ORDER JANARDAN SAHAI, MEMBER (J) - These are 8 connected petitions involving the same controversy and the same questions of law and facts. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri P.N. Chaturvedi has argued the case of Sunil Yadav as the leading case and it has been stated that the other cases be decided accordingly. Shri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents has also made a statement that all the cases be decided on the basis of the decision in Sunil Yadav's case. We are accordingly disposing of all these cases by a common order and have treated Sunil Yadav's case i.e., TA No. 204 of 2009 as the leading case and the facts which have been stated in this order are the facts of that petition. 2. The petitioners in all these cases were enrolled in the Indian Army after success in the All India Test for enrollment of Clerks, the result of which was declared on 1.1.2007. The petitioner Sunil Yadav was enrolled on 18.1.2007. After enrollment the petitioners were required to do the Basic Military Training (BMT) for a period of 19 weeks and after successful completion thereof, a further training course of Clerks for a period of 32 weeks. Under the policy of the Army Headquarters, dated 23.5.1999, Annexure 9 to the petition, which, according to the petitioners, was applicable to them, the petitioners were required to appear in a proficiency and aptitude test, which was to be held on the sixth day (Saturday) from the date of commencement of the Basis Training Course. Those who were unsuccessful were entitled to appear in a special test to be held in the eleventh week of the BMT. Those who had taken the test for the first time in the eleventh week, but were unsuccessful were "eligible to take the second chance in the test to be held in the sixteenth week of the BMT. The minimum passing marks in the proficiency and aptitude test under this policy were 15% and the candidates were to be examined in three subjects, namely, Mathematics, General English and General Knowledge. Those candidates, who had failed in both the tests were yet to be considered for re-musteration for other trades. 3. The minimum passing marks in the proficiency and aptitude test under this policy were 15% and the candidates were to be examined in three subjects, namely, Mathematics, General English and General Knowledge. Those candidates, who had failed in both the tests were yet to be considered for re-musteration for other trades. 3. The petitioners appeared in the proficiency and aptitude test on 12.4.2007 and their case is that they were successful land that is why they were allowed to complete the entire BMT of 19 weeks and were later on allowed to attend the Passing Out Parade (POP), which according to learned Counsel for the petitioner could be attended only by those who had successfully completed the BMT. The petitioners thereafter were granted 28 days leave, which according to the petitioner's Counsel is also permissible only to those who had successfully completed the BMT. However, instead of allowing the petitioners to complete the 32 weeks training course of clerks, the petitioners were given a show cause notice dated 9.8.2007 stating that the petitioners were unsuccessful in the proficiency and aptitude test held on 12.4.2007 and in the change of trade test held on 23.7.2007 and as to why they be not discharged from service. The petitioners gave reply to the show cause notice. A copy of the reply given by the petitioner Sunil Yadav is annexed with the counter affidavit as part of Annexure-CA-4. In that reply, the petitioner Sunil Yadav has admitted that he was unsuccessful in the proficiency and aptitude test, but has attributed his failure to various reasons which can be compendiously described as having been given by the authorities less time for preparation by keeping him involved in other activities. In piua-14 of the petition, it is stated that this reply was not a voluntary one and the petitioners were deceived by the training staff that if they gave a reply as dictated they would be allowed to appear in a second test and it was under compulsion that such reply was given. The respondents, however, discharged the petitioners by order dated 22.8.2007 signed by the Company Commander, Ghaznee Company and not by the Commanding Officer of No.1 Training Battalion the competent authority. Aggrieved, the petitioners made a petition to the GOC-in-C, Central Command, Lucknow dated 25.9.2007. This petition was rejected on 19.2.2008. The respondents, however, discharged the petitioners by order dated 22.8.2007 signed by the Company Commander, Ghaznee Company and not by the Commanding Officer of No.1 Training Battalion the competent authority. Aggrieved, the petitioners made a petition to the GOC-in-C, Central Command, Lucknow dated 25.9.2007. This petition was rejected on 19.2.2008. The petitioners thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 2466 of 2008 in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Counter and rejoinder affidavits were exchanged in the petition and the records were thereafter transferred to the Tribunal in view of the provisions of section 34 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. In the Tribunal, the respondents have filed a supplementary counter affidavit to the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner. 4. We have heard Shri P.N. Chaturvedi, learned Counsel for the applicants and Shri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. 5. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the discharge certificate dated 22.8.2007, Annexure-3 to the petition has been issued by the Company Commander of the Ghaznee Company and not by the competent authority the Commanding Officer of No. 1 Training Battalion. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner's Counsel upon the provisions of section 23 of the Army Act, which provides that the discharge certificate shall be furnished by the Commanding Officer. Reliance is also placed upon Rule 12 of the Army Rules and it is submitted on the strength of these provisions that the discharge is illegal. Before dealing with the impact and scope of section 23 and Rule 12, it is appropriate to clarify the factual position upon which the aforesaid provisions are sought to be applied. No doubt, the discharge certificate bears the signatures of the Company Commander of the Ghaznee Company and there are no signatures thereupon of the Commanding Officer of No.1 Training Battalion but the stand in the counter affidavit is that orders have indeed been passed by the Commanding Officer and' the Company Commander of the Ghaznee Company has merely issued. the certificate on behalf of the Commanding Officer. The respondents have annexed the copy of the discharge roll as Annexure SCA-9. At the bottom of Annexure SCA-9 there are signatures of Col. P. Bahuguna, Commanding Officer No.1 Training Battalion, Bengal Engr. Group & Centre. the certificate on behalf of the Commanding Officer. The respondents have annexed the copy of the discharge roll as Annexure SCA-9. At the bottom of Annexure SCA-9 there are signatures of Col. P. Bahuguna, Commanding Officer No.1 Training Battalion, Bengal Engr. Group & Centre. It is thus apparent that the discharge roll on the basis of which the discharge is effected was signed by the Commanding Officer himself. . 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the discharge certificate itself is required to be signed by the Commanding Officer. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to interpret section 23 Army Act and Rule 12 and to examine the purpose of issuance of a discharge certificate in the context of the another provision of the Army Rules, Rule 18. Section 23 of the Army Act reads as follows: "23. Certificate on termination of service.-Every junior commissioned office, warrant officer, or enrolled person who is dismissed, removed, discharged, retired or leased from the service shall be furnished by the Commanding Officer with a certificate, in the language which is the' mother tongue of such person and also in the English language setting for: (a) the authority terminating his service; (b) the cause for such termination; and (c) the full period of his service in the regular army." 7. Under this provision, the discharge certificate is to be furnished by the Commanding Officer. In Oxford and IBH Modern English dictionary, the word 'furnish' has been given the following meaning "1. to equip with whatever is necessary; esp. to put furniture into (a room apartment etc.), 2. to supply; provide." In Chamber's Dictionary the definition is "1. To provide (a house, etc.) with furniture, 2. to supply (what is necessary). Rule 12 of the Army Rules reads as follows : "12. Discharge Certificate.-(1) A certificate required to be furnished under the provisions of section 23 is hereinafter called a "discharge certificate . (2) A discharge certificate may be furnished either by personal deliver thereof by or on behalf of the commanding officer to the person dismissed, removed, discharged or released, or by the transmission of the same to such person by registered post." 8. (2) A discharge certificate may be furnished either by personal deliver thereof by or on behalf of the commanding officer to the person dismissed, removed, discharged or released, or by the transmission of the same to such person by registered post." 8. Section 23 casts an obligation upon the Commanding Officer to provide a discharge certificate to the person dismissed, removed, discharged, retired or released but it does not specifically require the Commanding Officer himself to sign the discharge certificate. A combined reading in section 23 and Rule 12 indicates that the discharge certificate must be issued by the Commanding Officer himself or under his orders. The interpretation put forward by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon Rule 12 is that it merely provides the manner in which the discharge certificate is transmitted to the person discharged and any person other than the Commanding Officer can only deliver the discharge certificate on behalf of the Commanding Officer. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 12 provides that the discharge certificate may be furnished either by personal delivery thereof by or on behalf of the Commanding Officer to the person dismissed, removed, discharged or released, or by the transmission of the same to such person by registered post. It thus appears from section 23 of the Act and Rule 12 that the discharge certificate need not be given to the person discharged at the time of discharge itself and can be delivered to him at a later point of time, even by post. It is thus implicit in the scheme of these provisions that the discharge may be effective from a different date which can even be earlier than that on which the discharge certificate is furnished. This interpretation is also supported by Rule 18 of the Army Rules which deals with the point of time at which the discharge becomes effective. