-93. None of the parties filed any document to show about the legally constituted body of plaintiff trust for the year 1992-93. The case of the plaintiff is that S.M.Kantha Raju is not the duly authorized President, whereas the case of the defendants 9 and 10 is that S.M.Kantha Raju is the duly elected President of the trust. These issues have to be resolved after letting in evidence by both the parties, but at this stage prima facie a finding has been recorded by a competent civil Court to the effect that S.M.Kantha Raju as a President, Daniel Gandhi as Board member, P.Palus as Secretary and Convenor and M. Prasada Rao as Attorney, Matha David Raja Mohan Rao and P.John who are plaintiffs in O.S.No.3 of 1994 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Srikakulam have no right to deal with the sale of the trust property by October, 1993. To what extent that is binding on the parties is again yet to be decided in the suit itself, but prima facie it shows that S.M.Kantha Raju and others have no right to execute a sale deed in favour of the defendants 9 and 10 and some others and also 22 sale deeds in favour of various companies. No doubt, the said sale deeds have been validated by the Government when the surplus land allegedly surrendered by the Church. But the core question to be decided is whether S.M.Kantha Raju and others are duly authorized to sell the church properties or not. 33. Several cases and counter cases are pending between the parties including filing of suits by some third parties and also police initiated Section 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings before the Revenue Courts. After considering the material, the Revenue Court found that H.Ratnakar Thyagaraj group and Hill Crest bunglow residents were found to be in possession of the schedule property by 08-1-1997. 33. Several cases and counter cases are pending between the parties including filing of suits by some third parties and also police initiated Section 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings before the Revenue Courts. After considering the material, the Revenue Court found that H.Ratnakar Thyagaraj group and Hill Crest bunglow residents were found to be in possession of the schedule property by 08-1-1997. Similarly, injunction was granted against defendants 1 to 13 in I.A.No.1580 of 2004 in O.S.No.1263 of 2004 on the file of the I Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. The said injunction order was confirmed in the appeal. The Receiver also after taking possession filed interim report stating that anti social elements were present in the petition schedule premises. Therefore, in view of long standing disputes between various groups including third parties with regard to the same subject matter of the property, it would cause public disorder in the area of the schedule property if the Receiver is discontinued at this point of time. The purpose and object of appointing Receiver is for the benefit of those ultimately found to be rightful owners. If the Court has exercised its power to appoint a Receiver for a certain property, it has done so with a view to preserve the property for the benefit of the rightful owner who has to be determined judicially at a later point of time. If the impugned order is to be confirmed, each group would show muscle power so as to take possession of the suit schedule property. In such circumstances, certainly there would be scramble for possession leading to disorder. Some structures were in existence including a prayer hall for the Christians to offer prayers. The third parties who have purchased the property certainly would demolish the building so as to make use of it commercially as the property is very much located in a strategic locality of Visakhapatnam. No doubt, this is not a suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit schedule property, but at the same time admittedly Baptist Church is the original owner of the property in question. The question whether S.M.Kantha Raju and others have power to alienate the property incidentally has to be decided during the trial. No doubt, this is not a suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit schedule property, but at the same time admittedly Baptist Church is the original owner of the property in question. The question whether S.M.Kantha Raju and others have power to alienate the property incidentally has to be decided during the trial. Therefore, in these aforesaid circumstances, continuation of Receiver is imperative so as to preserve the subject matter of the litigation pending a judicial determination of the rights of the parties to it. As there was a adverse and conflicting claim to the property and further there is dissipating of the property, the Receiver can be continued till the disposal of the suit. Though injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff in another suit in respect of the same property, but the case of the plaintiff is that they are unable to protect the possession of the property because of influential film producer along with his mafia gang are trying to take possession of the property. It is not in dispute that for the last four years, the schedule property is in possession and control of the Receiver. At this point of time, if the Receiver is discontinued, there would be a serious law and order problem because several influential groups are trying to interfere with the possession of the property. For the last 17 years, there is a dispute with regard to the schedule property in one Court or the other. Considering these aspects, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 34. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed setting aside the common judgment, dated 19-10-2009 in CMA Nos. 78 and 92 of 2007 on the file of the IV Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam and confirming the order, dated 15-06-2007, in I.A.No.556 of 2006 in O.S.No.454 of 2006 on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. It is needless to mention that the observations, if any, made in these revisions are only for the purpose of disposal of the present revisions and uninfluenced by any of the observations, the trial Court shall dispose of the suit in accordance with law. There shall no order as to costs.