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 18 provides that the discharge of a person if duly authorized shall be carried out by the Commanding Officer with all convenient speed. The authority competent may also specify any future date from which it shall take effect but if no such date is specified the discharge shall take effect from the date on which it was duly authorized or from the date on which the person dismissed or discharged, ceased to perform military duty, whichever is the later date. The authority competent may also specify any future date from which it shall take effect but if no such date is specified the discharge shall take effect from the date on which it was duly authorized or from the date on which the person dismissed or discharged, ceased to perform military duty, whichever is the later date. This provision makes it clear that the discharge becomes effective from the date it is authorized and/or from the date which may be specified in the discharge order or as provided under sub-rule (2) of Rule 18 from a future date which may be specified or where no date is specified then from the date the person discharged ceases to perform military duty, whichever is the later date. The date of issuance of the discharge certificate does not have any bearing upon the date on which the discharge become effective. The purpose of a discharge certificate is to equip the discharged person with an authentic document containing the cause of termination of his service, the authority terminating his service and the length of service rendered by him in the army. The discharge certificate is an information of these facts to the person before whom it is presented. It is not an instrument which brings about a cessation of service. In this case, the discharge roll was signed by the Commanding Officer of No.1 Training Battalion and the mere fact that the discharge certificate was issued by the Company Commander of the Ghaznee Company would not result in the discharge itself becoming ineffective. Even if it is taken that the discharge certificate ought to have been signed by the Commanding Officer, the said irregularity would not affect the discharge itself. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Ex. Sepoy Ram Karan v. Union of India and others. 1 2008 (4) SCT 514. In that case, it was held that the discharge under Army Rule 13 (3) (III) (v) can be ordered only by the Brigade/Sub-Area Commander and not by the Commanding Officer. According to the petitioner's Counsel this case is an authority for the proposition that the discharge certificate could not have been signed by the Company Commander and it should have borne the signature of the Commanding Officer. According to the petitioner's Counsel this case is an authority for the proposition that the discharge certificate could not have been signed by the Company Commander and it should have borne the signature of the Commanding Officer. We are afraid, we do not find anything in the decision to support what the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the discharge was ineffective or illegal, in our opinion, therefore, does not have any merit. 9. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner had cleared the proficiency and aptitude test and that it was the policy of 23.5.1999 which was applicable to the petitioner's case. The stand of the respondents, on the other hand, in the counter affidavit is that the Army Headquarters had issued a subsequent policy letter dated 17.3.2003, which had superseded the policy letter of 1999. According to the respondents, this proficiency and aptitude test was held on 10.4.2007 in accordance with the 2003 policy and the petitioners have failed to qualify. A copy of the policy letter dated 17.3.2003 has been filed with the counter affidavit as Annexure CA-6. Under this new policy only one chance for clearing the proficiency and aptitude test is to be given and not two chances. Secondly, the test is to be held in the 10th week and there is no provision as in the 1999 policy for holding the test on a Saturday six days after commencement of the BMT. The third difference is that whereas under the policy of 1999, the minimum marks required to clear the test were 15%, the new policy requires minimum 40% passing percentage. However, there is a common note in the 1999 policy and the policy of 2003 that the candidates, who have failed to qualif} in the proficiency and aptitude test are yet to be considered for remusteration to other trades and in case they are not found eligible therein then alone a discharge is contemplated. The policy of 1999 and also the policy of 2003 provides that an advance cautionary note is to be given to all the persons, who are to take the proficiency and aptitude test. The policy of 1999 and also the policy of 2003 provides that an advance cautionary note is to be given to all the persons, who are to take the proficiency and aptitude test. It is stated in para 18 of the Counter Affidavit that a cautionary note dated 18.4.2006, Annexure CA-6, was given to the petitioners and receipt was obtained from him. In the advance cautionary note, a reference of the new policy of 2003 was made and it was clearly specified that if the candidate fails to pass the test, action to change his trade discharge from the service will be taken by the officer as deemed fit. This cautionary note also provides in para 1(b) that the proficiency and aptitude test for recruit clerks will be conducted only once during the recruitment training and in para 1(c) that the qualifying marks in the test would be 40%. It is stated in the counter affidavit that this cautionary letter bears the signatures of the petitioner. 10. The case of the petitioners and contention of their Counsel Shri P.N. Chaturvedi on the other hand, is that the cautionary note which was given to the petitioner was in terms of the policy of 1999, as per Annexure-9 to the petition. Annexure-9 is the copy of the policy dated 23.5.1999, which does bears the signatures of Lt. Col. Badola dated 22.5.(the year is not mentioned). This letter, however, does not bear the signature of petitioner Sunil Yadav or of any other petitioner. This letter rather bears the signature of a soldier, whose army number is 1497425K. It thus appears that this letter has been given to the person bearing the said army number. The army numbers of the persons who had taken the proficiency and aptitude test on 10.4.2007 including that of the petitioners have been given in the Result Sheet, Annexure-SCA-5 of the Supplementary Counter Affidavit. The army number of the soldier upon whom the letter of Col. Badola was served does not match with any of the numbers of the candidates who had taken the proficiency and aptitude test. The petitioners' case that Annexure-9 of the policy letter of 1999 was served upon them is not borne out and it appears that the petitioners have used the Annexure served upon some one else and in some context not known, to prove that it was served upon them. The petitioners' case that Annexure-9 of the policy letter of 1999 was served upon them is not borne out and it appears that the petitioners have used the Annexure served upon some one else and in some context not known, to prove that it was served upon them. A copy of this policy letter Annexure-9 in Sunil Yadav's petition has been filed in the other petitions also bearing different Annexure number. On the other hand, CA-6 filed by the Respondents is a copy of a letter dated 18.4.2006 which indicates that the test was to be held as per the new policy on 2003. This letter bears the signatures of Sunil Yadav. The case of the petitioner is the Rejoinder Affidavit upon this point is that the signatures of the petitioner were taken on the letter dated 18.4.2006, Annexure CA-6 to the counter affidavit under compulsion. This averment has been denied by the respondents in the supplementary counter affidavit to the Rejoinder. The petitioners have not given any material in corroboration of their case that they were compelled to put their signatures on the letter Annexure CA-6. The burden of proof that the petitioners were made to sign under compulsion lies squarely upon the petitioners, which they have failed to discharge. Moreover, there are certain circumstances which indicate that the new policy of 2003 had actually been implemented and applied in respect of the proficiency and aptitude test, which was held on 12.4.2007. It has been pointed out by Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Standing Counsel, who appeared for the respondents that in the reply given by the petitioner Sunil Yadav to the show cause notice it has been admitted by him that no test was held at all on 6th day (Saturday), of the commencement of the BMT which is contemplated under the 1999 policy and only one test was held. A copy of the final result of the proficiency and aptitude test held on 12.4.2007 has been filed by the respondents with their counter affidavit as Annexure SCA-5 (CA-3), which indicates that in all there were 39 candidates who took the test out of whom 18 failed and 21 passed. The proceedings of the Board have been signed by the Presiding Officer Capt. Rakesh Kumar and by two other members of the Board. The proceedings of the Board have been signed by the Presiding Officer Capt. Rakesh Kumar and by two other members of the Board. There is no averment in the petition or at all that the result sheet has been forged. In the circumstances, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondents have not given effect to the policy of 2003 and they were still implementing the policy of 1999. Moreover, when the policy of 1999 has been replaced by a subsequent policy after a period of four years in 2003, we do not have nay reason to doubt why in the test held in 2007, the respondents would not give effect to the later policy. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the petitioners are entitled to succeed on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The basic premise of the application of the doctrine was the contention that a representation was made by the Respondents that the policy of 1999 would be applicable which provided for pass marks at 15% and two chances in the aptitude test. That contention we have repelled and have found that no such representation was made. The contention regarding applicability of the doctrine is now remains based upon the fact that the petitioners were made to complete the entire BMT stretched over a period of 19 weeks and if each of the petitioners had failed in the proficiency and aptitude test, there was no reason why the petitioners were required to complete the training and moreover thereafter to attend the passing out parade and to go on 28 days leave which is granted to the persons who have successfully completed the training. In support of the contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon certain decisions of the Apex Court and of the Allahabad High Court. The first decision cited is Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University.1 AIR 1976 SC 377 This was a case of a student, who was admitted to LLB II Year even though his percentage in LLB 1st year was less and he was allowed to appear in the LLB II year examination. The first decision cited is Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University.1 AIR 1976 SC 377 This was a case of a student, who was admitted to LLB II Year even though his percentage in LLB 1st year was less and he was allowed to appear in the LLB II year examination. The Apex Court held that once the University authorities acquiesced to the informities which were contained in the admission form and had allowed the candidate to appear in the examination, then by force of the University Statute, the University had no power to withdraw his candidature. The decision is distinguishable on facts. The principle upon which the case was decided was that after the University had allowed the candidate to appear in the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowers the University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant had worked itself out and the statute did not permit the University to withdraw his candidature. 12. The second case cited is that of Miss Sangeeta Srivastava v. Proof. U.N. Singh and others.2 AIR 1980 Del 27 In that case, the University had directed the college to cancel the admission of the candidate, who had wrongly been admitted 111 MA Part I class even though her marks in B.A. were less than required but the college did not comply with the direction of the University and the student was allowed to attend the classes till shortly before the examination. The Delhi High Court applied the principle of equitable estoppel and held that the inaction by the University resulting in admission to a non eligible candidate deprived the University to take a stand that the candidate would not be allowed to appear in the examination. The distinguishing feature of this case is that the ordinances gave power to the University to grant exemption and it was held by the Delhi High Court that in view of the power of exemption, the non-eligibility of the student would amount to mere irregularity and would not be ultra vires the Ordinance. 13. The next case cited in Bundelkhand University v. Laxmi Narain Yadava.3 AIR 1983 All 377 In that case the stand of the educational authorities was that the candidate had taken admission on the basis of a forged mark sheet. 13. The next case cited in Bundelkhand University v. Laxmi Narain Yadava.3 AIR 1983 All 377 In that case the stand of the educational authorities was that the candidate had taken admission on the basis of a forged mark sheet. The Appellate Court had repelled such a contention and it was found by the Appellate Court that a revised mark sheet was issued to the candidate and that the said mark sheet was a genuine one. The Court invoked the doctrine of estoppel that the candidate has changed his position as he lost chance of reappearing in the B.Sc. Part-I examination. This case, therefore, is also distit;\guishable on facts. 14. The last case cited in Kanishka Aggarwal v. University of Delhi and others.1 AIR 1992 Del 105 In this case it was held that the burden of providing estoppel no doubt lay upon the petitioner but it is a light burden and what is of consequence is not whether the representation made to a person is express or implied, but the effect of the representation. 15. Shri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Standing Counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Maddanappa v. Chandramma,2 AIR 1965 SC 1812 in which dealing with the scope of section 115, Evidence Act it has been held as follows: "The object of estoppel is to prevent fraud and secure justice between the parties by promotion of honesty and good faith. Therefore, where one person makes a misrepresentation to the other about a fact he would not be shut out by the rule of estoppel, if that other person knew the true state of facts and must consequently not have been misled by the misrepresentation." In Maddanappa 's case, section 115 Evidence Act was invoked. While repelling its applicability on the facts of the case, the observations above quoted were made by the Supreme Court. Section 115 Evidence Act, however, lays down a rule of evidence whereas the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a rule of equity and has a wider application. 16. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P.,3 AIR 1979 SC 621 Bhagwati, J. explained the principle as follows : "..... where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future. 16. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P.,3 AIR 1979 SC 621 Bhagwati, J. explained the principle as follows : "..... where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future. Knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not." The doctrine is applied most frequently against Government and public bodies making a promise and going back upon it. 17. The principle of estoppel applied in all the aforesaid cases cited by the petitioners' Counsel requires that there should be a representation or promise by the person against whom the doctrine is invoked and that representation should result in the person invoking the doctrine to change his position and it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon the promise. The facts, which have been set out in the present case for invoking the doctrine are that the petitioners were allowed to continue the BMT even though they may have failed in the proficiency and aptitude test and they were allowed to attend the Passing Out Parade and had also been granted leave. Firstly, there is an absence of any representation express or implied made to the petitioners. The policy of 1999 as also the policy of 2003 provides that the persons, undergoing BMT who fail in the aptitude test will be considered for re-musteration. The mere fact, therefore, that a candidate who had failed in the proficiency and aptitude test was allowed to continue with the BMT would not mean either that any express or implied representation was made to the applicants that they had cleared the test or that even if they have failed they would not be discharged. The mere fact, therefore, that a candidate who had failed in the proficiency and aptitude test was allowed to continue with the BMT would not mean either that any express or implied representation was made to the applicants that they had cleared the test or that even if they have failed they would not be discharged. The candidates who had failed would have to be continued in the service of the Army till such time that they are considered for re-musteration. In the present case also the petitioners have been considered for re-musteration in July, 2007, but were found ineligible. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the exercise relating to re-musteration nor his pointed out any error in these proceedings. Moreover, the case of the respondents in the matter of allowing the petitioners to continue even after they had failed in the proficiency and aptitude test, is also based upon the letter dated 31.1.2000. A copy of that letter has been annexed along with the supplementary counter affidavit as Annexure-SCA-3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this letter has application only in respect of AMC, Signals and Air Defence and in the .case of Trained Soldiers and has no application in the case of the petitioners and he submits that the petitioners could not have been allowed to be retained in the centre. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the Army Order No.3 of 1999, which provides the circumstances in which re-mustering is to be permitted. We have already adverted to the policy of 1999 which has been relied upon by the petitioners and the policy of 2003 relied upon by the respondents and in both the policies, it is provided that the candidates have to be considered for re-mustering. In the circumstances, even if the petitioners have been allowed to continue till such time, the re-musteration exercise was conducted and the petitioners found ineligible and a show cause notice as required under Rule 13 was given to them, it cannot be said that any representation was made to the petitioners that they would not be discharged having completed the BMT. There is also nothing to show that the position of the petitioners was changed on account of the said representation. There is also nothing to show that the position of the petitioners was changed on account of the said representation. The cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are cases relating to admission in educational institutions and the effect of the educational authorities allowing a candidate to appear in the examination and thereafter directing cancellation of admission or withdrawal of his candidature in the examination. In such cases there is an element of equity in favour of the student who would be put to irreparable loss if the admission is cancelled, as he may have pursued his studies for a long time or cleared examination in higher classes, or lost the chance of re-appearing in a back-paper etc. We do not, however, find any equity in favour of the applicants, who had failed in the aptitude test and thereafter had merely continued in the service of the Army for a shot period of about three months, when they were given a show cause notice. During this period, they were considered for re-musteration and were found ineligible. The principle of promissory estoppel cannot be extended in favour of the petitioners in the facts of the present case. 18. In the result, we do not find any merit in these petitions and they are dismissed. Petition Dismissed.